George Washington to New Hampshire, 29 December 1777 (Detail, GLC03706) The Cold War: Competing Worldviews- Kennan and Zhdanov, 1947 by Jason Stroud Roanoke Rapids High School Zhdanov- http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/04/documents/cominform.html Kennan- http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/04/documents/x.html As World War II drew to a close in Europe in 1945, cracks began to develop in the "Grand Alliance" between the United States and Soviet Union. The alliance had never been a cozy partnership, and with Germany defeated, there was no longer a common interest to outweigh the tremendous ideological differences that had always existed between the Communist Soviets and the democratic capitalist Americans. These differences were intensified as it became evident that the two powers had drastically different visions of what postwar Europe should look like. Students should be familiar with events during the late stages and immediately following World War II, including the Yalta Conference, the dispute over Poland, Potsdam, the division of Germany, and the establishment of Soviet-style communist governments in eastern Europe following the German surrender. They should also be familiar with the careers of the authors of the two documents below: American State Department official George Kennan and Soviet Cominform head Andei Zhdanov. Kennan had been a diplomat in Moscow following the Russian Civil War, and was a witness to Stalin's program of collectivization and the bloody party purges of the 20s and 30s. He returned to the USSR as an assistant to US ambassador Averell Harriman, and in that capacity, wrote the so-called 'Long Telegram,' a bleak assessment of the nature of Soviet-American relations, in 1946. His opinion was highly regarded in Washington, where he was considered the foremost authority on the Soviet Union. As a young man, Zhdanov had participated in the Russian Civil War with the Bolsheviks. He was a loyal follower of Stalin, and took part in the purges, particularly of intellectuals and artists. In the process, he developed the theory of art and literature called 'Soviet Realism.' By 1947, he had created Cominform, an international forum for sharing Communist ideology. The Sources of Soviet Conduct George Kennan, senior State Department official July 1947 The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia... Belief is maintained in the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of its destruction, in the obligation of the proletariat to assist in that destruction and to take power into its own hands. But stress has come to be laid primarily on those concepts which relate most specifically to the Soviet regime itself: to its position as the sole truly Socialist regime in a dark and misguided world, and to the relationships of power within it. The first of these concepts is that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism. We have seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications for Russia's conduct as a member of international society. It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere assumption of a community of aims between the Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capitalist. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime, and therefore to the interest of the peoples it controls. If the Soviet government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy (who is without honor) and should be taken in the spirit of caveat emptor…But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it. The forces of progress can take their time in preparing the final coup de grace. Meanwhile, what is vital is that the "socialist fatherland" - that oasis of power which has been already won for Socialism in their person of the Soviet Union -- should be cherished and defended by all good communists at home and abroad, its fortunes promoted, its enemies badgered and confounded. This brings us to the second of the concepts important to contemporary Soviet outlook. That is the infallibility of the Kremlin. The Soviet concept of power, which permits no focal points of organization outside the party itself, requires that the party leadership remain in theory the sole repository of truth. For if truth were to be found elsewhere, there would be justification for its expression in organized activity. But it is precisely that which the Kremlin cannot and will not permit. The leadership of the Communist Party is therefore always right, and has been always right ever since in 1929 Stalin formalized his personal power by announcing that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously. Thus the Kremlin has no compunction about retreating in the face of superior force. And being under the compulsion of no timetable, it does not get panicky under the necessity for such retreat. Its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal. Its main concern is to make sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power. But if it finds unassailable barriers in its path, it accepts these philosophically and accommodates itself to them. The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal… These considerations make Soviet diplomacy at once easier and more difficult to deal with than the diplomacy of individual aggressive leaders like Napoleon and Hitler. On the one hand it is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic of rhetoric of power. On the other hand it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents. …In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies…In the light of the above, it will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The Russians look forward to a duel of infinite duration, and they see that already they have scored great successes. It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and capitalist worlds.... Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the Western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. It would be an exaggeration to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the communist movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power. For no mystical, Messianic movement -- and particularly not that of the Kremlin -- can face frustration indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs. Thus the decision will really fall in large measure in this country itself. The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation. Report on the international situation to the Cominform Andrei Zhdanov September 22, 1947 The fundamental changes caused by the war on the international scene and in the position of individual countries has entirely changed the political landscape of the world. A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct becomes two major trends in postwar international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A. Allied with it are Great Britain and France. ... The imperialist camp is also supported by colony-owning countries, such as Belgium and Holland, by countries with reactionary anti-democratic regimes, such as Turkey and Greece, and by countries politically and economically dependent upon the United States, such as the Near Eastern and South American countries and China. The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new imperialist war, to combat socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements everywhere. In the pursuit of these ends the imperialist camp is prepared to rely on reactionary and anti-democratic forces in all countries, and to support its former adversaries in the war against its wartime allies. The anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies. It also includes countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. The anti-imperialist camp is backed by the labor and democratic movement and by the fraternal Communist parties in all countries, by the fighters for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies, by all progressive and democratic forces in every country... The end of the Second World War confronted all the freedom-loving nations with the cardinal task of securing a lasting democratic peace sealing victory over fascism. In the accomplishment of this fundamental task of the postwar period the Soviet Union and its foreign policy are playing a leading role. This follows from the very nature of the Soviet socialist state, to which motives of aggression and exploitation are utterly alien, and which is interested in creating the most favorable conditions for the building of a communist society. One of these conditions is external peace. As embodiment of a new and superior social system, the Soviet Union reflects in its foreign policy the aspirations of progressive mankind, which desires lasting peace and has nothing to gain from a new war hatched by capitalism. The Soviet Union is a staunch champion of liberty and independence of all nations, and a foe of national and racial oppression and colonial exploitation in any shape or form. The change in the general alignment of forces between the capitalist world and the socialist world brought about by the war has still further enhanced the significance of the foreign policy of the Soviet state and enlarged the scope of its activity on the international arena. The successes and the growing international prestige of the democratic camp were not to the liking of the imperialists. Even while World War II was still on, reactionary forces in Great Britain and the United States became increasingly active, striving to prevent concerted action by the Allied powers, to protract the war, to bleed the U.S.S.R., and to save the fascist aggressors from utter defeat. The sabotage of the Second Front by the Anglo-Saxon imperialists, headed by Churchill, was a clear reflection of this tendency, which was in point of fact a continuation of the Munich policy in the new and changed conditions. But while the war was still in progress British and American reactionary circles did not venture to come out openly against the Soviet Union and the democratic countries, realizing that they had the undivided sympathy of the masses all over the world. But in the concluding months of the war the situation began to change. The British and American imperialists already manifested their willingness to respect the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries at the Potsdam tripartite conference in July 1945. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the democratic countries in these two past years has been a policy of consistently working for the observance of the democratic principles in the postwar settlement. The countries of the anti-imperialist camp have loyally and consistently striven for the implementation of these principles, without deviating from them one iota. Consequently, the major objective of the postwar foreign policy of the democratic states has been a democratic peace, the eradication of the vestiges of fascism and the prevention of a resurgence of fascist imperialist aggression, the recognition of the principle of the equality of nations and respect for their sovereignty, and general reduction of all armaments and the outlawing of the most destructive weapons, those designed for the mass slaughter of the civilian population. ... Of immense importance are the joint efforts of the diplomacy of the U.S.S.R. and that of the other democratic countries to secure a reduction of armaments and the outlawing of the most destructive of them -- the atomic bomb. Soviet foreign policy proceeds from the fact of the coexistence for a long period of the two systems -- capitalism and socialism. From this it follows that cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and countries with other systems is possible, provided that the principle of reciprocity is observed and that obligations once assumed are honored. Everyone knows that the U.S.S.R. has always honored the obligations it has assumed. The Soviet Union has demonstrated its will and desire for cooperation. Kennan's article- 1. Given Kennan's assessment of Soviet conduct and policy, did containment make sense as a US foreign policy principle? Why or why not? Explain your viewpoint. 2. Using at least two pieces of historical evidence, defend or reject the following statement from the article- "The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia..." 3. Based on what you know about the Soviet and American governments following World War II, are Kennan's predictions about Soviet-American relations sensible or overly-pessimistic. Explain your answer. 4. Assuming that Kennan was correct in his assessment of "Soviet conduct," what foreign policy options did the US have other than containment? 5. Kennan's article discusses the aspects of Soviet ideology that thought would lead to a long-term struggle between it and the United States. In your supported opinion, what aspects of American ideology contributed to this struggle? Zhdanov's speech- 1. Using at least two pieces of 20th century historical evidence, defend or reject the following statement from the speech- "The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to combat socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements everywhere." 2. Of the two selections, only Zhdanov mentions the atomic bomb. Why do you think this is the case? 3. With which of Zhdanov's points would Kennan most strongly disagree? Explain. 4. What assumptions does Zhdanov make about capitalist societies? 5. After reading his speech, do you think Zhdanov had read Kennan's article? Why or why not? Explain your viewpoint.