POLITICAL DEBATES

BETWEEN

HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN

AND

HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS,

In the Celebrated Campaign of 1858, in Illinois:

INCLUDING THE PRECEDING SPEECHES OF EACH, AT CHICAGO, SPRINGFIELD, ETC.; ALSO, THE TWO GREAT SPEECHES OF MR. LINCOLN IN OHIO, IN 1859.

AS

CAREFULLY PREPARED BY THE REPORTERS OF EACH PARTY, AND PUBLISHED AT THE TIMES OF THEIR DELIVERY.

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voting appendix to carry out the schemes of other interests, but a political ruse united to assert her own dignity in the confederacy and carry out to their legitimate consummation the immortal principles of the Ordinance of 1787, under which she was organized, by standing by its champions and indignantly spurting the whole tribe of trading Doughboys, who feast at the sacred birthright of their own States.

Respectfully yours,

S. WILLIAMSON, Clayouga,
BRASSTON, Stenger, Georgia,
A. C. RAMAGE, Belmont,
N. W. CARROLL, Preble,
S. T. CURRANT, Morrow,
W. S. RUSSELL, Sandusky,
P. K. O'BANNON, Zeching,
V. O. CRIPTON, Louden,
S. W. McCULLOUGH, Logan,
SAML. C. JOHNSON, Lawrence,
A. L. NORTHUP, Dekalb,
O. D. BIGLOW, Hancock,
JAMES H. LAM, Johnson,
JACOB EBERHART, Warren,
B. NASH, Greene,

SIR,—I consider it my duty to call your attention to the proposals of Messrs. Lincoln and Douglas, preliminary to the Debates.

Sincerely yours,

A. LINCOLN.
[The following speech was delivered at Springfield, Ill., at the close of the Republican State Convention held at that time and place, and by which Convention Mr. Lincoln had been named as their candidate for U. S. Senator. Mr. Douglas was not present.]

Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the Convention: If we could first know where we are, and what we are tending, we could better judge what to do, and how to do it. We are now far into the eighth year, since a policy was initiated with the avowed object, and confident promise, of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease, until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, till it shall become a law of the land.

Have we no tendency to the latter condition?

Let any one who doubts, carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal combination—piece of machinery, so to speak—composed of the Nebraska doctrine, and the Dred Scott decision. Let him consider not only what work the machinery is adapted to do, and how well adapted; but also, let him study the history of its construction, and trace, if he can, or rather fail, if he can, to trace the evidences of design, and concert of action, among its chief architects, from the beginning.

The new year of 1854 found slavery excluded from more than half the States by State Constitutions, and from most of the national territory by Congressional prohibition. Four days later, commenced the struggle which ended in repealing that Congressional prohibition. This opened all the national territory to slavery, and was the first point gained.

But, so far, Congress only had acted; and an indorsement by the people, real or apparent, was indispensable, to save the point already gained, and give chance for more.

This necessity had not been overlooked; but had been provided for, as well as might be, in the notable argument of "squatter sovereignty," otherwise called "so-
right of self-government," which latter phrase, though expressive of the only rightful basis of any government, was so perverted in this attempt to make use of it as to amount to just the same. That if any one man choses to enact another, no third man shall be allowed to object. That argument was incorporated into the Nebraska bill itself, in the language which follows: "It being the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to frame and regulate their domestic policies in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States." Then opened the roar of loose declamation in favor of "squatter sovereignty," and "sacred right of self-government." "But," said the friends of the measure, "so as to expressly declare that the people of the Territory have no slave.

"Not us," said the friends of the measure; and down they voted the amendment.

While the Nebraska bill was passing through Congress, a case was in the process involving the question of a negro's freedom, by reason of his owner having voluntarily taken him first into a free State and then into a Territory covered by the Congressional prohibition, and held him as a slave for a long time in each, was passing through the U. S. Circuit Court for the District of Missouri; and both Nebraska bill and law were brought to a decision in the same month of May, 1854. The negro's name was "Dred Scott," whose name now designates the decision finally made in the case. Before the then next Presidential election, the law case came to, and was argued in, the Supreme Court of the United States; but the decision of it was deferred until after the election. Still, before the election, Senator Trumbull, on the floor of the Senate, requested the leading advocate of the Nebraska bill to state his opinion whether the people of a Territory can constitutionally exclude slavery from their limits; and the latter answered: "That is a question for the Supreme Court." But Mr. Buchanan was elected, and the indictment, as such it was, secured. That was the second point gained. The indictment, however, fell short of a clear popular majority by nearly four hundred thousand votes, and so, perhaps, was not overwhelmingly reliable and satisfactory. To exclude it therefrom, as impressively as possible echoed back upon the people the weight and authority of the indictment. The Supreme Court met again; did not announce their decision, but ordered a re-argument. The Presidential inauguration came, and still no decision was made. So Untrumbull exhorted the people to abide by the forthcoming decision, whatever it might be. Then, in a few days, came the decision.

The reputed author of the Nebraska bill finds an early occasion to make a speech at this capital indicating the Dred Scott decision, and demand the doctrine that this was a decision to the President and the author of the Nebraska bill, on the more question of fast, whether the Lecompton Constitution or was not, in any just sense, made by the people of Kansas; and in that quarter the latter declares that all he wants is a fair vote for the people, and that he cares not whether slavery be voted down or voted up. I do not understand his declaration that he cares not whether slavery be voted down or voted up, to be intended by him other than as an apt definition of the policy he would impress upon the public mind—the principle for which he declares he has suffered so much, and is ready to suffer to the end. If he has any parental feeling, well may he cling to that principle. If the present President is the last one to avoid the language of his predecessor, the Lecompton Constitution.

Under the Dred Scott decision, "squatter sovereignty" squatted out of existence, tumbled down before the tempests like temporary edifices. The whole appeal of the question was to the people of Kansas, which had been brought back into loose sand—helped to carry an election, and then was kicked to the winds. His late joint struggle with the Republicans, against the Lecompton Constitution, involves nothing of the original Nebraska doctrine. That struggle was made on the point—the right of a people to make their own constitution—a point on which he and the Republicans have never differed.

The principle of the Dred Scott decision, in connection with Senator Douglas's "care not" policy, constitute the piece of machinery, in its present state, in the present amendment. This is the third point gained. The working points of that machinery are as follows:

First, That no negro slave, imported as such from Africa, and no descendant of such, as cannot be declared a citizen of any State, in the sense of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States. This point is made in order to declare the negro, in every possible event, of the benefit of that provision of the United States Constitution, which declares that "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States."

Secondly, That "subject to the Constitution of the United States," neither Congress nor Territorial Legislatures can exclude slavery from any United States territory. This point is in order that individual men may fill up the Territories with slaves, without danger of losing them as property, that they may be free to move by the courts of any State, the negro may be forced into the hire of the master. This point is made, not to be pressed immediately; but, if acquiesced in for awhile, and apparently endorsed by the people at an election, then to sustain the legal conclusion that when Dred Scott's master might lawfully do with Dred Scott, in the free State of Illinois, every other master may lawfully do with any other one, or one thousand slaves, in Illinois, or in any other free State.

Auxiliary to all this, and working hand in hand with it, the Nebraska doctrine, or whatever is its precise and sound public opinion, at least Northern public opinion, not to care whether slavery is voted down or voted up. This shows exactly where we now are; and partially also, whither we are tending.

It will not adduce additional light on the latter to go back, and run the mind over the story of events and facts already stated. See oral things will now appear less dark and mysterious than they did when they were transpiring. The people were the right hand, partly free," "subject only to the Constitution." What the Constitution had to do with it, outsiders could not then see. Plainly enough now, it was an exactly fitted millstone. Over the court decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect freedom of the people to be just the freedom at all. Why was the freedom, declared to be forever free, declared only now the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision. Was the court decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect freedom of the people, to be just the freedom at all. Why was the freedom, declared to be forever free, declared only now the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision. Was the court decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect freedom of the people, to be just the freedom at all. Why was the freedom, declared to be forever free, declared only now the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision. Was the court decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect freedom of the people, to be just the freedom at all. Why was the freedom, declared to be forever free, declared only now the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision. Was the court decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect freedom of the people, to be just the freedom at all. Why was the freedom, declared to be forever free, declared only now the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision. Was the court decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect freedom of the people, to be just the freedom at all. Why was the freedom, declared to be forever free, declared only now the adoption of it would have spoiled the niche for the Dred Scott decision. Was the court decision to afterward come in, and declare the perfect freedom of the people, to be just the freedom at all.
all understood one another from the beginning, and all worked upon a common plan or draft drawn up before the first blow was struck.

It should not be overlooked that, by the Nebraska bill, the people of a State as well as Territory, were to be left "perfectly free"—"subject only to the Constitution." Why is mention of a State? They were legislating for Territories, and not for or about States. Certainly the people of a State are and ought to be subject to the Constitution of the United States; but why is mention of this negatived in this matter? Territorial law? Why are the people of a Territory and the people of a State therein lumped together, and their relation to the Constitution therein treated as being precisely the same? While the opinion of the court, by Chief Justice Taney, in the Dred Scott case, and the separate opinions of all the concurring judges, expressly declare that the Constitution of the United States is not a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery from any United States Territory, they all seem to declare whether or not the same Constitution permits a State, or the people of a State, to exclude it. Possible, this is a mere omission; but who can be quite sure, if McClean or Curtis had sought to get into the opinion a declaration of unlimited power in the people of a State to exclude slavery from their limits, just as Chase and Mace sought to get such declaration, in behalf of the people of a Territory, into the Nebraska bill? I ask, who can be quite sure that it would not have been voted down in the one case as it had been in the other? The nearest approach to the point of declaring the power of a State over slavery, is made by Judge Nelson. He approaches it more than once, using the precise idea, and almost the language, too, of the Nebraska act. On one occasion, his exact language is, "except in cases where the power is restrained by the Constitution of the United States, the law of the State is supreme over the subject of slavery within its jurisdiction." In what cases the power of the States is so restrained by the United States Constitution, is left an open question, precisely as the same question is left by the opinion of the court in the Dred Scott case, was left open in the Nebraska act. Put this and that together, and we have another nice little niche, which we may, at long, see filled with another Supreme Court decision, declaring that the Constitution of the United States does not permit a State to exclude slavery from its limits. And this may especially be expected if the doctrine of "care not whether slavery be voted down or voted up," shall gain upon the public mind sufficiently to give promise that such a decision may be maintained when made. Such a decision is all that slavery now lacks of being alike lawful in all the States. Widen it, or subdue it, such decision is certainly going to come, and will soon be upon us, unless the power of the present political dynasty shall be met and overthrown. We shall lie down pleasantly dreaming that the people of Missouri are on the verge of making their State free, and we shall awake to the reality instead, that the Supreme Court has made Illinois a slave State. To meet and overthrow the power of that dynasty, is the work now before all those who would prevent that consummation. That is what we have to do. How can we best do it? There are those who denominate us openly to their own friends, and yet whisper us softly, that Senator Douglas is the great instrument there is with which to effect that object. They wish us to labor all, from the fact that he now has a little quarrel with the present head of the dynasty; and that he has regularly voted with us in a single point, upon which he and we have never differed. They remind us that he is a great man, and that the largest of us are very small ones. Let this be granted. But "a living dog is better than a dead lion." Judge Douglas, if not a dead lion, for this work, is at least a caged and toothless one. How can he oppose the advances of slavery? Does he care anything about it? His avowed mission is impressing upon the public mind to care nothing about it. A leading Douglas democratic newspaper thinks Douglas superior talent will be needed to resist the revival of the African slave trade. Does Douglas believe an effort to revive this trade? Has he not said so? Does he really think so? But if it is, can he resist it? Years he has labored to prove it a sacred right of white men to take negro slaves into the new Territories. Can he possibly show that it is less a sacred right to buy them where they can be bought cheaper? And unquestionably they can be bought cheaper in Africa than in Virginia. He has done all in his power to reduce the whole question of slavery to one of a mere right of property; and as such, how can he oppose the foreign slave trade? How can he refuse that trade in that "property" shall be "perfectly free"—unless he does it as a protection to the home production? And to the home producers will probably not ask the protection, he will be wholly without a ground of opposition.

Senator Douglas holds, we know, that a man may rightfully be worse to-day than he was yesterday—that he may rightfully change his mind without doing it wrong. But can we, for that reason, run ahead, and infer that he will make any particular changes, which his times, his party, or his own good sense may give him no intimation he had to make? Can we safely base our action upon any such vague inference? Now, as ever, I wish not to misrepresent Judge Douglas's position, question his motives, or do ought that can be personally offensive to him. Whatever, if ever, he said we can come together on principle so that our cause may have assistance from his great ability. I hope to have interposed no adventitious obstacle. But clearly, he is not now with us—he does not promise to be—he does not promise ever to be.

Our cause, then, must be intrusted to, and conducted by, its own undoubted friends—those whose hands are free, whose hearts are in the work—"who do care for the result."

Two years ago the Republicans of the nation mustered over thirteen hundred thousand strong. We did this under the single impulse of resistance to a common danger, with every externall circumstances against us. Of strange, discordant; and even hostile elements, we gathered from the four winds, and formed and fought the battle through, under the constant hot fire of a disciplined, proud and pampered enemy. Did we brave all then, to falter now?—now, when that same enemy is waverers, discovered and by the same law? The result is not doubtful. We shall not fail—if we stand firm, we shall not fail. Wise counsels may accelerate, or modify delay, but, sooner or later, the victory is sure to come.

SPEECH OF SENATOR DOUGLAS,

On the occasion of his Public Reception at Chicago, Friday evening, July 9th, 1858. (Mr. Lincoln was present.)

MR. DOUGLAS said:

MR. CHAIRMAN AND FELLOW-CITIZENS— I can find no language which can adequately express my profound gratitude for the magnificent welcome which you have extended to me on this occasion. This vast sea of human faces indicates how deep an interest is felt by our people in the great questions which agitate the public mind, and which underlie the foundations of our free institutions. A reception like this, so great in numbers that no human voice can be heard to its countless thousands—so enthusiastic that no one individual can be the object of such enthusiasm—clearly shows that there is some great principle which sinks deep in the heart of the masses, and involves the rights and the liberties of a whole people, that has brought you together with a unanimity and a cordiality never before excelled, if, indeed, equaled on any occasion. I have not the vanity to believe that it is any personal fulfillment.

It is an expression of your devotion to that great principle of self-government, to
which my life for many years past has been, and in the future will be, devoted. If there is any one principle dearer and more sacred than all others in free governments, it is that which asserts the exclusive right of a free people to form and adopt their own fundamental law, and to manage and regulate their own internal affairs and domestic institutions.

When I found an effort being made during the recent session of Congress to force a Constitution upon the people of Kansas against their will, and to admit her into the Union with a Constitution which their people had rejected by more than 10,000, I felt as if I was a man of honor and a representative of Illinois, bound by every considerate duty of fidelity, of patriotism, and of friendship, to resist to the utmost of my power the consummation of that fraud. With others I did resist it, and resisted persistently until the attempt was abandoned. We were forced to refer that Constitution back to the people of Kansas, to be accepted or rejected as they shall decide at an election, which is fixed for the first Monday in August next. It is true that the mode of reference, and the form of the submission, was not such as I could sanction with my vote, for the reason that it discriminated between Free States and Slave States; providing that if Kansas consented to come in under the Lecompton Constitution it should be received with a population of 35,000, but that if she demanded another Constitution, more consistent with the sentiments of her people and their feelings, that it should not be received into the Union until she has 33,420 inhabitants. I did not consider that mode of submission fair, for the reason that any election is a mockery which is not free—that any election is a fraud upon the rights of the people which holds out inducements for affirmative votes, and threatens penalties for negative votes. But while I was not satisfied with the mode of submission, whilst I resisted it to the last, demanding a fair, a just, a free mode of submission, still, when the law passed placing it within the power of the people of Kansas at election to reject the Lecompton Constitution, and then make another in bondage, and then the people of that State must abide their opinions. I did believe that either the penalties on one hand, or the inducements on the other, would force that people to accept a Constitution to which they are irreconcilably opposed. All I can say is, that if their votes can be controlled by such considerations, all the sympathy which has been manifested, and all the effort that has been made in defense of their right to self-government have been made in an unworthy cause.

Hence, my friends, I regard the Lecompton battle as having been fought and the victory won, because the arrogant demand for the admission of Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution was refused, regardless of whether her people wanted it or not, has been abandoned, and the principle which recognized the right of the people to decide for themselves has been submitted in its place.

Fellow-citizens: While I devoted my best energies—all my energies, mental and physical—to the contest on the great principle, and whilst the result has been such as will enable the people of Kansas to come into the Union, with such a Constitution as they desire, yet the credit of this great moral victory is to be divided among a large number of men of various and different political creeds. I was rejoiced when I found in this great contest the Republican party coming up manfully and sustaining the principle that the people of each territory, when coming into the Union, have the right to decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits. I have seen the time when that principle was controverted. I have seen the time when all parties did not recognize the right of a people to have slavery or freedom, to tolerate or prohibit slavery, as they deemed best; but claimed that power for the Congress of the United States, regardless of the wishes of the people to be affected. I was rejoiced when I found upon the Crittenden-Montgomery bill the Republicans stood by it, and when I found upon the Crittenden-Montgomery bill the Republicans stood by it, and when I found upon the Crittenden-Montgomery bill the Republicans stood by it, and when I found upon the Crittenden-Montgomery bill the Republicans stood by it. I have said that this was as it should be. I have said that this was as it should be. I have said that this was as it should be. I have said that this was as it should be. I have said that this was as it should be. I have said that this was as it should be.
regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, and that no limitation should be placed upon that right in any form.

In the performance of my duty, in 1854, when it became necessary to bring forward a bill for the organization of the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska—Was it not my duty, in obedience to the Illinois platform, to your standing instructions to your Senators, adopted with almost entire unanimity, to incorporate in that bill the great principles of self-government, declaring that it was the true intent and meaning of the act not to legislate slavery into any State or Territory, or to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States? Did you ever consider the principle in the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and the spirit of that bill as expressed by the 1854 platform of Illinois assembled in Convention at Springfield, and not only laid down by the State plattform, but nominated a candidate for the United States Senate, as my successor. I take great pleasure in saying that I have known, personally and intimately, for about a quarter of a century, the worthy gentleman who has been nominated for my place, and I will say that I regard him as a kind, amiable, and intelligent gentleman, a good citizen and an honorable opponent; and whatever issue I may have with him will be of principle, and not involving personalities.

Mr. Lincoln made a speech before that Republican Convention which unanimously nominated him for the Senate—a speech evidently well prepared and carefully written—in which he states the basis upon which he proposes to carry on the campaign during this summer. In it he lays down two distinct propositions which I shall notice, and upon which I shall take a direct and bold issue with him.

His first and main proposition I will give in his own language, scripture quotations and all [laughter]; I give his exact language:—"A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure, permanently, half slave and half free. If I do not expect the house to fall; but I do expect it to cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other.

In other words, Mr. Lincoln asserts, as a fundamental principle of this government, that there must be uniformity in the local laws and domestic institutions of each and all the States that compose the Union; and he therefore invites the non-slaveholding States to band together, organize as one body, and make war upon slavery in Kentucky, upon slavery in Virginia, upon the Carolinas, upon slavery in all of the slaveholding States in this Union, and to persevere in that war until it shall be exterminated. He then tells the slaveholding States to stand together as a unit and make an aggressive war upon the free States of this Union with a view of establishing a slave system in them all; of forcing it upon Illinois, of forcing it upon New York, upon New England, and upon every other free State, and that they shall keep up the warfare until it has been formally established in them all. In other words, Mr. Lincoln advocates boldly and clearly a war of sections, a war of the North against the South, of the free States against the slave States—a war of extermination—to be continued relentlessly until the one or the other shall be subdued, and all the States shall either become free or become slave.

Now, my friends, I must say to you frankly, that I take bold, unqualified issue with him upon that principle. I assert that it is neither desirable nor possible that there should be uniformity in the local institutions and domestic regulations of the different States of this Union. The framers of our government never contemplated uniformity in its internal concerns. The fathers of the Revolution, the great men who made the Constitution, well understood that the laws and domestic institutions which would suit the great plains of South Carolina, they well understood that laws which would suit the agricultural districts of Pennsylvania, and New York would be totally unfit for the rice plantations of South Carolina; best understood that laws which would suit the agricultural districts of Pennsylvania and New York would be totally unfit for the large mining regions of the Pacific, or the lumber regions of Maine. Therefore, the great variety of soil, of production and of interests, in a Republic as large as this, required different local and domestic regulations in each locality, adapted to the wants and interests of each separate State, and for that

what kind of common schools they will have; what system of banking they will adopt, or whether they will adopt any at all; you allow them to decide for themselves, and if the husband and wife, and father and child, and guardian and ward, in fact, you allow them to decide for themselves all other questions of this kind. I ask myself this question: Whenever you put a limitation upon the right of any people to decide what laws they want, you have destroyed the fundamental principle of self-government.

In connection with this subject, perhaps, it will not be improper for me on this occasion to allude to the position of those who have chosen to array my conduct on this same subject. I have observed from the public prints, that but a few days ago the Senator from the Nort...
reason it was provided in the Federal Constitution that the thirteen original States should remain sovereign and supreme within their own limits in regard to all that was local, internal, and domestic, while the Federal Government should have certain powers which were general and national, and could be exercised only by federal authority.

The framers of the Constitution well understood that each locality, having separate and distinct interests, required separate and distinct laws, domestic institutions, and police regulations adapted to its own wants and its own condition; and they acted on the presumption, also, that these laws and institutions would be as diversified and as dissimilar as the States would be numerous, and that no two would be precisely alike, because the interests of no two would be precisely alike.

Hence, I assert, it was the great fundamental principle which underlies our complex system of State and Federal Governments, contemplated diversity and dissimilarity in the local institutions and domestic affairs of each and every State then in the Union, or thereafter to be admitted into the Confederacy. I therefore conceive that my friend, Mr. Lincoln, has totally misapprehended the great principles upon which our government rests. Uniformity in local and domestic affairs would be destructive of State rights, of State sovereignty, of personal liberty and personal freedom. Uniformity in the parent of despotism the world over, not only in politics, but in religion. Wherever the doctrine of uniformity is proclaimed, that all the States must be free or all slave, that all labor must be white or all black, that all the citizens of the different States must have the same privileges or be governed by the same regulations, you have destroyed the greatest safeguard which our institutions have thrown around the rights of the citizen.

How could this uniformity be accomplished, if it was desirable and possible? There is but one mode in which it could be obtained, and that must be by abolishing the State Legislatures, blotting out State sovereignty, and making the States into one consolidated empire, and vesting Congress with the plenary power to make all the police regulations, domestic and local laws, uniform throughout the limits of the Republic. When you shall have done this, you will have uniformity. Then the States will all be slave or all free; there will be no room for the choice of whether it will be Republican, American, or Democratic. I respect the decisions of that august tribunal; I shall act or not act, according to their decision.

From this view of the case, my friends, I am driven irresistibly to the conclusion that diversity, dissimilarity, variety in all local and domestic institutions, is the guarantee of our liberties; and that the framers of our institutions were wise, sagacious, and patriotic, when they made this government a confederation of sovereign States, with a Legislature for each, and conferred upon each Legislature the power to make all local and domestic institutions, to suit the people it represented, without interference from any other State or from the general Congress of the Union. If we expect to maintain our liberties, we must preserve the rights and sovereignty of the States; we must maintain and carry out that great principle of self-government incorporated in the compendious measures of 1866, enforced by the Illinois Legislature in 1801, emphatically embodied and carried out in the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and vindicated this year by the refusal to bring Kansas into the Union with a Constitution distasteful to her people.

I am equally free to say that the reason assigned by Mr. Lincoln for resisting the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case, does not in itself merit my approbation. He objects to it because that decision declared that a negro descended from African parents, who were born here and sold as slaves, is not, and cannot be, a citizen of the United States. He says it is wrong, because it deprives the negro of the benefits of that clause of the Constitution which says that citizens of one State shall enjoy all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States; in other words, it deprives him of the negro of the privileges, immunities, and rights of citizenship, which belong, according to that decision, only to the white man. I am free to say to you that in my opinion this government of ours is founded on the white basis. It was made by the white man, for the benefit of the white man, to be administered by white men, in such manner as they should determine. It is also true that a negro, an Indian, or any other man of inferior race to a white man, should be permitted to enjoy, and humanity requires that he should have all the rights, privileges and immunities which he is capable of exercising, consistent with the safety of society. I would give him every right and every privilege which his capacity would enable him to enjoy, consistent with the good of the society in which he lived. But you may ask me, what are these rights and these privileges? My answer is, that each State must decide for itself the nature and extent of those
right. Illinois has decided for herself. We have decided that the negro shall not be a slave, and we have at the same time decided that he shall not vote, or serve on juries, or enjoy political privileges. I am content with that system of policy which we have adopted for ourselves. I deny the right of any other State to complain of any policy in that respect, or to interfere with it, or to attempt to change it. On the other hand, the State of Maine has decided that in that State a negro man may vote on an equality with the white man. The sovereign power of Maine had the right to prescribe that rule for herself. Illinois has no right to complain of Maine for conferring the right of negro suffrage, nor has Maine any right to interfere with, or complain of Illinois because she has denied negro suffrage.

The Constitution of New York has decided by her Constitution that a negro may vote, provided that he own $2500 worth of property, but not otherwise. The rich negro can vote, but the poor one cannot. Although that distinction does not commend itself to my judgment, yet I assert that the sovereign power of New York has the right to prescribe it. The Constitution of Kentucky, Virginia and other States have provided that negroes, or a certain class of them in those States, shall be slaves, having neither civil or political rights. Without incurring the wisdom of that decision, I assert that Virginia has the same power by virtue of her sovereignty to protect slavery within her limits, as Illinois has to barish it forever from our own borders. I assert the right of each State to decide for itself on all these questions, and I do not subscribe to the doctrine of my friend, Mr. Lincoln, that uniformity is either desirable or possible. I do not acknowledge that the States must all be free or must all be slave.

I do not acknowledge that the negro must have civil and political rights everywhere or anywhere. I do not acknowledge that the Chinese must have the same rights in California that we would confer upon them here. I do not acknowledge that the Cooley principle into this country must necessarily be put upon a equality with the white races. I do not acknowledge any of these doctrines of uniformity in the local and domestic regulations in the different States.

Thus you see, my fellow-citizens, that the issues between Mr. Lincoln and myself, as respective candidates for the U.S. Senate, as made up, are diverse from that of the Fugitive Slave Law and irreconcilable. He goes for uniformity in our domestic institutions, for a war of sections, until one or the other shall be subdued. I go for the great principle of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, the right of the people to decide for themselves.

On the other hand, Mr. Lincoln goes for a war upon the Supreme Court of the United States, because of their judicial decision in the Dred Scott case. I yield obedience to the decisions in that court—to the final determination of the highest judicial tribunal known to our constitution. He objects to the Dred Scott decision because it does not put the negro in the possession of the rights of citizenship on an equality with the white man. I am opposed to negro equality. I do not acknowledge this nation as a white people—a people composed of the descendants of a people who have established this government for themselves and their posterity, and I am in favor of preserving not only the purity of the blood, but the purity of the government from any mixture or amalgamation with inferior races. I have seen the effects of this mixture of superior and inferior races—this amalgamation of white men and Indians and negroes; we have seen it in Mexico, in Central America, in South America, and in all the Spanish-American States, and its result has been degeneration, demoralization, and degradation below the capacity for self-government.

I am opposed to taking any step that recognizes the negro man or the Indian as the equal of the white man. I am opposed to giving him a vote in the administration of the government. I would extend to the negro, and the Indian, and all dependent races every right, every privilege, and every immunity consistent with the safety and welfare of the white races; but equality they never should have, either political or social, or in any other respect whatever.

My friends, you see that the issues are distinctly drawn. I stand by the same platform that I have so often proclaimed to you and to the people of Illinois herefore. I stand by the Democratic organization, yield obedience to its usages, and support its regular nominations. I endorse and approve the Cincinnati platform, and I adhere to and intend to carry out, as part of that platform, the great principle of self-government, which recognizes the rights of the people in each State and Territory to decide for themselves their domestic institutions. In other words, if the Lecompton issue shall arise again, you have only to turn back and see where you have found me during the last six months, and then rest assured that you will find me in the same position, battling for the same principle, and vindicating it from assault from whatever quarter it may come, so long as I have the power to do it.

Fellow-citizens, you now have before you the outlines of the propositions which I intend to discuss before the people of Illinois during the pending campaign. I have spoken without preparation and in a very desultory manner, and may have omitted some points which I desired to discuss, and may have been less explicit on others than I could have wished. I have made up my mind to appeal to the people against the combination which has been made against me. The Republican leaders have formed an alliance, an unholy, unnatural alliance with a portion of the unsavory federal office-holders. I intend to fight that allied army wherever I meet them. I know they deny the alliance while avoiding the common purpose, but yet these men who are trying to divide the Democratic party for the purpose of electing a Republican Senator in my place, are just as much the agents, the tools, the supporters of Mr. Lincoln as if they were avowed Republicans, and expect their reward for their services when the Republicans come into power. I shall deal with these allied forces just as the Russians dealt with the allies at Sebastopol. The Russians, when they fired a broadside at the common enemy, did not stop to inquire whether it hit a Frenchman, an Englishman, or a Turk, nor will I stop, nor shall I stop to inquire whether my blows hit the Republican leaders or their allies, who are holding the federal offices and yet acting in concert with the Republicans to defeat the Democratic party and its nominees. I do not include all of the federal office-holders in this remark. Such of them as are Democrats and show their Democracy by remaining inside of the Democratic organization and supporting its nominees, I recognize as Democrats, but those who, having been defeated inside of the organization, go outside and attempt to divide and destroy the party in concert with the Republican leaders, have ceased to be Democrats, and belong to the allied army, whose avowed object is to elect the Republican ticket by dividing and destroying the Democratic party.

My friends, I have exhausted myself, and I certainly have fatigued you, in the long and desultory remarks which I have made. It is now two nights since I have been in bed, and I think I have a right to a little sleep. I will, however, have an opportunity of stating you more fully how you face to face, and addressing you on more than one occasion before the November election. In conclusion, I wish to say to you, justice to my own feelings demands it, that my gratitude for the welcome you have extended to me on this occasion knows no bounds, and can be described by no language which I can command. I see that I am literally at home among my constituents. This welcome has supplied me for every effort that I have made in the public service during nearly twenty-five years that I have held office at your hands. It not only compensates me for the past, but it furnishes an inducement and incentive for future effort which no man, no matter how patriotic, can feel who has not witnessed the magnificent reception you have extended to me to-night on my return.
SPEECH OF HON. ABRAM LINCOLN,

IN REPLY TO SENATOR DOUGLAS.

Delivered at Chicago, Saturday evening, July 10, 1860. (Mr. Douglas was not present.)

Mr. Lincoln was introduced by Mr. L. Wilson, Esq., and as he made his appearance he was greeted with a perfect storm of applause. For some moments the enthusiasm continued unabated. At last, when by a wave of his hand partial silence was restored, Mr. Lincoln said:

MY FELLOW-CITIZENS: On yesterday evening, upon the occasion of the reception given to Senator Douglas, I was furnished with a seat very convenient for hearing him, and was otherwise very courteously treated by him and his friends, and for which I thank him and them. During the course of his remarks my name was mentioned in such a way as, I suppose, renders it at least improper that I should make some sort of reply to him. I shall not attempt to follow him in the precise order in which he addressed the assembled multitude upon that occasion, though I shall perhaps do so in the main.

There was one question to which he asked the attention of the crowd, which I deem of somewhat less importance—at least of propriety for me to dwell upon—than others which he brought near the close of his speech, and which I think it would not be entirely proper for me to omit attending to, and yet if I were not to give some attention to it now, I should probably forget it altogether. While I am upon this subject, allow me to say that I do not intend to indulge in that inconvenient mode sometimes adopted in public speaking, of reading from documents; but I shall depart from that rule so far as to read a little scrap from his speech, which notices this first topic of which I shall speak—that is, provided I can find it in the paper.

"I have made up my mind to appeal to the people against the combination that has been made against me! The Republican leaders having formed an alliance, an unbridled and unnatural alliance, with a portion of unscrupulous federal office-holders. I intend to fight that allied army wherever I meet them. I know they deny the alliance, but yet there are men who are trying to divide the Democratic party for the purpose of electing a Republican Senator in my place, are just as much the agents and tools of the supporters of Mr. Lincoln. Hence I shall deal with this allied army just as the Russians dealt with the allies at Sebastopol—that is, the Russians did not stop to inquire, when they fired a broadside, whether it hit an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a Turk. Nor will I stop to inquire, nor shall I hesitate, whether my blows shall hit these Republican leaders or their allies, who are holding the federal officers and yet acting in concert with them."

Well, now, gentlemen, is not that very alarming? Just to think of it! Right at the back of the scenes, in the corners, is a poor, kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman, I am to be slain in this way. Why, my friend, the Judge, is not only, as it turns out, not a dead lion, nor even a living one—he is the rugged Russian Bear!

But if they will have it—for he says that we deny it—that there is any such alliance, as he says there is—and I don't propose hanging very much upon this question of veracity—but if he will have it that there is such an alliance—that the Administration men and we are allied, and we stand in the attitude of English, French and Turk, he occupying the position of the Russian, in that case, I beg that he will indulge us while we barely suggest to him that these allies took Sebastopol.

Gentlemen, only a few more words as to this alliance. For my part, I have to say, that whether there be such an alliance, depends, so far as I know, upon what may be a right definition of the term alliance. If for the Republican party to see the other great party to which they are opposed divided among themselves, and not try to form the division itself, and neither be glad of it—if that is an alliance, I confess I am; but if it is meant to be said that the Republicans had formed an alliance going beyond that, by which there is contribution of money or sacrifice of principle on the one side or the other, so far as the Republican party is concerned, if there be any such thing, I protest that I neither know any thing of it, nor do I believe it. I will, however, say—as I think this branch of the argument is lagged in—I would before I leave it, state for the benefit of those concerned, that one of those same Buchanan men did once tell me of an argument that he made for his opposition to Judge Douglas, that if the friend of our Senator Douglas had been talking to him, and had among other things said to him: "Why, you don't want to beat Douglas?"—"No," said he, "I do want to beat him, and I will tell you why. I believe his original Nebraska bill was right in the abstract, but it was wrong in the time that it was brought forward. It was wrong in the application to a Territory in regard to which the question had been settled; it was brought forward at a time when nobody asked it; it was tendered to the South when the South had not asked for it, but when they could not well refuse it; and for this same reason he forced that question upon our party; it has sunk the best men all over the nation, everywhere; and now when our President, struggling with the difficulties of this man's getting up, has reached the very hardest point to turn in the case, he deserts him, and I am for putting him where he will trouble us no more."

Now, gentlemen, that is not my argument—that is not my argument at all. I have to only been stating to you the argument of a Buchanan man. You will judge if there is any force in it.

Popular sovereignty! everlasting popular sovereignty! Let us for a moment inquire into this vast matter of popular sovereignty. What is popular sovereignty? We have heard as an early period in the history of this country a phrase that was another name for the same thing—"Squatter Sovereignty." It was not exactly Popular Sovereignty, but Squatter Sovereignty. What do those terms mean? What? What are those terms meant when used now? And vast credit is taken by our friends, the Judge, in regard to his support of it, when he declares that the last years of his life have been, and all the future years of his life shall be, devoted to this matter of Popular Sovereignty. What is it? Why, it is the sovereignty of the people! What was Squatter Sovereignty? I suppose if it had any significance at all it was the right of the people to govern themselves, to be sovereign in their own affairs while they were squatted down in a country not their own, while they were squatted on a Territory that did not belong to them, in the sense that a State belongs to the people who inhabit it—when it belonged to the nation—such right to govern themselves was called "Squatter Sovereignty."

Now I wish you to mark. What has become of that Squatter Sovereignty? What has become of it? Can you get any body to tell you now that the people of a Territory have any authority to govern themselves, in regard to this mooted question of slavery, before they form a State Constitution? No such thing at all, although there is a general running fire, and although there has been a burst made in every speech on that side, assuming that policy had given the people of a Territory the right to govern themselves upon this question; yet the point is dodged. To-day it has been decided—no more than a year ago it was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, and is insisted upon to-day, that the people of a Territory have no right to exclude slavery from a Territory, that if any one man objects to it is for him to bring it into a Territory, all the rest of the people have no right to keep them out. This being so, and this decision being made one of the points that the Judge approved, and one in the approval of which he says he means to keep me down—put me down I should not say, for I have never been up. He says he is in favor of it, and sticks to
it, and expects to win his battle on that decision, which says that there is no such thing as Squatter Sovereignty; but that any one man may take slaves into a Territory, and all the other men in the Territory may be opposed to it. And it is a constant theme of their Constitution, they cannot prohibit it. When it is a fact that there is not much left of this vast matter of Squatter Sovereignty I should like to know!

When we get back, we get to the point of the right of the people to make a Constitution. Kansas was settled, for example, in 1854. It was settled under a Constitution, in a very regular way, for three years. All this time negro slavery could be taken in by any five individuals, and by that decision of the Supreme Court, which the Judge approves, all the rest of the people cannot keep it out; but when they come to make a Constitution they may say no negro slavery. But it is there; they are obliged to tolerate it some way, and all experience shows it will be so—for they will not take the negro slaves and absolutely deprive the owners of them. All experience shows this to be so. All that space of time that runs from the beginning of the settlement of the Territory until there is sufficiently of people to make a State Constitution—all that period of time popular sovereignty is given up. The seal is absolutely put down upon it by the Court decision, and Judge Douglas puts his own upon the top of that, yet he is appealing to the people to give him vast credit for his devotion to popular sovereignty.

Again, when we get to the question of the right of the people to form a State Constitution as they please, to form it with slavery or without slavery—if that is any thing new, I confess I don’t know it. Has there ever been a time when any body said that any other than the people of a Territory itself should form a Constitution? What is now in it that Judge Douglas should have fought seven years of his life, and pledged himself to fight all the remaining years of his life for? Can Judge Douglas find any body on earth that said that any body else should form a Constitution to suit a people? [A voice—"Yes."] Well, I should like you to name him; I should like to know who he was. [Same voice—"John Calhoun."]

Mr. Lincoln—No, Sir, I never heard of even John Calhoun saying such a thing. He insists on the same principle as Judge Douglas; but his notion of applying it, in fact, was wrong. It is enough for my purpose to ask this, when ever a Republican said anything against it? They never said anything against it, but they have constantly spoken for it; and whoever will undertake to examine the platforms, and the speeches of responsible men of the party, and of irresponsible men, too, if you please, will be unable to find one word from anybody in the Republican ranks, opposed to that Popular Sovereignty which Judge Douglas thinks that he has invented. I suppose that Judge Douglas will claim in a little while, that he is the inventor of the idea that the people should govern themselves; that nobody ever thought of such a thing until he brought it forward. We do not remember, that in that old Declaration of Independence, it is said that “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” There is the origin of Popular Sovereignty. Now, then, shall come in at this day and change that he invented it?

The Lecompton Constitution connects itself with this question, for it is in this matter of the Lecompton Constitution that our friend Judge Douglas claims such vast credit. I agree that in opposing the Lecompton Constitution, so far as I can understand it, I do not differ from him; and, gentlemen, you will readily see why I could not deny it, even if I wanted to. But I do not wish to tell all of the Republicans in the nation opposed it, and they would have opposed it just as much without Judge Douglas’s all with it. They had all taken great pains in its long before. Why, the reason that the Constitution, I urged against him a year before. I have the printed speech in my hand. The argument that he makes, why that Constitution should not be adopted, that the people were not fairly represented, not allowed to vote, I pointed out in a speech a year ago, which I hold in my hand now, that no fair chance was to be given to the people. ["Read it," “read it.”] I shall not waste your time by trying to read it. ["Read it," "read it.”] Gentlemen, reading from speeches, is a very tedious business, particularly for an old man that has to put on spectacles, and more so if the man be so tall that he has to bend over to the light. A little of this, too, as to this matter of Popular Sovereignty and the Lecompton Constitution. The Lecompton Constitution, as the Judge tells us, was defeated. The defeat of it was a good thing or it was not. He thinks the defeat of it was a good thing, and so do I, and we agree in that. Who defeated it?

A voice—"Judge Douglas."

Mr. Lincoln—Yes, he furnished himself, and if you suppose he controlled the other Democrats that went with him, he furnished them three votes, while the Republicans furnished only one. That is what he did to defeat it. In the House of Representatives he and his friends furnished some twenty votes, and the Republicans furnished ninety odd. Now who was it that did the work?

A voice—"Douglas."

Mr. Lincoln—Why, yes, Douglas did it! To be sure he did. Let us, however, put that proposition another way. The Republicans could not have done it without Judge Douglas. Could he have done it without them? Which could have come the nearer to doing it without the other?

A voice—"Who killed the bill?"

Another voice—"Douglas."

Mr. Lincoln—Ground was taken against it by the Republicans long before Douglas did it. The proportion of opposition to that measure is about five to one. A voice—"Why don’t they come out on it?"

Mr. Lincoln—You don’t know what you are talking about, my friend. I am quite willing to answer any gentleman in the crowd who asks an intelligent question. Now who, in all this country, has ever found any of our friends of Judge Douglas’s way of thinking, and who have voted upon this main question, that has ever thought of using a word in behalf of Judge Trumbull?

A voice—"We have."  

Mr. Lincoln—I defy you to show a printed resolution passed in a Democratic meeting, that I take it upon myself to defy any man to show a printed resolution of a Democratic meeting, large or small, in favor of Judge Trumbull, or any of the five or ten or one hundred Republicans who beat that bill. Everything must be for the Democrats! They did every thing, and the five to the one that really did the thing, they snub over, and they do not seem to remember that they have an existence upon the face of the earth.

Gentlemen, I fear that I shall become tedious. I leave this branch of the subject to take hold of another. I take up that part of Judge Douglas’s speech in which he respectfully attended to me.

Judge Douglas made two points upon my recent speech at Springfield. He says they are to be the issues of this campaign. The first one of these points he bases upon the language in a speech which I delivered at Springfield, which I believe I can quote correctly from memory. I said there that "we are now far into the fifth year since a policy was instaurated for the avowed object, and with the confirmed purpose, of putting an end to slavery agitation; under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only ceased, but has constantly augmented," "I believe it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free.” I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I am quoting from my speeches. I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest, in
the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the States, North as well as South.

What is the paragraph? In this paragraph which I have quoted in your hearing, and to which I ask the attention of all, Judge Douglas thinks the adoption of the Constitution gives great political heresy. I want your attention particularly to what he has inferred from it. He says that I am in favor of making all the States of this Union uniform in all their internal regulations; that in all their domestic concerns I am in favor of making them entirely uniform. He draws this inference from the language I have quoted to you. He says that I am in favor of making war by the North upon the South for the extinction of slavery; that I am also in favor of invading (as he expresses it) the South to war upon the North, for the purpose of nationalizing slavery. Now, it is singular enough, if you will look carefully into that passage over, I did not say the war upon the South, or the invasion of the South, or the nationalizing of slavery. I only said what I expected would take place. I made a prediction only—it may have been a foolish one, perhaps. I did not even say that I desired slavery should be put in course of ultimate extinction. I do say so now, however; but there need be no longer any difficulty about that. It may be written down in the great speech.

Gentlemen, Judge Douglas informed you that this speech of mine was probably carefully prepared. I admit that it was. I am not master of language; I have not prepared it. It was not that I had not care about a quibble in regard to words. I know what I meant, and I will not leave this crowd in doubt, if I can explain it to them, what I really meant in the use of that paragraph.

I have not, in the first place, unaware that this Government has endured eighty-two years, half slave and half free. I know that. I am tolerably well acquainted with the history of the country, and I know that it has endured eighty-two years, half slave and half free. I am not ashamed of it. I believe it has endured, because during all that time, until the introduction of the Nebraska bill, the public mind did rest all the time in the belief that slavery was in course of ultimate extinction. That was what gave us the rest that we had through that period of eighty-two years; at least, so I believe. I have always hated slavery. I think, as much as any Abolitionist—I have been an Old Line Whig—I have always hated it, but I have always been quiet about it until this new era of the introduction of the Nebraska bill. I always believed that everybody was against it, and that it was in course of ultimate extinction. [Pointing to Mr. Browning, who stood near by.] Browning thought so; the great mass of the nation have rested in the belief that slavery was in course of ultimate extinction. They had reason so to believe.

In the adoption of the Constitution and its attendant history led the people to believe; and that such was the belief of the framers of the Constitution itself, why did those old men, about the time of the adoption of the Constitution, declare that after twenty years the African Slave Trade, by which slaves are supplied, might be cut off by Congress? Why were all these acts? I might enumerate more of these acts, but enough, perhaps, to show that the framers of the Constitution intended and expected the ultimate extinction of that institution. And now, when I say, as I said in my speech that Judge Douglas has quoted from, when I say that I think the opponents of slavery are the friends of the Constitution, and that the friends of slavery are the enemies of the Constitution, I only mean to say, that they will place it in the course of ultimate extinction, I only mean to say, that they will place it in the course of ultimate extinction. I only mean to say, that we have no right to interfere with it, because it is in the course of ultimate extinction. I only mean to say, that we have no right to interfere with it, because it is in the course of ultimate extinction; and we are by both duty and inclination to stick to that Constitution, in all its letter and spirit, from beginning to end.

said that always, Judge Douglas had heard me say it—if not quite a hundred times, at least as good as a hundred times and when it is said that I am in favor of interfering with slavery where it exists, I know it is unwarranted by anything I have ever said, and, as I believe, by anything I have ever said. If, by any means, I have ever used language which could fairly be so construed (as, however, I believe I never have), I would withdraw it. I would withdraw it.

So much, then, for the inference that Judge Douglas draws, that I am in favor of setting the states at war with one another. I know that I never meant any such thing. I believe that no man could infer any such thing from anything I have ever said.

Now, in relation to his inference that I am in favor of a general consolidation of all the local institutions of the various States, I will attend to that for a little while, and try to prove, if I can, how on earth it could be said that I am in favor of such an institution from anything I said. I have said, very many times, that Judge Douglass's hearings, that no man believed more than I in the principle of self-government; that it lies at the bottom of all my ideas of just government, from beginning to end. I have denied that his use of that term applies properly. But for the thing itself, I deny that any man has ever gone beyond of me in his devotion to the principle, whatever he has done in efficiency in advocating it. I think that I have said it in your hearing—that I believe each individual is naturally entitled to do as he pleases with himself and the fruit of his industry, so far as it is in no wise interfere with any other man's rights—that each community, as a State, has a right to do exactly as it pleases with all the concerns within that State that interfere with the rights of no other State, and that the General Government, under power, has no right to interfere with anything except that general class of things that does concern the whole. I have said that at all times. I have said as illustrations, I think, did believe in the right of Illinois to interfere with the crabbery laws of Indiana, the other States, etc., if he pleases; or the liquor laws of Maine, I have said those things over and over again, and I repeat them here as my sentiments.

How is it, then, that Judge Douglas infers, because I know to see slavery put where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, that I am in favor of Illinois going over and interfering with the crabbery laws of Indiana? What can authorize him to draw any such inference? I suppose there might be one thing that at least enabled how to draw such an inference—that it would not be true with me or many others, that is, because he looks upon all this matter of slavery as an exceedingly little thing, this matter of keeping one-sixth of the population of the whole nation in a state of oppression and tyranny unequaled in the world. He looks upon it as being an exceedingly little thing—only equal to the question of the crabbery laws of Indiana—something having no moral question in it—as something on a par with the question of whether a man shall pasture his hounds with cattle, or plant it with tobacco, or little and so small a thing that he can look it upon it as being an exceedingly little thing—only equal to the question of the crabbery laws of Indiana—something having no moral question in it—as something on a par with the question of whether a man shall pasture his hounds with cattle, or plant it with tobacco, or little and so small a thing that he can look it upon it as being an exceedingly little thing—only equal to the question of the crabbery laws of Indiana—something having no moral question in it—and so he proceeds to infer that I am in favor of bringing about an amalgamation of all the other little things in the Union. Now, it so happens—it so happens, I presume, I presume, I presume, the foundation is this mistake—that the Judge thinks that and it so happens that there is a vast portion of the American people that do not look upon it as being this very little thing. They look upon it as a vast moral evil; they can prove it as such by the writings of those who gave us the blessings of liberty, the blessings that we enjoy, and that they so looked upon it, and not as an evil merely confining itself to the State where it is at issue; and while we agree that by the Constitution we are entitled to, in the States where it exists, we have no right to interfere with it, because it is in the course of ultimate extinction, I only mean to say, that we have no right to interfere with it, because it is in the course of ultimate extinction; and we are by both duty and inclination to stick to that Constitution, in all its letter and spirit, from beginning to end.
we must make sugar-cane grow here too, and we must make those which grow North grow in the South. And all this I suppose he understands I am in favor of doing. Now, so much for all this nonsense—for I must call it so. The Judge can have no issue with me on a question of establishing uniformity in the domestic regulations of the States.

At a little now on the other point—the Dred Scott decision. Another of the issues he says that he is to be made with me is upon his devotion to the Dred Scott decision, and my opposition to it.

I have expressed hereof, and I now repeat, my opposition to the Dred Scott decision. I would be allowed to state the nature of that opposition, and I ask you your indulgence while I do so. What is fairly implied by the term Judge Douglas has used, “resistance to the decision”? I do not resist it. If I wanted to take Dred Scott from his master, I would be interfering with property, and that is the difficulty that Judge Douglas speaks of, of interfering with property would arise. But I am doing no such thing as that, but all that I am doing is refusing to obey it as a political rule. If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new Territory, in spite of the Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should.

Mr. Lincoln—that is what I would do. Judge Douglas said last night, that before the decision he might advance his opinion, and it might be contrary to the decision when it was made; but after it was made he would abide by it until it was reversed. Just so! We let this property abide by the decision, but we will try to reverse that decision. We will try to put it where Judge Douglas would not object, for he says he will obey it until it is reversed. Some people have a right to reverse that decision, once it is made, and we mean to reverse it, and we mean to do it peaceably.

What are the uses of decisions of courts? They have two uses. As rules of property they have two uses. First, they decide upon the question before the courts. They decide in this case that Dred Scott is a slave. Nobody resists that, but they say to everybody else, that persons standing just as Dred Scott stands, as is he is. That is, they say that when a question comes up upon another person, it will be so decided again, unless the court decides in another way, unless the court reverses its decision the whole. Well, we mean to do what we can to have the court decide the other way. That is one thing we mean to try to do.

The sacredness that Judge Douglas throws around this decision, is a degree of sacredness that has never been before thrown around any other decision. I have never heard of such a thing. Why, decisions apparently contrary to that decision, or that good lawyers think are contrary to that decision, have been made by that very court before. It is the first of its kind; it is an anomaly in legal history. It is a new wonder of the world. It is based on falsehood in the main as to the facts—allusions of facts upon which it stands as if not all in many instances, and no decision made on any question—the first instance of a decision made under so many unfavorable circumstances—has ever been held by the profession as law, and it has always needed confirmation before the lawyers regarded it as settled law. But Judge Douglas will have it that it all hands must take this extraordinary decision, made under these extraordinary circumstances, and give their vote in Congress in accordance with it, yield to it and obey it in every possible case. Circumstances alter cases. Do not gentlemen here remember the case of that same court, some twenty-five or thirty years ago, deciding that a National Bank was constitutional? I ask, if somebody does not remember that a National Bank was declared to be constitutional? Such is the truth, whether it be remembered or not. The Bank charter ran out, and a re-charter was granted by Congress. That result was, I say, before General Jackson. It was urged upon him, when he denied the constitutionality of the Bank, that the Supreme Court had decided that it was constitutional; and that General Jackson then said that the Supreme Court had no right to lay down a rule to govern a coordinate branch of the Government, the members of which had sworn to support the Constitution—that each member had sworn to support that Constitution as he understood it. I will venture here to say, that I have heard Judge Douglas say that he approved of General Jackson for that act. What has now become of all his tirade about “resistance to the Supreme Court?”

My fellow-citizens, getting back a little, I pass from these points, when Judge Douglas makes his threat of annihilation upon the “alliance,” he is cautious to say that that warfare of his is to fall upon the leaders of the Republican party. Alarmed, perhaps, at the number of men and every distinction he makes, has its significance. He means for the Republicans who do not count themselves as leaders, to be his friends; he makes no fuss over them; it is the leaders that he is making war upon. He wants it understood that the mass of the Republican party are really his friends. It is his duty, he says, to be doing something, that are interesting to the termination of his hand. This is clearly and unquestionably the light in which he presents that matter, I want to ask your attention, addressing myself to the Republicans here, that I may ask you some questions, as to where you, as the Republican party, would be placed if you sustained Judge Douglas in his present position by a reflection? I do not claim, gentlemen, to be unchaste; I do not pretend that I would not like to go to the United States Senate; I make no such hypocritical pretense, but I do say to you that in this mighty issue, it is nothing to you—nothing to the mass of the people of the nation, whether or not Judge Douglas or myself shall ever be heard of after this night; it may be a trifle to either of us, but in connection with this mighty question, upon which hang the destinies of the nation, perhaps it is absolutely nothing; but where will you be placed if you reindorse Judge Douglas? Don’t you know how apt he is—how exceedingly anxious he is at all times to seize upon anything and everything to persuade you that something he has done you yourselves? Why, he tried to persuade you last night that our National Bank was unconstitutional; he wished to persuade him to introduce the Nebraska bill; he wished to have somebody in that Legislature ever thought of such a thing; and when he first introduced the bill, he never thought of it; but still he fights furiously for the proposition, and that he did it because there was a-studying instruction to our Senate to be always introducing Nebraska bills. He tells you he is for the Cincinnati platform, he tells you he is for the Dred Scott decision. He tells you, not in his speech last night, but substantially in a former speech, that he cares not if slavery is voted up or down—he tells you the struggle on Lecompton is past—it may come up again or not, and if it does he stands where he stood when you voted against his opposition, you build up the Republican party. If you indorse him, you tell him if you don’t care whether slavery be voted up or down, and he will close, or try to close your mouths with his declaration, repeated by the day, the week, the month, and the year. Is that what you mean? [Grief of “no one voice yes.”] Yes, I have no doubt you who have always been for him, if you mean that. No doubt of that, soberly I have said, and I repeat it. I think, in the position in which Judge Douglas stood in opposing the Lecompton Constitution, he could have said, that if he did not know that it will return, but if it does we may know where to find him, and if it does not we may know where to look for him, and that it is on the Cincinnati platform. Now I could ask the Republican party, after all the hard names that Judge Douglas has called them by—all his repeated charges of traitors to marry with and hug negroes—all his declarations of Black Republicanism—by the way, we are improving, the black has got rubbed off—but with all that, if he be the Republican, where do you stand? Do you stand ready saddled, bridled and harnessed, and waiting to be driven over to the slavery extension camp of the nation—just ready to be driven over, tied together in a line—to be driven over, every man with a rope around his neck, that having been held by Judge Douglas in his former speech at the question. If Republicanism is what they have done, I think they had better not do it, but I think that the Republican party is made up of those who, as far as they can possibly, will oppose the extension of slavery, and who will hope for its ultimate extinc-
tion. If they believe it is wrong in grasping up the new lands of the continent, and keeping them from the settlement of free white laborers, who want the land to bring up their families upon; if they are in earnest, although they may make a mistake, they will grow restless, and the time will come when they will come back again and reorganize, if not by the same name, at least by the same spirit, and pursue their party's cause. It is better, then, to save the work while it is begun.

You have done the labor; maintain it—keep it. If men choose to serve you, go with them; but if you have made up your organization upon principle, stand by it; for, as surely as God reigns over you, and has inspired your mind, and given a sense of property, and continues to give you hope, so surely will you still cling to those ideas, and you will at last come back again after your wanderings, merely to do your work over again.

We were often—more than once at least—in the course of Judge Douglas's speech last night, reminded that this government was made for white men—that he believed it was made for white men. Well, that is putting it into a shape in which no one wants to deny it; but the Judge then goes into his passion for drawing inferences, and says, in effect, either we have one another alone, and do nothing; or we are now a mighty nation; we are thirty, or about thirty millions of people, and we own and inhabit about one-fifteenth part of the dry land of the whole earth. We run our memory back over the pages of history to point of numbers, vastly inferior to what we are now, with a vastly less extent of country, with vastly less of anything we deem desirable among men—we look upon the change as exceedingly advantageous to us and to our posterity, and we fix upon something that happened so long ago, as in some way or other being connected with this rise of prosperity. We find a race of men living in that day whom we claim as our fathers and grandfathers; they were men; they fought for the principle of liberty; they contended for it; and we understand that by what they then did it has followed that the degree of prosperity, which we now enjoy has come to us. We hold this annual celebration of remembrance of all the good done in this process of time, of how it was done and who did it, and how we are historically connected with the same meetings in better and our contemporaries; we are more attached to the one to the other, and are more firmly bound to the country we inhabit. In every way we are better men in the age, and race, and country in which we live, for these celebrations. But after we have done all this we have not yet reached the whole. There is something else connected with this. We have besides these men—descended by blood from our ancestors—wandering among us, perhaps half our people, who are not descendants at all of these men; they are men who have come from Europe—German, Irish, Scotch and Scandinavian—men that have come from Europe, and those ancestors have come here and settled here, finding themselves our equals in all things. If they look back through this history to trace their connection with those days by blood, they find they have none, they cannot carry themselves back to the glorious epoch and make themselves feel that they are part of us, but when they look through that old Declaration of Independence, they find that those old men say that "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal," and then they feel that they are morally bound by that declaration in that day evidences their relation to those men, that it is the father of all moral principle in them, and that they have a right to claim it as they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh, of the men who wrote that Declaration, and so they are. That is the case in that Declaration that is a bond between these men and the fathers of our country. They have inherited the same patriotic hearts as long as the love of freedom exists in the minds of men throughout the world.

Now, sir, for the purpose of squaring things with this idea of "don't care if slavery is voted up or voted down," for sustaining the Dred Scott decision, for declaring that the Declaration of Independence did not mean anything at all, we have Judge Douglas giving his exposition of what the Declaration of Independence means, and we have him saying that the people of America are equal to the people of England. According to his construction, you Germans are not connected with it. Now I ask you all to speculate, if all the people, if indubitably, if ratified, if confirmed, and enforced, if taught to our children, and repeated to them, do not tend to rob out the spirit of liberty in the country, and to transform this Government into a Government of some other form. Those arguments that are made, that the inferior race are to be treated as such as they are capable of enjoying; that as much is to be done for them as their condition will allow. What are these arguments? They are the arguments that kings have made for enthroning the people in all the world. You will find that all the arguments in favor of king-craft were of this class; they always bestowed the new privilege, and then that they wanted to do it, but because the people were better off for being hidden. That is their argument, and this argument of the Judge is the same old serpent that says you work and eat, you till and I will enjoy the fruits of it. Turn in whatever way you will—whether it comes from the mouth of a king, an ancestor for enslaving the people of his own country, or from the mouth of men of one race as a reason for enslaving the men of another race, it is all the same old serpent, and I hold that if a correct argumentation is made for the purpose of convincing the public mind that we should not have a large, should not be granted, but does not stop with the negro. I should like to know if taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle, and making exceptions to it, which will stop it? If one man says it does not mean a negro, why not another say it does not mean some other man? If that declaration is not the truth, let us get the statue book, in which we find it, and tear it out? Who is so bold as to do it? If it is not true, let us tear it out! [cries of "no, no!"] let us stick to it, and let us stand firmly by it then.

It may be that there are certain conditions that make it necessary and impose it upon us, and it is to the extent that a necessity is imposed upon us, that we must submit to it. I think that was the condition in which we found ourselves when we established this Government. We had slavery among us, we could not get our government to put it in the book, or if we were permitted to remain in slavery, we would not have known. Because of that, we were secure, if we got it, if we were permitted to make slavery, we would have known. Because of that, we were secure, if we could have been permitted to do it, and leaving by necessity submitted to that, it is clear that the declaration of the charter of our liberties. Let that charter stand as our standard.

My friends, I said to me that I am a poor hand to quote Scripture. I will try it again, however. It is said in one of the admonitions of our Lord, "As your Father in Heaven is perfect, ye also be perfect." The Savior, I suppose, did not expect that more could be perfect as the Father in Heaven; but He said, "As your Father in Heaven is perfect, ye also be perfect." If that were a standard, and he who did most toward reaching that standard, attained the highest degree of moral perfection. So I say in relation to the principle that all men are
created equal, let it be as nearly reached as we can. If we cannot give freedom to every creature, let us do nothing that will impose slavery upon any other creature. Let us then turn this Government back into the channel in which the framers of the Constitution originally placed it. Let us stand firmly by each other. If we do not so we are turning in the contrary direction, that our friend Judge Douglas proposes—not intentionally—as working in the traces tend to make this one universal institution. He is one that runs in that direction, and as such I resist him.

My friends, I have detailed you about as long as I desired to do, and I have only to say, let us discard all this quibbling about this man and the other man—which race and that race and the other race being inferior, and therefore they must be placed in a certain order. In short, that we have here left us. Let us discard all these things, and unite as one people throughout this land, until we shall once more stand up declaring that all men are created equal.

My friends, I could not, without breaking off upon some new topics, which would detain you too long, continue to-night. I thank you for this most extensive audience that you have furnished me to-night. I leave you, hoping that the lamp of liberty will burn in your bosoms until there shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created free and equal.

SPEECH OF SENATOR DOUGLAS.

Delivered at Bloomington, Ill., July 16th, 1858. (Mr. Lincoln was present.)

Senator DOUGLAS said:

MR. CHAIRMAN, AND FELLOW-CITIZENS OF McLEAN COUNTY: To say that I am profoundly touched by the hearty welcome you have extended me, and by the kind and complimentary sentiments you have expressed toward me, is a feeble expression of the feelings of my heart.

I appear before you this evening for the purpose of vindicating the course which I have felt it my duty to pursue in the Senate of the United States, upon the great public questions which have agitated the country since I last addressed you. I am aware that my Senatorial course has been arraigned, not only by political foes, but by a few men pretending to belong to the Democratic party, and yet acting in alliance with the enemies of that party, for the purpose of electing Republicans to Congress in this State, in place of the present Democratic delegation. I desire your attention whilst I address you, and then I will ask your verdict, whether I have not in all things acted in entire good faith, and honestly carried out the principles, the professions, and the invocations which I made before my constituents, previous to my going to the Senate.

During the last session of Congress, the great question of controversy has been the admission of Kansas into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution. I need not inform you that from the beginning to the end I took hold, determined, and undeviatingly in opposition to that Lecompton Constitution. My reason for that course is contained in the fact that that instrument was not the act and deed of the people of Kansas, but it was the act and deed of the United States government. I did not embody it in the United States government. It was the act and deed of the government of the United States. In the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution of the United States, as well as the Constitution of every State of the Union—that every people ought to have the right to form, adopt and ratify the Constitution under which they are to live. When I intruded the Nebraska bill in the Senate of the United States, in 1854, I incorporated in it the provision that it was the true intent and meaning of the Nebraska bill, not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, or to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people there to be governed by their own form of government or institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States. In that bill the people of Kansas were distinctly made to understand that the people of Kansas should be left not only free, but perfectly free to form and regulate their own domestic institutions to suit themselves; and the question arose, when the Lecompton Constitution was sent into Congress, should the admission of Kansas not only asked, but attempted to be forced upon them, whether it was not that Constitution was the free act and deed of the people of Kansas? No man pretended to insist that it was. Every man in America knew that it was rejected by the people of Kansas, by a majority of over ten thousand. The attempt was made in Congress to force the Territory into the Union under that Constitution. I resisted, therefore, the Lecompton Constitution because it was a violation of the great principle of self-government, upon which all our institutions rest. I do not wish to mislead you, or to have you in doubt as to the motives of my action. I did not oppose the Lecompton Constitution upon the ground of the slavery clause contained in it. I made my speech against that instrument before the vote was taken on the slavery clause. At the time I made it I did not know whether that clause would be voted in or out; whether it would be included in the Constitution, or excluded from it, and it made no difference with me what the result of the vote was, for the reason that I was contending for a principle, under which you have no more right to force a State upon a people against their will, than you have to force a slave State upon them without their consent.

The error consisted in attempting to control the free action of the people of Kansas in any respect whatsoever. It is an argument with me to say that such and such a clause of the Constitution was not palatable, that you did not like it, it is a consequence whether you in Illinois like any clause in the Kansas Constitution or not; it is not a question for you, but it is a question for the people of Kansas. They have a right to make a Constitution in accordance with their own wishes, and if you do not like it you are not bound to go there and live under it. We in Illinois have made a Constitution to suit ourselves, and we think we have a tolerably good one; but whether we have or not, it is nobody's business but our own. If the people in Kentucky do not like it, they need not come here to live under it; if the people of Indiana are not satisfied with it, what matters it to us? Wo, and we alone, have the right to a voice in its adoption or rejection. Reasoning thus, my friends, my efforts were in the vindication of the great principle involving the right of the people of each State and of every Territory to form and regulate their own domestic institutions to suit themselves, subject only to the Constitution of our common country. I am rejoiced to be enabled to say to you that we fought that battle until we forced the advocates of the Lecompton instrument to abandon the attempt of inflicting it upon the people of Kansas, without receiving from them the party of submission to the people had been just, fair and equal. I did not consider the mode of submission provided for in what is known as the "English" bill, a fair submission, and for this simple reason, among others: It provided, in effect, that if the people of Kansas would accept the Lecompton Constitution, that they might come in with 50,000 inhabitants, but that, if they rejected it, in order that they might form a Constitution of their own, it must conform to the feelings and sentiments of the people of the United States. They should not be received into the Union until they had 50,000 inhabitants. In other words, it said to the people, if you will come into the Union as a slaveholding State, you shall be admitted with 50,000 inhabitants, but if you insist on being a free State, you shall not be admitted until you have 150,000. I was not willing to
discriminate between free States and slave States in this Confederacy. I will not put a restriction upon a slave State that I would not put upon a free State, and I will not permit, if I can prevent it, a restriction being put upon a free State which is not applied with the same force to the slaveholding States. Equality among the States is a cardinal and fundamental principle in our Constitution, and cannot be violated without overturning our system of Government. Hence I demanded that the free States and the slaveholding States should be kept on an exact equality, one with the other, as the Constitution of the United States had placed the people of the United States and the people of a slave State in the same position, let them have it, and if they want a free State they have a right to it, and it is not for the people of Illinois, or Missouri, or New York, or Kentucky, to complain, whatever the decision of the people of Kansas may be upon that point. I present the proposition submitted by Congress, that Kansas shall become a State of the Union, and there is no way of keeping her out if you should try. The act of admission would become irrevocable; Kansas would be a State, and there would be an end of the controversy. On the other hand, if at that election the people of Kansas shall reject the proposition, as it is now generally thought will be the case, from that moment the Lecompton Constitution is dead, and again there is an end of the controversy. So you see that either way, on the 3d of August next, the Lecompton controversy ceased and terminated forever; and a similar event may never again arise. For then, the Lecompton scheme will attempt to play the Lecompton game over again. But, my fellow-citizens, I am well convinced that that game will never be attempted again; it has been so solemnly and thoroughly rebuked during the last session of Congress, that it will find but few advocates in the future. The President of the United States, in his annual message, expressly recommends that the example of the Minnesota case, where Congress required the Constitution to be submitted to the vote of the people for ratification or rejection, shall be followed in all future cases; and all that we have to do is to sustain as one man that recommendation, and the Kansas controversy can never again arise.

My friends, I do not desire you to understand me as claiming for myself any special merit for the course I have pursued on this question. I simply did my duty, a duty enjoined by fidelity, by honor, by patriotism; a duty which I could not have shrunk from, in my opinion, without dishonor and falsehood to my constituency. Besides, I only did what it was in the power of any one man to do. There were others, men of eminent ability, by whom, by whole-hearted applause, were entailed to the greatest share of the credit. Foremost among them all, as he was head and shoulders above them all, was Kentucky's great and gallant statesman, John J. Crittenden. By his course upon this question he has shown himself to be the successor of the immortal Clay, and well may Kentucky be proud of him. I will not withhold, either, the meed of praise due the Republican party in Congress for the course which they pursued. In the language of the New York Tribune, they came to the Douglas platform, making their own, but the interests of the country. My friends, when I am at battle for a great principle, I keep an eye on the aid and support from whatever quarter I can get in order to carry out that principle. I never hesitate in my course when I find those on all sides who are with me in principle finally coming to its support. Nor is it for me to inquire into the motives which animated the Republican members of Congress in supporting the Crittenden-Montgomery bill. It is enough for me that in that case they came square up and indorsed the great principle of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, which declared that Kansas should be received into the Union with slavery, or without, as its Constitution should prescribe. I was the more rejoiced at the action of the Republicans on that occasion for another reason. I could not forget, you will not more forget, how the Constitution had been treated in the convention, in declaring that never should another slave State be admitted into this Union unless by the Constitution of the United States, or unless by the Constitution of the territory. Illinois stands proudly forward as a State which early took her position in favor of the principle of popular sovereignty as applied to the Territories of the United States. When the compromise measure of 1850 passed, predicated upon that principle, you recollect the excitement which prevailed throughout the northern portion of this State. I vindicated those measures then, and defended myself for having voted for them, upon the ground that they embodied the principle that every people ought to have the privilege of forming and regulating their own institutions and sit themselves—that each State had that right, and I say no reason why it should not be extended to the Territories. When the people of Illinois had an opportunity of passing judgment upon those measures, they indorsed them by a vote of their representatives thirty-six, or one in the affirmative, and forty-four in the negative—in which they asserted that the principle embodied in the measures was the birthright of freemen, the gift of Heaven, a principle vindicated by our revolutionary fathers, and that no limitation should ever be placed upon it, either in the organization of a Territorial Government, or the admission of a State into the Union. That resolution still stands unrevoked on the journals of the Legislature of Illinois. In obedience to it, and in exact conformity with the principle, I brought in the Kansas-Nebraska bill, requiring that the people of that State should be left perfectly free in the formation of their institutions, and in the organization of their Government. I now submit to you whether I have not in good faith redeemed that pledge, that the people of Kansas should be left perfectly free to form and regulate their institutions as they may, and yet, while no man can arise in any crowd and deny that I have been faithful to my principles, and redeemed my pledge, we find those who are struggling to crush and defeat me, for the very reasons that I have been faithful in carrying out those measures. We find the Republican leaders forming alliances with professed Lecompton men to defeat every Democratic nominee and elect Republicans in their places, and aiding and defending them in order to help them break down Anti-Lecompton men whom they attempt to place in office to carry the opposition to Lecompton. The only hope that Mr. Lincoln has of defeating me for the Senate rests in the fact, that he may be able to change the result in the states in favor of the Lecompton Constitution, and, for that reason you will find he does not say a word against the Lecompton Constitution or its supporters. He is as silent as the grave upon that subject; and then he comes to me upon the question of giving up our Lecompton votes, in order that he may be elected to the Senate as the representative of Republican principles! You know that these alliances exist. I think you will find that it will come before the course is over.
Every Republican paper takes ground with my Lecompton enemies, encouraging them, stimulating them in their opposition to me and styling my friends boaters from the Democratic party, and their Lecompton allies the true Democratic party of the country. If they think that they can mislead and deceive the people of Illinois, by that sort of an unmanly and odious alliance, I think they show very little sagacity, or give the people very little credit for intelligence. It must be a contest of principle. Either the radical abolition principles of Mr. Lincoln must be maintained, or the strong constitutional national Democratic principles with which I am identified must be carried out.

There can be but two great political parties in this country. The contest this year and in 1860 must necessarily be between the Democracy and the Republicans, if we can judge from present indications. My whole life has been identified with the Democratic party. I have devoted all of my energies to advocating its principles and sustaining its organization. In this State the party was never better united or more harmonious than at this time. The State Convention which assembled on the 24 of April, and nominated Porter and French, was regularly called by the State Central Committee, appointed by the previous State Convention for that purpose. The meetings in each county in the State for the appointment of delegates to the Convention were regularly called by the county committees, and the proceedings, in every county in the State, as well as in the State Convention, were regular in all respects. No Convention was ever more harmonious in its action, or showed a more tolerant and just spirit toward brother Democrats. The leaders of the party there assembled declared their unalterable attachment to the time-honored principles and organization of the Democratic party, and to the Cincinnati platform. They declared that that platform was the only authoritative exposition of Democratic principles, and that it must so stand until changed by another National Convention. This is the sentiment they entertained at the time they met, and as to what they would prescribe no Democrat or permit the prescription of Democrats because of their opinion upon Lecomptonism, or upon any other issue which has arisen; but would recognize all men as Democrats who remained inside of the organization, preserved the uses of the party, and supported its nominees. These loyal Democrats who now claim to be the peculiar friends of the National Administration, and have formed an alliance with Mr. Lincoln and the Republicans for the purpose of defeating the Democratic party, have ceased to claim fellowship with the Democratic organization; have entirely separated themselves from it, and are endeavoring to build up a faction in the State, not with the hope or expectation of electing any one man who professes to be a Democrat to office in any county in the State, but merely to secure the defeat of the Democratic nominees and the election of Republicans in those places. What excuse can any honest Democrat have for abandoning the Democratic organization and joining with the Republicans to defeat our nominees, in view of the platform established by the State Convention? They cannot pretend that it was prescribed because of their opinions upon Lecomptonism, or any other question, for the Convention expressly declared that they recognized all as good Democrats who remained inside of the organization, and abided by the nominations. If the question is settled or is to be considered as finally disposed of by the Constitutional Convention of August, what possible excuse can any Democrat make for keeping up a division for the purpose of proscribing his party, after that election is over and the controversy has terminated? It is evident that all who shall keep up this warfare for the purpose of dividing and destroying the party, have made up their minds to abandon the Democratic organization for ever, and to join those for whose benefit they are now trying to distract our party, and elect Republicans in the place of the Democratic nominees.

I submit the question to you whether I have been right or wrong in the course I have taken in the present Congress. And I submit, also, whether I have not redeemed in good faith every pledge I have made to you? Then, my friends, the question recurs, whether I shall be sustained or rejected? If you are of opinion that Mr. Lincoln will advance the interests of Illinois better than I can; that he will sustain her credit and her dignity higher than it has been in my power to do; that your interests, and the interests of your children, require his election instead of mine; it is your duty to give him your support. If, on the contrary, you think that my adherence to these great fundamental principles upon which our Government is founded is the only way of maintaining the peace and harmony of the country and administering the perpetuity of the Republic, I then ask you to stand by me in the efforts I have made to that end.

And this brings me to the consideration of the two points at issue between Mr. Lincoln and myself. The Republican Convention, when it assembled at Springfield, did me the country the honor of indicating the man who was to be their standard-bearer, and the embodiment of their principles, in this State. I owe them my gratitude for thus making up a direct issue between Mr. Lincoln and myself. I shall have no controversy of a personal character with Mr. Lincoln. I have known him well for a quarter of a century. I have known him, as you all know him, a kind-hearted, amiable gentleman, a right good fellow, a worthy citizen, of eminent ability as a lawyer, and I have no doubt, sufficient ability to make a good Senator. The question, then, for you to decide is, whether his principles are more in accordance with the genius of our free institutions, the peace and harmony of the Republic, than those which I advocate. He tells you, in his speech made at Springfield, before the Convention which gave him his unanimous nomination, that:

"A house divided against itself cannot stand."

"I believe this Government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free."

"I do not expect the Union to be dissolved— I don't expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided."

"It will become all one thing or all the other."

That is the fundamental principle upon which he sets out in this campaign. Well, I say to you all— I, you all will believe one word of it when you come to examine it carefully, and see its consequences. Although the Republican party has existed from its first growth to this day, divided into free States and slave States, yet we are told that in the future it cannot endure unless they will become all free or all slave. For that reason he says, as the gentleman in the crowd says, that they must be all free. He wishes to go to the Senate of the United States in order to carry out that line of public policy which will compel all the States in the South to become free. How is he going to do it? Has Congress any power over the subject of slavery in Kentucky, or Virginia, or any other State of this Union? How, then, is Mr. Lincoln going to carry out that principle which he says is essential to the existence of this Union, to wit: That slavery must be abolished in all the States of the Union, or must be established in them all? You convince the South that they must either establish slavery in Illinois, and in every other free State, or submit to its abolition in every Southern State, and you invite them to make a warfare upon the Northern States in order to establish slavery, for the sake of perpetuating it at home. Thus, Mr. Lincoln, by his proposition, a war of sections, a war between Illinois and Kentucky, a war between the free States and the slave States, a war between the North and the South, for the purpose of either exterminating slavery in every Southern State, or planting it in every Northern State. He tells you that the safety of this Republic, that the existence of this Union, depends upon that warfare being carried on until one section or the other shall be entirely exterminated. The States must all be free or slave, for a house divided against itself cannot stand. That is Mr. Lincoln's doctrine of the Union. My Friends, is it possible to preserve peace between the North and the South if such a doctrine shall prevail in either section of the Union? Will you ever submit to a warfare waged by the Southern States to establish slavery in Illinois? What man in Illinois would not lose the last drop of his blood before he would submit to the institution of slavery being forced upon us by the other States, against our will? And if that be the case, what Southern man would not shed the last drop of his blood to prevent Illi-
no, or any other Northern State, from interfering to abolish slavery in his State? Each of those States is sovereign under the Constitution; and if we wish to preserve our liberties, the reserved rights and sovereignty of each and every State must be maintained. I have said on a former occasion, and I hope repeat, that it is either almost impossible to establish uniformity in the local and domestic institutions of all the States of this Confederacy. And why? Because the Constitution of the United States rests upon the right of every State to decide all its local and domestic institutions for itself. It is not possible, therefore, to make them conform to each other. We cannot subvert the Constitution everywhere or establishing it everywhere in the same mode which I have pointed out by an amendment to the Constitution to the effect that there is no other possible mode. Mr. Lincoln intends resorting to that, or else he means nothing by the great principle up which he desires to be elected. I trust that we shall be able to stand on a constitutional basis, as much as I do mean by this Scriptural quotation that "A house divided against itself cannot stand"; that the Government cannot endure permanently, half slave and half free; that it must be all one thing or all the other. Who among you expects to live, or have his children live, until slavery shall be established, in almost or abolished in South Carolina? Who expects to see that occur during the lifetime of ourselves or our children.

There is but one possible way in which slavery can be abolished, and that is by leaving a State, according to the principle of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, perfectly free to form and regulate its institutions in its own way. That was the principle upon which this Republic was founded, and it is under the operation of that principle that we have been able to preserve the Union thus far. Under its operations, slavery disappeared from New Hampshire, from Rhode Island, from Connecticut, from New York, from New Jersey, from Pennsylvania, from six of the twelve original slaveholding States; and this gradual system of emancipation went on in rapid strides and steadily, so long as we in the free States were content to live, to work, to do business, and left our neighbors alone. But the moment the Abolition Societies were organized throughout the North, plunging a violent crusade against slavery in the Southern States, this combination necessarily caused a counter-combination in the South, and a sectional line was drawn which was a barrier to any further emancipation. Bane in mind that emancipation has not taken place in any one State since the Free Soil party was organized as a political party in this country. Emancipation went on gradually in States after State so long as the free States were content with managing their own affairs and leaving the South perfectly free to do as they pleased; but the moment the North said we are powerful enough to control you of the South, the moment the North proclaimed itself the determined master of the South, that moment the South combined to resist the attack; and thus sectional parties were formed and gradual emancipation ceased in all the Northern slaveholding States. And yet Mr. Lincoln, in view of these historical facts, proposes to keep up this principle of abolishing slavery in all the Northern States together in one political party, elect a President by Northern votes alone, and then, of course, call in a Congress composed of Northern men, and administer the Government by Northern men only, denying all the Southern States of this Union any participation in the administration of affairs whatsoever. I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, whether such a line of policy is consistent with the peace and harmony of the country? Can the Union endure under such a system of policy? He has taken his position in favor of sectional agitation and sectional warfare. I have taken mine in favor of securing peace, of abolishing slavery everywhere among all the States, by permitting each to mind its own business, and discontinue any attempt at interference on the part of one State with the domestic concerns of the others.

Mr. Lincoln makes another issue with me, and he wishes to confuse the contest to those sitting in the Senate to introduce a proposition into the Senate as readily as the one to which I have already referred. The other issue is a crusade against the Supreme Court of the United States, because of its decision in the Dred Scott case. My fellow-citizens, I have no
issue to make with the Supreme Court. I have no crusade to preach against that august body. I have no warfare to make upon it. I resign all pretensions of the proposition that the Court, when pronounced, as the judiciary upon all questions within their jurisdiction. It would be perfectly legitimate and proper for Mr. Lincoln, myself, or any other lawyer, to go before the Supreme Court and argue any question that might arise there, taking either side of it, and enforcing it with all our ability, zeal, and energy, but when the decision is pronounced, that decision becomes the law of the land, and he, and you, and myself, and every other good citizen, must bow to it, and yield obedience to it. Unless we respect it, and bow in deference to the final decisions of the highest tribunal of our country, we are driven at once to anarchy, to violence, to mob law, and there is no security left for our property, or our civil rights. What protects your property but the law, and who expounds the law but the judicial tribunals? Where can appeal be taken from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, in all cases where a person does not like the adjudication, to whom is that appeal to be taken? Are we to appeal from the Supreme Court to a county meeting like this? And shall we here re-argue the question and reverse the decision? If so, how are we to enforce our decrees after we have pronounced them? Does Mr. Lincoln intend to appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court to a Republican caucus, or a town meeting? To whom is he going to appeal? [To Loyalty, and shouts of laughter.] Why, if I understand aright, Lincoln and Loyalty are co-appellants in a joint suit, and as much as they are so, he would not certainly appeal from the Supreme Court to his own partner to decide the case for him.

Mr. Lincoln tells you that he is opposed to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case. Well, suppose he is; what is he going to do about it? I never got beat in a law suit in my life that I was not opposed to the decision, and if I had it before the Circuit Court I took it up to the Supreme Court, where, if I got beat again, I thought it better to say no more about it, as I did not know what further modes of reversing the decision I could use or endure. Yet he says, 'To whom is Mr. Lincoln going to appeal?' Why, he says he is going to appeal to Congress. Let us see how he will appeal to Congress. He tells us that on the 8th of March, 1850, Congress passed a law called the Missouri Compromise, prohibiting slavery forever in all the territory West of the Mississippi and North of the Missouri line of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, that Dred Scott, a slave in Missouri, was taken by his master to Fort Snelling, in the present State of Minnesota, situated on the West branch of the Mississippi river, and consequently in the Territory where slavery was prohibited by the Act of 1850; and that Dred Scott appealed for his freedom in consequence of having been taken into a free Territory, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that Dred Scott did not become free by being taken into that Territory, but that having been carried back to Missouri, was yet a slave. Mr. Lincoln is going to appeal from that decision and reverse it. He does not intend to reverse it as to Dred Scott. Oh, no! But he will reverse it so that it shall not stand as a rule in the future. How will he do it? He says that if he is elected to the Senate he will introduce and pass the Kansas-Nebraska Law, which is proroguing slavery again in all the Territories. Suppose he does re-enact the same law which the Court has pronounced unconstitutional, will that make it constitutional? If the Act of 1850 was unconstitutional in consequence of having no power to pass it, will Mr. Lincoln find it constitutional by passing it again? What clause of the Constitution of the United States provides for an appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court to Congress? If my reading of that instrument is correct, it is to the effect that that instrument is to the effect that the Constitution of the United States provides anything in the Constitution of law of a State to the contrary notwithstanding. Hence, you will find that not only such Acts of Congress are laws as are made in pursuance of the Constitution. When Congress has passed an act, and put it on the statute book, and it has been made in conformity with the Constitution or not? The Constitution of

the United States tells you. It has provided that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in a Supreme Court, which Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. Thus, the Supreme Court is declared, in so many words, to be the tribunal, and the only tribunal, which is competent to adjudicate upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress. He tells you that that Court has adjudicated the question, and decided that an act of Congress prohibiting slavery in the Territory is unconstitutional and void; and yet he says he is going to pass another like it. What for? Will it be any more valid? Will he be able to convince this Court that the second act is valid when the first is invalid and void? What good does it do to pass a second act when the first is invalid and void? If it is not unconstitutional? If it is not unconstitutional, why will he have the effrontery to arrogate the Supreme Court before the people, and to bring them into all the political discussions of the country? Will that do any good? Will it inspire any more confidence in the judicial tribunals of the country? What good can it do to wage this war upon the Court, arguing it against Congress, and Congress against the Court? The Constitution of the United States has said that this Government shall be divided into three separate and distinct branches, the executive, the legislative and the judicial, and of course each one is supreme and independent of the other within the circle of its own powers. The functions of Congress are to enact the statutes, the province of the Court is to pronounce upon their validity, and the duty of the Executive is to carry the decision into effect which is rendered by the Court. And yet, notwithstanding the Constitution makes the decision of the Court final in regard to the validity of an act of Congress, Mr. Lincoln is going to reverse that decision by passing another act of Congress. Perhaps he will resort to the same subterfuge that I have found others of his party resort to, which is to agitate and again until he can change the Supreme Court and put other men in the places of the present incumbents. I wonder whether Mr. Lincoln is right sure that he can accomplish that reform. He certainly will not be able to get rid of the present Judges until they die, and from present appearances I think they have as good security of life as he has of his. To whom is Mr. Lincoln going to appeal? Why, he says he is going to appeal to Congress. Let us see how he will appeal to Congress. He tells us that on the 8th of March, 1850, Congress passed a law called the Missouri Compromise, prohibiting slavery forever in all the territory West of the Mississippi and North of the Missouri line of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes, that Dred Scott, a slave in Missouri, was taken by his master to Fort Snelling, in the present State of Minnesota, situated on the West branch of the Mississippi river, and consequently in the Territory where slavery was prohibited by the Act of 1850, and that Dred Scott appealed for his freedom in consequence of having been taken into a free Territory, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that Dred Scott did not become free by being taken into that Territory, but that having been carried back to Missouri, was yet a slave. Mr. Lincoln is going to appeal from that decision and reverse it. He does not intend to reverse it as to Dred Scott. Oh, no! But he will reverse it so that it shall not stand as a rule in the future. How will he do it? He says that if he is elected to the Senate he will introduce and pass the Kansas-Nebraska Law, which is proroguing slavery again in all the Territories. Suppose he does re-enact the same law which the Court has pronounced unconstitutional, will that make it constitutional? If the Act of 1850 was unconstitutional in consequence of having no power to pass it, will Mr. Lincoln find it constitutional by passing it again? What clause of the Constitution of the United States provides for an appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court to Congress? If my reading of that instrument is correct, it is to the effect that that instrument is to the effect that the Constitution of the United States provides anything in the Constitution of law of a State to the contrary notwithstanding. Hence, you will find that not only such Acts of Congress are laws as are made in pursuance of the Constitution. When Congress has passed an act, and put it on the statute book, and it has been made in conformity with the Constitution or not? The Constitution of
Would such a Court command the respect of the country? If the Republican party cannot trust Democratic Judges, how can they expect us to trust Republican Judges, when they have been selected in advance for the purpose of packing a decision in the event of a case arising? My fellow-citizens, whatever parties or political issues shall be brought to the bench, the structure shall stand, and their judicial conduct reviewed in town meetings and successions; whenever the independence and integrity of the judiciary shall be tampered with to the extent of rendering them partial, blind and suppliant tools, that security will you have for your rights and your liberties, and the safety of your property, as the future generations are concerned? Mr. Lincoln told it directly in regard to this warfare upon the Supreme Court of the United States. I accept the decision of that Court as it was pronounced. Whatever may be the individual opinions may be, I, as a good citizen, am bound to respect the decision of the Court in this case, as the Constitution of the United States, in this respect, has decided it, and as the executive officers administer them. I am bound by our Constitution as our fathers made it, and as it is our duty to support it. I am bound, as a good citizen, to sustain the Constitution and the constitution authorities, and to resist, discourage, and defeat, by all lawful and peaceful means, all attempts at exciting mobs, or violence, or any other revolutionary proceedings against the Constitution and the constituted authorities of the country.

Mr. Lincoln is alarmed for fear that, under the Dred Scott decision, slavery will go into all the Territories of the United States. All I have to say is that, with or without that decision, slavery will go just where the people want it, and not one inch further. You have had experience upon that subject in the case of Kansas. You have been told by the Republican party that, from 1854, when the Kansas-Nebraska bill passed, down to last winter, that slavery was sustained and supported in Kansas by the laws of what they called a "bogus" Legislature, and how many slaves were there in the Territory at the end of last winter? Not as many at the end of that period as there were on the day the Kansas-Nebraska bill took effect. There was quite as large a slave population there as ever was in Kansas. And at no time in the Missouri Compromise, and in spite of it, before the Kansas-Nebraska bill passed, and now it is asserted that there are not as many slaves there as were before the passage of the bill, notwithstanding that they had local laws sustaining and encouraging it, enacted, as the Republicans say, by a "bogus" Legislature, imposed upon Kansas by an invasion from Missouri. Why has not slavery obtained a foothold in Kansas under these circumstances? Simply because there was a majority of people opposed to slavery, and every slaveholder knows that if he took his slaves there, the moment that majority opposition to slavery took hold of the ballot-boxes, and a fair election was held, that moment slavery would be abolished and he would lose them. For that reason, such owners as took their slaves there brought them back to Missouri, fearing that if they remained they would be emancipated. Thus you see that under the principle of popular sovereignty, slavery has been kept out of Kansas, notwithstanding the fact that for the first three years they had a Legislature in Territory favorable to it. I tell you, my friends, it is impossible under our institutions to force slavery on an inconsiderable people. If this principle of popular sovereignty is to operate, the people in the Nebraska bill be fairly carried out, by letting the people decide the question for themselves, by a fair vote, at a fair election, and with honest returns, slavery will never exist one day, or one hour, in any Territory against the unfriendly legislation of an unfriendly people. If this principle of popular sovereignty is to operate, the decision may have settled the abstract question so far as the Kansas-Nebraska bill is concerned, but if not, the practical result is concerned; for, to use the language of an eminent Southern Senator, on this very question:

"I do not care a fig which way the decision shall be, for it is of no particular consequence whether a Territory shall exist a day or an hour, in any Territory or State, unless it has affirmative laws sustaining and supporting it, furnishing police regulations and remedies, and an omission to furnish them would be fatal as a constitutional prohibition. Without affirmative legislative action in this respect, it would be, and is, as barren a rock, without protection. It would wilt and die for the want of support."

Hence, if the people of a Territory want slavery, they will encourage it by passing affirmative laws, and the necessary police regulations, and this is as fatal as a constitutional prohibition, specially so, if ratified by their legislation, and carried into effect, and this is as it should be if they were opposed to it. They could pass such local laws and police regulations as would drive it out in one day, or one hour, if they were opposed to it, and therefore, so far as the question of slavery in the Territories is concerned, so far as the principle of popular sovereignty is concerned, the matter of imposition in its practical operation, it matters not how the Dred Scott case may be decided with reference to the Territories. My own opinion is that the point is well known. It is shown by my votes and speeches in Congress. But be it as it may, the question was an abstract question, having no practical results, and whether slavery shall exist or not exist in the Territories, shall or shall not exist in any State, is wholly dependent upon whether the people are for or against it, which it is not every way they shall decide it in any Territory or in any State, will be entirely satisfactory to me. But I must now leave a few words upon Mr. Lincoln's main objection to the Dred Scott decision. He is not going to submit to it. Not that he is going to make war upon it with force of arms. But he is going to appeal and reverse it in some way; he cannot tell us how. I reckon not by a writ of error, because I do not know where he would prosecute that, except before Abolition Society. And when he appeals, he does not exactly tell us to whom will appeal, except it be the Republican party, and I have yet to learn that the Republican party, under the Constitution, has judicial powers; but he is going to appeal from it and reverse it, either by an act of Congress, or by turning out the judges, or in some other way. And why? Because he says that his decision drives the negro of the benefits of that clause of the Constitution of the United States. It is this that Mr. Lincoln will not submit to. Why? For the palpable reason that he wishes to confer upon the negro the rights and privileges that he claims he is entitled to, under the clause of the Constitution, that makes the citizens of each State to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. Well, it is very true that the Courts do have that effect. By deciding that a negro is not a citizen, of course it denies to him the rights and privileges awarded to citizens of the United States. It is this that Mr. Lincoln will not submit to. Why? For the palpable reason that he wishes to confer upon the negro all the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States. I will not quarrel with Mr. Lincoln for his views on that subject. I have no doubt he is conscientious in them. I have not the slightest idea that he contends otherwise than that a negro ought to enjoy and exercise all the rights and privileges given to white men; but I do not agree with him, and hence I cannot conform with him. I believe that this Government of ours was founded on the white basis. I believe that it was established by white men; by men of European birth, or descended of European races, for the benefit of white men and their posterity in all time to come. I do not believe that it was the design or intention, at any time, of the signers of the Declaration of Independence or the framers of the Constitution, to include negroes, Indians, or other inferior races, with white men, as citizens. Our fathers had at that day seen the question of controlling civil and political rights upon the Indian and negro in the Southern and French colonies on the American continent and the adjacent islands. In Mexico, in Central America, in South America and in the West India Islands, where the Indian, the negro, and men of all colors and conditions, by law, the effect of political amalgamation can be seen. Ask any of those gallant young men in your own county, who went to Mexico to fight the battles of their country, what President Lincoln considers an unjust and unwise war, and hear what they will tell you in regard to the amalgamation of races in those countries, the changes there, first political, then social, has led to demoralization, excitement, and all the evils which have attended the people below the point of capacity for self-government. Our fathers knew that the effect of amalgamation in those countries, not only those who landed at Jamaica, but at Plymouth Rock and all other points on the coast, they pursued the policy of confining...
civil and political rights to the white race, and excluding the negro in all cases. Still Mr. Lincoln conscientiously believes that it is his duty to advocate negro citizenship. He wants to give the negro the privilege of citizenship. He quotes Scripture again, and says: "As your Father in Heaven is perfect, so also will you be perfected." And he applies this scriptural sentiment to all classes; and he expects us all to be as perfect as our Master, but as nearly perfect as possible. In other words, he is willing to give the negro an equality under the law, in order that he may approach as near perfection, or an equality with the white man, as possible. To this same end he quotes the Declaration of Independence in these words: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men were created equal, and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and goes on to argue that the negro was included, or intended to be included, in that Declaration by the signers of the paper. He says that by the Declaration of Independence, therefore, all kinds of men, negroes included, were created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, and further, that the right of the negro to be on an equality with the white man is a Divine right conferred by the Almighty, and rendered inalienable according to the Declaration of Independence. Hence no human law or constitution can deprive the negro of that equality with the white man to which he is entitled by Divine law. [Higher law.]

Now, I do not question Mr. Lincoln's sincerity on this point. He believes that the negro, by the Divine law, is created the equal of the white man, and that no human law can deprive him of that equality, thus secured; and he contends that the negro ought therefore to have all the rights and privileges of citizenship on an equality with the white man. In order to accomplish this, the first thing that would have to be done in this State would be to blot out of our State Constitution that clause which prohibits negroes from coming into this State, and making it an act of the Legislature to permit them to come and spread over the state, and not until in middays they shall look black as night. When our friend Lincoln gets all his colored brothers around him here, he will then raise them to perfection as fast as possible, and place them on an equality with the white man, first removing all legal restrictions, because they are our equals by Divine law, and there should be no such restrictions. He wants them to vote. I am opposed to it. If they had a vote, I reckon they would all vote for him in preference to me, entertaining the views I do. But that matters not. The position he has taken on this question not only presents him as claiming for them the right to vote, but their right under the Divine law and the Declaration of Independence, to be elected to offices, to be members of the Legislature, to go to Congress, to become Governors, or United States Senators, or Judges of the Supreme Court; and I suppose that when they control that court they will probably reverse the Dred Scott decision. He is going to bring negroes here, and give them the right of citizenship, the right of voting, and the right of holding office and sitting on juries, and what else. Why should not we permit them to marry, would they give them that right. I suppose he will let them marry whom they please, provided they marry their equals. If the Divine law declares that the white man is the equal of the negro woman—that they are on a perfect equality, I suppose he admits the right of any white man to marry the white woman. In the words of the Declaration of Independence, his doctrine that the negro, by Divine law, is placed on a perfect equality with the white man, and that that equality is recognized by the Declaration of Independence, lends him necessarily to establish negro equality under the law; but whether they are to be, or not, to be so, must depend upon the degree of virtue and intelligence they possessed, and certain other qualities that are matters of taste rather than of law. I do not understand Mr. Lincoln as saying that he expects to make them our equals socially, or by intelligence, nor in fact as citizens, but that he expects to make them our equals in the law, and then say to them, "as your Master in Heaven is perfect, be ye also perfect."

Well, I confess to you, my fellow-citizens, that I am utterly opposed to that system of abolition philosophy. I do not believe that the signers of the Declaration of Independence had any reference to negroes when they made the expression that all men were created equal, or that they had any reference to the Chinese or Coolies, the Indians, the Japanese, or any other inferior race. They were speaking of the white race, the European race on this continent, and they were speaking of colored races who should come here. They were speaking only of the white race, and never dreamed that their language would be construed only to the negro, and never dreamed that their language would be construed only to the negro, and never dreamed that their language would be construed only to the negro, and never dreamed that their language would be construed only to the negro. But the more I examine the history of the Declarations, the more it seems to me that the Declaration represented a slaveholding constitution. Did they intend, when they put their signatures to that instrument, to declare that their own slaves were on an equality with them; that they were made their equals by Divine law, and that any human law reducing them to an inferior position, was void, as being in violation of Divine law? Was that the meaning of the signers of the Declaration of Independence? Did Jefferson and Madison, and Lee—did any of the signers of that instrument, or all of them, on the day they signed it, give their slaves freedom? History records that they did not. Did they go further, and put the negro on an equality with the white man throughout the country? They did not. And yet if they had understood that Declaration as including the negro, which Mr. Lincoln holds they did, they would have been bound, as constitutions men, to have restored the negro to that equality which he thinks the Almighty intended they should occupy with the white man. They did not do it. Slavery was abolished in only one State before the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, and then in others gradually, down to the time this abolition agitation began, and it has not been abolished in one since. The history of the country shows that neither the signers of the Declaration, or the framers of the Constitution, ever supposed that their language would be used in an attempt to make this nation a mixed nation of Indians, negroes, whites and mongrels. I repeat, our whole constitution confirms the proposition, that from the earliest settlement of the colonies down to the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, our fathers proceeded on the white basis, making the white people the governing race, but confining to the Indian and negroes all inferior races, all the rights and all the privileges they could enjoy consistent with the safety of the society in which they lived. That is my opinion now. I told you that humanity, philanthropy, justice and sound policy required that we should give the negro every right, every privilege, every immunity consistent with the safety and welfare of the State. The question then naturally arises, what are those rights and privileges, and what is the nature and extent of them? My answer is, that is a question which comes here. The question must be decided by itself. We have decided that question. We have said that in this State the negro shall not be a slave, but that he shall enjoy no political rights—that his status shall not exist. I am content with that position. My friend Lincoln's is not. He thinks that our policy and our law on that subject are contrary to the Constitution of the United States. He thinks that the Almighty made the negro his equal and his brother. For my part I do not consider the negro any kin to me, nor to any other white man; but I would still carry my humanity and my philanthropy to the extent of giving him every privilege and every immunity that he could enjoy, consistent with our own good. We in Illinois have the right to decide the question for ourselves, and we are bound to allow every other State to do the same. Maine allows the negro equal rights with the white man. I do not quarrel with our friends in Maine for that. If they think it wise and proper in Maine to put the negro on an equality with the white man, and he will go to the polls and vote, we have a right to do the same. On the other hand New York permits a
interfering with the domestic institutions and regulations of other States, permit the Territories and new States to decide their institutions for themselves, as we did when we were in their condition; blot out these lines of North and South, and resort back to these lines of State boundaries which the Constitution has marked out, and construct new States upon the general lines of the country; but these, and we will be one united, harmonious people, with fraternal feelings, and no discord or dissension.

These are my views and these are the principles to which I have devoted all my energies and all my labors since 1850, when I acted side by side with the immortal Clay and the god-like Webster in that memorable struggle in which Whigs and Democrats united upon a common platform of patriotism and the Constitution, throwing aside parochial feelings in order to restore peace and harmony to a distracted country. And when I look back upon the noble, bold, clear, and sound policy of Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster, and the unaltered nature of the great Compromise measures of 1850, the principles of the Nebraska bill, the doctrine of leaving each State and Territory free to decide its institutions for itself, as the only means by which the peace of the country could be preserved and the Union perpetuated,—I pledge, him, on that death-bed of his, that so long as I lived my energies should be devoted to the vindication of that principle, and of his name as connected with it. I gave the same pledge to the great expounder of the Constitution, he who has been called the "god-like Webster." I looked up to Clay and him as a son would to a father, and I call upon the people of Illinois, and the people of the whole Union, to bear testimony, that never since the sod has been laid upon the graves of these eminent statesmen have I failed, on any occasion, to vindicate the principle with which the last great, crowning acts of their lives were identified, or to vindicate their names wherever they have been assailed; and now my life and energy are in the service of this great work, as the means in that city, and destruction of this spirit and barbarous idea. This Union can only be preserved by maintaining the fraternal feeling between the North and the South, the East and the West. If that good feeling can be preserved, the Union will be as perpetual as the fame of its great founders. It can be maintained by preserving the sovereignty of the States, the right of each State and each Territory to settle its domestic concerns for itself; and the duty of each to refrain from interfering with the other in any of its local or domestic institutions. Let that be done, and the Union will be perpetual; let that be done, and this Republic, which began with thirteen States, and which now numbers thirty-two, which, when it began, was small, but now extended from the Atlantic to the Mississippi, but now reaches to the Pacific, may yet expand, North and South, until it covers the whole Continent, and becomes one vast American Confederacy. Then, my friends, the path of duty, of honor, of patriotism, is plain. There are a few simple principles to be preserved. Bear in mind the dividing line between State rights and Federal authority; let us maintain the great principles of popular sovereignty, of State rights, and of the Constitution as the Constitution has made it, and this Republic will endure forever.

I thank you kindly for the patience with which you have listened to me. I have not varied you. I have a heavy day’s work before me tomorrow. I have several speeches to make. My friends, in whose hands I am, are taxing me beyond human endurance, but I shall take the helm and control them hereafter. I am profoundly grateful to the people of McLean for the reception they have given me. I have no other doves with which to answer this question of peace. Why should this slavery agitation be kept up? Does it benefit the white man or the slave? Who does it benefit except the Republican politicians, who use it as their hobby to ride into office? Why, I repeat, should it be continued? Why, I repeat, should it be continued? Why, I repeat, should it be continued? A confederacy of sovereign and independent States? Let us recognize the sovereignty and independence of each State, refrain from
favors. I have been with you but little for the past few years on account of my official duties. I intend to visit you again before the campaign is over. I wish to speak to your whole people. I wish them to pass judgment upon the correctness of my course, and the soundness of the principles which I have proclaimed. If you do not approve my policies, I cannot ask your support. If you believe that the election of Mr. Lincoln would contribute more to preserve the harmony of the country, to perpetuate the Union, and more to the prosperity and the honor and glory of the State, then it is your duty to give him the preference. If, on the contrary, you believe that I have proved to your satisfaction that I will give greater strength and efficiency to the principles which I have expounded, I shall then be grateful for your support. I renew my profound thanks for your attention.

SPEECH OF SENATOR DOUGLAS,
Delivered July 17, 1858, at Springfield, Ill. (Mr. Lincoln was not present.)

MR. CHAIRMAN, AND FELLOW-CITIZENS OF SPRINGFIELD AND OLD SANGAMON:
My heart is filled with emotions at the situation which have been so happily and so kindly made in the welcome just extended to me—a welcome so numerous and so categorical, so very cordial a welcome to my house among my old friends, that I can express my gratitude. I do feel at home wherever I return to old Sangamon and receive those kind and friendly greetings which have never failed to meet me when I have come among you; but never before have I had such occasion to be grateful and to be proud of the manner of the reception as on the present. While I am willing, sir, to attribute a part of this demonstration to those kind and friendly personal relations to which you have referred, I cannot conceal from myself that the controlling and prevailing element in this great mass of human beings is devotion to that principle of self-government to which so many years of my life have been devoted; and rejoice more in considering it an approval of my support of a cardinal principle than I would if I could appropriate it to myself as a personal compliment. You may speak rightly when you assert that during the last session of Congress there was an attempt to violate one of the fundamental principles upon which our free institutions rest. The attempt to force the Lecompton Constitution upon the people of Kansas against their will, would have been, if successful, subversive of the great fundamental principles upon which all our institutions rest. If there is any one principle more sacred and more vital to the existence of a free government than all others, it is the right of the people to form and ratify the Constitution under which they are to live. It is the cornerstone of the temple of liberty; it is the foundation upon which the whole structure rests, and whatever it can be successfully evaded self-government has received a vital wound. I deemed it my duty, as a citizen and as a representative of the State of Illinois, to resist, with all my energies and with whatever of ability I could command, the consummation of that effort to force a Constitution upon an unwilling people.

I am aware that other questions have been connected, or attempted to be connected, with that great struggle, but they were more collateral questions, not affecting the main point. My opposition to the Lecompton Constitution rested solely upon the fact that it was not the act of the people, and that if it did not embody their will. I did not object to it upon the ground of the slavery clause contained in it. I should have resisted it with the same energy and determination even if it had been a free State instead of a slaveholding State; and as an evidence of this first I wish you to bear in mind that my speech against that Lecompton act was made on the 9th day of December, nearly two weeks before the vote was taken on the acceptance or rejection of the slavery clause. I did not then know, I could not have known, whether the slavery clause would be accepted or rejected; my general impression was that it would be rejected, and in my speech I assumed that impression would be true; that probably it would be voted down; and then I said to the U. S. Senate, as I now proclaim to you, my constituents, that you have no right to force a free State upon an unwilling people unless you have the fear that they will force a slave State upon them against their will. You have no right to force either a good or a bad thing upon a people who do not choose to receive it. And then, again, the highest proof of their worth is to determine for themselves what kind of institutions are good, and what kind of institutions are bad, and it may be that the same people, situated in a different latitude and different climate, and with different productions and different interests, might decide the same question one way in the North and another way in the South, in order to adapt their institutions to the wants and wishes of the people to be affected by them.

You are all familiar with the Lecompton struggle, and I will occupy no more time upon the subject except to remark that when we drove the enemies of the principle of popular sovereignty from the effort to force the Lecompton Constitution upon the people of Kansas, and when we compelled them to abandon the attempt and to refer that Constitution to the people for acceptance or rejection, we obtained a concession of the principle for which I had contended throughout the struggle. When I saw that the principle was conceded, and that the Constitution was not to be forced on Kansas against the wishes of the people, I felt anxious to give the people a chance to express their support; but, when I examined it, I found that the mode of reference to the people and the wording of the resolution upon which the vote was taken, was so objectionable as to make it unfair and unjust.

Sir, it is an axiom with me that in every free government an unfair election is no election at all. Every election should be free, should be fair, with the same privileges and the same indemnities for a negative as for an affirmative vote. The objection to what is called the "English" proposition, by which the Lecompton Constitution was referred back to the people of Kansas was this, that if the people chose to accept the Lecompton Constitution they could come in with only 35,000 inhabitants, while if it was determined to reject it in order to form another more in accordance with their wishes and sentiments, they were compelled to stay out until they should have 93,420 inhabitants. In other words, it was making a distinction and demanding a union between free States and slave States under the Federal Constitution. I deny the justice, I deny the right, of any distinction or discrimination between the States North and South, free or slave. Equality among the States is a foundation principle of this government. Hence, while I will never consent to the passage of a law that is a slave State, may come in with 35,000, while a free State shall not come in in unless it has 93,420, on the other hand, I shall not consent to admit a free State with a population of 35,000, and require 93,420 in a slaveholding State.

My principle is to recognize each State of the Union as independent, sovereign, and equal in its sovereignty. I will apply that principle not only to the original thirteen States, but to the States which have since been brought into the Union, and also to every State that shall hereafter be received. "As long as water shall run and grass grow." For these reasons I felt compelled, by a sense of duty, by a conviction of principle, to vote, in my vote against what is called the English bill; but yet the bill became a law, and under that law an election has been ordered to be held on the first Monday in August for the purpose of determining that question of acceptance or rejection of the proposition submitted by Congress. I have no hesitation in saying to you, and dread of that person, and that the chairman of your committee has justly said in his address, that whatever the decision of the people of Kansas may be at that election, it must be final and conclusive of the whole subject; for at that
election a majority of the people of Kansas shall vote for the acceptance of the Congressional proposition, Kansas from that moment becomes a State of the Union, the law admitting her becomes irrevocable, and thus the controversy terminates forever. If, on the other hand, the people of Kansas vote down the proposition, as it is possible they will do, by a large majority, then from that instant the Lecompton Constitution is dead, dead beyond the power of resurrection, and thus the controversy terminates. And when the monster shall have pronounced, and I trust that all of you will be willing to accept that pronouncement in the direct language of the Lecompton Constitution. The controversy may now be considered as terminated, for in three weeks from now it will be finally settled, and all the ill-feeling, all the embittered feeling which grew out of it shall cease, unless an attempt should be made to repeat the same outrage upon the people. I need not assure you that my past course is a sufficient guarantee that if the occasion shall ever arise again while I occupy a seat in the United States Senate you will find me carrying out the same principle that I have this winter, with all the energy and all the power I may be able to command. I have the gratification of saying to you that I do not believe that that controversy will ever arise again, first, because the fate of Lecompton is a warning to the people of every Territory and of every State to be cautious how the example is repeated; and secondly, because the President of the United States, in his annual message, has said that he trusts the example in the Minnesota case, wherein Congress passed a law, called an enabling act, requiring the Constitution to be submitted to the people for acceptance or rejection, will be followed in all future cases. ["That was right."] I agree with you that it was right. I said so on the day after the message was delivered, in my speech in the Senate on the Lecompton Constitution, and I have frequently in the debate tendered to the President and his friends, tendered to the Lecomptonites, my voluntary pledge that if he will stand by that proposition, and carry it out, I will stand by that proposition, and carry it out. All we have to do, therefore, is to adhere firmly in the future, as we have done in the past, to the principles contained in the recommendation of the President in his annual message, that the example in the Minnesota case be followed, in all future cases of the admission of Territories into the Union as States. Let that be done and the principle of popular sovereignty will be maintained in all of its vigor and all of its integrity. I rejoice to know that Illinois stands prominently and proudly forward among the States which first took their position firmly and immovably upon this principle of popular sovereignty, applied to the Territories as well as to the States. You all recollect when in 1856 the peace of the country was disturbed in consequence of the agitation of the slavery question, and the effort to force the Whig Party upon the people in the Territories, that it required all the talent and all the energy, all the wisdom, all the patriotism, of a Clay and a Webster, united with great party leaders, to devise a system of measures by which peace and harmony could be restored to our distracted country. These compromise measures eventually passed and were recorded on the statute books, not only as the settlement of the then existing difficulties, but as furnishing a rule of action which should prevent in all future time the recurrence of like evils, if they were firmly and fairly carried out. I say on the spot at Chicago, on my return home that year, upon the principle that every people ought to have the right to form and regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution. They were founded upon the principle that, while every State possessed that right under the Constitution, that the same right should be extended to and exercised by the people of the Territories. When the Illinois Legislature assembled, a few mouths after the adoption of these measures, the first thing the members did was to review their action upon this slavery agitation, and to correct the errors into which they had fallen. You remember that their first act was to repeal the Whilm Proviso instructions to our U. S. Senators, which had been previously passed, and in lieu of them to record an other resolution upon the journal, with which you must all be familiar—a resolution brought forward by Mr. N. W. Edwards, and adopted by the House of Representatives by a vote of 61 in the affirmative to 4 in the negative. That resolution I quote to you in almost its precise language. It declared that the great principle of self-government, the birth-right and birthright of every free man, was the gift of heaven; it was a gift of heaven; it was given by the blood of our revolutionary fathers, and must be continued and carried out in the organization of all the Territories and the admission of all new States. That became the voice of the President, and the voice of the Democratic party and of the Whig party in 1854; all the Whigs and all the Democrats in the Legislature united in an affirmative vote upon it, and there being only 4 votes in the negative, of Abolitionists, of course, that resolution stands upon the journal of your Legislature to this day and has never been repealed, as a standing instruction to the Senators from Illinois in all time to come to carry out that principle of self-government and an affirmative vote upon it in the organization of any Territories or the admission of any new States. In 1854, when it became my duty as the chairman of the committee on Territories to bring forward a bill for the organization of Kansas and Nebraska, I incorporated that principle in it and Congress passed it, thus carrying the principle into practical effect. I will not recur to the scenes which took place all over the country in 1854 when that Nebraska bill passed. I could then travel from Boston to Chicago by the light of my own elbows, in consequence of having stood up for it. I leave it to you to say how I met that storm, and whether I qualified under its whether I did not "face the music," justify the principle, and pledge my life to carry it out. A friend here reminds me, yes, that when making speeches then, justifying the Nebraska bill and the great principle of self-government, that I predicted that in less than five years you would have to get out a second warrant and find an anti-Nebraska man. Well, I believe I did make that prediction. I did say that this was a matter of a prophet, that it occurred to me that among a free people, and an honest people, and an intelligent people, it was long enough for them to come to an understanding that the great principle of self-government was right, not only in the States, but in the Territories. I repeated this year to use my prediction, in that respect, carried out and fulfilled by the unanimous vote, in one form or another, of both Houses of Congress. But if you will remember that pending this Lecompton controversy that gallant old Roman, Kentucky's favorite son, the worthy successor of the immortal Clay—I allude, as you know, to the gallant John J. Crittenden brought forward a bill, now known as the Crittenden-Montgomery bill, in which it was proposed that the Lecompton Constitution should be referred back to the people of Kansas, to be decided for or against it, at a fair election, and if a majority of the people in favor of it, that Kansas should come into the Union as a slaveholding State, but that if a majority were against it, that they should make a new Constitution, and come in with slavery or without it, as they thought proper. ["That was right."] Yes, my dear sir, it was not only right, but it was carrying out the principle of the Nebraska bill in its letter and spirit. I have no choice but to vote for it, and so did every Republican Senator and Representative in Congress. I have found some Democrats so perfectly straight that they blame the great principle of the Nebraska bill because the Republicans voted the same way. [Great laughter.] "What did they say?" They said, "What did they say?"

What did they say? Why, many of them said that Douglas voted with the Republicans. Yes, not only that, but with the black Republicans. Well, there are still a few of that party who want to destroy that proposition. The New York Tribune says that Douglas did not vote with the Republicans, but that on that question the Republicans went over to Douglas and voted with him.

My friends, I have never yet abandoned a principle because of the support that it received, or the reverse of it. When I shall never abandon the principle of self-government merely because Republicans come to them. For what do we travel over the continent and make speeches in every political canvass, if it is not to enlighten the minds
of those Republicans; to remove the scales from their eyes, and to impart to them the light of democratic vision, so that they may be able to carry out the Constitution of our country as our fathers made it. And if by teaching our principles to the people we succeed in convincing the Republicans of the perniciousness of their way, we have lost all; but if we lose them, why, the only thing ever to do, if we find, as we find, our friends, and in truth, our country, are we really bound to turn traitors to our principles, merely because they give them their support? All I have to say is that I hope the Republican party will stand firm in the future, by the vote they gave on the Crédit Mobilier bill, which shall be ratified by those of their Convention and by the National Conventions, no declarations of "no more slave States to be admitted into this Union," but in lieu of that declaration that we will find the principle that the people of every State and every Territory shall come into this country in slavery or without it, just as they please, without any interference on the part of Congress.

My friends, whilst I was at Washington, engaged in this great battle for sound constitutional principles, I find from the newspapers that the Republican party of this State assembled in this Capital, in State Convention, and not only nominated, as it was wise and proper for them to do, a man for my successor in the Senate, but laid down a platform, and their nominee made a speech, carefully written and prepared, and well delivered, which that Convention accepted as containing the Republican creed. I have no comment to make on that part of Mr. Lincoln's speech, in which he represents me as forming a conspiracy with the Supreme Court, and with the late President of the United States and the present chief magistrate, having for my object the passage of the Nebraska bill, the Dred Scott decision and the extension of slavery—a scheme of political tricksters, composed of Chief Justice Taney and his eight associates, two Presidents of the United States, and one Senator of Illinois. If Mr. Lincoln deems me a conspirator of that kind, all I have to say is that I do not find it even so badly to the interest of the Union and the Constitution of the United States, the highest judicial tribunal on earth, as to believe that they were capable in their action and decision of entering into political intrigues for partisan purposes. I therefore think I shall only notice those parts of Mr. Lincoln's speech, in which he lays down his platform of principles, and tells you what he intends to do if he is elected to the Senate of the United States.

[An old gentleman here rose on the platform and said: "Be particular, Judge, be particular."]

Mr. Douglas—My venerable friend here says that he will be gratified if I will be particular, and in order that I may be so, I will read the language of Mr. Lincoln as reported by himself and published to the country. Mr. Lincoln lays down his main proposition in these words:

"A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this Union cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union will be dissolved, I do not expect the house will fall, but I do expect it to cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other."

Mr. Lincoln does not think this Union can continue to exist composed of half slave and half free States; they must all be all free or all slave. I do not doubt that this is Mr. Lincoln's conclusions. I do not doubt that he thinks it is the highest duty of every patriotic citizen to preserve this glorious Union, and to adopt these measures as necessary to its preservation. He tells you that the only mode to preserve the Union is to make all the States free or all slave. It must be the one or it must be the other. Not that being then the only mode given by him to the preservation of this glorious Union, how is he going to accomplish it? He says that he wants to go to the Senate in order to carry out this favorite patriotic policy of his, of making all the States free, or that the only way to save the Union is to do that, by what means is he going to accomplish it? By an act of Congress? Will be content that Congress has any power under the Constitution to abolish slavery in any State of this Union, or to interfere with it directly or indirectly? Of course he will not contend that. Then what is to be his mode of carrying out his principle, by which slavery shall be abolished in all of the States? Mr. Lincoln, having said a hundred times, at random, he is a lawyer, an eminent lawyer, and his profession is to know the remedy for every wrong. What is his remedy for this imaginary wrong which he supposes to exist? The Constitution of the United States provides that it may be remedied by Congress passing an amendment by a two-thirds majority of each house, which shall be ratified by three-fourths of the States, and the inference is that Mr. Lincoln intends to carry this slavery agitation into Congress with the view of amending the Constitution so that slavery can be abolished in all the States of the Union. In other words, he is not going to allow one portion of the Union to be slave and another portion to be free, but going to permit the house to be divided against itself. He is going to remedy it by a constitutional amendment.

What are to be these means? How can he abolish slavery in those States where it exists? There is but one mode by which a political organization, composed of men in the free States, can abolish slavery in the slaveholding States, and that would be to abolish the State Legislatures, blot out of existence the State sovereignties, invest Congress with full and plenary power over all the local and domestic and police regulations of the different States of this Union. Then there would be uniformity in the local concerns and domestic institutions of the different States; then the house would be no longer divided against itself; then the States would all be free, or they would all be slave; then you would have uniformly prevailing throughout this whole land in the local and domestic institutions, but it would be a uniformity not of liberty, but a uniformity of despotism that would triumph. I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, whether this is not the logical consequence of Mr. Lincoln's proposition? I have called on Mr. Lincoln to explain what he did mean by the speech, and he has made a speech at Chicago, in which he attempts to explain. And how does he explain? He will give him another language, precisely as it was reported in the Republican papers of that city, after undergoing his revision.

"I have said a hundred times, and have now no inclination to take it back, that I believe there is no right and ought to be no nomination in the people of the free States to enter into the slave States and interfere with the question of slavery at all." He believes that there is no right on the part of the free people of the free States to enter the slave States and interfere with the question of slavery, hence he does not propose to go into Kentucky and stir up a civil war between the blacks and the whites. All he proposes is to invite the people of Illinois and every other non-free State to band together as one sectional party, governed and divided by a geographical line, to make war upon this institution of slavery in the slaveholding States. He is going to carry it out by means of a political party, that has its adherents only in the free States; a political party, that does not pretend that it can give a majority in the slave States of the Union; and by this sectional vote he is going to elect a President of the United States; form a Cabinet and administer the Government on sectional grounds, being the power of the North over that of the South. In other words, he invites a war of the North against the South, a warfare of the free States against the slaveholding States. He invited all men in the free States to conspire to exterminate slavery in the Southern States; he asks all men in the free States to conspire to exterminate slavery in the Southern States, and then he notifies the South that unless they are going to submit to our efforts to exterminate their institutions, they must band together and plant slavery in Illinois and every Northern State. He says he is going to be President of the United States; form a Cabinet and administer the Government on sectional grounds, being the power of the North over that of the South. On this point I take issue with him directly. I assure him that he is not right to decide the slavery question for himself. We have decided it, and I think we have done it wisely; but whether wisely or unwisely, it is our business, and the people of the States that are now slave, have any right to interfere with us, directly or indirectly. Claiming as we do this right for ourselves, we must concede it to every other State, to be exercised by them respectively.
Now, Mr. Lincoln says that he will not enter into Kentucky to abolish slavery there, but that all he will do is to fight slavery in Kentucky from Illinois. He will not instantly set fire to the matches, but he will stir up this strife, but he would do it from this side of the river. Permit me to inquire whether the wrong, the outrage of interference by one State with the local concerns of another, is worse when you actually incite them to begin if actually incite them to begin if carried on by another State? For the purpose of illustration, suppose the British Government should plant a battery on the Niagara river opposite Buffalo and throw their shells over into Buffalo, where they should explode and blow up the houses and kill the inhabitants; why, it is your look-out, not ours. Thus, Mr. Lincoln is going to plant his Abolition batteries all along the banks of the Ohio river, and throw his shells into Virginia and Kentucky and into Missouri, and blow up the institution of slavery, and when we arrange him for his unjust interference, with the institutions of the other States, he says, "Why, I never did enter into Kentucky to interfere with you; I do not propose to do it; I only propose to take care of my own head by keeping on this side of the river, out of harm's way." But yet, he says he is going to preserve in this system of sectional warfare, and I have no doubt he is sincere in what he says. He says that the existence of the Union depends upon its success in firing into these slave States until he exterminates them. He says that unless he shall play his batteries successfully, so as to abolish slavery in every one of the States, that the Union shall never be saved. He says that a dissolution of the Union by calamity. Of course it would be. We are all friends of the Union. We all believe—that our lives, our liberties, our hopes in the future depend upon the preservation and perpetuity of this glorious Union. I believe that the hopes of the friends of the Union, that the perpetuity of the American Union, the perpetuity of the world depends upon the Union; but while I believe that my mode of preserving the Union is a very different one from that of Mr. Lincoln, I believe that the Union can only be preserved by maintaining the Constitution of the United States as our fathers made it. That Constitution gives to the people of every State the right to have slavery or not have it; to have negroes or not have them; to have Maine liquor laws or not have them; to have just such institutions as they choose, each State being left free to decide for itself. The framers of that Constitution never conceived the idea that uniformity in the domestic institutions of the different States was either desirable or possible. They well understood that the laws and institutions which would be well adapted to the granite hills of New Hampshire, would be unfit for the rice plantations of South Carolina; they well understood that each one of the thirteen States had distinct and separate interests, and required distinct and separate local laws and local institutions. And in view of that fact they provided that each State should retain its sovereign power within its own limits, with the right to make just such laws and just such institutions as it saw proper, under the belief that no two of them would be alike. If they had supposed that uniformity was desirable and possible, why did they provide for a separate Legislature for each State? Why did they not blot out State sovereignty and State Legislatures, and give all the power to Congress, in order that the laws might be uniform? For the very reason that uniformity, in their opinion, was neither desirable or possible. We have increased from thirteen States to thirty-two States, and just in proportion as the number of States increases and our territory expands, there will be a still greater variety and dissimilarity of climate, of production and of interest, corresponding to the greater dissimilarity and variety in the laws and institutions adopted therein. The laws that are necessary in the mining regions of California, would be totally useless and vicious on the prairies of Illinois; the laws that would suit the lumber regions of Maine or of Minnesota, would be totally useless and valueless in the tobacco regions of Virginia and Kentucky; the laws which would suit the manufacturing districts of New England, would be totally unsuited to the planting regions of the Carolinas, of Georgia, and of Louisiana. Each State is surrounded with districts possessing separate and distinct from each and every State, and there must have laws different from each and every State, in order that its laws shall be adapted to the climate and necessities of the people. Hence I insist that our institutions rest on the theory that there shall be dissimilarity and variety in the local laws and institutions of the different States instead of being uniform; and you find, my friends, that Mr. Lincoln and myself differ radically and totally on the fundamental principles of this Government. He goes for consolidation, for uniformity in our local institutions, for blotting out State rights and State sovereignty, and substituting all the power in the Federal Government for converting these thirty-two sovereign States into one Empire, and making uniformity throughout the length and breadth of the land. On the other hand, I go for maintaining the authority of the Federal Government within the limits marked out by the Constitution, and then for maintaining and preserving the sovereignty of each and all of the States of the Union, in order that each State may regulate and adopt its own local institutions in its own way, without interference from any power whatsoever. Thus you find there is a distinct line of principles—principles irreconcilable—between Mr. Lincoln and myself. He goes for consolidation and uniformity in our Government. I go for maintaining the sovereignty of the separate States under the Constitution, as our fathers made it, leaving each State at liberty to manage its own affairs and own internal institutions. Mr. Lincoln makes another point upon me, and rests his whole case upon these two points. His last point is, that he will wage a warfare upon the Supreme Court of the United States because of the Dred Scott decision. He takes occasion, in his speech, to denounce the Republican Convention, in my absence, not only for having expressed my acquiescence in that decision, but to charge me with being a conspirator with that court in devising that decision three years before Dred Scott ever thought of considering a suit for his freedom. The object of his speech was to convey the idea to the people that the court could not be trusted, that the late President could not be trusted, that the present one could not be trusted, and that Mr. Douglas could not be trusted; that they were all conspirators in bringing about that corrupt decision, to which Mr. Lincoln is determined he will never yield a willing obedience. He makes two points upon the Dred Scott decision. The first is that he objects to it because the court decided that negroes descended of slave parents are not citizens of the United States; and secondly, because they have decided that the act of Congress, passed 8th of March, 1850, prohibiting slavery in all of the Territories north of 36° 30', was unconstitutional and void, and hence did not have effect in emancipating a slave brought into that Territory. And he will not submit to that decision. He says, let the Judges of the Supreme Court, the Judges of the United States, the Judges of the Territories, to end the Dred Scott; but that he will not respect that decision, as a rule of law binding on this country, in the future. Why not? Because, he says, it is unjust. How is he going to remedy it? Why, he says he is going to reverse it. How? He is going to take an appeal. To whom is he going to appeal? The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court is the ultimate tribunal, the highest judicial tribunal on earth, and Mr. Lincoln is going to appeal from that. To whom? I know he appealed to the Republican State Convention of Illinois, and I believe that Convention reversed the decision, but I am not aware that they have yet carried it into effect. How are they going to make that reversal effective? Why, Mr. Lincoln tells us in his late Chicago speech. He explains it as clear as light. He says to the people of Illinois that you elect him to the Senate he will introduce a bill to reverse the decision of the Court pronounced unconstitutional. [Shouts of laughter and voices, "Spot the law."] Yes, he is going to spot the law. The court pronounces that law, prohibi-
ing slavery, unconstitutional and void, and Mr. Lincoln is going to pass an act reversing that decision and making it valid. I never heard before of an appeal being taken from the Supreme Court to the Congress of the United States to reverse its decision. I think the same would be true of appeals being taken from Congress to the Supreme Court, I think it is a statute valid. That has been done from the earliest days of Chief Justice Marshall, down to the present time.

The Supreme Court of Illinois do not hesitate to pronounce an act of the Legislature void, as being repugnant to the Constitution, and the Supreme Court of the United States is vested by the Constitution with that very power. The Constitution says that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in the Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. Hence it is the province and duty of the Supreme Court to pronounce judgment on the validity and constitutionality of an act of Congress. In this case they have done so, and Mr. Lincoln will not submit to it, and he is going to reverse it by another act of Congress of the same tenor. My opinion is that Mr. Lincoln ought to be on the supreme bench himself, when the Republicans get into power, if that kind of law knowledge qualifies a man for the bench. But Mr. Lincoln intimates that there is another mode by which he can reverse the Dred Scott decision. How is that? Why, he is going to appeal to the people to elect a President who will appoint judges who will reverse the Dred Scott decision. Well, let us see how that is going to be done. First, he has to carry on his sectional organization, a party confined to the free States, making war upon the slaveholding States until he gets a Republican President elected. [He never will, since I do not believe he ever will. But suppose he should; when that Republican President shall have taken his seat (Mr. Seward, for instance), will he then proceed to appoint judges? Not! he will have to wait until the present judges die before he can have any new ones; if it should be four years after his inauguration before the judges found it agreeable to die; and it is very possible, too, that Mr. Lincoln's senatorial term would expire before these judges would be accommodating enough to die. If it should happen so I do not see a very great prospect for Mr. Lincoln to reverse the Dred Scott decision. But suppose they should die, then how are the new judges to be appointed? Why, the Republican President is to call upon the candidates and catch them, and ask them, 'How will you decide this case if I appoint you judge?' Suppose, for instance, Mr. Lincoln to be a candidate for a vacancy on the supreme bench to fill Chief Justice Taney's place, and when he applied to Seward, the latter would say, 'Mr. Lincoln, I cannot appoint you until you inform me how you will decide the Dred Scott case?' Mr. Lincoln tells him, and then asks him how he will decide Tom Jones's case, and Bill Wilson's case, and then catches the judge and asks him how he will decide any case before him. When Mr. Lincoln has caught a Supreme Court composed of such judges, who have been appointed by a partisan President upon their giving pledges how they would decide a case before it arise, would your court be prostituted beneath the contempt of all mankind? What man would feel that his liberties were safe, his right of person or property was secure, if the supreme bench, that august tribunal, the highest on earth, was brought down to be a mere school for the60 judges who are to give decisions in what matters they will decide all the questions which may be brought before them? It is a proposition to make that court the corrupt, unscrupulous tool of a political party. But Mr. Lincoln cannot conscientiously submit, he thinks, to the decision of a court composed of a majority of Democrats. If he cannot, how can we expect us to have confidence in a court composed of a majority of Republicans, selected for the purpose of deciding against the Democracy, and in favor of the Republicans? The very proposition carries with it the degradation and discrediting destructive of the hope not destroyed, but the belief in the integrity of the Supreme Court.

I say to you, fellow-citizens, that I have no warfare to make upon the Supreme Court because of the Dred Scott decision. I have no complaints to make against that court, because of that decision. My private opinions on some points of the case may have been one way and on other points of the case another; but in matters concerning with the court and in others dissenting, but what have my private opinions in a question of law to do with the decision after it has been pronounced by the highest tribunal known to the Constitution? Yes, Mr.主席 addressing the chairman, as an eminent lawyer, have a right to entertain your opinions upon any question that comes before the court and to appear before the tribunal and maintain them boldly and with tenacity until the final decision shall have been pronounced, and then, sir, whether you are sustained or overruled your duty is to continue a citizen is to bow in deference to that decision. I intend to yield obedience to the decisions of the highest tribunals in the land in all cases whether your opinions are in conformity with my views, or not. When we refuse to abide by judicial decisions what protection is there left for life and property in this country? Will you appeal? To mob law, to partisan caucuses, to town meetings, to revolution? Where is the remedy when you refuse obedience to the constituted authorities? I will not stop to inquire whether I agree or disagree with all the opinions expressed by Judge Taney or any other judge. It is enough for me to know that the decision has been made. It has been made by a tribunal appointed by the Constitution to make it; it was a point within their jurisdiction, and I am bound by it.

But, my friends, Mr. Lincoln says that this Dred Scott decision destroys the doctrine of popular sovereignty, for the reason that the court has decided that Congress had no power to prohibit slavery in the Territories, and hence he infer that it would decide that the Territorial Legislatures could not prohibit slavery there. I will not stop to inquire whether the court will carry the decision that far or not. It would be interesting as a matter of theory, but of no importance in practice. For this reason, that if the people of a Territory want slavery they will have it, and if they do not want it they can stop it, and you cannot force it on them. Slavery cannot exist a day in the midst of an unevoloved people with unfounded laws, and laws and the truth and wisdom in a remark made to me by an eminent southern Senator, when speaking of this technical right to take slaves into the Territories. Said he, 'I do not care a fig which way the court shall be for it is of no particular consequence; slavery cannot exist a day or an hour in any Territory or State unless it has affirmative laws sustaining and supporting it, furnishing police regulations and remedies, and an omission to furnish them would be as fatal as a constitutions prohibition. Without affirmative legislation in its favor slavery could not exist on longer than a new-born infant could survive under the heat of the sun, on a barren rock, without protection. It would with and die for the want of support.' So it would be in the Territories. See the illustration in Kansas. The Republicans have told you, during the whole history of that Territory, that the pro-slavery party in the Legislature had carried a pro-slavery code, establishing and sustaining slavery in Kansas, but that this pro-slavery Legislature did not truly represent the people, but was imposed upon them from without, from Missouri, and hence the Legislature were one way and the people another. Granting all this, I am not aware what has been the result? With laws supporting and encouraging it, and the people against, there is not as many slaves in Kansas to-day as there were on the day the Nebraska bill passed and the Missouri Compromise was repealed. Why? Because slave owners knew that if they took their slaves into Kansas, where a majority of the people were opposed to slavery, that it would soon be abolished, and they would lose their right of property in consequence of taking them there. For this reason they would not take or keep them there. If there had been a majority of the people in favor of slavery and the climate had been favorable, they would have taken them there, but the climate not being suitable the interest of the people being opposed to it, and a majority of them against it, the slave owner did not find it profitable to take his slaves there, and consequently there are no slaves in Kansas, and if the Missouri Compromise was repealed. This shows clearly that if the people do not want slavery they will keep it out, and if they do want it they will protect it.
You have a good illustration of this in the territorial history of this State. You all remember that by the Ordinance of 1787, slavery was prohibited in Illinois, yet you all know, particularly you old settlers, who were here in territorial times, that the Territorial Legislature, in defiance of that Ordinance, passed a law allowing slavery, and brought them into the Territory, having them sign indentures to serve you and your posterity ninety-nine years, and their posterity thereafter to do the same. This herediitary slavehold was introduced in defiance of the act of Congress, in defense of the right of a Territory to decide the question for itself, in defiance of the act of Congress. On the other hand, if the people of a Territory are hostile to slavery, they will drive it out. Consequently this theoretical question raised upon the death of the Territorial Legislature, is worthy of no consideration whatever; for it only breaks into those political discussions and used as a hobby upon which to ride into office, or out of which to manufacture political capital.

But Mr. Lincoln's main objection to the Dred Scott decision I have reserved for my conclusion. His principal objection to that decision is that it was intended to deprive the negro of the rights of citizenship in the different States of the Union. Well, suppose it was, and there is no doubt that that was its legal effect, what is his objection to it? Why, he says, that a negro ought to be permitted to have the rights of citizenship. He is in favor of negro citizenship, and opposed to the Dred Scott decision, because it deprives negro of a citizen, and hence is not entitled to vote. Here I have a direct issue with Mr. Lincoln. I am not in favor of negro citizenship. I do not believe that a negro is a citizen or ought to be a citizen. I believe that this Government of ours was founded, and wisely founded, upon the white basis. It was made by white men for the benefit of white men, and their posterity, to be executed and managed by white men. I freely concede that human beings, all the privileges, all the immunities, to the Indian and negro which they are capable of enjoying consistent with the safety of society. You may then ask me what are those rights, what is the nature and extent of the rights which a negro ought to have? My answer is this: that a negro is a citizen, and that the negro shall have the right to interpose for himself in Illinois, and each Territory to decide for itself. In Illinois we have decided that a negro is not a slave, but we have at the same time determined that he is not a citizen and shall not enjoy any political rights. I concur in the wisdom of that policy and am in accord with it. I assert that the sovereignty of Illinois has a right to determine that question as we have decided it, and I deny that any other State has a right to interfere with us or call us to account for that decision. In the State of Maine they have decided by their Constitution that the negro shall have the right to live and hold office and hold title to property. You ask me why is this? My answer is that this is a part of the history of the country, and that the negro is a citizen of Maine, and shall have all the rights of a citizen. If the people of Maine desire to hold office and hold title to property and have the right to hold office and vote, they have no disposition to interfere with that. If the people of Maine desire to exclude the negro, they will not allow him to vote. In New York they have provided that a negro may vote provided he holds $200 worth of property, but that he shall not receive his vote; that is to say, they will allow a negro to vote if he is rich, but a poor fellow they will not allow to vote. In New York the white man and the negro are equal to a white man. Well, that is a matter of taste with them. If they think in so in that State, and do not carry the doctrine outside of it and propose to interfere with us, I have no disposition to interfere with them. If the negro is equal to a white man in their business, there is a good and a very good sense in a saying of Mr. Lincoln's: "I have no disposition to interfere with them in their business."

But looking at the justice for a moment, "Well, Squire," said he, "if a man chooses to make a darning well of himself I suppose there is no law against it." That is all I have to say about these negro regulations and this negro voting in other States where they have systems different from ours. If it is their wish to have slavery in Illinois, they have a cause to complain. Mr. Lincoln says that it is not consistent with their safety and their prosperity to allow a negro to have other political rights or his freedom, and hence he makes him a slave. That is his business, or not. It is his right, as sovereign of the Constitution of the country. The sovereignty of Kentucky, and that alone, can decide that question, and when he decides it there is no power on earth to which you can appeal to reverse it. Therefore, leave Kentucky as the Constitution has left her, a sovereign, independent State, with the exclusive consideration of slavery or not, as she chooses, and so long as I hold power I will maintain and defend her rights against any assaults from whatever quarter they may come.

I will never stop to inquire whether I approve or disapprove of the domestic institutions of a State. I maintain her sovereign rights. I defend her sovereignty from all assault, in the hope that she will join in defending us when we are assailed by any outside power. How are we to protect our sovereign rights, to keep slavery out, unless we protect the sovereign rights to every other State to decide the question for itself? Let Kentucky, or South Carolina, or any other State, attempt to interfere in Illinois, and tell us that we shall establish slavery, in order to make it uniform, according to Mr. Lincoln's proposition, throughout the Union; let them come here and tell us that we must and shall have slavery, and I will call on you to follow me, and shed the last drop of our heart's blood in repelling the invasion and chastising their insolence. And if we would fight for our reserved rights and sovereign power in our own limits, we must resist any attempt of coercion or in any other State.

Hence, you find that Mr. Lincoln and myself come to a direct issue on this whole doctrine of slavery. He is going to wage a war against it everywhere, not only in Illinois, but in his native State of Kentucky. And why? Because he says that the Declaration of Independence contains this language: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," and he asks whether that instrument does not declare that all men are equal. And, again, Mr. Lincoln then goes on to say that that clause of the Declaration of Independence includes negroes. "[I say not?]" Well, if you say not, I do not think you will vote for Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Lincoln goes on to argue that the language "all men" included the negroes, Indians, and all inferior races.

In his Chicago speech he says, in so many words, that it includes the negroes, that they were endowed by the Almighty with the right of equality with the white man, and therefore that that right is Divine—a right under the higher law; that the law of God is not the same as the law of the white man cannot deprive them of that right. This is Mr. Lincoln's doctrine. I have no intention of commenting in his belief. I do not question his sincerity, I do not doubt that he, in his conscience, believes that the Almighty made the negro equal to the white man. He thinks that the negro is his brother, and I have no disposition to interfere with that. If the people of Maine wish to exclude the negro, they will not allow to vote and hold office. If the people of Maine wish to have the negro hold office and vote in Illinois, they have no disposition to interfere with them. This is the doctrine outside of it and propose to interfere with us, I have no disposition to interfere with them. If the negro is equal to a white man in their business, there is a very good sense in a saying of Mr. Lincoln's: "I have no disposition to interfere with them in their business."
ents. Did those signers mean by that not to charge themselves, and all their consciences, with having violated the law of God, in holding the negro in an inferior condition to the white man? And yet, if they included negroes in that term, as conscientious men, they had reason, not only to hold abolition slavery throughout the land, but to have conferred political rights and privileges on the negro, and elevated him to an equality with the white man. ["They did not do it."] I know they did not do it, and the very fact that they did not do it shows that they did not understand the nature of political equality, and the Indian showed that they never dreamed that they were bound to put him on an equality. I am not only opposed to negro equality, but I am opposed to Indian equality. I am opposed to putting the cooies, now importing into this country, on an equality with us, or putting the Chinese or any inferior race on an equality with us. I hold that the white race, the European race, I care not whether Irish, German, French, Scotch, English, or to what nation they belong, so long as they are the white race, to be our equals. And I am for placing them, as our fathers did, on an equality with us, and their descendants, constitute the people of the United States. The Declaration of Independence only included the white people of the United States. The Constitution of the United States was framed by the white people, it ought to be administered by them, leaving each State to make such regulations concerning the negro as it chooses, allowing him political rights or not, as it chooses, and allowing him civil rights or not, as it may determine for itself.

Let us only carry out those principles, and we will have peace and harmony in the different States. But Mr. Lincoln's conscientious scruples on this point govern his actions, and I honor him for following them, although I abhor the doctrine which he preaches. His conscientious scruples lead him to believe that the negro is entitled by Divine right to the civil and political privileges of citizenship on an equality with the white man.

For that reason he says he wishes the Dred Scott decision reversed. He wishes to confer those privileges of citizenship on the negro. Let us see how he will do it. He will first be called upon to strike out of the Constitution of Illinois that clause which prohibits free negroes and slaves from Kentucky or any other State coming into Illinois. When he blows that clause, when he lets the door open or opens the gate for all the negro population to flow in and cover our prairies, until in a day's time they will be black as black as night; when he shall have done this, his mission will yet be unfilled. Then it will be that he will apply his principles of negro equality, that is, he can get the Dred Scott decision reversed in the meantime. He will then change the Constitution of Illinois, and allow negroes to vote and will make them eligible to the Legislature, so that thereafter they can have the right men for U.S. Senators. He will allow them to vote to elect the Legislature, the Judges and the Governor, and will make eligible to the office of Judges, the Governor, or to the Legislature. He will put them on an equality with the white man. What? Of course, after making them eligible to the judiciary, when he gets Cuffee elevated to the bench, he certainly will not refuse his judge the privilege of marrying any woman he may select! I submit to you, are these the legitimate consequences of his doctrine? If it be true, as he says, that by the Declaration of Independence and by Divine law, the negro is created equal the white man; if it be true that the Dred Scott decision is unjust and wrong because it deprives the negro of citizenship and does not follow that if he had the power he would make negroes citizens, and give them all the rights and all the privileges of citizenship on an equality with white men? I think that is the inevitable conclusion.

I do not doubt Mr. Lincoln's conscientious scruples on this subject, and I do not doubt that he will carry out that doctrine if he ever has the power. I do not say it is because I am utterly opposed to any political amalgamation or any other amalgamation on this continent. We are witnessing the result of giving civil and political rights to negroes in Central America, in South America, and in the West India Islands. Those young men who went from here to Mexico and from Mexico to the battles of their country in the Mexican war, can tell you the fruits of negro equality with the white man. They will tell you that the result of that equality is socialism; anarchy, domesticization and degradation, below the capacity for self-government. My friends, if we wish to preserve this Government we must maintain it on the basis on which it was established, to wit: the white race. We must preserve the pure race of the white man, not only in our politics but in our domestic relations. We must maintain the sovereignty of the States, and we must maintain the Federal Union by preserving the Federal Constitution inviolate. Let us do that, and our Union will not only be perpetual but may extend until it shall spread over the entire continent.

Follow me and I have already obtained you too long. I have exhausted myself and wearied you, and owe you an apology for the denunciation manner in which I have discussed these topics. I will have an opportunity of addressing you again before the November election comes off. I come to you to appeal to your judgment as American citizens, to take your verdict of approval or disapproval upon the discharge of my public duty and my principles as compared with those of Mr. Lincoln. If you conscientiously believe that his principles are more in harmony with the feelings of the American people and the interests and honor of the Republic, elect him. If, on the contrary, you believe that my principles are more consistent with those great principles upon which our fathers framed this Government, then I shall ask you to so express your opinion at the polls. I am aware that it is a biter and severe contest, but I do not doubt what the decision of the people of Illinois as to this, I do not anticipate any personal collision between Mr. Lincoln and myself. You all know that I am an amiable, good-natured gentleman, with whom no man has a right to pick a quarrel, even if he wanted to. I have been a worthy gentleman, I have known him for twenty-five years, and there is no better citizen, and no kinder-hearted man. He has been a gentleman, with power; high ability, and there is no objection to him, except the monstrous revolutionary doctrines with which he is identified and which he conscientiously entertains, and is determined to carry out if he gets the power.

He has one element of strength upon which he relies to accomplish his object, and that is his alliance with certain men in this State claiming to be Democrats, whose avowed object is to use their power to prostrate the Democratic cause. He hopes he can secure the few men claiming to be friends of the Lecompton Constitution, and for that reason you will find he does not say a word against the Lecompton Constitution or its supporters. He is as silent as the grave upon that subject. Befold Mr. Lincoln courting Lecompton votes, in order that he may go to the Senate as the representative of Republican principles. You know that all the facts are. I think you will find that it will come out before the contest is over. It must be a contest of principle. Either the radical abolition principles of Mr. Lincoln must be maintained, or the strong, constitutional, national Democratic principles with which I am identified must be carried out. I shall be satisfied whatever result you decide. I have been sustained by the people of Illinois with a steadfastness, a firmness which makes my heart overflow with gratitude. If it was to now be transferred to private life, I would have nothing to complain of. I would even then own you a debt of gratitude which the balance of life cannot repay. But my friends, you have discharged every obligation you owe to me. I have spent my best and best times paid by the welcome you have extended me. I have entered the State on my return home this time. Your reception not only discharges all obligations, but it furnishes inducement to renewed efforts to serve you in
the future. If you think Mr. Lincoln will do more to advance the interests and elevate the character of Illinois than myself; it is your duty to elect him; if you think he would do more to preserve the peace of the country and perpetuate the Union than myself, then elect him. I leave the question in your hands, and again tender you my profound thanks for the cordial and heartfelt welcome tendered to me this evening.

SPEECH OF HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
Delivered in Springfield, Saturday evening, July 17, 1858. (Mr. Douglas was not present.)

FELLOW-CITIZENS: Another election, which is deemed an important one, is approaching, and, as I suppose, the Republican party will, without much difficulty, elect their State ticket. But in regard to the Legislature, we, the Republicans, labor under some disadvantages. In the first place, we have a Legislature to elect upon an apportionment of the representation made several years ago, when the proportion of the population was far greater in the South (as compared with the North) than it is now; and insomuch as our opponents hold almost entire away in the South, and we a comparatively large majority in the North, the fact that we are now to be represented as we were years ago, when the population was different, is, to us, a very great source of embarrassment. We had in the year 1855, according to a census or enumeration of the inhabitants, taken for the purpose of a new apportionment of representation, what we know a fair apportionment of representation upon that census would give us. We know that it could not, if fairly made, fail to give the Republican party from six to ten more members of the Legislature than they can probably get as the law now stands. It so happened at the last session of the Legislature, that our opponents, holding the control of both branches of the Legislature, steadily refused to give us such an apportionment as we were rightly entitled to have upon the census already taken. So it happened at the last session of the Legislature, that the one that was so prejudiced against our receiving such an apportionment as we were rightfully entitled to have upon the census taken of the population of the State. The Legislature would pass no bill upon that subject, except such as was at least as unfair to us as the old one, and in which, in some instances, two men in the Democratic region were allowed to go as far toward sending a member to the Legislature as there were in the Republican regions. Comparison was made at the time as to representative and senatorial districts, which completely demonstrated that such was the fact. Such a bill was passed and tendered to the Republican Governor for his signature; but principally for the reasons I have stated, he withheld his approval, and the bill fell without becoming a law.

Another disadvantage under which we labor is, that there are one or two Democratic Senators who will be members of the next Legislature, and will vote for the election of Senator, who are holding over in districts in which we could, on all reasonable calculation, elect men of our own; if we only had the chance of an election. When we consider that there are but twenty-five Senators in the Senate, taking two from each of the six districts, which they rightfully held, and put upon the hands to the other, to be disposed of, it is not a disadvantage not to be lightly regarded. Still, as it is, we have this to contend with. Perhaps there is no ground of complaint on our part. In attending to the many things involved in the last general election for President, Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Members of Congress, of the Legislature, County Officers, and so on, we allowed those things to happen by want of sufficient attention, and we have no cause to complain of our adversaries, so far as this matter is concerned. But we have some cause to complain of the refusal to give us a fair apportionment.

There is still another disadvantage under which we labor, and to which I will ask your attention. It arises out of the relative positions of the candidates for the Senate, and before the State as candidates for the Senate. Senator Douglas is of worldwide renown. All the anxious politicians of his party, or who have been of his party for years past, have been looking upon him as certainly, at no distant day, to be the President of the United States. They have seen in his round, jolly, fruitful face post-offices, land-offices, marshallships and cabinet appointments, charioteer and foreign missions, bursting and spouting out in wonderful abundance, ready to be held void of by his greedy hands. And, as they have been gazing upon this attractive picture so long, they cannot, in the little distance that has taken place in the party, bring themselves to give up the charming hope; but with growler anxiety they rush about him, sustain him, and give him marches, triumphal entries, and receptions beyond what even in the days of his highest prosperity they could have brought about in favor. On the contrary, nobody has ever expected me to be President. In my poor, lean, homely face, nobody has ever seen that any cargoes were spouting out. These are disadvantages all, taken together, that the Republicans labor under. We have to fight this battle upon principle, and upon principle alone. I am, in a certain sense, made the standard-bearer in behalf of the Republicans. I was made so merely because there had to be some one so placed—I being in no wise preferable to any other one of the twenty-five—perhaps a hundred we have in the Republican ranks.

Then I say I wish it to be distinctly understood and borne in mind, that we have to fight this battle without many—perhaps without any—of the external aids which are brought to bear against us. So I hope those with whom I am surrounded have principle enough to meet themselves for the task and leave nothing undone, that can be fairly done, to bring about the right result.

After Senator Douglas left Washington, as his movements were made known by the public prints, he tarried a considerable time in the city of New York; and it was heralded that, like another Napoleon, he was lying by and framing the plan of his campaigns. It was telegraphed to Washington City, and published in the Union, that he was framing his plan for the purpose of going to Illinois to pouce upon and annihilate the reasonable and dissonant speech which Lincoln had made here on the 16th of June. Now, I do suppose that the Judge really spent some time in New York maturating the plan of the campaign, as his friends heralded for him. I have been able, by noting his movements since his arrival in Illinois, to discover evidences corroborative of that allegation. I think I have been able to see what are the material points of that plan. I will, for a little while, ask your attention to some of them. What I shall point out, though not showing the whole plan, are, nevertheless, the main points, as I suppose.

They are not very numerous. The first is Popular Sovereignty. The second and third are attacks upon my speech made on the 18th of June. Out of three main points—drawing within the range of popular sovereignty the question of the Le
cumpton Constitution—he makes his principal assault. Upon these his successive speeches are substantially one and the same. On this matter of popular sovereignty I wish to be a little careful. Auxiliary to these main points, to the thundering of cannon, their marching and music, their fife-and-drums, but I will not waste time with them. They are but the little trappings of the campaign. Coming to the substance—the first point—"popular sovereignty." It is to be laced upon the ears of those who rightly hate and despise them, planted upon the arches he passes under, and the banners which wave over him. It is to be dished up in as many varieties as a French cook can produce soups from potatoes. Now, as this is so great a staple of the plan of the campaign, it is worth while to examine it carefully; and if we examine only a very little, and do not allow ourselves to be misled, we shall be able to see that the whole thing is the most arra
Quixotism that was ever enacted before a community. What is the matter of popular sovereignty? The first thing, in order to understand it, is to get a good definition of what it is, and after that to see how it is applied. The second is, that everyone knows that in this controversy, whatever has been said has had reference to the question of negro slavery. We have not been in a controversy about the right of the people to govern themselves in the ordinary matters of domestic concern in the States and Territories. Mr. Buchanan, in one of his lectures, says: I think when we sent up the Lecompton Constitution, urged that the main points to which the public attention had been directed, was not in regard to the great variety of small domestic matters, but was directed to the question of negro slavery; and he asserts, that if the people had had a fair chance to vote upon that question, there was no reasonable ground of objection in regard to minor questions. Now, I think that the people had not had, or given them, a fair chance upon that slavery question; still, if there had been a fair submission to a vote upon that main question, the President's proposition would have been true to the uttermost. Hence, when hereafter I speak of popular sovereignty, I wish to be understood as applying what I say to the question of slavery only, not to other minor domestic matters of a Territory or a State.

Does Judge Douglas, when he says that several of the past years of his life have been devoted to the question of popular sovereignty, and that all the remainder of his life shall be devoted to it, does he mean to say that he has been devoting the rest of his life to securing to the people of the Territories the right to exclude slavery from the Territories? If he means so to say, he means to deceive; because he and every one knows that the decision of the Supreme Court, which he approves and makes especial ground of attack upon me for disapproving, forbids the people of a Territory to exclude slavery. This covers the whole ground, from the moment a Territory is formed, or from the moment a Territory is given a fair chance to vote upon the question of popular sovereignty, if it can be formed a State Constitution. So far as all that ground is concerned, the Judge is not sustaining popular sovereignty, but absolutely opposing it. He sustains the decision which declares that the popular will of the Territories has no constitutional power to exclude slavery. The States and Territories, in the period of time from the first settlement of a Territory till it reaches the point of forming a State Constitution, is not the thing that the Judge has fought for or is fighting for; but on the contrary, he has fought for, and is fighting for, the thing that militates and crushes out that popular sovereignty.

Well, so much being disposed of, what is left? Why, he is contending for the right of the people, when they come to make a State Constitution, to make it for themselves, and precisely as best suits themselves. I say again, that is Quixotism. I defy contradiction when I declare that the Judge can find so one to oppose him on that proposition. I repeat, there is nobody opposing that proposition on principle. Let me not be misunderstood. I know that, with reference to the Lecompton Constitution, I may be misunderstood, and the Anti-Lecompton Democrats, have not done it; but, on the contrary, they together have insisted on the right of the people to form a Constitution for themselves. The difference between the Buchanan men on the one hand, and the Douglas men and the Republicans on the other, has not been on a question of principle, but on a question of fact.

The dispute was upon the question of fact, whether the Lecompton Constitution had been fairly formed by the people or not. Mr. Buchanan and his friends have not contended for the contrary principle any more than the Douglas men or the Buchanan men. The Republicans have insisted that whatever of good or bad exists in getting up the Lecompton Constitution, were such as happen in the settlement of all new Territories. The question was, was it a fair emanation of the people? It was a question of fact and not of principle. As to the principle, all were agreed. Judge Douglas voted with the Republicans upon that matter of fact.

By their votes and votes, denied that it was a fair emanation of the people. The Administration affirmed that it was. With respect to the evidence bearing upon that question of fact, I readily agree that Judge Douglas and the Republicans had the right on their side, and that the Administration was wrong. I readily admit that, as a matter of principle, there is no constitutional objection to the right of a people in a Territory, merging into a State to form a Constitution for themselves without outside interference from any quarter. This being so, what is Judge Douglas going to spend his life for? Is he going to spend his life in maintaining a principle that nobody else opposes? Does he expect to add to his majestic dignity, and go through his apotheosis and become a god, in the maintaining of a principle which neither man nor mouse in all God's creation is opposing? Now something in regard to the Lecompton Constitution more specially; for I pass from this other question of popular sovereignty as the most acute humiliation that has ever been attempted on an intelligent community.

As to the Lecompton Constitution, I have already said that on the question of fact as to whether there was a fair emanation of the people or not, Judge Douglas with the Republicans and some Americans had greatly the argument against the Administration; and while I repeat this, I wish to know what there is in the opposition of Judge Douglas to the Lecompton Constitution that entitles him to be considered the only opponent to it—so being por excellence the very quinquereme of that opposition. I agree to the righteousness of his opposition. He is in the Senate and his class of men there formed the number three and no more. In the House of Representatives his class of men—the Anti-Lecompton Democrats—formed a number of about twenty. It took one hundred and twenty to defeat the measure, against one hundred and twelve. Of the voice of the other two—he and Mr. Douglas's friends furnished twenty, to add to which there were six Americans and ninety-four Republicans. I do not say that I am precisely accurate in the numbers, but I am sufficiently so for any use I am making of it.

Why is it that twenty shall be entitled to all the credit of doing that work, and the hundred none of it? Why, if, as Judge Douglas says, the honor is divided and the credit is to be given to other parties, why is it just so much given as is consistent with the wishes, the interests and advancement of the twenty? My understanding is, when a common job is done, or a common enterprise is in hand, if I put in five dollars to your one, I have a right to take out five dollars to your own. But he does not so understand it. He declares the dividend of credit for doing twenty to the Lecompton upon a basis which seems preposterous and incomprehensible.

Let us see. Lecompton in the raw was defeated. It afterward took a sort of cooked up shape, and was passed in the English bill. It is said by the Judge that the defeat was a good and proper thing. If it was a good thing, why is he entitled to more credit than others, for the performance of that good act, unless there was something in the antecedents of the Republicans that might induce every one to expect them to join in that good work, and at the same time, something leading them to doubt that he would? Does he place his supreme claim to credit, on the ground that he performed a good act which was never expected of him? He says I have a proneness for quoting Scripture. If I should do so now, it occurs that perhaps he places himself somewhat upon the ground of the parable of the lost sheep which went astray upon the mountains, and when the owner of the hundred sheep found the one that was lost, and threw it upon his shoulders, and came home rejoicing, it was said that there was more rejoicing over one sheep that was lost than over all ninety and nine that were not lost. The application is made by the Saviour in this parable, thus: 'Verily I say unto you, there is more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, than over ninety and nine just persons that need no repentance.'
And now, if the Judge claims the benefit of this parable, let him repeat. Let him not come up here and say: "I am the only just person; and you are the ninety-nine sinners!" Repentance before justification is a provision of the Christian system. Suppose the condition alone will the Requiem be granted, and he must have you understand that the Republicans made their opposition because it ultimately became a slave Constitution. To make proof in favor of himself on this point, he reminds us that he opposed Lecompton before the vote was taken declaring whether the State was to be free or slave. But that raised an additional objection as to the mode of submitting the Constitution to the people. But, bearing on the question of whether the delegates were fairly elected, a speech of his, made something more than twelve months ago, from this stand, becomes important. It was made a little while before the election of the delegates who made Lecompton. In that speech he declared there was every reason to hope and believe the election would be fair; and if any one failed to vote, it would be his own culpable fault.

A few days after, made a sort of answer to that speech. In that answer, I must say to the contrary, and which has already his Lecompton adversaries in the Senate last winter. I pointed to the facts that the people could not vote without being registered, and that the time for registering had gone by. I commented on it as wonderful that Judge Douglas could be ignorant of these facts, which every one else knew. I now pass from popular sovereignty and Lecompton. I may have occasion to refer to one or both.

When he was preparing his plan of campaign, Napoleon-like, in New York, as appears by two speeches I have heard him deliver since his arrival in Illinois, he gave special attention to a speech of mine, delivered here on the 16th of June last. He says that he carefully read that speech. He told us that at Chicago a week ago last night, and he repeated it at Bloomington last night. Doubtless, he repeated it as he said. I heard him; I did not hear him. In the two first places—Chicago and Bloomington—I heard him; to-day I did not. He said he had carefully examined that speech; whereas, he said not a word; and there is no reasonable doubt it was when he was in Illinois preparing his plan of campaign. He said he carefully examined it. He says it was evidently prepared with care. I freely admit it was prepared with care. I claim not to be more free from errors than others—perhaps scarcely so much; but I was very careful not to put anything in that speech as a mistake, and I did not make any inference which did not appear to me to be true, and fully warranted. If I had made any mistake I was willing to be corrected; if I had drawn any inference in regard to Judge Douglas, or any one else, which was not warranted, I was fully prepared to modify it as soon as discovered. I glanced myself upon the truth and the truth only, so far as I knew it, or could be brought to know it.

Having made that speech with the most kindly feelings toward Judge Douglas, as manifested therein, I was gratified when I found that he had examined it, and had not drawn any inference in regard to him, nor any inference, of which he thought fit to complain. In neither of the two speeches I have mentioned, did he make any such complaint. I will thank any one who will inform me that he, in his speech to-day, pointed out anything I had stated, respecting him, as being erroneous. I presume there is no such thing. I have reason to believe that the care and caution used in that speech, left it so that he, most of all others interested, would be gratified, for he was not able to point out even an error in it. It is not that which he could say was wrong. He seized upon the doctrines he supposed to be included in that speech, and declared that upon them they will turn the issues of this campaign. He then quotes, or attempts to quote, from my speech. I will not say that he will quote accurately. He has been taught that the Republicans made their opposition because it ultimately became a slave Constitution. To make proof in favor of himself on this point, he reminds us that he opposed Lecompton before the vote was taken declaring whether the State was to be free or slave. But that raised an additional objection as to the mode of submitting the Constitution to the people. But bearing on the question of whether the delegates were fairly elected, a speech of his, made something more than twelve months ago, from this stand, becomes important. It was made a little while before the election of the delegates who made Lecompton. In that speech he declared there was every reason to hope and believe the election would be fair; and if any one failed to vote, it would be his own culpable fault.

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said that because I supposed, when the public mind shall rest in that belief, we shall have peace on the slavery question. I have believed—and now believe—the public mind did rest on that belief up to the introduction of the Nebraska bill.

If it had it would not have been so long before the people would see the difference. The ordinary course of things is to make the axe the weapon of enslavement. The same axe will do the work. It will be fought, but a different issue will be made. They would not rest in that belief. If I had said that, it would not have been so long before the people would see the difference. The ordinary course of things is to make the axe the weapon of enslavement. It will be fought, but a different issue will be made. If I had said that, it would not have been so long before the people would see the difference.

If you are a man of a free people, you believe in the freedom of the people. If you are a man of a free people, you believe in the freedom of the people. If you are a man of a free people, you believe in the freedom of the people. If you are a man of a free people, you believe in the freedom of the people. If you are a man of a free people, you believe in the freedom of the people. If you are a man of a free people, you believe in the freedom of the people. If you are a man of a free people, you believe in the freedom of the people. If you are a man of a free people, you believe in the freedom of the people. If you are a man of a free people, you believe in the freedom of the people. If you are a man of a free people, you believe in the freedom of the people.
The declaration that Congress does not possess this constitutional power to charter a bank, has gone into the Democratic platform, at their National Conventions, and was brought forward and reaffirmed in their last Convention at Cincinnati. They have considered it their declaration, in the very teeth of its friends, if it were not disastrous, to see how quick those compromise-breakers administer on the policy of their dead adversaries, trumping up claims never heard of, and dividing the assets among themselves. If I should be found dead tomorrow morning, nothing but my insufficiency could prevent a speech being made on my authority, before the end of next week. It is nothing that in that "popular sovereignty" with which Mr. Clay was identified, the Missouri Compromise was expressly reserved; and it was a little singular if Mr. Clay and his associates might have a voice on purpose to have that compromise repealed.

Again, the Judge did not keep faith with Mr. Clay when he first brought in his Nebraska bill. He left the Missouri Compromise unaltered, and in his report accompanying the bill, he told the world he did it on purpose. The names of Mr. Clay must have been in great agitation, till thirty days later, when "popular sovereignty" stood forth in all its glory.

One more thing. Last night Judge Douglas tormented himself with horrors about my disposition to make negroes perfectly equal with white men in social and political relations. He did not stop to show that I have said any such thing, or that I have even the slightest knowledge of a thing. Mr. Clay has not been in any of the debates, nor has the Judge. In the debate of 1854, he said it was on the question of slavery that it was on the question of slavery, and that it was on the question of slavery. That is what the Judge pointed out to him by that rule he excludes the Germans, the Irish, the Portuguese, and all the other people who have come amongst us since the Revolution, he recognizes them for the first time. In his last speech he tells us it meant Europeans.

I press him a little further, and ask if it meant to include the Russians in Asia, or does he mean to include that vast population from the principles of our Declaration of Independence. I expect ere long he will introduce another amendment to his definition. He is not at all particular. He is satisfied with any thing which does not interfere with the idea of a slave to be a slave, and a negro to be a negro. It may do it in part, but it must not lift negroes up.

My declarations upon the subject of negro slavery may be misrepresented, but cannot be misunderstood. I have said that I do not understand the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal in all respects. They are not equal in color; but I suppose that it does mean to declare that all men are equal in some respects. It was to declare in the right to life, to liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Certainly the negro is not our equal in color; perhaps not in many other respects; and, in the right to put into his mouth the bread that his own hands have earned, he is equal to every other man, white or black. In pointing out that more has been given him, you cannot be justified in taking away the little which has been given him. All I ask for the negro is that if you do not like him, let him alone. If God gave him but little, that little let him enjoy.

When our Government was established, we had the institution of slavery amongst us. We were in a certain sense compelled to tolerate its existence. It was a sort of necessity. We had gone through our struggle and secured our own independence. The framers of the Constitution found the institution of slavery amongst our other institutions at the time. They found that by an effort to eradicate it, they would have failed upon it, and that they had already gained. They were wise to the necessity. They gave power to Congress to abolish the slave trade at the end of twenty years. They also prohibited it in the Territories where it did not exist.
The following is the correspondence between the two rival candidates for the United States Senate.

Mr. Lincoln to Mr. Douglas.

CHICAGO, ILL., July 21, 1858.

Hon. A. S. Douglas—My Dear Sir: Will it be agreeable to you to make an arrangement for you and myself to address the same audiences during the present campaign, as was done by Mr. Judd? Our recent letters have led me to hope that you would not consider this arrangement as in any way adverse to your views.

Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

Mr. Douglas to Mr. Lincoln.

CHICAGO, July 21, 1858.

Hon. A. Lincoln—Dear Sir: Your note of this date, in which you inquire if it would be agreeable to me to make an arrangement to divide the time and address the same audiences during the present campaign, was handed me by Mr. Judd. Recent letters have led me to hope that you would not consider an arrangement of this kind as adverse to your views.

I went to Springfield last week for the purpose of conferring with the Democratic State Central Committee on the subject of dividing the canvass and having addressed the State Central Committee on this subject, a resolution has been adopted by which the canvass of the third candidate is to be divided with the other candidates.

Besides, there is another consideration which should be kept in mind. It has been suggested recently that any arrangement had been made between Mr. Douglas and Mr. Judd to divide the canvass of the State Central Committee, which would, with myself, have caused me to decline the canvass, but this suggestion has been made with the view of obtaining the nomination of the third candidate.

I cannot refrain from expressing my surprise, if it was your original intention to invite such an arrangement, that you should have waited until I had made arrangements, at the very last moment, when I was not even aware of your intentions.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant.

A. DOUGLAS.
Mr. Douglas to Mr. Lincoln.

REPUBLIC, ILLINOIS, July 30, 1858.

Dear Sir: Your letter, dated yesterday, preceding my proposition, for a joint discussion at one prominent point in each Congressional District, as stated in my previous letter, was received this morning. The times and places designated are as follows:

- Ottawa, La Salle County, August 21st, 1858.
- Peoria, Tazewell County, August 22nd, 1858.
- Monmouth, Union County, September 16th, 1858.
- Charleston, Coles County, October 11th, 1858.
- Galesburg, Knox County, October 11th, 1858.
- Quincy, Adams County, October 11th, 1858.
- Alton, Madison County, October 11th, 1858.

I agree to your suggestion that we shall alternately open and close the discussion. I will speak at Ottawa one hour, you can reply, occupying an hour and a half, and I will then close for half an hour. At Peoria, you shall open the discussion and speak one hour, I will follow for an hour and a half, and you can then reply for half an hour. We will alternate in like manner in each successive place.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. A. DOUGLAS.

Mr. Lincoln to Mr. Douglas.

SPRINGFIELD, July 31, 1858.

Hon. S. A. Douglas—Dear Sir: Yours of yesterday, naming places, times and terms, for joint discussions between us, was received this morning. Although, by the terms, as you propose, you take fair openings and close, to my name, I accept, and close the arrangement. I direct this to you at Belleville, and shall try to have both your letters there appear in the Journal and Register of Monday morning. Your obedient servant,

A. LINCOLN.

FIRST JOINT DEBATE, AT OTTAWA,
August 21, 1858.

MR. DOUGLAS'S SPEECH.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I appear before you to-day for the purpose of discussing the leading political topics which now agitate the public mind. By an arrangement between Mr. Lincoln and myself, we are present here to-day for the purpose of having a joint discussion, as the representatives of the two great political parties of the State and Union, upon the principles in issue between those parties; and this vast concourse of people shows the deep feeling which pervades the public mind in regard to the questions dividing us.

Prior to 1854, this country was divided into two great political parties, known as the Whig and Democratic parties. Both were national and patriotic, advancing principles that were universal in their application. An old line Whig could proclaim his principles in Louisiana and Massachusetts alike. Whig principles had no boundary sectional lines, they were not limited by the Ohio river, nor by the Potomac, nor by the line of the free and slave States, but applied and were proclaimed whenever the Constitution ruled or the American flag waved over the American soil. So it was, and it is with the great Democratic party, which, from the days of Jefferson until this period, has proven itself to be the historic party of this nation. While the Whig and Democratic parties differed in regard to a bank, the tariff, distribution, the specie circular and the subtreasury, they agreed on the great slavery question which now agitates the Union. I say that the Whig party and the Democratic party agreed on this slavery question, while they differed on matters of expediency to which I have referred. This Whig party and the Democratic party, jointly adopted the Compromise measures of 1850 as the basis of a proper and just solution of this slavery question in all its forms. Clay was the great leader, with his usual sagacity, who took up his right hand and sustained by the patriots in the Whig and Democratic ranks, who had devised and enacted the Compromise measures of 1850.

In 1851, the Whig party and the Democratic party united in Illinois in adopting resolutions endorsing and approving the principles of the Compromise measures of 1850, as the proper adjustment of the question. In 1853, when the Whig party assembled in Convention at Baltimore for the purpose of nominating a candidate for the Presidency, the first thing it did was to declare the Compromise measures of 1850, in substance and principle, a suitable adjustment of the question. When the speaker was interrupted by loud and longcontinued applause! My friends, science will be more acceptable to me in the discussion of these questions that applause. I desire to address myself to your judgment, your understanding, and your conscience, and not to your passions or your enthusiasm. When the Democratic Convention assembled in Baltimore in the same year, for the purpose of nominating a Democratic candidate for the Presidency, it also adopted the Compromise measures of 1850 as the basis of Democratic action. Thus you see that in 1853-54, this Whig party and the Democratic party both stood on the same platform in regard to the slavery question. That platform was the right of the people of each State and each Territory to decide their local and domestic institutions for themselves, subject only to the Federal Constitution. During the session of Congress of 1853-54, I introduced into the Senate of the United States a bill to organize the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska on the principle which had been adopted in the Compromise measures of 1850, approved by the Whig party and the Democratic party in Illinois in 1853, and endorsed by the Whig party and the Democratic party in National Convention in 1852. In order that there might be no misunderstanding in relation to the principle involved in the Kansas and Nebraska bill, I put forth the true intent and meaning of the act in those words: "It is the true intent and meaning of this act not to legalize slavery into any State or Territory, or to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Federal Constitution." Thus, you see, that in 1854, when the Kansas and Nebraska bill was brought into Congress for the purpose of carrying out the principles which both parties had adopted to that time indorsed and approved, there had been no division in this country in regard to that principle except the opposition of the Abolitionists. In the hands of Represenatives of the Illinois Legislature, upon a resolution asserting that principle, every Whig and every Democrat in the House voted in the affirmative, and only four men voted against it, and those four were old line Abolitionists.

In 1855, Mr. Abraham Lincoln and Mr. Trumbull entered into an arrangement, one with the other, and each with his respective friends, to dissolve the old Whig party on the one hand, and to dissolve the old Democratic party on the other, and to connect the members of both into an Abolition party, under the name and dignity of a Republican party. The terms of that arrangement between Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Trumbull have been published to the world by Mr. Lincoln's special order. H. Mathews, Esq., they were, that Lincoln should have Sheridan's place in the United States Senate, which was then about to become vacant, and that Trumbull should have the place of Mr. Seward, who was then about to expire. Lincoln went to work to Abolitionize the old Whig party all over the State, persuading that he was the friend of as ever; and Trumbull went to work in his part of the State persuading Abolitionists in its milder and lighter form, and trying to Abolitionize the Democratic party, and bring the Democrats handshaked and bound hand and foot into the Abolition camp. In pursuance of the arrangement, the parties met at Springfield in October, 1854,
and proclaimed their new platform. Lincoln was to bring to the Abolition camp the old line Whigs, and transfer them over to Goldings, Chase, Fred Douglass, and Parson Lovejoy, who were ready to receive them and christen them in their new faith. They laid down on that occasion a platform for their new Republican party, which was to be thus constructed; to have the resolutions of the first Illinois State Convention ever held in Illinois by the Black Republican party, and I now hold them in my hands and will read a part of them, and cause the others to be printed. Here are the most important and material resolutions of this Abolition platform:

1. Resolved, That we believe this truth to be self-evident, that all parties become subservient to which they are established or incapable of restoring the Government to the true principles of the Constitution, it is the right and duty of the people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with such parties, and to organize new parties with such views as the circumstances and exigencies of the nation may demand.

2. Resolved, That the laws imperatively demand the re-organization of parties and repudiating all previous party attachments, names and professions; we make ourselves together in defense of the liberty and Constitution of the country, and will not more cooperate with the Republican party, pledged to the accomplishment of the following purposes: To bring the administration of the Government back to the control of the principles; to restore Nebraska and Kansas to the position of free territories; and, as the Constitution of the United States vests in the States, and not in Congress, the power to legislate for the extrication of fugitives from labor, to repeal entirely the admission of any slave States into the Union; to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; to exclude slavery from all the territories over which the General Government has exclusive jurisdiction; and to resist the oppressed of any part of the states unless the practice of slavery therein forever shall have been prohibited.

3. Resolved, That in furtherance of these principles we will use such Constitutional and lawful means as shall seem best adapted to their accomplishment, and that we will support no man for office, under the General State Government, who is not totally and fully committed to the same principles, and whose personal character and conduct do not warrant a confidence that he is reliable, and who shall not have adopted old party allegiance and ties.

Now, gentlemen, your Black Republicans have cherished every one of these propositions, and yet I venture to say that you cannot get Mr. Lincoln to come out and say that he is in favor of each one of them. In all your platform, Mr. Lincoln has been and is yet to-day as a member of Congress from the Sangamon district, when I was then in the Senate of the United States, and was glad to welcome you and your friends. But in Congress, he distinguished himself by his opposition to the Mexican War, taking the ground that it was an enemy against his own country; and when he returned home he found that the indignation of the people followed him everywhere, and he was again submerged or obliged to retire into private life, forgotten by his former friends. He came up again in 1854, just in time to make this Abolition or Black Republican platform, and then was with Goldings, Lovejoy, Chase, and Fred Douglass, for the Republican party to stand upon. Trumbull, too, was one of our own contemporaries. He was born and raised in old Connecticut, was bred a Federalist, but removing to Georgia, turned Nullifier, when nullification was popular, and as soon as he disposed of his clocks and wound up his business, migrated to Illinois, turned a lawyer here, and made his appearance in 1841, as a member of the Legislature. He became noted as the author of the scheme to repudiate a large portion of the State debt of Illinois, which, if successful, would have brought infamy and disgrace upon the fair electors of our glorious State. The odium attached to that measure con- signed him to oblivion for a time. I helped to do it. I walked into a public meeting in the hall of the House of Representatives, and replied to his repudiating speech, and resolutions were carried over his head denouncing repudiators, insisting the moral and legal obligation of Illinois to pay every dollar of the debt she owed and every bond that bore her seal. Trumbull's maladie has followed me since I thus defeated his infamous scheme.

These two men having formed this combination to abolish the old Whig party and the old Democratic party, and put themselves into the Senate of the United States, in pursuance of their bargain, are now carrying out that arrangement. Matheny states that Trumbull broke faith; that the bargain was that Lincoln should be made the Whig's man, and Trumbull to wait for the next campaign, when the great陶people, that Trumbull cheated. Lincoln, having control of four or five abolitionist Democrats who were holding over in the Senate; he would not let them vote for
Lincoln, and which obliged the rest of the Abolitionists to support him in order to secure an Abolition Senator. There are a number of authorities for the truth of this statement, and I suppose that even Mr. Lincoln will not deny that this is the case.

Mr. Lincoln demands that he shall have the place intended for Trumbull, as Trumbull cheated him and got his, and Trumbull is stamping the State reducing me for the purpose of securing the position for Lincoln, in order to quiet me. It was a foolish arrangement of this arrangement that the Republican Convention was impaneled to sustain. For Lincoln and nobody else, and it was on this account that they passed resolutions that he was the first, their last, and their only choice. Archy Williams was nowhere, Browning was nowhere, Wentworth was not to be considered, and there could not be two or more men in the Republican party, as they were not hunting for any one. The Republicans may have reasons for this, but I think it is the reason that he does not give them the so-called support of the party.

Having formed this new party for the benefit of deserters from Whigsey, and deserters from Democracy, and having had the advantage of it, with a variety of climate, and fresh ideas, and a new spirit, and an idea of what this new party is, I think it is the reason that he does not give them the so-called support of the party.

In his speech at Springfield to the Convention, which nominated him for the Senate, he said:

"In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure permanently half Slave and half Free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction: or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States—old as well as new, North as well as South.

"(I am "good," and others.)"

I am delighted to hear you Black Republicans say "good." I have no doubt that the doctrine expresses your sentiments, and I will prove to you now, if you will listen to me, that if this be true, it will do more than any other measure for the overthrow of the slavery system and the destruction of the slavery party. I do not believe that Mr. Lincoln, in the extract from which I have read, says that this Government cannot endure permanently in the same condition in which it was made by its framers—divided into free and slave States. He says that it has existed for about seventy years thus divided, and yet he tells you that it cannot endure permanently on the same principles, and in the same relative condition in which our fathers made it. Why can it not exist divided into free and slave States? Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Madison, Hamilton, Jay, and the great men of that day, made this Government divided into free States and slave States. He says that this Government was divided into free States and slave States, and let each State perfectly free to do as it pleased on the subject of slavery. Why can it not exist on the same principles which our fathers made it? They knew when they framed the Constitution that in a country as wide as this, with such a variety of climate, production and interest, the people necessarily required different laws and institutions in different localities. They knew that the laws and regulations which would suit the granite hills of New Hampshire would be unsuited to the rice plantations of South Carolina, and yet, therefore, provided for each State to maintain its own Legislature and its own sovereignty, with the full and complete power to do as it pleased within its own limits, in all that was local and national. One of the reserved rights of the States, was the right to regulate the relations between Master and Servant, or any other question. At the time the Constitution was framed, there were thirteen States in the Union, twelve of which were slaveholding States and one a free State. Suppose this doctrine of uniformity preached by Mr. Lincoln, that the States should all be free or all be slave has prevailed, and what would have been the result? One of the twelve slaveholding States would have overruled the one free State, and slavery would have been fastened by a Constitutional provision on every inch of the American Republic, instead of being left as our fathers wisely left it, to each State to decide for itself. Here I assert that uniformity in the local laws and institutions of the different States is neither possible or desirable. If uniformity had been adopted when the Government was established, it must inevitably have been the result of the slave State or some other State everywhere, or else the uniformity of Negro citizenship and Negro equality everywhere.

We are told by Lincoln that he is utterly opposed to the Dred Scott decision, and will not submit to it for the reason that he says it deprives Negroes of their rights, but we ask what right have the negroes to vote in the States and free negroes out of the States, and allow the free negroes to flow in, and cover your prairies with black settlements? Do you desire to turn this beautiful State into a free negro colony, in order that when Missouri abolishes slavery she can send one hundred thousand dispossessed slaves into Illinois, to become property, as they are now, in an equality with yourselves? If you desire negro citizenship, if you desire to allow them to come into the State and settle with the white man, if you desire them to vote on an equality with yourselves, and to make them eligible to office, to serve on juries and to adjudge your rights, then support Mr. Lincoln and the Black Republican party, who are in favor of negro citizenship everywhere. For one, I am opposed to negro citizenship in any and every form. I believe this Government was made on the white basis. I believe it was made by white men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity for ever, and I am in favor of confining citizenship to white men, men of European birth and descent, instead of conferring it upon negroes, Indians, and other inferior races.

Mr. Lincoln, following the example and lead of all the Black Abolitionists, who go along with him into the bowels of schools and churches, and from the Declaration of Independence, that all men were created equal, and then asks, how can you deprive a negro of that equality which God and the Declaration of Independence awards to him? He and they maintain that negro equality is guaranteed by the Constitution. But they think that, of course, they have a right to say so, and so vote. I do not question Mr. Lincoln's conscientious belief that the negro was made his equal, and hence is his brother, but for my own part, I do not regard the negro as my equal, and positively deny that he is or can be my brother or my kin in no whatever. Lincoln has evidently been controlled by his conscience, but I have been controlled by my conscience. He has always been true to the Almighty, and that no man can deprive him of these rights which were guaranteed to him by the Supreme Ruler of the Universe. Now, I do not believe that the Almighty ever intended the negro to be the equal of the white man. If he did, he has been a long time demonstrating the fact. For the whole of years the negro has been a race upon the earth, and during all that time, in all climates and climates, wherever he has wandered or been taken, he has been inferior to the race with which he has there met. He belongs to an inferior race, and must always occupy an inferior position. I do not hold that because the negro is inferior that therefore he ought to be a slave. By no means can such a conclusion be drawn from what I have said. On the contrary, I hold that humanity and Christianity both require that the negro shall have and enjoy every right, every privilege, and every immunity consistent with the safety of the society in which he lives. On that point, I presume, there can be no diversity of opinion. You and I are bound to extend to our inferior and dependent beings every right, every privilege, every facility and immunity consistent with the public good. The question then arises, how shall the several slaveholding States, who are inconsistent with the laws of God and the Constitution, which is the law of God, and the question which each State and each Territory must decide for itself—Illinois has decided it for herself. We have provided that the negro shall not be a slave, and we have also provided that he shall not be a citizen, but protect him in his civil
right, in his life, his person and his property, only depriving him of all political rights whatsoever, and refusing to put him on an equality with the white man. That policy of Illinois is satisfactory to the Democratic party and to many of the Republicans, there would then be no question upon the subject; but the Republi-
cans say that he ought to be made a citizen, and when he becomes a citizen he becomes your equal, with all your rights and privileges. They assert the Dred Scott case to be monstrous, because it deals that the negro shall be a citizen and afterward be under the Constitution. Now, I hold that Illinois had a right to abolish and prohibit slavery as she did, and I hold that Kentucky has the same right to continue and protect slavery that Illinois had to abolish it. I hold that New York had as much right to abolish slavery as Virginia has to continue it, and that every State of this Union is a sovereign power, with the right to do as it pleased upon the question of slavery, and upon all its domestic institutions. Slavery is not the only question which comes up in this controversy. There is a far more important one to you, and that is, what shall be done with the free negro? We have settled the slavery question as far as we are concerned; we have prohibited it in Illinois forever, and in doing so, I think we have done wisely, and there is no man in the State who would be more strenuous in his opposition to the introduction of slavery than I would; but when we settled it for ourselves, we exhausted all our power over that subject. We have done our whole duty, and can do no more. We must leave each and every State to decide for itself the same question. In relation to the policy to be pursued toward the free negroes, we have said that it shall not vote; whilst Maine, on the other hand, has said that they shall vote. Maine is a sovereign State, and has the power to regulate the qualifications of voters within his limits. I would never consent to confer the right of voting and of citizenship upon a negro, but still I am not going to quarrel with Maine for differing from us on that point. Maine take care of her own negroes and fixes the qualifications of her own voters to suit herself, without interfering with Illinois, and Illinois will not interfere with Maine. So with the State of New York. She allows the negro to vote provided he owns two hundred dollars' worth of property, but not otherwise. I do not think the wisdom of this law can make any distinction whatever between a negro who holds property and one who does not, yet if the sovereign State of New York chooses to make that distinction it is her business and not mine, and I will not quarrel with her for it. She can do as she pleases so long as she confines herself within the limits of her own State and does not try to dictate to other States how they shall regulate the qualifications of their voters. Now, my friends, if we will only sit down calmly and quietly upon this great prin-
ciple of popular sovereignty, which guarantees to each State and Territory the right to do as it pleased on all subjects, local and domestic, instead of Congress interfering, we can carry on our institutions peace one with another. Why should Illinois be at war with Missouri, or Kentucky with Ohio, or Virginia with New York, merely because their institutions differ? Our fathers intended that our institutions should differ. They knew that the North and the South, having different climates, productions and interests, required different institutions. This doctrine of Mr. Lincoln, of uniformity among the institutions of the different States, is a new doctrine, never dreamed of by Washington, Madison, or the framers of this Government. Mr. Lincoln and the Republican party set themselves up as wiser than these men who made this Govern-
ment, which has flourished for seventy years under the principle of popular sovereignty, recognizing the right of each State to do as it pleased. Under that principle, we have grown from a nation of three or four million to a nation of about thirty millions of people; we have crossed the Allegheny mountains and filled up the whole North-west, turning the prairies into a garden, and building up churches and schools, thus spreading civilization and Christianity where before there was nothing but savage barbarism. Under that principle we have become, from a feeble nation, the strongest nation on the face of the earth, and if we only adhere to the principle, we can go forward increasing in territory, in power, in strength and in glory until the Republic of America shall be the North Star that shall guide the friends of freedom throughout the civilized world. And why can we not adhere to the great principle

of self-government, upon which our institutions were originally based? I believe that this new doctrine preached by Mr. Lincoln and his party will dissolve the Union if it succeeds. They are trying to array all the Northern States in one body against the South, and to bring about a sectional war between the Free States and the slave States, in order that one or the other may be driven to the wall.

I am told that my time is out. Mr. Lincoln will now address you for an hour and a half, and I will then occupy an hour in replying to him.

MR. LINCOLN'S REPLY.

MY FELLOW-CITIZENS: When a man bears himself somewhat misrepresented, it provokes him—at least, I find it so with myself—but when misrepresentation be-
comes very gross and palpable, it is more apt to annoy him. The first thing I see it fit to notice, is the fact that Judge Douglas alleges, after running through the history of the old Democratic and the old Whig parties, that Judge Trumbull and myself made an arrangement in 1854, by which I was to have the place of Gen. Shields in the United States Senate, and Judge Trumbull was to have the place of Judge

Douglas. Now, all I have to say upon that subject is, that I think no man—not even Judge Douglas—can prove it, because it is not true. I have no doubt but he is a "consensuous" in saying it. As to those resolutions that he took such a length of time to read, as being the platform of the Republican party in 1854, I say I never had anything to do with them, and I think Trumbull never had. Judge Douglas

cannot show that either of us ever did have anything to do with them. I believe this is the fact about those resolutions: There was a call for a Convention to form a Republican party at Springfield, and I think that my friend, Mr. Lovejoy, who is here upon this stand, had a hand in that. I think this is true, and I think if he will remember accurately, he will be able to recollect that he tried to get me into it, and I was not willing to go. I believe it is also true that I went away from Springfield when the Convention was in session, to attend court in Tazewell county. It is true they did place my name, though without authority, upon the committee, and afterwards wrote to me to attend the meeting of the committee, but I refused to do so, and I never had anything to do with that organization. This is the plain truth about all that

matter of the resolutions.

Now, about this story that Judge Douglas tells of Trumbull bargaining to sell out the old Democratic party, and Lincoln agreeing to sell out the old Whig party, I have the means of knowing about that; Judge Douglas cannot have; and I know there is no substance to it whatever. Yet I have no doubt he is a "conversational" about it. I know that after Mr. Lovejoy got into the Legislature that winter, he complained of me that I had told all the old Whigs of his district that the old Whig party was good enough for them, and some of them voted against him because I told them so. Now, I have no means of totally disproving such charges as this which the Judge makes. A man cannot prove a negative, but he has a right to claim that when a man makes an affirmative charge, he must offer some proof to show the truth of what he says. I certainly cannot introduce testimony to show the negative about things, but I have a right to claim that if a man says he knows a thing, then he must show how he knows it. I always have a right to claim this, and it is not something of a thing that he may be a "consensuous" on the subject.

Now, gentlemen, I have to waste my time on such things, but in regard to that

general Allusion that Judge Douglas makes, when he says that I was engaged at that time in selling out and abolishing the old Whig party—I hope you will permit me to give you a part of a printed speech that I made then at Potosi, which will show altogether a different view of the position I took in that contest of 1854.

Voice—Put on your spectacles.
Mr. Lincoln—Yes, sir, I am obliged to do so. I am no longer a young man. This is the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.* The foregoing history may not be precisely accurate in every particular; but I am sure it is sufficiently so for all the uses I shall attempt to make of it, and in it we have been left entirely unsatisfactory to correctly judge whether the repeal of the Missouri Compromise is right or wrong.

I think, and shall try to show, that it is wrong; wrong in its direct effect, letting slavery into Kansas and Nebraska—and wrong, in its prospective principle, allowing it to spread to every other part of the wide world, where men can be found inclined to take it.

This declared indifference, but, as I must think, covert real zeal for the spread of slavery, I cannot but hate. I hate it because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world—enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, toTam as incapacious—causes the real friends of freedom to doubt our sincerity—and especially because it forces so many really good men amongst ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of civil liberty—criticizing the Declaration of Independence, and insisting that there is right principle of action but self-interest.

Before proceeding, let me say I think I have no prejudice against the Southern people. They are just what we would be in their situation. If slavery did not now exist among them, they would not introduce it. If it did exist now amongst us, we should not instantly give it up. This I believe of the masses North and South. Doubtless there are individuals on both sides, who would hold slaves under any circumstances; and others who would gladly introduce slavery, if it were out of existence. We know that some Southern men do free their slaves, go North, and become abolitionists; while some Northern men go South, and become most cruel slave owners. When Southern people tell us they are no more responsible for the origin of slavery than we, I acknowledge the fact. When it is said that the institution exists, and that it is very difficult to get rid of it, in any satisfactory way, I can understand and appreciate the saying. I surely will not blame them for not doing what I should not know how to do myself. If all earthly power were given me, I should not know what to do, as to the existing institution. My first impulse would be to free all the slaves, and send them to Liberia—to their own native land. But a moment's reflection would convince me, that whatever of high hope (as I think there is) there may be in this, the long run, its sudden execution is impossible. If they were all landed there in a day, they would all perish in the next ten years; and there are not supplies sufficient to save them. What next? Free them, and make them politically and socially our equals? My own feelings will not admit of this; and if mine would, we well know that those of the great mass of white people will not. Whether this feeling accords with justice and sound judgment, is not the sole question; if, indeed, it is any part of it. A universal feeling, whether well or ill-founded, cannot be safely disregarded. We cannot, then, make them equals. It does seem to me that systems of gradual emancipation might be adopted; but for their tardiness in this, I will not undertake to judge whether a consent of their constitutional rights, I acknowledge them, not grudgingly, but fully and fairly; and I would give them any legislation for the reclaiming of their fugitives, which should not, in its stringency, be more likely to carry a free man into slavery, than our ordinary criminal laws are to hang an innocent one.

*But all this, my judgment, furnishes no more excuse for permitting slavery to go into our new territory, than it would for reviving the African slave-trade by law. The law which forbids the bringing of slaves from Africa, has so long forbid the taking of them to Nebraska, can hardly be distinguished on any moral principle; and the repeal of the former could find quite as plausible excuse as that of the latter.

I have reason to know that Judge Douglas knows that I said this. I think he has the answer here to one of the questions he put to me. I do not mean to allow him to catch me unless he pays back for it in kind. I will not answer questions one after another, unless he recovers it; but as he has made this inquiry, and I have answered it before, he has got it without my getting anything in return. He has got my answer on the Fugitive Slave law.

Now, gentlemen, I don't want to read at any greater length, but this is the true conclusion of all I have ever said in regard to the institution of slavery and the black race. This is the whole of it, and anything that argues me into his idea of perfect social and political equality with the negro, is but a specious and fantastic arrangement of words, by which a man can prove a horse-chestnut to be a chestnut horse. I will say here, while upon this subject, that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races. There is a physical difference between the two, which, in my judgment, will forever forbid their living together upon the footing of perfect equality, and inasmuch as it becomes a necessity that there must be a difference, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position. I have never said anything to the contrary, but I hold that, notwithstanding, there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man. I agree with Judge Douglas he is not my equal in many respects; certainly not in moral or intellectual endowment. But in the right to eat the bread, without the leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal and entitled to all the protection of the law. Now I pass on to consider one or two more of these little follies. The Judge is wildly at fault about his early friend Lincoln being a "grocery-keeper." I don't know as it would be a great sin, if I had been; but he is mistaken. Lincoln never had anything to do with the world. It is true that Lincoln did live in the last part of one winter in a little still-house, up at the head of a hollow. All I say is that my friend, the Judge, is equally at fault when he charges me at the time when I was in Congress as having opposed the soldiers who were fighting in the Mexican war. The Judge did not make his charge very distinctly, but I can tell you that he can prove by referring to the record. You remember I was an old Whig, and whenever the Democratic party tried to get me to vote that the war had been rightfully begun, I said I would not do it. But whenever they asked for my money, for bonds, or anything to pay the soldiers there, during all that time, I gave them the same vote that Judge Douglas did. You can think as you please as to whether that was consistent. Such is the truth; and the Judge has the right to make all he can out of it. But when he brings it, by a general charge, conveys the idea that I withheld supplies from the soldiers who were fighting the Mexican war, or did anything else to hinder the soldiers, he is, to say the least, grossly and altogether mistaken, as a conclusion of the records will prove to him.

As I have not had up so much of my time as I had supposed, I will dwell a little longer upon one or two of these minor topics upon which the Judge has spoken. He has read from my speech in Springfield, in which I say that "a house divided

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*This extract from Mr. Lincoln's "Peora speech" of 1854, was read by him in the Ottawa debate, but was not reported fully or accurately in either the Times or Press and Tribune. It is inserted here in accordance with a complete report of the debate.
against itself cannot stand." Does the Judge say it can stand? I don't know whether he does or not. The Judge does not seem to be attending to me just now, but I would like to know if it is his opinion that a house divided against itself can stand. If he does, then there is a question of velocity, not between him and me, but between the Judge and an authority of something higher.

Now, my friends, I ask your attention to this matter for the purpose of saying something seriously. I know that the Judge may really enough agree with me that the maxim which was put forth by the Saviour is true, but he may not agree with that as far as his application. I do not imply it, and then I have a right to say that I do not imply it. When he undertakes to say that because I think this nation, so far as the question of slavery is concerned, will become one thing or the other, I am in favor of bringing about a new country, a new nation, in all the institutions of the various States, he argues erroneously. The great variety of the local institutions in the States, springing from differences in the soil, differences in the face of the country, and in the climate, are bonds of Union. They do not make "a house divided against itself," but they make a house united. If they produce in one section of the country the same results that are called for by the wants of another section, this other section can supply the wants of the first, they are not matters of discord but bonds of union, true bonds of union. But can this question of slavery be considered as among these varieties in the institutions of the country? I leave it to you to say whether, in the history of our Government, this institution of slavery has not at all times been a bond of union, and, on the contrary, been an apple of discord, and an element of division in the house. I ask you to consider whether, as long as the moral constitution of man's mind shall continue to be the same, after this generation and assemblages shall sink into the grave, and another race shall arise, with the same moral and intellectual development we have—whether, if that institution is standing in the same irritative position in which it is now, and we are not under the necessity of continuing the subject upon original principles, to say that, in regard to this question, the Union is a house divided against itself; and when the Judge reminds me that I have often said to him that the institution of slavery has existed for eighty years in some States, and yet it does not exist in others, I agree to the fact, and I account for it by looking at the position in which our fathers originally placed it—restricting it from the new Territories where it had not gone, and legislating to cut off its source by the abolition of the slave-trade, thus putting the seal of legislation against its spread. The public mind did rest in the belief that this was in the course of ultimate extinction; and while it is placed upon that basis, I say, and I have said, that I believe we shall not have peace until the question of the institution of slavery is altogether removed.

A Voice—Then do you repudiate Popular Sovereignty?

Mr. Lincoln—Well then, let us talk about Popular Sovereignty! What is Popular Sovereignty? Is it the right of the people to have slavery or not have it, as they see fit in the Territories? I will state—and I have an able man to watch me—my understanding is that Popular Sovereignty, as now applied to the question of slavery, does allow the people of a Territory to have slavery if they want to, but does not allow them to have it if they do not want it. I do not mean that if this vast concourse of people were in a Territory of the United States, any one of them would be obliged to have a slave if he did not want one; but I do say, as I understand the Judge's speech and an authority of something higher, if any one man wants slaves, the rest have no way of keeping that man from holding them.

When I made my speech at Springfield, of which the Judge complains, and from which he quotes, I really was not thinking of the things which he ascribes to me at all. I had no thought in the world that I was doing anything to bring about a war between the free and slave States. I had no thought in the world that I was doing anything to bring about a political and social equality of the black and white races. It never occurred to me that I was doing anything or favoring anything to reduce to a dead uniformity all the local institutions of the various States. But I must say, in all fairness to him, if I am doing something which leads to these bad results, it is none the better that I did not mean it. It is just as bad to the country, if I have any influence in producing it, whether I intend it or not. But can it be true, that placing this institution upon the original basis—the basis upon which our fathers placed it—can have any tendency to set the Northern and the Southern States at war with one another, or that it can have any tendency to make the people of Vermont raise insurrection, because they raise it in Louisiana, or that it can compel the people of Illinois to cut pine logs on the Grand Prairie, where they will not grow, because they cut pine logs in Maine, where they do grow? The Judge says this is a new principle started in regard to this question. Does the Judge claim that he is working on the plan of the founders of Government? I think he says in some of his speeches—indeed, I have one here now—that he saw evidence of a policy to allow slavery to be south of a certain line, while north of it it should be excluded, and he saw an indisposition on the part of the country to stand upon that policy, and therefore he leaves it to the people to interpret the Constitution and principles that he got up the Nebraska bill! I am fighting it upon these "original principles"—fighting it in the Jeffersonian, Washingtonian, and Madisonian fashion.

Now, my friends, I wish you to attend for a little while to one or two other things in that Springfield speech. My main object was to show, so far as my humble ability was capable of showing to the people of this country, what I believed the truth—that there was a tendency, if not a conspiracy among those who have engineered this slavery question for the last four or five years, to make slaveholding a local and universal in this nation. Having made that speech principally for that object, after arranging the evidences that I thought tended to prove my proposition, I concluded with this bit of comment:

"We cannot abstractly know that these exact adaptations are the result of preconcert, but when we see a lot of framed timbers, different portions of which we know have been gotten out at different times and places, and by different workmen—Stephen, Franklin, Roger, and Madison placed it, it would be in the course of ultimate extinction, and the public mind would, as for eighty years past, believe that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. The crisis would be past and the institution might be let along for a hundred years, if it should live so long, in the States where it exists, yet it would be going out of existence in the way best for both the black and the white race."

When my friend, Judge Douglas, came to Chicago, on the 9th of July, this speech having been delivered, the 16th of June, he made a harangue there, in which he took hold of this speech of mine, showing that he had carefully read it; and while he paid no attention to this matter at all, but complimented me as being a "kind, amiable and intelligent gentleman," notwithstanding I had said this, he goes on and
eliminates, or draws out, from my speech this tendency of mine to set the States at war with one another, to make all the institutions uniform, and set the negroes and white people to marrying together. Then, as the Judge had complimented me with them, I tell them I have no faith in the Negro (I must confess to my feeling, and I am not a foe to the cause, and I came from a great man. I was not very much accustomed to slavery, and it came the sweeter to me. I was rather like the New Yorker with the gingerbread, when he said he reckoned he loved it better than any other man, and got less of it. As the Judge had complimented me, I could not make up my mind that I meant to deal unfairly with him; so I went to work to show him that he misunderstood the whole scope of my speech, and that I never intended to set the people at war with one another. As an illustration, the next time I met him, which was at Springfield, I said I was inclined, that I claimed no right under the Constitution, that I claimed no right under the Constitution. I was not entitled to enter into the slave States and interfere with the institutions of slavery. He says upon it: "Lincoln will not enter into the slave States, but will go to the lands of the Ohio, on this side, and shoot over!" He runs on, says, the horridest of all, the horridest in the Springfield speech he says, "Unless the slaveholder is successful in his batteries, until he shall have extinguished slavery in all the States, the Union shall be dissolved." Now I don't think that was exactly the way to treat a "kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman." I know if I had asked the Judge to show where or where it was I had said that, if I didn't succeed in firing into the slave States until slavery should be extinguished, the Union should be dissolved, he could not have shown it. I understand what he would do. He would say, "I don't mean to quote from you, but this was the reach of what you say." But I have the right to ask, and I do ask now. Did you not put it in such a form that an ordinary reader or listener would take it as an expression from you?

In a speech at Springfield, on the night of the 17th, I thought I might as well attend the Judge's case a little and I called his attention to this charge of conspiracy to nationalize slavery. I called his attention to the fact that he had acknowledged, in his hearing twice, that he had carefully read the speech, and, in the language of the lawyers, as he had twice read the speech, and still held it in his mind throughout all his speeches, he took a decision on him. I raised the question of his right to renew that charge of conspiracy. Ten days afterward I met the Judge at Clinton—so to say, I was on the ground, but not in the discussion—and heard him make a speech. Then he comes in with his plea to the charge, for the first time, and his plea when put in, as well as I can recollect it, amounted to this: that he never had any talk with Judge Taney or the President of the United States with regard to the Dred Scott decision before it was made. I (Lincoln) ought to know that the man who makes a charge without knowing it to be true, falsifies as much as he who knowingly tells a falsehood. If he could not pronounce the whole thing a falsehood; but he would make no personal application of the charge of falsehood, not because of any regard for the "kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman," but because of his own personal self-respect. I have understood it thus: But (turning to Judge Douglas) will not hold the Judge to it if he is not willing) that he has broken through the "self-respect," and has got to saying the thing. The Judge nods to me that it is so. It is fortunate for me that I can keep as good-humored as I do, when the Judge acknowledges that he has been trying to make a question of everything with me. I know the Judge is a great man, while I am only a small man, but I feel I have got him. I demur to that plea. I waive all objections that it was not filed till after default was taken, and demur to it upon the merits. What if Judge Douglas did not talk with Chief Justice Taney and the President, before the Dred Scott decision was made, does it follow that he could not have had as perfect an understanding without talking as with it? I am not disposed to stand upon my legal advantage. I am disposed to take his denial as an answer in plenary, that he has not the slightest, or any knowledge, information or belief as to the existence of such a conspiracy. I am disposed to take his answer as being as broad as though he had put it in these words. And now, I ask, even if he had done so, have not I the right
to come in due time, we shall see that it was the other half of something. I now say again, if there is any different reason for putting it there, Judge Douglas, in a good-natured way, without calling anybody a liar, can tell the reason now.

When a judge spoke at Clinton, he came very near making a charge of falsehood against me. He used, as I found it printed in a newspaper, which I remember, was very nearly like the real speech, the following language:

"In the case of the charge of conspiracy, before the reason, that I did not suppose there was a man in America with a heart so corrupt as to believe such a charge could be true. I have too much respect for Mr. Lincoln to suppose he is serious in making the charge." I confess this is rather a curious view, that out of respect for me he should consider I was making what I deemed rather a grave charge. I confess it strikes me rather strangely. But I let it pass. As the judge did not for a moment believe that there was a man in America whose heart was so "corrupt" as to make such a charge, and as he places me among the "men in America" who have been brave enough to make such a charge, I hope he will excuse me if I hunt out another charge very much like this and if it should turn out that in hunting I should find that other, and it should turn out to be Judge Douglas himself who made it, I hope he will reconsider this question of the deep corruption of heart he has thought fit to address to me.

In Judge Douglas' speech of March 24, 1858, which I hold in my hand, he says:

"In this connection there is another point to which I desire to allude. I seldom refer to the course of newspapers, or notice the articles which they publish in regard to myself; but the course of the Washington Union has been of extraordinary form for the last two or three months, that I think well enough to make some allusion to it. It has read me out of the Democratic party every other day, at least for two or three months, and keeps reading me out, and, as if it had not succeeded in shaking me, it now comes out to me, or for any other newspapers. I am willing to allow its history and action for the last twenty years for itself, and the claims of its constitution and principles, and my fidelity to political obligations. The Washington Union has a personal grievance. When its editor was nominated for public printer, I declined to vote for him, and stated that at some time I might give my reasons for doing so. Since I declined to give that vote, this newspaper, perhaps, these vindictive and constant attacks have been repeated almost daily on me. Will my friend from Michigan read the article to which I allude?"

This is a part of the speech. You must excuse me from reading the entire article of the Washington Union, as Mr. Stuart read it for Mr. Douglas. The Judge goes on and says, as I think, correctly:

"Mr. President, you have here several distinct propositions advanced boldly by the Washington Union editorially, and apparently authoritatively, and under the questions any of them is denounced as an Abolitionist, a Freesider, a fanatic. The propositions are, first, that the primary object of all government at its origin and score was the protection of person and property; second, that the Constitution of the United States declares that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and, therefore, thirdly, all State laws, whether organic or otherwise, which prohibit the citizens of one State from entering another with their "property," and especially declaring it forbidden, are direct violations of the original intention of the Government and Constitution of the United States; and, fourth, that the emancipation of the slaves of the Northern States was a gross outrage on the rights of property, inasmuch as it was a precedent of the kind, and the practice of a government which was bound to destroy itself the moment the independence of the people of the United States was invaded by a violation of the Constitution; and, fifth, that the emancipation of the slaves of the Northern States, on the 18th of December, 1862, and the 17th of November, and in the 18th appeared the first article giving the allusion of the Union to the Lecompton Constitution. It was in these words:

"Remember this article was published in the Union on the 17th of November, and on the 18th appeared the first article giving the allusion of the Union to the Lecompton Constitution. It was in these words:"

"Kansas and Her Constitution.—The vexed question is settled. The problem is solved. The dead point of danger is passed. All serious trouble to Kansas affairs is over and gone.

"And a column, nearly, of the same sort. Then, when you come to look into the Lecompton Constitution, you find the same doctrine incorporated in it which was put forth editorially in the Union. What is it?"

"ARTICLE 7, Section 1. The right of property is before and higher than all Constitutional sanctions; and the right of the owner of a slave to sell slave and his increase is the same and as inviolable as the right of the owner of any property whatever.

"Then in the schedule there is a provision that the Constitution may be amended after 1864 by a two-thirds vote.

"That no alienation shall be made to affect the right of property in the ownership of slaves.

"It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution, that they are identical in spirit with the authoritative article in the Washington Union of the day previous to its endorsement of this Constitution."

I pass over some portions of the speech, and I hope that any one who feels interested in this matter will read the entire section of the speech, and see whether I do the Judge injustice. He proceeds:

"When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November, followed by the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of November, and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that a State has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that there was a fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of this Union.

"I stop the quotation there, again requesting that it may all be read. I have read all of the portion I desire to comment upon. What is this clause that the Judge thinks I must have a very corrupt heart to make? It was a purpose on the part of certain high functionaries to make it impossible for the people of one State to prohibit the retention of slaves within their limits. Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, and other States, it was a fatal blow to slavery. In other words, it was a clause implying a design to make the institution of slavery national. And now I ask your attention to what Judge Douglas has himself done here. I know he made that part of the speech as a reason why he had refused to vote for a certain man for public printer, but when we get at it, the change isn't in the very one I made against him, that he thinks I am so corrupt for uttering. Now, whom does he make that charge against? Does he make it against that newspaper editor merely? No, he says it is identical in spirit with the Lecompton Constitution, and so the framers of that Constitution are brought in with the editor of the newspaper in that "fatal blow being struck." He did not call it a "conspiracy." In his language it is a "fatal blow being struck." And if the words carry the meaning better when changed from a "conspiracy" into a "fatal blow being struck," I will change my expression and call it "fatal blow being struck." We see the charge made not merely against the editor of the Union, but all the framers of the Lecompton Constitution; and not only so, but the article was an authoritative article. By whose authority? Is there any question but he means it was by the authority of the President and his Cabinet—the Administration? Is there any sort of question but he means to make that charge? Then there are the editors of the Union, the framers of the Lecompton Constitution, the President of the United States and his Cabinet, and all the supporters of the Lecompton Constitution, in Congress and out of Congress, who are all involved in this "fatal blow being struck." I comment to Judge Douglas' consideration the question of how corrupt a man's heart must be to make such a charge?"

"I might have done the part of the other side, but one branch of the subject, in the little time I have left, to which I call your attention, and as I shall come to a close at the end of that branch, it is probable that I shall not occupy quite all the time allotted to me. Although on these questions I would like to talk twice as long as I have, I could not
enter upon another head and discuss it properly without running over my time. I ask the attention of the people here assembled and elsewhere, to the course that Judge Douglas is pursuing every day as bearing upon this question of making slavery national. He is drawing it back to the records, and with the spirit which makes the Speaker taciturn yesterday and day before, and makes constantly all over the country—I ask your attention to them. In the first place, what is necessary to make the institution national? Not war. There is no danger that the people of Kentucky will shoulder their muskets, and with a young tigger stock, march into Illinois and force them upon us. There is no danger of our going over there and making war upon them. Then what is necessary for the nationalization of slavery? It is simply the next Dred Scott decision. I may, by the way, for the Supreme Court to decide that there is no State under the Constitution which can exclude it, just as they have already decided that under the Constitution neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature can do it. When that is decided and acquiesced in, the whole thing is done. This being true, and this being the way, as I think, that slavery is to be made national, let us consider what Judge Douglas is doing every day to that end. In the first place, let us see what influence he is exerting on public sentiment. In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed. Consequently he who wields public sentiment, poisons deeper than he who wields statutes or pronounced decisions. He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed. This must be borne in mind, as also the additional fact that Judge Douglas is a man of vast influence, so great that it is enough for many men to profess to believe anything, when they once find out that Judge Douglas professes to believe it. Consider also the attitude he occupies at the head of a large party—a party which he claims as a majority of all the voters in the country. This man sits in a decision which forbids the people of a State to exclude slavery, and he does so not because he says it is right in itself—he does not give any opinion on that—but because it has been decided by the court, and being decided by the court, he is, and you are bound to take it in your political action as law, not that he judges at all of its merits, but because a decision of the court is to him, "Thus with the Lord." He pleases it, and he wants it, and you will bear in mind that, thus committing himself unwisely to this decision, commit him to the next one just as firmly as to this. He did not commit himself on account of the merit or demerit of the decision, but it is "Thus with the Lord." The next decision, as much as this, in which he would commit himself unwisely to a decision of the Supreme Court pronouncing a National Bank constitutional. He says, I did not hear him say so. He denies the accuracy of my recollection. I say he ought to know better than I, but I will make no question about the thing, though it still seems to me that I heard him say it twenty times. I will tell him, though, that he now claims to stand on the Cincinnati platform, which affirms that Congress cannot grant a National Bank, in the teeth of that all standing decision that Congress under the Constitution can. And I remind him of another piece of history on the question of respect for judicial decisions, and it is a piece of Illinois history, belonging to a time when the large party to which Judge Douglas belonged, were displeased with a decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois, because they had decided that a Governor could not remove a Secretary of State. You will find the whole story in Lord's History of Illinois, and I know that Judge Douglas will not deny that he was then in favor of overruling that decision by the mode of adding five new judges, so as to vote down the four old ones. Not only so, but it ended in the Judge's sitting down to write such a decision as would break down the four old ones. It was in this way precisely that he got his title of Judge. Now, when the Judge tells me that men appointed conditionally to sit as members of a court, will have to be elected beforehand upon some subject, I say, "You know, Judge, you have tried it." When he says a court of this kind will lose the confidence of all men, will be prostituted and disgraced by such a proceeding, I say, "You know better than I, but I am apt to think you have no respect"; that will hang on when he has once got his teeth fixed: you may cut off a leg, or you may tear up your arm, still he will not relax his hold. And so I may point out to the Judge, and say that he is, in fact, bolder all over, from the beginning of his political life to the present time, with attacks upon judicial decisions—I may cut off limb after limb of his public record, and strive to wrench him from a single dictum of the court—yet I cannot divert him from it. He hangs to the last to the Dred Scott decision. These things show there is a purpose strange as death and eternity for which he adheres to this decision, and for which he will adhere to all other decisions of the same court.

A Liberator—"Give us something besides Dred Scott."

Mr. Lincoln—"Yes; no doubt, you want to hear something that don't hurt. Now, having spoken of the Dred Scott decision, we may come to it."

Henry Clay, my best ideal of a statesman, the man for whom I fought all my humble life. Henry Clay once said of a class of men who would repudiate all tenderness to liberty and ultimate emancipation, that they must, if they would do this, go back to the era of our Independence, and muzzle the cannon which thunders its annual jubilee return; they must blow out the moral lights around us; they must penetrate the human soul, and eradicate there the love of Liberty; and then, and only then, could they perpetuate slavery in this country. To my thinking, Judge Douglas is, by his example and vast influence, doing that very thing in the community, when he says that the negro has nothing in the Declaration of Independence. Henry Clay plainly understood the country. Judge Douglas is going back to the era of our Revolution, and to the extent of his ability, muzzling the cannon which thunders its annual jubilee return. When he invites any people, willing to have slavery, to establish it, he is blowing out the moral lights around us. When he says he "cares not whether slavery is voted down or voted up"—that it is a sacred right of self-government—he is, in my judgment, penetrating the human soul and eradicating the light of reason and the love of Liberty in this American people. And now I will only say that when, by all these means and appliances, Judge Douglas shall succeed in bringing public sentiment to an exact accordance with his own views, when these vast assemblages shall echo back all these sentiments—when they shall come to the House of our Assembly, and ask to avow his principles, and to say all that he says on these mighty questions—then it needs but the fulminations of the second Dred Scott decision, which he indorses in advance, to make slavery alike lawful in all the States—old as well as new, North as well as South.

My friends, that ends the chapter. The Judge can take his half hour.

MR. DOUGLAS'S REPLY.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: I will now occupy the half hour allotted to me in replying to Mr. Lincoln. The first point to which I will call your attention is, as to what I said about the organization of the Republican party in 1854, and the platform that was formed on the fifth of October of that year, and I will then put the question to Mr. Lincoln, whether or not, he approves of each article in that platform, as well as ask for a specific answer. I did not charge him with being a member of the committee which reported that platform. I charged that that platform was the platform of the Republican party as adopted on the floor of the Senate of that year. The fact that it was the platform of the Republican party is admitted, but Mr. Lincoln now says, that although some of its names were on the committee which reported it, that he does not think he was there, but thinks he
was in Taosweld, holding court. Now, I want to remind Mr. Lincoln that he was at Springfield when that Convention was held, and those resolutions adopted.

The point I am going to remind Mr. Lincoln of is this: that after I had made my speech in 1864, during the day, he gave me notice that he was going to reply to me that day. And I had to go to Springfield at 11 o'clock, and I asked Lincoln specifically whether he agreed with them in that? ["Did you get an answer?"] He is afraid to name it. He knows I will trot him down to Egypt. I intend to make him answer there, or I will show the people of Illinois that he does not intend to answer those questions. The Convention to which I referred to Mr. Lincoln, will not be alluding again a little further, and pledges itself to exclude slavery from all the Territories over which the Government has exclusive jurisdiction north of 36 deg. 30 min., as well as South. Now I want to know what he approves that provision. I want him to answer, and when he does, I will take him before the General Government, whether he is the first, last, and only choice of a party with whom he does not agree in principle. He does not deny that that principle was unanimously adopted by the Republican party; he does not deny that the whole Republican party is pledged to it; he does not deny that a man who is not faithful to it is faithless to the Republican party; and now I want to know whether that party is unanimously in favor of a man who does not adopt that creed and agree with them in their principles. I want to know whether the man who does not agree with them, and who is afraid to name his difference, and who dodges the issue, is the first, last, and only choice of the Republican party.

A voice: "How about the conspiracy?"

Mr. Douglas: "Never mind; I will come to that soon enough. But the platform which I have read to you, not only lays down these principles, but adds:"

Rebellion, That in furtherance of these principles we will use such constitutional and lawful means as shall seem best adapted to their accomplishment; and that we will support any law passed by the General or State Government, which is not inconsistent with this platform, and United to the support of these principles, and whose personal character and conduct is not a guarantee that he is reliable, and who shall not have adopted the party allegiance and dies.

The Black Republican party stands pledged that they will never support Lincoln unless he has got himself to that platform, but he cannot declare in that party, he has made up his mind whether he will or not. He talked about everything else he could think of to occupy his hour and a half; and when he could not think of anything more to say, without an excuse for refusing to answer these questions, he sat down long before his time was out.

In relation to Mr. Lincoln's charge of conspiracy against me, I have a word to say. In his speech-to-day he quotes a playfull part of his speech at Springfield, about Stephen, and James, and Franklin, and Roger, and says that I did not take exception to it. I did not answer it, and he repeats it again. I did not take exception to this figure of his. He has a right to be as playful as he pleases in throwing his arguments together, and I will not object; but I did take exception to his second Springfield speech, in which he stated that he intended his first speech as a charge of corruption or conspiracy against the Supreme Court of the United States, President Pierce, President Buchanan, and myself. That gave the offensive character to the charge. He then said that when he made it he did not know whether it was true or not. But now you hear Judge Douglas has denied it, although he had replied to the other parts of his speech three times, he repeated it as a charge of conspiracy against me, thus charging me with moral turpitude. When he put it in that form, I did say, that inasmuch as he repeated the charge simply because I had not denied it, I would deprive him of the opportunity of ever repeating it again, by declaring that it was,
in all its bearings, an infamous lie. He says he will repeat it until I answer his fully and nonsense, about Stephen, and for, and Roger, and Bob, and James. He says he will repeat it until I answer his fully and nonsense, about Stephen, and for, and Roger, and Bob, and James.

I studied that one—prepared that one sentence with the greatest care, considered it full of meaning, and put it in its full, its direct, its true meaning, and now he carries that speech around and reads that sentence to show how pretty it is. His vanity is wounded because I will not go into that beautiful figure of his about the building of a house. All I have to say is, that I am not honest enough to acknowledge he does not know to be true, and then make up my mind in answering it, when I know it to be false and nobody else knows it to be true.

I have not brought a charge of moral turpitude against him. When he, or any other man, brings one against me, instead of disproving it, I will say that it is a lie, and let him prove it if he can.

I have lived twenty-five years in Illinois. I have served you with all the fidelity and ability which I possess, and Mr. Lincoln is at liberty to attack my public action, my vote, and my conduct; but when he dares to attack my moral integrity, by a charge of conspiracy between myself, Chief Justice Taney and the Supreme Court, and two Presidents of the United States, I will repel it.

Mr. Lincoln has not character enough for integrity and truth, merely on his own part, nor, to amend it, to amend President Buchanan, President Pierce, and nine Judges of the Supreme Court, not one of whom would be complimented by being put on an equality with him. There is an unpardonable presumption in a man putting himself up before thousands of people, and pretending that his past acts, without proof, with facts and without truth, is enough to bring down and destroy the parent and best of living men.

Fellow-citizens, my time is fast expiring. I must pro ce. Mr. Lincoln wants to know why I voted against Mr. Chase's amendment to the Nebraska bill. I will tell him. In the first place, the bill already covered all the power which Congress had, by giving the people the whole power over the subject. Chase offered a proviso that they might abolish slavery, which by implication would cover the idea that they could prohibit by not introducing that institution. Gen. Cass asked him to modify his amendment, so as to provide that the people might either prohibit or introduce slavery, and thus make it fair and equal. Chase refused to so modify his proviso, and then Gen. Cass and all the rest of us, voted it down. Those facts appear in the journals and debates of Congress, where Mr. Lincoln found the charge, and if he had told the whole truth, there would have been no necessity for me to occupy your time in explaining the matter.

Mr. Lincoln wants to know why the word "State," as well as "Territory," was put into the Nebraska bill. I will tell him. It was put there to meet just such false arguments as he has been adverting. That first, not only the people of the Territories should do as they pleased, but that when they come to be admitted as States, they should come into the Union with or without slavery, as the people determined. I meant to knock in the head this Abolition doctrine of Mr. Lincoln's, that there shall be no more slave States, even if the people want them. And it does not do for him to say, or for any other Black Republican to say, that there is nobody in favor of the doctrine of no more slave States, and that nobody wants to interfere with the right of the people to do as they please. What was the origin of the Missouri difficulty and the Missouri Compromise? The people of Missouri formed a Constitution in a slave State, and asked admission into the Union, with or without slavery, as the people determined. Hence this first slavery agitation arose upon a State and not upon a Territory, and yet Mr. Lincoln does not know why the word State was placed in the Kansas-Nebraska bill. The whole Abolition argument on that doctrine was that admitting a State from coming in with slavery or not, as it pleased, it is, that same doctrine is here in this Republican platform of 1854; it has never been repealed; and every Black Republican stands pledged by that platform, never to vote for any man who is not in favor of it. Yet Mr. Lincoln does not know that there is a man in the world who is in favor of preventing a State from coming in as it please, notwithstanding. The Springfield platform says that they, the Republican party, will not allow a State to come in under such circumstances. He is an ignoble man.

Now you see that upon these very points I am as far from bringing Mr. Lincoln up to the line as I ever was before. He does not want to answer his principles. I do want to know mine, as clear as sunlight in mid-day. Democracy is founded upon the eternal principle of right. The plainer these principles are avowed before the people, the stronger will be the support which they will receive. I only wish I had the power to make them so clear that they would shine in the heavens for every man, woman, and child to read. The first of these principles that I would proclaim would be in opposition to Mr. Lincoln's doctrine of uniformity between the different States, and I would declare instead the sovereign right of each State to decide the slavery question, as well as all other domestic questions for themselves, without interference from any other State or power whatsoever.

When that principle is recognized, you will have peace and harmony and fraternal feeling between all the States of this Union; until you do recognize that doctrine, there will be sectional warfare agitating and disturbing the country. What does Mr. Lincoln propose? He says that the Union cannot exist divided into free and slave States. If it cannot endure thus divided, then he must strive to make them all free or all slave, which will inevitably bring about a dissolution of the Union.

Gentlemen, I am told that my time is out, and I must beg to stop.
ries, whether he answers mine or not; and that after I have done so, I shall proceed to him.

I have supposed myself, since the organization of the Republican party at Bloomington, in 1854, bound as a party man by the platform of the party, and since, if in any interrogatories which I shall answer I go beyond the scope of what is within these platforms, it will be perceived that no one is responsible but myself.

Having said thus much, I will take up the Judge's interrogatories as I find them printed in the Chicago Times, and answer them secretly. In order that there may be no mistake about it, I have copied the interrogatories in writing, and also my answers to them. The first one of these interrogatories is in these words:

Question 1: "I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands, as he did in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law?"

Answer: I do not now, nor ever did, stand in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law.

Question 2: "I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged today, as he did in 1854, against the admission of any more slave States into the Union, even if the people want them?"

Answer: I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against the admission of any more slave States into the Union, even if the people want them.

Question 3: "I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union with such a Constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make?"

Answer: I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new State into the Union, with such a Constitution as the people of that State may see fit to make.

Question 4: "I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia?"

I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

Question 5: "I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States?"

I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different States.

Question 6: "I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States, North as well as South, of the Missouri Compromise?"

Answer: I am implicitly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States Territories.

Question 7: "I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?"

Answer: I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and, in any case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition, accordingly as I might think that such acquisition would or would not aggravate the slavery question among ourselves.

Now, my friends, it will be perceived upon an examination of these questions and answers, that so far I have only answered that I was not pledged to this, that or the other. The Judge has not framed his interrogatories to ask me anything more than this, and I have answered in strict accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered truly that I am not pledged at all upon any of the points to which I have answered. But I am not disposed to hang upon the exact form of his interrogatories. I am rather disposed to take up at least some of these questions, and state what I really think upon them.

As to the first one, in regard to the Fugitive Slave law, I have never hesitated to say, and I do not now hesitate to say, that I think, under the Constitution of the United States, that the power to control the fugitive slave is vested with the States, and that the power to control the fugitive slave is vested in the States, and that this power is vested in the States.

Having said that, I have had nothing to say in regard to the existing Fugitive Slave law, further than that I think it should have been framed so as to be free from some of the objections that pertain to it, without lessening its efficiency.

And inasmuch as we are not now in an agitation in regard to an alteration or modification of that law, I would not be the man to introduce it as a new subject of agitation.

In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission of any more slave States into the Union, I state to you very frankly that I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put in a position of having to pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there would never be another slave State admitted into the Union; but I must add, that if slavery should be kept out of the Territories during the territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people shall, having a fair chance and a clear field, when they come to adopt the Constitution, do such an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave Constitution, in defiance of the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into the Union.

The third interrogatory is answered by the answer to the second, it being, as I conceive, the same as the second.

The fourth one is in regard to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, in relation to that, I have my mind very distinctly made up. I should be exceedingly glad to see slavery abolished in the District of Columbia. I believe that Congress possesses the constitutional power to abolish it. As a member of Congress, I should not with my present views, be in favor of endeavoring to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, unless it would be upon those conditions: First, that the abolition should be gradual. Second, that it should be on a vote of the majority of qualified voters in the District; and third, that compensation should be made to unwilling owners. With these three conditions, I confess I would be exceedingly glad to see Congress abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and, in the language of Mr. Garrison, I would step from our Capital that God bluer upon our nation.

In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say here, that as to the question of the abolition of the slave-trade between the different States, I can truly answer, as I have, that I am pledged to nothing about it. It is a subject to which I have not given that mature consideration that would make me feel authorized to state a position so as to hold myself entirely bound by it. In other words, that question has never been prominently enough before me to induce me to investigate whether we really have the constitutional power to do it. I could investigate it if I had sufficient time, to bring myself to a conclusion upon that subject; but I have been too much occupied to do so. I say so frankly to you here, and to Judge Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be of opinion that Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish the slave-trade among the different States, I should still be in favor of the exercise of that power, on the ground of the conservative principle of which I conceive it to be, to what I have said in relation to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

My answer as to whether I desire that slavery should be prohibited in all the Territories of the United States, is full and explicit within itself, and cannot be made clearer by any comments of mine. So I suppose in regard to the question whether I am opposed to the acquisition of any more territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein, my answer is such that I could add nothing by way of illustration, or making upon it what I have already stated, than the answer which I have placed in writing.

Now in all this, the Judge has me, and he has me on the record. I suppose he had flattered himself that I was really entertaining one set of opinions for one place and another set for another place—that I was afraid to say at one place what I uttered at another. What I am saying here I suppose I say to a vast audience as strongly tending to Abolitionism as any audience in the State of Illinois, and I believe I am saying that which, if it would be offensive to any persons and render them enemies to myself, would be offensive to persons in this audience.
The first one is:

Question 1. If the people of Kansas shall, by means entirely unobjectionable in all other respects, adopt a State Constitution, and ask admission into the Union under it, before there is the requisite number of inhabitants according to the English bills, and two-thirds of the population will have to admit them?

Q. 2. Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?

Q. 3. If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adopting and following such decision as a rule of political action?

Q. 4. Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory, in disregard of how such acquisition may affect the nation on the slavery question?

As introductory to these interrogatories which Judge Douglas propounded to me at Ottawa, he read a set of resolutions which he said Judge Trumbull and myself had participated in adopting, in the first Republican State Convention, held at Springfield, in October, 1854. He insisted that I and Judge Trumbull, and perhaps the entire Republican party, were responsible for the doctrines contained in the set of resolutions which he read, and I understand that it was from that set of resolutions that he deduced the interrogatories which he propounded to me, using these resolutions as a sort of authority for propounding these questions to me. Now I say here today that I do not answer the interrogatories because of their springing in all from that set of resolutions which he read. I answered them because Judge Douglas thought it to ask them. I do not now, or never did, recognize any responsibility upon myself in that set of resolutions. When I replied to him on that occasion, I assured him that I never had anything to do with them. I repeat here today, that I never had anything to do with the resolutions.

It turns out, I believe, that those resolutions were never passed in any Convention held in Springfield. It turns out that they were never passed at any Convention or public meeting that I had any part in. I believe it turns out in addition to all this, that there was not, in the fall of 1854, any Convention holding a session in Springfield, calling itself a Republican State Convention; yet it is true there was a Convention, or assembly of men calling themselves a Convention, at Springfield, that did pass some resolutions. But so little did I really know of the proceedings of that Convention, or what set of resolutions they had passed, though having a general knowledge that there had been such an assembly of men there, that when Judge Douglas read the resolutions, I really did not know but they had been the resolutions passed and there. I did not doubt that they were the resolutions adopted.

But I could not bring myself to suppose that Judge Douglas could say what he did upon this subject without knowing that it was true. I contended myself, on that occasion, with denying as I truly could, all connection with them, not denying or affirming whether they were passed at Springfield. Now it turns out that he had got hold of some resolutions passed at some Convention or public meeting in Kane county. I wish to say here, that I don't concede that in any fair and just mind this discovery relieves me at all. I had just as much to do with the Convention in Kane county as I had with the Convention in Springfield. And I am as much responsible for the resolutions in Kane county as those at Springfield, the amount of the responsibility being exactly nothing in either case; no more than there would be in regard to a set of resolutions passed in the moon.

To bring this extraordinary matter in this canvass for some further purpose than anything yet advanced. Judge Douglas did not make his statement upon that occasion as matters that he believed to be true, but he stated them roundly as being true, in such form as to pledge his veracity for their truth. When the whole matter turned out to be false, and when we consider who these false statements were made by, I have called attention to the fact that the distinguished Senator of the United States—that he has served nearly twelve years as such—that his character is not at all limited as an ordinary Senator of the United States, but that his name has become of world-wide renown—it is most extraordinary that he should so far forget all the suggestions of justice to an adversary, or of prudence to himself, as to venture upon the assertion of that which the slightest investigation would have shown him to be wholly false. I can only account for his having done so upon the supposition that that evil genius which has attended him through his life, giving him to apparent astonishing prosperity, such as to lead very many good men to doubt there being any advantage in virtue over vice—I say I can only account for it on the supposition that that evil genius has at last made up its mind to forsake him.

And I may add that another extraordinary feature of the Judge's conduct in this canvass—is more extraordinary by this incident—is, that he is in the habit, in almost all the speeches he makes, of charging falsehood upon his adversaries, myself and others. I now ask whether he is able to find in any thing that Judge Trumbull, for instance, has said, or in any thing that I have said, a justification at all compared with what we have, in this instance, for that sort of vulgarity.

I have been in the habit of charging as a matter of belief on my part, that, in the introduction of the Nebraska bill into Congress, there was a conspiracy to make slavery perpetual and national. I have arranged from time to time the evidence which establishes and proves the truth of this charge. I recurred to this charge at Ottawa, I shall not now have time to dwell upon it at very great length, but inasmuch as Judge Douglas in his reply of half an hour, made some points upon me in relation to it, I propose noticing a few of them.

The Judge insists that, in the first speech I made, in which I very distinctly made that charge, he thought for a good while I was in fun—that I was playful—that I was not sincere about it—and that he only grew angry and somewhat excited when he found that I insisted upon it as a matter of earnestness. He says he characterizes the next speech as the possible fruit of an imaginary idea. I implied his novel character in that transaction. Well, I did not think, till I saw the view that he had impressed upon his moral character. He is very much in the habit, when he argues me up into a position I never thought of occupying, of very easily saying he has no doubt Lincoln is "conscientious" in saying so. He should remember that I did not know but what he was altogether "conscientious" in that matter. I can concede it possible for men to acquiesce in a good thing, and I really find nothing in Judge Douglas's course of arguments that is contrary to or inconsistent with his belief of a conspiracy to nationalize and spread slavery as being a good and blessed thing, and so I hope he will understand that I do not at all question but that in all this matter he is entirely "conscientious".

But to draw your attention to one of the points I made in this case, beginning at the beginning. When the Nebraska bill was introduced, or a short time afterward, by an amendment, I believe, it was provided that it must be considered the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any State or Territory, or to enable the people thereof to bring slavery into any State or Territory for the purpose of making any thing a State or Territory. I am just as much responsible for the resolutions passed in Kane county as those at Springfield, the amount of the responsibility being exactly nothing in either case; no more than there would be in regard to a set of resolutions passed in the moon.
And I have argued and said that for men who did intend that the people of the Territory should have the right to exclude slavery absolutely and unconditionally, the voting down of Chase’s amendment was wholly inexplicable. It is a puzzle—a riddle.

But I have said that with men who did look forward to such a decision, or who were actuated by the contemplation of the Supreme Court making a decision, or might be made, the voting down of that amendment would be perfectly rational and intelligible. It would keep Congress from coming in collision with the decision of the Supreme Court. Anybody can conceive that if there was an intention or expectation that such a decision was to follow, it would not be a very desirable party attitude to get into for the Supreme Court—all or nearly all its members belonging to the same party—to decide one way, when the party in Congress had decided the other way. Hence it would be very rational for men expecting such a decision, to keep the issue in that law clear for it. After pointing this out, I tell Judge Douglas that it looks to me as though here was the reason why Chase’s amendment was voted down. I tell him that as he did it, and know why he did it, if it was done for a reason different from this, he knows what that reason was, and can tell us what it was. I tell him, also, it will be vastly more satisfactory to the country for him to give some other plausible, intelligible reason why it was voted down than to stand upon his dignity and call people liars. Well, on Saturday he did make his answer, and what do you think it was? He says if I had only taken upon myself to tell the whole truth about that amendment of Chase’s, no explanation would have been necessary on his part—or words to that effect. Now, I say here, that I am quite unconscious of having suppressed any thing material to the case, and I am very frank to admit if there is any sound reason other than that which appeared to me material, it is quite fair for him to present it. What reason does he propose? That when Chase came forward with his amendment expressly authorizing the people to exclude slavery if they so desired, he (Chase) would add to his amendment that the people should have the power to introduce or exclude, they would let it go. This is essentially all of his reply. And because Chase would not do that, they voted his amendment down. Well, it turned out. I believe, upon examination, that General Cass took some part in the little running debate upon that amendment, and then ran away and did vote on it at all. Is not that the fact? So confident, as I think, was General Chase that there was a chance somewhere, he chose to run away from the whole thing. This is an insignificant detail from the fact that, though he took part in the debates, his name does not appear in the ayes and nays. But does Judge Douglas’s reply amount to a satisfactory answer? [Gives the word “yes,” “yes,” and “no.”] There is some little difference of opinion here. But I ask attention to a few more views bearing on the question. In considering whether it amounts to a satisfactory answer. The men who were determined that that amendment should not get into the bill and spoil the place where the Dred Scott decision was to come in, sought an excuse to get rid of it somewhere. One of these men was Chase. He said he would introduce an amendment a provision that the people might introduce slavery if they wanted to. They very well knew Chase would do no such thing—that Mr. Chase was one of the men differing from them on the broad principle of his insisting that freedom was better than slavery—a man who would not consent to emaciate himself with his own hands, by which he was made to recognize slavery on the one hand and liberty on the other as precisely equal; and when they insisted on his doing this, they very well knew he insisted on that which he could not for a moment think of doing, and that they were only bluffing him. I believe (if I have not, when he made his answer, had a chance to examine the journals or Congressional Globe, and therefore speak from memory)—I believe the state of the bill at that time, according to parliamentary rules, was such that no member could propose an additional amendment to Chase’s amendment. I rather think this is the fact—the Judge makes his best.

Very well. I would like to know, then, if they wanted Chase’s amendment fixed over, why somebody else could not have offered it? If they wanted it amended, why did they not offer the amendment? Why did they stand there tumbling and quibbling at Chase? Why did they not put it in themselves? But to put it on the other ground; suppose that there was such an amendment offered, and Chase’s was an amendment to an amendment; until one is disposed of by parliamentary law, you believe both in Congress. Then all these gentlemen had to do was to vote Chase’s no, and then in the amended form in which the whole thing, and them here is the amendment to it, if they wanted to put it in that shape. This was all they were obliged to do, and the ayes and nays on Chase’s amendment show that there were thirty-six who voted it down, against ten who voted in favor of it. The thirty-six held entire sway and control. They could in some form or other have put that bill in the exact shape they wanted. If there was a rule preventing their amending it at the time, they could pass that, and then Chase’s amendment being merged, put it in the shape they wanted. They did not choose to do so, but they went into a quibble with Chase to get him to add what they knew he would not add, and because he would not, they stand upon that flimsy pretext for voting down what they argued was the meaning and intent of their own bill. They left room thereby for this Dred Scott decision, which goes very far to make slavery national throughout the United States. I pass one or two points I have because my time will very soon expire, but I must be allowed to say that Judge Douglas refers again, as he did upon one or two other occasions, to the enormity of Lincoln—an insignificant individual like Lincoln—upon his ipse dixit charging a conspiracy upon a large number of members of Congress, the Supreme Court and two Presidents, to nationalize slavery. I want to say that, in the first place, I have made no charge of this sort upon my ipse dixit. I have only arrayed the evidence tending to prove it, and presented it to the understanding of others, saying what I think it proves, but giving you the means of judging whether it proves it or not. This is precisely what I have done. I have not planted a fact upon the limits of every territory. On this occasion, I wish to read you a piece of evidence which I brought forward at Ottawa on Saturday, showing that he had made substantially the same charge against substantially the same persons, excluding his dear self from the category. I ask him to give some attention to the evidence which I brought forward, that he himself had discovered a ‘false blow being struck’ against the right of the people to exclude slavery from their limits, which fatal blow he assumed as evidence in an article in the Washington Union, published “by authority.” I ask by whose authority? He discovers a similar or identical provision in the Lecompton Constitution. Made by whom? The framers of that Constitution. Advocated by whom? By all the members of the party in the nation, who advocated the introduction of Kansas into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution.

I have asked his attention to the evidence that he arrayed to prove that such a fatal blow was being struck, and to the facts which he brought forward in support of that charge—being identical with the one which he thinks so villainsome in me. He pointed out at a press-packer editor merely, but at the President and his Cabinet, and the members of Congress advocating the Lecompton Constitution and those framing that instrument. I must again be permitted to remind him, that although my ipse dixit may not be as great as his, yet it somewhat reduces the force of his calling my attention to an enormity of my making a like charge against him.

Go on, Judge Douglas.

MR. DOUGLAS’S SPEECH.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: The silence with which you have listened to Mr. Lincoln during his hour is creditable to this vast audience, composed of men of various political parties. Nothing is more honorable to any large mass of people assembled for the purpose of peace, than that kind and respectful attention
that is yielded not only to your political friends, but to those who are opposed to you in politics.

I am glad that at last I have brought Mr. Lincoln to the conclusion that he had better abandon the proposition on certain political questions, which he has entered into at Ottawa. He there showed no disposition, no inclination, to answer them. I did not present idle questions for him to answer merely for my gratification. I laid the foundation for those interrogatories by showing that they constituted the platform of the party whose nominee he is for the Senate. I did not presume that I had the right to excite him as I saw proper, unless I showed that his party, or a majority of it, stood upon the platform and were in favor of the propositions upon which my questions were based. I desired simply to know, inasmuch as he had been nominated for the Senate, whether he had prepared himself to answer the questions, and whether he was prepared to answer the platform which that party had adopted for its government. In a few moments I will proceed to review the answers which he has given to these interrogatories; but in order to relieve his anxiety I will first respond to those which he has presented to me. Mink, you, he has not presented interrogatories which have ever received the sanction of the party with which I am acting; and hence he has no other foundation for them than his own curiosity.

First, he desires to know if the people of Kansas shall form a Constitution by means entirely proper and unobjectionable and ask admission into the Union as a State, before they have the requisite population for a member of Congress, whether I will vote for that admission. Well, now, I regret exceedingly that he did not answer that interrogatory himself before he put it to me. In order that we might understand, and not be left to infer, on which side he is. Mr. Trumbull, during the last session of Congress, voted from the beginning to the end against the admission of Oregon, although a free State, because she had not the requisite population for a member of Congress. Mr. Trumbull would not consent, under any circumstances, to let a State, free or slave, come into the Union until it had the requisite population. As Mr. Trumbull is in the field, fighting for Mr. Lincoln, I would like to have Mr. Lincoln answer his own question and tell me whether he is fighting Trumbull on that issue or not. But I will answer his question. In reference to Kansas, it is my opinion, that as she has population enough to constitute a slave State, she has people enough for a free State. I will not make Kansas an exceptional case to the other States of the Union. I hold it to be a sound rule of universal application to require a Territory to contain the requisite population for a member of Congress, before it is admitted as a State into the Union. I made that proposition in Congress in 1856, and I renewed it during the last session, in a bill providing that no Territory of the United States should form a Constitution and apply for admission until it had the requisite population. On another occasion I proposed that neither Kansas, or any other Territory, should be admitted until it had the requisite population. Congress did not adopt any of my propositions containing this general rule, but did make an exception for the case of Kansas. I will stand by that exception. Either Kansas stands in as a free State, with whatever population she may have, or the rule must be applied to all the other Territories alike. Therefore answer at once, that it having been decided that Kansas has people enough for a slave State, I hold that she has such a population for a free State. I hope Mr. Lincoln is satisfied with my answer; and now I would like to get his answer to his own interrogatory,—whether or not he will vote to admit Kansas before she has the requisite population. I want to know whether he will vote to admit Oregon before that Territory has the requisite population. Mr. Trumbull will not, and the same reason that compels Mr. Trumbull against the admission of Oregon, compels him against Kansas, even if she should apply for admission as a free State. If there is any sincerity, any truth, in the argument of Mr. Trumbull in the Senate, against the admission of Oregon because she had not 95,420 inhabitants, although her population was larger than the Constitution does not allow for the admission of both Oregon and Kansas until they have 95,420 inhabitants. I would like Mr. Lincoln to answer this question. I would like him to take his own medicine. If he differs with Mr. Trumbull, let him answer his argument against the admission of Oregon, instead of poking questions at me.

The next question propounded to me by Mr. Lincoln is, can the people of a Territory organize, and go on with their organization, and order, against the wishes of any citizen of the United States? I answer simply, as Mr. Lincoln has heard me answer a hundred times from every stump in Illinois, that in my opinion the people of a Territory can, by lawful means, exclude slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution. Mr. Lincoln knows that I had answered that question over and over again. He heard me argue the Nebraska bill on that principle all over the State in 1854, and as Lincoln, and in 1856, and he has no excuse for prevailing to be in doubt as to my position, and his position cannot be any other than that of his party. It matters not what way the Supreme Court may decide as to the abstract question whether slavery may or may not go into a Territory under the Constitution, the people have the lawful means to introduce it or exclude it as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist day or night anywhere, unless it is supported by local police regulations. Those police regulations can only be established by the local legislature, and if the people are opposed to slavery they will elect representatives to that body who will by uni-sectional legislation officially prevent the introduction of it into their midst. If, on the contrary, they are for it, their legislation will favor its extension. Hence, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a slave Territory or a free Territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska bill. I hope Mr. Lincoln deems my answer satisfactory on that point.

In this connection, I will notice the charge which he has introduced in relation to Mr. Chase's amendment. I thought that I had closed that amendment out of Mr. Lincoln's hands at Ottawa, but it seems that still lurks his imagination, and he is not yet satisfied. I had supposed that he would be ashamed to press that question further. He is a lawyer, and has been a member of Congress, and has occupied his time and mine by telling you about parliamentary proceedings. He ought to have known better than to try to answer a question of his miserable importation upon this intelligent audience. The Nebraska bill provided that the legislative power, and authority of the said Territory, shall extend to all rights of legislation consistent with the organic act and the Constitution of the United States. It did not make any exceptions. It gave the people of the said Territory, all the power that it was possible to give, without violating the Constitution to the Territorial Legislature, with no exception or limitation on the subject of slavery at all. The language of that bill which I have quoted, gave the full power and the full authority over the subject of slavery, affirmatively and negatively, to introduce it or exclude it, so far as the Constitution of the United States would permit. What more could Mr. Chase give by his amendment? Nothing. He offered his amendment for the identical purpose for which Mr. Lincoln is using it, to enable demagogues in the country to try and deceive the people.

His amendment was to this effect. It provided that the Legislature shall have the power to exclude slavery; and General Cass suggested, "why not give the power to introduce as well as exclude?" The answer was, they have the power already in the bill to do both. Chase was afraid his amendment would be adopted if he put the alternative proposition and so make it fair both ways, but would not yield. He offered it for the purpose of having it rejected. He offered it so as he himself moved over and over again, simply to make capital of it for the stump. He expected that it would be capital for small politicians in the country, and that they would make an effort to deceive the people with it, and he was not mistaken for Lincoln is carrying out the plan admirably. Lincoln knows that the Nebraska bill, without Chase's amendment, gave all the power which the Constitution would allow, and Congress could do any more? Could Congress go beyond the Constitution of the country? We gave all a full grant, with no exception in regard to slavery see
way or the other. We left that question as we left all others, to be decided by the people for themselves, just as they pleased. I will not occupy my time on this question. I have argued it before all over Illinois. I have argued it in this beautiful city of Freeport; I have argued it in the North, the South, the East, and the West, as well as in the same sentiments and the same principles, and multiply, and expand, is this law of this nation's existence. You cannot limit this great Republic by mere boundary lines, saying, "Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther." Any one of you gentlemen might as well say to a man who is well off, that he is old enough, and must not grow any larger, and in order to prevent his growth put a hoop around him to keep him to his present size. What would be the result? Either the hoop must burst and be rent asunder, or the child must die. So it would be with this great nation. With our natural increase, growing with a rapidity unknown in any other part of the globe, with the title of emigration that is issuing from desolation in the old world to seek refuge in our own, there is a constant torrent pouring into this country that requires more land, more territory upon which to settle, and just as fast as our interests and our destiny require additional territory in the North, in the South, or on the islands of the ocean, I am for it, and when we acquire it, we shall have the people, according to the Nebraska bill, free to do as they please on the subject of slavery and every other question.

I trust now that Mr. Lincoln will deem himself answered on the two points. He racked his brain so much in devising these two questions that he exhausted himself and had not strength enough to the others. As soon as he is able to hold a council with his advisors, lovejoy, firmworth, and Fred Douglas, he will frame and propose others. [*Good good.*] You Black Republicans who say good, I have no doubt that they are all good men. I have reason to recollect that some people in this country think that Fred Douglass is a very good man. The first time I ever saw him he was talking from the stand to you, people of Freeport, as I am doing now. I saw a carriage, and a magnificent one it was, come up, and a young lady was sitting on the box, whilst Fred Douglass and his mother rode inside, and the owner of the carriage acted as driver. I saw this in your own town. [*What of it?*] All I have to say of it is this, that if you, Black Republicans, think that the negro ought to be on a social equality with your wives and daughters, and ride in a carriage with your wife, whilst you drive the team, you have perfect right to do so. I am told that one of Fred Douglass's kinsmen, another rich, black negro, is now traveling in this part of the State making speeches for his friend Lincoln as the champion of black men. [*What have you to say against it?*] All I have to say on that subject is, that those of you who believe that the negro is your equal and ought to be on a social equality with your wives and daughters, and legally, have a right to entertain those opinions, and of course will vote for Mr. Lincoln.

I have a word to say on Mr. Lincoln's answer to the interrogatories contained in my questions, and which he has pretended to reply to here-to-day. Mr. Lincoln makes a great parade of the fact that I quoted a platform which he adopted by the Black Republican party at Springfield in 1854, which it turns out, was adopted at another place. Mr. Lincoln leaves sight of the thing itself in his replies over the mistake I made in stating the place where it was done. He thinks that the platform was not adopted on the right "spot." When I put the direct questions to Mr. Lincoln as to whether he now stands pledged to that creed—to the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law, a refusal to admit any more territory, and his political principles are great on "spite." In Congress, as a representative of this State, he declared the Mexican war to be unjust and inhuman, and would not support it, or acknowledge his own
country to be right in the contest, because he said that American blood was not shed on American soil in the "right spot." And now he cannot answer the questions I put to him at Ottawa. I read quite a quantity of very moving resolutions at opening the convention which the resolutions I then read were proclaimed, but I was not, and am not in error as to the fact of their forming the basis of the creed of the Republican party when that party was first organized. I state to you the closing days upon which I rely for my statement that the resolutions in question were adopted at Springfield on the 3rd of October, 1854. Although I was aware that such resolutions had been passed in this district, and nearly all the northern Congressional Districts, and County Conventions, I had not noticed whether or not they had been adopted by any State Convention. In 1855, a debate arose in Congress between Major Thomas L. Harris, of the Springfield District, and Mr. Norton, of the Joliet District, on political matters connected with our State, in the course of which Major Harris quoted those resolutions as having been passed by the first Republican State Convention that ever assembled in Illinois. I knew that Major Harris was remarkable for his accuracy, that he was a very conscientious and sincere man, and I also noticed that Norton did not question the accuracy of this statement. I therefore took it for granted that it was so, and the other day when I concluded to use the resolutions at Ottawa, I wrote to Charles H. Lamphie, editor of the State Register, at Springfield, calling his attention to them, telling him that I had been informed that Major Harris was lying sick at Springfield, and desiring him to call upon him and ascertain all the facts concerning the resolutions, the time, and the place where they were adopted. In reply, Mr. Lamphie sent me two copies of his paper, which I have here. The first is a copy of the Register published at Springfield, Mr. Lincoln's own town, on the 15th of October, 1854, on which the adjournment of the Convention, from which I desire to read the following: "During the late discussions in this city, Lincoln made a speech, to which Judge Douglas replied. In Lincoln's speech he took the broad ground that, according to the Constitution, he was a man of Independence, to the white and black races in all the States, but he drew the conclusion, which he several times repeated, that the slave man had no right to pass laws for the government of the black man without the negro's consent. This speech of Lincoln's was heard and applauded by all the Abolitionists assembled in Springfield. So soon as Mr. Lincoln was done speaking, Mr. Codding arose and requested all the delegates to the Republican Convention to withdraw into the secret chamber. They did so, and after long deliberation, they laid down the following platform as the platform on which they stood. We call the particular attention of all readers to it." Then follows the identical platform, word for word, which I read at Ottawa.

Now, that was published in Mr. Lincoln's own town, eleven days after the Convention was held, and it has remained on record up to this day never contested.

When I quoted the resolutions at Ottawa and questioned Mr. Lincoln in relation to them, he said that his name was on the committee that reported them, but he did not serve, nor did he think he served, because he was, or thought he was, in accordance with the Constitution, and he said that the resolutions passed by the Springfield Convention. He said he did not know what was said during the debate, and that afterward his friends declared that they had discovered that they varied in some respects from the resolutions passed by that Convention, but we have shown you that the good evidence for believing that the resolutions had been passed at Springfield. Mr. Lincoln, ought to have known better; but not a word is said about his ignorance on the subject, while I, notwithstanding the circumstances, am accused of forgery.

Now, I will show you that if I have made a mistake as to the place where these resolutions were adopted—and when I get down to Springfield I will investigate the matter and see whether or not I have—that the principles they enunciate were adopted as the Republican platform ("white, white"), in the various counties and Congressional Districts throughout the north end of the State in 1854. This platform was adopted in nearly every way by the resolutions of the Black Republican majority for the Legislature in that year, and here is a man [pointing to Mr. Davis, who sits in the stand near Dunton Brown] who knows as well as any living man that it was the creed of the Black Republican party at that time. I would be willing to call Davis as a witness, or any other honest man belonging to that party, I will now read the resolutions adopted at the Rockford Convention on the 30th of August, 1854, which nominated Washburne for Congress. You elected him on the following platform:

Resolved. That the continued and increasing aggressions of slavery in our country and among our free institutions, and the prevalence of those aggressions against the peaceful enjoyment of the rights of citizens and of the free institutions of the country, and the increasing influence and prevalence of those aggressions, have been the subject of the resolutions of the Black Republican party, and that the resolutions adopted at the Rockford Convention on the 30th of August, 1854, which nominated Washburne for Congress, you elected him on the following platform:

Resolved. That the continued and increasing aggressions of slavery in our country and among our free institutions, and the prevalence of those aggressions against the peaceful enjoyment of the rights of citizens and of the free institutions of the country, and the increasing influence and prevalence of those aggressions, have been the subject of the resolutions of the Black Republican party, and that the resolutions adopted at the Rockford Convention on the 30th of August, 1854, which nominated Washburne for Congress, you elected him on the following platform:
have backed out from that position and gone back to Abolitionism, you are black and you are born.

Gentlemen, I have shown you what your platform was in 1854. You still adhere to it. The same platform was adopted by nearly all the counties where the Black Republican party had a majority in 1854. I wish now to call your attention to the representatives in the Legislature when they assembled together at Springfield. In the first place, you must remember that this was the organization of a new party. It is so deduced in the resolutions themselves, which say that you are going to dissolve old party ties and call up the new party Republican. The old party ties, you will have to cut out from ear to ear, and the Democratic party was to be annihilated and batted out of existence, whilst in lieu of those parties the Black Republican party was to be organized on this Abolition platform. You know who the chief leaders were in breaking up and destroying these great parties. Lincoln on the one hand and Fillmore on the other, being disappointed politicians, and having retired from being a body of officials that they will never find in this Congress, they will be to be found in our Abolition camp. Giddings, Chase, Fonda Douglass and Lovejoy were there to christen them whenever they were brought in. Lincoln went to work to dissolve the old Whig party. Clay was dead, and although the real spirit was not yet gone on his grave, this man undertook to bring into dispute those great Compromise measures of 1850, with which Clay and Webster were identified. Up to 1854 the old Whig party and the Democratic party had stood on a common platform so far as this slavery question was concerned. You Whigs and we Democrats differed about the red ink, the tariff, distribution, the specie circular and the secession, but we agreed on this slavery question and the true mode of preserving the peace and harmony of the Union. The Compromise measures of 1850 were introduced by Clay, were defended by Webster, and supported by Cass, and were approved by Fillmore, and assented to by the men of both parties. They constituted a common plank upon which both Whigs and Democrats stood. In 1853 the Whig party, in its last National Convention at Baltimore, endorsed and approved these measures of Clay, and so did the National Convention of the Democratic party. Thus the old line Whigs and the old line Democrats stood pledged to the great principle of self-government, which guarantees to the people of each Territory the right to decide the slavery question for themselves. In 1854, after the death of Clay and Webster, Mr. Lincoln, on the part of the Whigs, and Mr. Douglas, on the part of the Democrats, set about to destroy the Whig party, by dissolving it, transferring the members into the Abolition camp and making them vote under Abolition leaders, Fonda Douglass, Lovejoy, Chase, Farnsworth, and other Abolition leaders. Fillmore undertook to dissolve the Democratic party by taking old Democrats into the Abolition camp. Mr. Lincoln was in the efforts by many leading Whigs throughout the State. Your member of Congress, Mr. Washburne, being one of the most active. Fillmore was bit by many renegades from the Democratic party, among whom were John Wentworth, Tom Turner, and others, with whom you are familiar.

[Mr. Turner, who was one of the moderators, here interposed and said that he had drawn the resolutions which Senator Douglas had read.]

Mr. Douglass, Mr. Turner, and Mr. Turner says that he drew these resolutions. ["Hurrah for Douglas."] That is right, give Turner cheers for drawing the resolutions if you approve them. If he drew those resolutions he will not deny that they are the creed of the Black Republican party.

[Mr. Turner says that they are the creed of the Black Republican party.]

Mr. Douglass—And yet Lincoln denies that he stands on them. Mr. Turner says that the creed of the Black Republican party is the admission of no more slave States, and yet Mr. Lincoln declares that he would not like to be placed in a position where he would have to vote for them. All I have to say to Mr. Lincoln is, that I do not think there is much danger of his being placed in such a position. As Mr. Lincoln would be very sorry to be placed in such an embarrassing position as to be obliged to vote on the admission of any more slave States, I propose, out of mere kindness, to relieve him from any such necessity.

When the bargain between Lincoln and Fillmore was completed for abolishing the Whig and Democratic parties, they spread over the State, Lincoln still pretending to be an old line Whig in order to "rope in" the Whigs, and Fillmore pretending to be a good Democrat as he ever was, in order to cloak the Abolitionists. They played the part that "decoy ducks" play down on the Potomac river. In that part of the country they make artificial ducks and put them on the river in places where the wild ducks are to be found, for the purpose of deceiving them. Well, Lincoln and Fillmore played the part of those "decoy ducks" and they inveigled enough old line Whigs and old line Democrats to elect a Black Republican Legislature. When that Legislature met, the first thing it did was to elect as Speaker of the House, the very man who made this statement that he wrote the Abolition platform on which Lincoln will not stand. I want to know of Mr. Turner whether or not, when he was elected, he was a good embodiment of Republican principles?

Mr. Turner—"I hope I was then and am now."

Mr. Douglas—He swears that he hopes he was then and is now. He wrote that Black Republican platform, and is satisfied with it now. I admire and acknowledge Turner's honesty. Every man of you know that what he says about these resolutions being the platform of the Black Republican party is true, and you also know that each one of these men who are shouting and trying to deny it are only trying to cheat the people out of their votes for the purpose of deceiving them still more after the election. I propose to trace this thing a little further, in order that you can see what additional evidence there is to fasten this revolting principle on the minds of the people. When the Legislature assembled, there was an United States Senator to elect in the place of Gen. Shields, and before they proceeded to ballot, Lovejoy insisted on laying down certain principles by which to govern the party. It has been published to the world, and sufficiently published, that at the time the alliance was made between Fillmore and Lincoln to Abolish the two parties, an agreement that Lincoln should take Shields' place in the United States Senate, and Fillmore should have none so soon as they could conveniently get rid of me. When Lincoln was beaten for Shields' place, in a manner I will refer to in a few minutes, he felt very sore and reticent; his friends grumbled, and some of them came out and charged that the most infamous treachery had been practiced against him; that the bargain was that Lincoln was to have had Shields' place, and Fillmore was to have waited for mines, but that Fillmore having the control of a few Abolitionized Democrats, he prevented them from voting for Lincoln, thus keeping him within a few votes of an election until he succeeded in forcing the party to drop him and elect Fillmore. Well, Fillmore having elected himself, his friends made a fuss, and in order to keep them and Lincoln quiet, the party were obliged to come forward, in advance, at the last State election, and make a pledge that they would go for Lincoln and nobody else. Lincoln could not be silenced in any other way.

Now, there are a great many Black Republicans of you who do not know this thing was done. ["White, white," and great clamor.] I wish to remind you that while Mr. Lincoln was speaking there was not a Democrat vulgar and blackened enough to interrupt him. I know that the shoe is pinching you. Now, you are scared to death for the result. I have seen this thing before. I have seen men make appointments for joint discussions, and the moment their men have been heard, try to interrupt and prevent a fair hearing of the other side. ["Is this a bad news before, and defy your press. [Tremendous applause.] My friends, do not be deaf, I need my whole time. The object of the opposition is to occupy my time in order to prevent me from giving the whole evidence and calling this double dealing on the Black Republican party. As I have
before said, lovejoy demanded a declaration of principles on the part of the Black Republicans of the Legislature before going into an election for United States Senator. He offered the following preamble and resolutions which I hold in my hand:

Whereas, human slavery is a violation of the principles of natural and revealed right, and whereas the Declaration of Independence fully unites with the spirit of these principles, making the freedom to be the inalienable birthright of all men; and whereas, the preamble to the Constitution of the United States avows that that instrument was ordained to establish justice, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity; and whereas, in furtherance of the above principles, slavery was forever prohibited in the old Northwest Territory, and recently in California, in the United States, and a wide departure from the uniform action of the General Government in violation of the Constitution and the prostration of slavery; therefore,

Resolved, by the House of Representatives, the Senate concurring therein, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representative requested to introduce, if not otherwise introduced, and to vote for a bill to restore such prohibition to the aforesaid Territories, and also to extend a similar prohibition to all territory which now belongs to the United States, or which may hereafter come under their jurisdiction.

Resolved, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives requested to introduce, and to vote for a bill to prohibit slavery, whether the territory out of which such State may have been formed shall have been acquired by conquest, treaty, purchase, or from original territory of the United States.

Resolved, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives requested to introduce, and to vote for a bill to repeal the act entitled "An act respecting fugitives from justice and persons escaping from the service of their masters, and, falling in that, for such a modification of it as shall secure the right of habeas corpus, and trial by jury under the regularly-constituted authorities of the State, in all persons claiming service or labor.

These resolutions were introduced by Mr. Lovejoy immediately preceding the election of Senator. They declared first, that the Wilmot Proviso must be applied to all territory north of 36 deg. 30 min. Secondly, that it must be applied to all territory south of 36 deg. 30 min. Thirdly, that it must be applied to all the territories west of the Mississippi River for the United States, and the United States, and finally, that it must be applied to all the territory hereafter to be acquired by the United States. The next resolution declares that no more slave States shall be admitted into this Union under any circumstances whatever, no matter whether they are formed out of territory now owned by us or that we may hereafter acquire, by treaty, by Congress, or in any manner whatever. The next resolution demands the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave law, although its unconditional repeal would have no provision for carrying out that clause of the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees the surrender of fugitives. If they could not get an unconditional repeal, they demanded that that law be so modified as to make it nearly useless as possible. Now, I want to show you who voted for these resolutions. When the vote was taken on the first resolution it was declaring the Wilmot Proviso to be applied to all territory north of 36 deg. 30 min. You will find that is a strict party vote, between the Democrats on one hand, and the Black Republicans or the other. [Gives a "white, white, and clairor." I know your name, and always call things by their right name. The point I wish to call your attention to, is this that these resolutions were adopted by the 7th day of February, and that on the 26th day of February, they went into an election for a United States Senator, and that day every man who voted for these resolutions, with but two exceptions, voted for Lincoln for the United States Senator. [Give up their names.] I will read the names over to you if you have a copy of Lincoln's book, but I believe your object is to occupy my time.

On the next resolution the vote stood—years 38, 38, and on the third resolution—years 38, 35, and 47. I wish to impress it upon you, that every man who voted for these resolutions, with but two exceptions, voted for Lincoln when he was elected President. Being one of the members who thus voted for Lincoln were elected to the Legislature to vote for no man for office under the State or Federal Government who was not committed to this Black Republican platform. They were all so pledged. Mr. Turner, who stands by me, and who then represented you, and who says that he wrote those resolutions, voted for Lincoln, when he was pledged not to do so unless Lincoln was in favor of those resolutions. I now ask Mr. Turner, [turning to Mr. Turner], did you violate your pledge in voting for Mr. Lincoln, or did he commit himself to your platform before you cast your vote for him?

Mr. Turner did not answer the question. He then read the whole list of names here and show you that all the Black Republicans in the Legislature for Mr. Lincoln, were pledged not to vote for him unless he was committed to the doctrine of no more slave States, the prohibition of slavery in the Territories, and the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law. Mr. Lincoln tells you here that he is not pledged to any such doctrine. Either Mr. Lincoln was then committed to those propositions, or Mr. Turner violated his pledges to you when he voted for him. Either Lincoln was pledged to each one of those propositions, or else every Black Republican Representative from this Congressional District violated his pledge of honor to his constituents by voting for him. I ask you which horn of the dilemma will you take? Will you hold Lincoln up to the platform of his party, or will you accuse every Representative who had in the Legislature of violating his pledge of honor to his constituents? There is no escape for you. Either Mr. Lincoln was committed to those propositions, or your members violated their faith. Take either horn of the dilemma you choose. There is no dodging the question; I want Lincoln's answer. He says he was not pledged to repeal the Fugitive Slave law, that he does not quite like to do it; he will not introduce a law to repeal it, but thinks there ought to be some law; he does not tell what it ought to be; upon the whole, he is altogether undecided, and don't know what to think or do. That is the substance of his answer upon the repeal of the Fugitive Slave law. I put the question to him distinctly, and he indorsed that part of the Black Republican platform which calls for the entire abrogation and repeal of the Fugitive Slave law. He answers no; that he does not indorse that, but he does not tell what he is for, or what he will vote for. His answer is, in fact, no answer at all. Why cannot he speak out and say what he is for and what he will do?

In regard to there being no more slave States, he is not pledged to that. He would not dare, he says, to be put in a position where he would have to vote one way or another on that question. I pray you, do not put him in a position that would embarrass him so much. Gentlemen, if he goes to the Senate, he may be put in that position, and then which way will he vote?

[Voice.—"How will you vote?"]

Mr. Douglass—I will vote for the abolition of such a State as by the form of its Constitution the people say they want; if they want slavery, they shall have it; if they prohibit slavery it shall be prohibited. They can form their institutions to suit themselves, subject only to the Constitution; if I have one stand ready to receive them into the Union. Why censure your Black Republican candidates talk out as plain as this when they are questioned?

I do not want to cheat any man out of his vote. No man is deceived in regard to my principles if I have the power to express myself in terms explicit enough to convey my ideas.

Mr. Lincoln made a speech when he was nominated for the United States Senate which covers all these abolition platforms. He there lays down a proposition so broad, his whole abolitionist action to cover the whole ground.

"In my opinion it [the slavery agitation] will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe the Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of Slavery will arrest the fur-
...spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States—old as well as new, North as well as South.

If you find that Mr. Lincoln lays down the doctrine that this Union cannot endure divided as our fathers made it, with free and slave States. He says they must all become one thing, or all the other; that they must all be free or all slave, or else the Union cannot continue to exist. It being his opinion that to admit any more slave States, or to continue to divide the Union into free and slave States, will dissolve it. I want to look to Mr. Lincoln whether he will vote for the admission of another slave State.

He tells you the Union cannot exist unless the States are all free or all slave; he tells you that he is opposed to making them all free, and he says he is for making them all slave, in order that the Union may exist; and yet he will not say that he will not vote against another slave State, knowing that the Union must be dissolved if he votes for it. Ask you if that is fair dealing? The true intent and inevitable conclusion of his speech is, that he is opposed to the admission of any more slave States under any circumstances. If he is so opposed, why not say so? If he believes this Union cannot endure divided into free and slave States, that they must all become slave, in order to save the Union, he is bound as an honest man, to vote against any more slave States. If he believes he is bound to do it, show me that it is my duty in order to save the Union to do a particular act, and if I will do it if the Constitution does not prohibit it. I am not for the dissolution of the Union under any circumstances. I will pursue no course of conduct that will give just cause for the dissolution of the Union. The hope of the friends of freedom throughout the world rests upon the perpetuity of this Union.

The down-trodden and oppressed people who are suffering under European despoticism. I speak with feeling and anxiety to the American citizens, the only resting place and permanent home of freedom and self-government.

Mr. Lincoln says that he believes that this Union cannot continue to endure with slave States in it, and yet he will not tell you distinctly whether he will vote for or against the admission of any more slave States, but says he would not like to be put to the test. I do not think he will be put to the test. I do not think that the people of Illinois desire a man to represent them who would not like to be put to the test on the performance of a high constitutional duty. I will retire in shame from the Senate of the United States when I am not willing to be put to the test in the performance of my duty. I have been put to severe tests. I have stood by my principles in fair weather and in foul, in the sunshine and in the rain. I have defended the great principles of self-government here among you when Northern sentiment ran in a torrent against me, and I have defended that sentiment with all that I have; and when the Northern sentiment came down like an avalanche upon me. I was not afraid of any test they put to me. I knew I was right—I know my principles were sound—I know that the people would always come to the end that I know God of Heaven would smile upon me if I was faithful in the performance of my duty.

Mr. Lincoln makes a charge of corruption against the Supreme Court of the United States, and two Presidents of the United States, and attempts to bolster it up by saying that I did the same against the Nebraska bill. There was no conspiracy between the judges of the Supreme Court, President Pierce, President Buchanan, and myself by that bill, and the decision of the court to break down the barrier and establish slavery all over the Union. Does he not know that that charge is historically false as against President Buchanan? He knows that Mr. Buchanan was at that time in England, representing this country with distinguished ability at the Court of St. James, that he was there for a long time before, and did not return for a year or more after. He knows that he is true, and that fact proves his charge to be false as against Mr. Buchanan. There is no doubt but what he knew that fact. I wish to call his attention to the fact that at the time the Nebraska bill was passed, the Dred Scott case was not before the Supreme Court at all; it was not upon the docket of the Supreme Court; it had not been brought there, and the judges in all probability knew nothing of it. Thus the history of the country proves the charge to be false as against them. As to President Pierce, his high character as a man of integrity and honor is enough to vindicate him from such a charge; and as to myself, I pronounce the charge an infamous lie, wherever and whenever made, and by whomsoever made. I am willing that Mr. Lincoln should go and make up every public act of mine, every measure I have introduced, report I have made, speech delivered, and criticism them, when he charges me upon a corrupt conspiracy for the purpose of perpetuating the institutions of the country, I have said it as it deserves. I say the history of the country proves it to be false, and that it could not have been possible at the time. But now he tries to protect himself in this charge, because I made a charge against the Washington Union. My speech in the Senate against the Washington Union was made because it advocated a revolutionary doctrine, by declaring that the free States had not the right to prohibit slavery within their own limits. Because I made that charge against the Washington Union, Mr. Lincoln says it was a charge against Mr. Buchanan. Suppose it was; is Mr. Lincoln the peculiar defender of Mr. Buchanan? Is he so interested in the Federal Administration, and so bound to it, that he must jump to the rescue and defend it from every attack that I may make against it? I understand the whole thing. The Washington Union, under that most corrupt of all circumstances, was published by the printer of the late Black Republican House of Representatives; he was a candidate before the present Democratic House, but was ignominiously kicked out, and then he took the money which he had made out of the public printings by means of the oppressive Black Republicans, bought the Washington Union, and is now publishing it in the name of the Democratic party, and advocating Mr. Lincoln's election to the Senate. Mr. Lincoln therefore considers an attack upon Wendell and his corrupt gang as a personal attack upon him. This only proves what I have charged, that there is an alliance between Lincoln and his supporters, and the Federal office-holders of this State, and Presidential aspirants out of it, to break me down at home.

Mr. Lincoln feels bound to come in to the rescue of the Washington Union. In that speech which I delivered in answer to the Washington Union, I made it distinctly against the Union, and against the Union alone. I did not choose to go beyond that. If I have occasion to attack the President's conduct, I will do it in language that will not be misunderstood. When I differed with the President, I spoke out so that you all heard me. That principle passed away; it resulted in the triumph of my principle by allowing the people to do as they please, and there is an end of the controversy. Whenever the great principle of self-government—the right of the people to govern themselves comes into the Union, with slavery or without it, as they see proper, shall arise, you will find no standing firm in defense of that principle, and fighting whoever fights it. If Mr. Buchanan stands as I doubt he will, by the recommendation contained in his Message, that hereafter all State Constitutions ought to be submitted to the people before the admission of new States into the Union, he will find me standing by him firmly, shoulder to shoulder, in carrying it out. I know Mr. Lincoln's object; he wants to divide the Democratic party, in order that he may defeat me and get to the Senate.

Mr. Douglas's time here expired, and he stepped on the moment.
MR. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER.

MY FRIENDS: It will readily occur to you that I cannot, in half an hour, notice all the things that so able a man as Judge Douglas can say in an hour and a half; and I hope, therefore, if there be any thing that he has said upon which you would like to hear something from me, but which I omit to comment upon, you will bear in mind that it would be expecting an impossibility for me to go over his whole ground. I can but take up some of the points that he has dwelt upon, and employ my half-hour specially on them.

First thing I have to say to you is a word in regard to Judge Douglas's declaration about the "vulgarity and blackguardism" in the audience—that no such thing, as he says, was shown by any Democrat while I was speaking. Now, I only wish, by way of reply on this subject, to say that while I was speaking, I used no "vulgarity or blackguardism" toward any Democrat.

Now, my friends, I come to all this long portion of the Judge's speech—perhaps half of it—which he has devoted to the various resolutions and platforms that have been adopted in the different counties in the different Congressional Districts, and in the Illinois Legislature—which he supposes are at variance with the positions I have assumed before you to-day. It is true that many of these resolutions are at variance with the positions I have here assumed. All I have to ask is that we talk reasonably and rationally about it. I happen to know, the Judge's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, that I have never tried to conceal my opinions, nor tried to deceive any one in reference to them. He may go and examine all the members who voted for me for United States Senator in 1855, after the election of 1854. They were pledged to certain things here at home, and were determined to have pledges from me, and if he will find any of these persons who will tell him anything inconsistent with what I say now, I will resign, or rather retire from the race, and give him no more trouble. The plain truth is this: At the introduction of the Nebraska policy, we believed there was a new era being introduced in the history of the Republic, which tended to the spread and perpetuation of slavery. But in our opposition to that measure we did not agree with one another in everything. The people in the north end of the State were for stronger measures of opposition than we of the central and southern portions of the State, but we were all opposed to the Nebraska doctrine. I have had one feeling and that one feeling and that one feeling has not caused the north end of the State to be out of your Conventions and passed your resolutions. We in the middle of the State and further south did not hold such Conventions and pass such resolutions, although we had in general a common view and a common sentiment. So there were divisions which the Judge has alluded to, and the line that has come from, were local, and did not spread over the whole State. We at last met together in 1856, from all parts of the State, and we agreed upon a common platform. You, who have extreme notions, either denied the right of the north to propose them, or yield to them, or yield them practically, for the sake of embodying the opposition to the measures which the opposite party were pushing forward at that time. We met you then, and if there was any thing yielded, it was for practical purposes. We agreed then upon a platform for the party throughout the entire State of Illinois, and now we are all bound as a party, to that platform. And I say here to you, if any one expects of me—in the case of my election—that I will do any thing not signified by our Republican platform and my answers here to-day, I tell you very truly that person will be deceived. I do not ask for the vote of any one who supposes that I have secret purpots or pledges that I dare not speak out. Cannot the Judge be satisfied? If he fears, in the unfortunate case of my election, that my going to Washington will enable me to advocate sentiments contrary to those which I expressed when you voted for me and elected me, assure him that his fears are wholly needless and groundless. Is the Judge really afraid of any such thing? I'll tell you what he is afraid of. He is afraid we'll all pull together. This is what alarms him more than any thing else. For my part, I do hope that all of us, entertaining a common sentiment in opposition to what appears to us a move to nationalize and perpetuate slavery, will waive those minor differences on questions which either trench upon the dead past or the distant future, and all pull together in this struggle. What are your sentiments? If it be true, that on the ground which I occupy—ground which I occupy so boldly as Judge Douglas does his—my view of things, though partly contradictory with yours, are not as perfectly in accordance with your feelings as you suppose. If they are, I say to you in all candor, go for him and not for me. I hope to deal in all things fairly with Judge Douglas, and with the people of the State, in this contest. And if, after I have been elected to any office, I trust I may go down with my stain of falsehood upon my reputation—notwithstanding the hard opinions Judge Douglas chooses to entertain of me.

The Judge has again addressed himself to the abolition tendencys of a speech of mine, made at Springfield in June last. I have so often tried to answer what he is always saying on that melancholy theme, that I almost walk with disgust from the discussion—from the repetition of an answer to it. I trust that nearly all of this intelligent audience have read that speech. If you have, I may venture to leave it to you to inspect it closely, and see whether it contains any of those "baggages" which frighten Judge Douglas. The Judge complains that I did not fully answer his questions. If I have the sense to comprehend and answer those questions, I have done so fairly. If it can be pointed out to me how I can more fully and fairly answer him, I aver I have not the sense to see how it is to be done. He says I do not deduce I would in any event vote for the admission of a slave State into the Union. If I have been fairly reported he will see that I did give an explicit answer to his interrogatories, I did not merely say that I would dislike to be put to the test; but I said clearly, if I were put to the test, and a Territory from which slavery had been excluded should present itself, I would oppose the admission of it as a Territory.
Buchanan, and I will tell Judge Douglas that in my opinion, when he made that charge, he had an eye further north than he was to-day. He was then fighting against a people who called him a Black Republican and said he mixed all through his speech, and it is tolerably manifest that his eye was a great deal further north than it is to-day. The Judge says that though he made this charge, Coombs got up and declared there was no man in the United States, except the editor of the Union, who was in favor of the doctrines put forth in that article. And thereon, I understand that the Judge withdrew the charge. Although he had taken extracts from the newspaper, and then from the Lecompton Constitution, to show the existence of a conspiracy to blow out a "fatal blow," by which the States were to be deprived of the right of excluding slavery, it all went to pot as soon as Coombs got up and told him it was not true. It reminds me of the story that John Phoenix, the California railroad surveyor, tells. He says they started out from the Plaza to the Mission of Dolores. They had two ways of determining distance. One was by a chain and pins taken over the ground. The other was by a "go-at-a-solder"—an invention of his own—a three-legged instrument, with which he computed a series of triangles between the points. At night he turned to the chain-man to ascertain what distance they had come, and found that by some mistake he had merely dragged the chain over the ground without keeping any record. By the "go-at-a-solder" he found he had made ten miles. Being skeptical about this, he asked a drayman who was passing how far it was to the plaza. The drayman replied it was just half a mile, and the surveyor put it down in his book—just as Judge Douglas says, after he had made his calculations and computations, he took Toomey's statement. I have no doubt that after Judge Douglas had made his charge, he was as easily satisfied about its truth as the surveyor was of the drayman's statement of the distance to the plaza. Yet in a few months the whole matter of which Douglas deemed a "fatal blow" at State sovereignty, was elected by the Democrats as public printer.

Now, gentlemen, you may take Judge Douglas's speech of March 29th, 1858, beginning about the middle of page 24, and reading to the bottom of page 24, and you will find the evidence on which I say that he did not make his charge against the editor of the Union alone. I cannot stop to read it, but I will give it to the reporters of Judge Douglas. Mr. President, you have found several distinct propositions advanced boldly by the Washington Union editorially and apparently authoritatively, and every man who questions any of them is denounced as an Abolitionist, a Press-seller, a fanatic. The propositions are these: First, that the primary object of the government at its original institution is the protection of persons and property; second, that the Constitution of the United States declares that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; thirdly, all State laws, whether organic or otherwise, which prohibit the citizens of one State from settling in another with their slave property, and especially declaring it forfeited, are direct violations of the original intention of the Government and Constitution of the United States; and, fourth, that the emancipation of the slaves of the Northern States was a gross outrage on the rights of property, insomuch as it was involuntarily done on the part of the owner. If you go back to the Kansas and Nebraska Constitution, you will find the same doctrine incorporated in it, which was put forth editorially in the Union. What is it?

"ARTICLE 7, Section 1. The right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction; and the right of the owner of a slave to such slave and his services is identical in the same and as inviolable as the right of the owner of any property whatever."

"But no alteration shall be made to affect the right of property in the ownership of slaves."

"It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution that they are identical in spirit with this authoritative article in the Washington Union of the day previous to its insertion of this Constitution."

"When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November, followed by the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of November, and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that a State has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that there was a fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of this Union."

Here he says, "Mr. President, you here find several distinct propositions advanced boldly and, apparently authoritatively." By whose authority, Judge Douglas? Again, he says in another place, "It will be seen by these clauses in the Lecompton Constitution, that they are identical in spirit with this authoritative article."

By whom? Who do you mean to say authorized the publication of these articles? He knows that the Washington Union is considered the organ of the Administration. I demand of Judge Douglas by whose authority he meant to say these articles were published, if not by the authority of the President of the United States and his Cabinet? I defy him to show whom he referred to, if not to those high functionaries in the Federal Government. More than this, he says the articles in that paper and the provisions of the Lecompton Constitution are "identical," and being identical, he argues that the authors are co-operating and conspiring together. He does not use the word "conspiring," but what other construction can you put upon it? He winds up with this:

"When I saw that article in the Union of the 17th of November, followed by the glorification of the Lecompton Constitution on the 18th of November, and this clause in the Constitution asserting the doctrine that a State has no right to prohibit slavery within its limits, I saw that there was a fatal blow being struck at the sovereignty of the States of this Union."

I ask him if all this fuss was made over the editor of this newspaper. It would be a terribly "fatal blow" indeed which a single man could strike when no President, no Cabinet officer, no member of Congress, was giving strength and encouragement to the moment. Out of respect to Judge Douglas's good sense I must believe he manufactures his idea of the "fatal" character of that blow out of such a misfortune as not to reflect any credit on that editor for being, but that the Judge's eye is further south now. Then, it was very peculiar and decidedly north. His hope rested on the idea of visiting the great "Black Republican" party, and making it the fall of his new sick. He knows he was then expecting from day to day to turn Republican and place himself at the head of our organization. He has found that the idea despised "Black Republicans" estimate him by a standard which he has taught them none too well. Hence he is crushing back into his old camp, and you will find him eventually installed in full fellowship among those whom he was then battling, and with whom he now pretends to be as such fearless variance. [Loud applause and cries of "go on, go on.] I cannot, gentlemen, my time has expired.
THIRD JOINT DEBATE, AT JONESBORO,

September 15, 1858.

MR. DOUGLAS'S SPEECH.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I appear before you to-day in pursuance of a previous notice, and have made arrangements with Mr. Lincoln to divide time, and discuss with him the leading political topics that now agitate the country.

Prior to 1834 this country was divided into two great political parties known as Whig and Democratic. These parties differed from each other upon certain questions which were then deemed to be important to the best interests of the Republic. Whig and Democratic differed about a bank, the tariff, the nonintrusion of the specie circular and the sub-treasury. On those issues we went before the country and discussed the principles, objects and measures of the two great parties. Each of the parties could proclaim its principles in Louisiana as well as in Massachusetts, in Kentucky as well as in Illinois. Since that period, a great revolution has taken place in the formation of parties, by which they now seem to be divided by a geographical line, a large party in the North being arrayed under the Abolition or Republican banner, in hostility to the Southern States, Southern people, and Southern institutions. It becomes important for us to inquire how this transformation of parties has occurred, made from those of national principles to geographical fictions. You remember that in 1860—this country was agitated from its center to its circumference about this slavery question—it became necessary for the leaders of the great Whig party and the leaders of the great Democratic party to postpone, for the time being, their particular disputes, and unite first to save the Union before they should quarrel as to the precise form in which it was to be governed. During the Congress of 1849-50, Henry Clay was the leader of the Union men, supported by Cass and Webster, and the leaders of the Democracy and the leaders of the Whigs, in opposition to Northern Abolitionists or Southern Diamontists. That great contest of 1850 resulted in the adoption of the Compromise Measures of that year, which measures rested on the great principle that the people of each State and Territory of this Union ought to be permitted to regulate their own domestic affairs in their own way, subject to no other limitation than that which the Federal Constitution imposes. I now wish to ask you whether that principle was right or wrong which guaranteed to every State and community the right to form and regulate their domestic institutions to suit themselves. These measures were adopted, as I have previously said, by the joint action of the Union Whigs and Union Democrats in opposition to Northern Abolitionists and Southern Diamontists. In 1858, when the Whig party assembled at Baltimore, in the National Convention for the last time, they adopted the principle of the Compromise Measures of 1850 as the rule of party action in the future. One month thereafter the Democrats assembled at the same place to nominate a candidate for the Presidency, and declared the same great principle as the rule of action by which the Democratic party would be governed. The Presidential election of 1852 was fought on that basis. It is true that the Whigs claimed special merit for the adoption of those measures, because they asserted that their great Clay originated those measures, and their Godkin or Webster defended them, and their Fillmore signed the bill making them the law of the land; but on the other hand, the Democrats claimed special credit for the Democracy, upon the ground that we gave twice as many votes in both Houses of Congress for the passage of those measures as the Whig party.

Thus you see that in the Presidential election of 1852, the Whigs were pledged by their platform and their candidate to the principle of the Compromise Measures of 1850, and the Democracy were likewise pledged by our principles, our platform, and our candidate to the same line of policy, to preserve peace and quiet between the different sections of this Union. Since that period the Whig party has been transformed into a sectional party, under the name of the Republican party, whilst the Democratic party continues the same national party it was at that day. All sectional men, all men of Abolition sentiments and principles, no matter whether they were old Abolitionists or had been Whigs or Democrats, rally under the sectional Republican banner, and consequently all national men, all Union-loving men, whether Whigs, Democrats, or by whatever name they have been known, ought to rally under the stars and stripes in defense of the Constitution as our fathers made it, and of the Union as it has existed under the Constitution.

How has this departure from the faith of the Democracy and the faith of the Whig party been accomplished? In 1854, certain restless, ambitious, and disappointed politicians throughout the land took advantage of the temporary excitement created by the Nebraska bill to try and dissolve the old Whig party and the old Democratic party, to abdicate their members, and lead them, bound hand and foot, captive into the Abolition camp. In the State of New York a Convention was held by some of these men and a platform adopted, every plank of which was as black as night, each one relating to the negro, and not one relating to the interests of the white man. That example was followed throughout the Northern States, the effect being made to combine all the free States in hostile array against the South. The men who thus thought that they could build up a great sectional party, and through its organization control the political destinies of this country, based all their hopes on the single fact that the North was the stronger division of the nation, and hence, if the North could be combined against the South, a sure victory awaited their efforts. I am doing no more than justice to the truth of history when I say that in this State Abraham Lincoln, on behalf of the Whigs, and Lyman Trumbull, on behalf of the Democrats, were the leaders who persistently resisted this grand schemes of abdicating the two parties to which they belonged. They had a private arrangement as to what should be the political destiny of each of the contracting parties before they went into the negotiation. The arrangement was that Mr. Lincoln was to adopt the old line Whigs with him, claiming that he was still as good a Whig as ever, over to the Abolitionists, and Mr. Trumbull was to run for Congress in the Belleville District, and, claiming to be a good Democrat, coax the old Democrats into the Abolition scheme. The old Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Giddings, has been alleged as the representative of the old line Abolitionists, and the old line Abolitionists and Freesoll party of this State, they should secure a majority in the Legislature. Lincoln was then to be made United States Senator in Shields's place, Trumbull remaining in Congress under the Whig form, and the old Senate form, the Whig party being thus formed, the Union Whigs and Union Democrats in opposition to Northern Abolitionists and Southern Diamontists, in 1858, when the Whig party assembled at Baltimore, in the National Convention for the last time, they adopted the principle of the Compromise Measures of 1850 as the rule of party action in the future. One month thereafter the Democrats assembled at the same place to nominate a candidate for the Presidency, and declared the same great principle as the rule of action by which the Democratic party would be governed. The Presidential election of 1852 was fought on that basis. It is true that the Whigs claimed special merit for the adoption of those measures, because they asserted that their great Clay originated those measures, and their Godkin or Webster defended them, and their Fillmore signed the bill making them the law of the land; but on the other hand, the Democrats claimed special credit for the Democracy, upon the


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hereafter no more slave States should be admitted into this Union, even if the people of such State desired slavery; that the Fugitive Slave laws should absolutely and unconditionally be repealed; that slavery should be abolished in the District of Columbia; that the slave trade should be abolished between the different States, and in fact, every article in their creed related to this slavery question, and pointed to a Northern geographical party in hostility to the extension of slavery at all times and in all places of this Union. Such were their principles in Northern Illinois. A little further South they became bleached and grew paler just in proportion as public sentiment moved in the same direction. They were defeated in the North, anti-Illinois men down about Springfield, and in this neighborhood they contented themselves with talking of the ineffectiveness of the Fugitive Slave Law; the Misouri Compromise. In the extreme northern counties they brought in hands to canvass the State whose complexion suited their political creed, and hence Fred Douglass, the negro, was to be found there, following Gen. Cass, and attempting to speak on behalf of Lincoln, Trumbull and Abolitionism, against that illiterate Senator. Why, they brought Fred Douglass to Freeport, when I was addressing a meeting there, in a carriage driven by the white owner, the negro sitting inside with the white lady and her daughter. When I got through canvassing the northern counties that year, and prognosticated as far south as Springfield, I was met and opposed in discussion by Lincoln, Lovejoy, Trumbull, and Sidney Breese, who were on one side. Father Giddings, the high priest of Abolitionism, had just been there, and Chase came about the same time I left. ["Why didn't you shoot him?"] I did refuse running shot at them, but as I was single-handed against the white, black and mixed crowd, I had to use a shot gun and fire into the crowd instead of taking them off singly with a rifle. Trumbull laid for his lieutenants, in contrast to abhor the Democratic, such men as John Wentworth of Chicago, Gov. Reynolds of Belleville, Sidney Breese, of Alton, who, they thought, would make the best of the State for the Union, each of whom modified his opinions to suit the faction he was in. Douglass, for instance, would not go so much further than to talk about the inadequacy of the Nebraska bill, whilst his allies at Chicago, advocated negro equality, putting the white man and the negro on the same basis under the law. Now these men, four years ago, were engaged in a conspiracy to break down the Democracy; today they are again acting together for the name proposed. They do not rest the same flag; they do not own the same principles, or profess the same faith; but conceal their union for the sake of policy. In the northern counties, you find that all the conventions are called in the name of the Black Republican party; at Springfield, they charge the Convention, invite all the enemies of the Democracy to unite, and when they get down into Illinois, Trumbull issues notices calling upon the Free Democrats to come and hear him speak. I have one of the handbills calling a Free Democrat meeting at Waterloo the other day, which I received there, which is in the following language:

A meeting of the Free Democracy will take place in Waterloo, on Monday, Sept. 11th, at 8 o'clock A.M. by John Breese and others, will address the people upon the different political topics of the day. Members of all parties equally invited to be present, and hear and determine for themselves.

The Mexican War Democrats.

What is that name of Free Democrats put forth for undue to deceive the people, and make them believe that Trumbull and his followers are the same party as that which raises the black flag of Abolitionism in the northern part of the State, and makes war upon the Democratic party throughout the State? When I put that question to them at Waterloo on Saturday last, one of them rose and stated that they had changed their political creed in order to the election. Why, there was a candid admission. Their object in changing their party organization and principles in different localities was avowed to be an attempt to cheat and deceive some portion of the people until the election. Why cannot a political party that is conscious of the rectitude of its purposes and the soundness of its principles, come every where alike? I would decline to hold any political principles that I could not avow in the same terms in Kentucky that I would do in Ohio, New York, in Pennsylvania, as well as in Missouri or Illinois, as well as in New Jersey or New York. So long as we live under a Constitution common to all the States, our political faith ought to be unchanging, as the Republic, and just as that Constitution itself should be proclaimed alike in every portion of the Union. But it is apparent that our opponents find it necessary, for partisan effect, to change their colors in different counties, according to the changing phase of their popular breeze, and hope with these discordant materials combined together to secure a majority in the Legislature for the whole State, by shutting down the Democratic party. This combination did succeed in 1854 so far as to elect a majority of their candidates to the Legislature, and the first important act which they passed was to elect a Senator in the place of the eminent and talented Senator Shields. His term expired in the United States Senate at that time; and he had to be thereby the abolitionist coalition for the simple reason that he would not join in their conspiracy to wage war against one-half of the Union. That was the only objection to General Shields. He had served the people of the State with ability; he had served them with fidelity and ability as Auditor, he had performed his duties to the satisfaction of the whole country at the head of the Land Department in Washington, he had covered the State and the Union with immortal glory on the bloody fields of Mexico in defense of the honor of our flag, and yet he had to be stricken down by this ungodly combination. And for what cause? Merely because he would not join a combination of omnibus of the State to make war upon the other half after having poured out his heart's blood for all the States in the Union. Trumbull was put in his place by Abolitionism. How did Trumbull get there? Before the Abolitionists would consent to go into an election they required the members of the Senate to sign a new combination to that its members shall not be subject to the question of Abolitionism. Lovejoy and his high priests, brought in resolutions defining the Abolition creed, and required the members to sign them on its vote or not. In that creed, as laid down by Lovejoy, they declared that the United States must be divided into the Territories of the United States, North as well as South of 36 deg. 30 min., and that no more territory should ever be acquired unless slavery was at first prohibited therein; second, that no more States should ever be admitted into the Union unless slavery was first prohibited, by Constitutional provision, in such States; third, that the Fugitive Slave Law must be immediately repealed; or, failing in that, such amendments were to be made to it as would render it useless for the purposes for which it was passed. The resolutions were offered they were voted upon, part of them carried, and the others defeated; the same men who voted for them, with only two exceptions, voting soon after for Abraham Lincoln as their candidate for the United States Senate. He came within one or two votes of being elected, but he could not get the number required, for the simple reason that his friend Trumbull, who was a party to the bargain by which Lincoln was to take Shields's place, controlled a few abolitionized Democrats in the Legislature, and would not allow them to all for him, thus scaring Lincoln by permitting him on each ballot to be almost elected, but not quite, until he forced them to drop Lincoln and elect him (Trumbull), in order to unite the party. Thus you find, through the whole of this year, the bargain between Trumbull, Lincoln, and the abolitionists, and the union of these discordant elements in one harmonious party; yet Trumbull violated his pledge, and played a Yankee trick on Lincoln when they came to divide the spoils. Perhaps you would like a little evidence on this point. If you would, I will call Col. James H. Matheny, of Springfield, to the stand. Mr. Lincoln's special confidential friend for the last twenty years, and call what he will say upon the subject of this bargain between him, and the Black Republican or Abolition candidate for Congress in the Springfield District against the gallant Col. Harris, and is making
speeches all over that part of the State against me and in favor of Lincoln, in concert with Trumbull. He ought to be a good witness, and I will read an extract from a speech which he made in 1858, when he was mad because his friend, Lincoln, had been cheated. It is one of numerous speeches of the same tenor that were made about that time, expressing this hatred between Lincoln, Trumbull and the Abolitionists. Matheny then said:

“The Whigs, Abolitionists, Know Nothings and renegade Democrats made a solemn compact for the purpose of carrying this State against the Democracy; on this compact, Mr. Trumbull said, the whole State would all unite and elect Lincoln. They could not thereby carry his district for the Legislature, in order to throw all the strength that could be obtained into that body against the Democrats. 2d. That when the Legislature was in session, such as speech criers, clerks, et cetera, would be given to the Abolitionists; and 3d. That the Whigs were to have the United States Senator. That, accordingly, in good faith, Trumbull was elected to Congress, and his district carried for the Legislature, and, when it convened, the Abolitionists filled all the offices of that body, and thus the “bold” was fairly executed. The Whigs, on their part, demanded the election of Abraham Lincoln, to the United States Senate, that the bond might be fulfilled, the other parties to the contract having already secured to themselves all that was called for. But, in the most perfidious manner, they refused to elect Mr. Lincoln; and the mean, low-lived, sneaking Trumbull succeeded, by pledging all that was required by any party, in thrusting Lincoln aside and foisting himself, an excommunication from the rotten bowels of the Democracy, into the United States Senate; and thus it has ever been, that an honest man makes a bad bargain when he conspires or contracts with rogues.”

Matheny thought that his friend Lincoln made a bad bargain when he conspired against his own benefactors and allowed his Abolitionists to have his campaign. Lincoln was swayed off the track, and he and his friends all at once began to moan; became sore and mad, and disposed to tell, but dare not; and thus they stood for a long time, until the Abolitionists cooled and flattened him back by their influence that he should, of course, be a Senator in Douglas’s place. In that way the Abolitionists have been enabled to hold Lincoln to the alliance up to this time, and now they have brought him into a fight against me, and he is to see if he is right; they do it by them, Lincoln did this, that is, “Abolition men of them, a promise, and holds the book, if not security, that Lovjoy shall not cheat him as Trumbull did.”

When the Republican Convention assembled at Springfield, in June last, for the purpose of nominating State officers only, the Abolitionists could not get Lincoln and his friends into it unless they would pledge themselves that Lincoln should be their candidate for the Senate; and you will find, in proof of this, that Convention unanioumsly Lincoln, the first, last and only choice for the Senate. Supposing Lincoln should die, what a terrible condition the Republican party would be in! They would have nobody left. They have no other choice, and it was necessary for them to put themselves before the world in this ridiculous, ridiculous attitude of having no other choice in order to quiet Lincoln’s suspicions, and assure him that he was not to be cheated by Lovjoy, and the trickery by which Trumbull outgener-ated him. Well, gentlemen, I think they will have a nice time of it before they get through. I do not intend to give them any chance to cheat Lincoln at all this time. I intend to relieve him of all anxiety upon that subject, and spare them
into free and slave States from its organization up to this day. During that period we have increased from four millions to thirty millions of people; we have extended our territory from the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean; we have acquired the Floridas and Texas, and other territory sufficient to double our geographical extent; we have increased in population, in wealth, and in power beyond any example on earth; we have risen from a weak and feeble power to become the terror and admiration of the civilized world; and all this has been done under a Constitution which Mr. Lincoln, in substance, says is in violation of the law of God, and under a Union divided into two sections, which Mr. Lincoln thinks, because such division cannot stand. Surely, Mr. Lincoln is a wiser man than those who framed the Government. Washington did not believe, nor did his contemporaries, that the local laws and domestic institutions that were well adapted to the twenty millions of people that were suited to the rice plantations of South Carolina; they did not believe at that day that in a Republic so broad and extended as this, containing such a variety of climate, soil, and interest, that uniformity in the local laws and domestic institutions was either desirable or possible. They believed them as our experience has proved so far, now, that each locality, having different interests, a different climate and different surroundings, required different local laws, local policy and local institutions, adapted to the wants of that locality. Thus our Government was formed on the principle of diversity in the local institutions and laws, and not on that of uniformity.

As I see it, I can only place at these points and present them as fully as I would wish, because I desire to bring all the facts in controversy between the two parties before you in order to have Mr. Lincoln’s reply. He makes war on the decision of the Supreme Court, in the case known as the Dred Scott case. I wish to make a very few assertions, that I have no way to make on these that have been rendered by the Supreme Court. I am content to take that decision as it stands, and which is delivered by the highest tribunal on earth, a tribunal established by the Constitution of the United States for that purpose, and hence I believe that the decision becomes the law of the land, binding on us, and on every other good citizen, whether we like it or not. Hence I do not choose to go into an argument to prove, before this audience, whether or not Chief Justice Taney understood the law better than Abraham Lincoln.

Mr. Lincoln objects to that decision, first and mainly because it denies the negro, the rights of citizenship. I am as much opposed to his reason for that objection as he is himself. I hold that a negro is not and never ought to be a citizen of the United States. I hold that this Government was made on the white basis, by white men, for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and should be administered by white men and none others. I do not believe that the Almighty made the negro capable of self-government. I am sure that all abolition lectures that you find traveling about the country, are in the habit of reading the Declaration of Independence to prove that all men were created equal and independent by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Mr. Lincoln is very much in the habit of following in the track of Lovejoy in this particular, by reading that part of the Declaration of Independence to prove that the negro was endowed by the Almighty with the inalienable right of equality with white men. He says to you, my fellow-citizens, that in my opinion, the signers of the Declaration had no reference to the negro whatever; whenever they declared all men to be created equal. They desired to express by that phrase white men, men of European birth and European descent, and had no reference either to the negro, the savage Indian, the Papago, the Malay, or any other inferior and degraded race, when they spoke of the equality of men. One great evidence that such was their understanding, is to be found in the fact that to this day the Papago, without being entitled to any of the blessings of life as every other signor of the Declaration represented a slaveholding constituency, and we know that no one of them emancipated his slaves, much less offered citizenship to them when they signed the Declaration; and yet, if they intended to declare that the negro was the equal of the white man, and entitled by divine right to an equality with him, they would have bound, as honest men, that day and year, to have put their signatures on an equality with themselves. Instead of doing so, as Mr. Lincoln says, they turned their eyes to heaven, they implored the divine blessing upon them, during the seven years bloody, war they had to fight to maintain that Declaration; never dreaming that they were violating divine law by still holding the negroes in bondage and depriving them of equality.

My friends, I am in favor of preserving this Government as our fathers made it. It does not follow by any means that because a negro is not, and never was, to my mind, necessarily intended to be a slave. On the contrary, I do so, and I think that our Constitution was intended to extend to the negro every right, every privilege, every immunity which he is capable of enjoying, consistent with the good of society. When you ask me what these rights are, what their nature and extent is, I tell you that that is a question which each State of this Union must decide for itself. Illinois has already decided the question. We have decided that the negro must not be a slave within our limits, but we have also decided that the negro shall not be a citizen within our limits; that he shall not vote, hold office, or exercise any political rights. I maintain that Illinois, as a sovereign State, has a right thus to fix her policy with reference to the relation between the white man and the negro; but while we had that right to decide the question for ourselves, we must recognize the same right in Kentucky and in every other State to make the same decision, or a different one. Having decided our own policy with reference to the black race, we must leave Kentucky and Missouri, and every other State perfectly free to make such a decision as they see proper on that question.

Kentucky has decided that question for herself. She has said that within her limits a negro shall not exercise any political rights, and she has also said that a post is a state officer under the laws of that State shall be abolished. Kentucky has a right to adopt that as her policy as we had to adopt the contrary policy for our own. New York has decided that in that State a negro may vote if he has $240 worth of property, and if he owns that much he may vote upon an equality with the white man. I, for one, am utterly opposed to negro suffrage anywhere and under any circumstances; yet, because the Supreme Court have decided in the celebrated Dred Scott case that a State has a right to confer the privilege of voting upon free negroes, I cannot go to war upon New York because they have given a policy repugnant to my feelings. But New York must mind her own business, and keep her negro suffrage to herself, and not attempt to force it upon us.

In the State of Maine they have decided that a negro may vote and hold office as a white man. I had occasion to speak to Senators from Maine, in a discussion last session, that if they thought that the white people within the limits of their State were no better than negroes, I would not quarrel with them for it, but they may not say that my white constituents of Illinois are no better than negroes, or we would be sure to quarrel.

The Dred Scott decision covers the whole question, and declares that each State has the right to settle this question of suffrage for itself, and all questions relating to the relations between the white man and the negro. Judge Taney expressly lays down the doctrine that I receive it as law, and I say that while those States are adopting regulations on that subject disgusting and abhorrent, according to my views, I will not make war on them if they will mind their own business and let us alone.

I now come back to the question, why cannot this Union exist forever divided into free and slave States, as our fathers made it? It can thus exist if each State will carry out the principles upon which our institutions were founded, to wit: the right of every State to judge for itself what is right and wrong, without meddling with the rights of the neighbor. I have already referred to that great principle, and this Union will not only live forever, but it will extend and expand until it covers the whole continent, and makes this confederacy one grand, ocean-bound Republic. We must bear in mind that we are yet a young nation,
MR. LINCOLN'S REPLY.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: There is very much in the principles that Judge Douglas has here enunciated that I most cordially approve, and over which I shall have no complaint with him. In so far as he has insisted that all the States have to do exactly as they please about all their domestic relations, including that of slavery, I agree entirely with him. He places me wrong in spite of all I can tell him, though I repeat it again and again, insisting that I have no difference with him upon this subject. I have made a great many speeches, some of which have been printed, and it will be utterly impossible for him to find any thing that I have ever put in print contrary to what I now say upon this subject. I hold myself under constitutional obligations to allow the people in all the States, without interference, direct or indirect, to do exactly as they please, and I deny that I have any inclination to interfere with them, even if there were no such constitutional obligations. I can only say again that I am placed improperly—allegro improperly, in spite of all I can say—when it is insisted that I entertain any other view or purposes in regard to that matter.

While I am upon this subject, I will make some answers briefly to certain propositions that Judge Douglas has put. He says, "Why can't this Union endure permanently, half slave and half free?" I have said that I supposed it could not, and I will try, before this new audience, to give briefly some of the reasons for entertaining that opinion. Another form of his question is, "Why can't we be as stable as our fathers placed us?" That is the exact difficulty between us. I say, that Judge Douglas and his friends have changed them from the position in which our fathers originally placed it. I say, in the way our fathers originally left the slavery question, the institution was in the course of ultimate extinction, and the public mind rested in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. I say when this Government was first established, it was the policy of its founders to prohibit the spread of slavery into the new Territories of the United States, where it had not existed. It is Judge Douglas who has broken up that policy, and placed it upon a new basis by which it is to become national and perpetual. I have asked or desired any where is that it should be placed back upon the basis that the fathers of our Government originally placed it upon. I have no doubt that it would become extinct, for all time to come, if we but reapplied the policy of the fathers by restricting it to the limits it has already covered—restricting it from the new Territories.

I do not wish to dwell at great length on this branch of the subject at this time, but allow me to repeat one thing that I have stated before. Brooks, the man who assailed Senator Sumner on the floor of the Senate, and who was complimented with dinners, and silver pitchers, and gold-bedecked cane; but who, for all these things, so far as I can discover, made himself more indignant. One of his speeches declared that when this Government was originally established, nobody expected that the institution of slavery would last until this day. That was but the opinion of one man, but it was such an opinion as we cannot get rid of. Judge Douglas or anybody in favor of slavery in the North at all. You can sometimes get it from a Southern man. He said at the same time that the framers of our Government did not have the knowledge that experience has taught us—that experience and the involution of the cotton-gin have taught us that the perpetuation of slavery is a necessity. He insisted, therefore, upon its being changed from the basis upon which the fathers of the Government left it to the basis of its perpetuation and nationalization.

I insist that the difference between Judge Douglas and myself—that Judge Douglas is helping that change along. I insist upon this Government being placed where our fathers originally placed it.

I remember Judge Douglas once said that he saw the evidence on the statute books of Congress, of a policy in the origin of Government to divide slavery and
freedom by a geographical line—that he saw an indissolubility to maintain that policy, and therefore he got the art about studying a way to a way a way to the line of 36 degrees 30 minutes, in the United States, on the right—i.e., the line which he thought ought to have been placed upon at first; and in that speech he confesses that he sees no place it, not upon the basis that the father placed it upon, but upon one gotten up on "original principles." When he asks me why we cannot get along with it in the organization of a Territorial Government in the areas where our fathers placed it, he has better clear up the evidences that he has himself changed it from that basis; that he has himself been chiefly instrumental in changing the policy of the fathers. Any one who will read his speech of the 22d of July, and see that he has made a passion, showing that he set about fixing the line upon an altogether different set of principles. I think I have fully answered him when he asks me why we cannot let it alone upon the basis where our fathers left it, by showing that he has himself changed the whole policy of the Government in that regard.

Now, fellow citizens, in regard to this matter about a contract that was made between Judge Trumbull and myself, and all that long portion of Judge Douglas's speech on this subject—I wish simply to say what I have said to him before, that he cannot know whether it is true or not, and I do know that there is not a word of truth in it. And I have told him so before. I don't want any hard language indulged in, but I do know how to deal with this persistent objecting to a story that I know to be utterly without truth. It used to be a fashion amongst them when a charge was made in some sort of way was brought forward to establish it, and if no proof was found to exist, the charge was dropped. I don't know how to meet this kind of an argument. I don't want to have a fight with Judge Douglas, and I have no way of making an argument up to the consistency of a corn-cob and stopping his mouth with it. All I can do is, good-humoredly, to say that, from the beginning to the end of all that story about my part of the discussion, on my part, and on Trumbull's part, and myself, there is not a word of truth in it. I can only ask him to show some sort of evidence of the truth of his story. He brings forward here and reads from what he considers is a speech by James H. Matheny, charging such a bargain between Trumbull and myself. My own opinion is that Matheny did some such immoral thing as to tell a story that he knew nothing about. I believe he did. I contradicted it instantly, and it has been contradicted by Judge Trumbull, while nobody has produced any proof, because there is none. Now, whether the speech of Judge Douglas brings forward here is really the one Matheny made I do not know, and I hope the Judge will pardon me for doubting the genuineness of this document, since its publication of this speech in the Springfield Resolutions at Ottawa. I do not wish to dwell at any great length upon this matter. I can say nothing when all is said that I have given this very matters, except it is not true, and demand that he who insists upon it shall produce some proof. That is any man can do, and I leave it in that way, for I know of no other way of dealing with it.

The Judge has gone over a long account of the old Whig and Democratic parties, and it connects itself with this charge against Trumbull and myself. He says that they entered upon a compromise in regard to the slavery question in 1850; that in a National Democratic Convention resolutions were passed to abide by that compromise as a finally upon the slavery question. He also says that the Whig party in National Convention agreed to abide by and regard as a finally the Compromise of 1850. I understand the Judge to be altogether right about this, and I understand that part of the history of the country as stated by him to be correct. I recollect that I, as a member of the Senate, acquiesced in that compromise. I recollect the President, Judge Douglas was heard on the Whig Abolitionists, precisely as he does today—not a bit of difference. I have often heard him. We could do nothing when the old Whig party was alive that was not Abolitionism, but it has got an amendment in the Senate and the bill has passed away. When the Compromise was made it did not repeat the old Missouri Compromise.
tions that he has hinted up against me, what I, as a lawyer, would call a good plea to a bad declaration. I understand that it is a maxim of law, that a poor plea may be secured by a bad declaration. I think that the opinions of the Judge brings to those who support me, yet differ from me, is a bad declaration against me; but if I can bring the same things against him, I am putting in a good plea to that kind of declaration, and now I propose to try it.

At Freeport Judge Douglas occupied a large part of his time in producing resolutions and documents of various sorts, as I understood, to make me somehow responsible for them; and I propose now doing a little of the same sort of thing for him. In the name of Thompson Campbell, a personal friend of Judge Douglas and myself, a political friend of Judge Douglas and opponent of mine, was a candidate for Congress in the Gallina District. He was interrogated as to his views on this same slavery question. I have before me the interrogatories and Campbell’s answers to them. I will read them:

**INTERROGATORIES.**

1st. Will you, if elected, vote for and cordially support a bill prohibiting slavery in the Territories of the United States?

2d. Will you vote for and support a bill abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia?

3d. Will you vote for and advocate the repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law passed at the recent session of Congress?

4th. Will you advocate and vote for the elections of a Speaker of the House of Representatives who shall be willing to organize the committee of that House so as to give the free States their just influence in the business of legislation?

5th. What are your views, not only as to the constitutional right of Congress to prohibit the slave-trade between the States, but also as to the expediency of correcting that right immediately?

**CAMPBELL’S EVIDENCE.**

To the first and second interrogatories I answer unequivocally in the affirmative.

To the third interrogatory I reply that I am opposed to the admission of any slave State into the Union, but I do not view that it may be turned out of Texas or any other Territory.

To the fourth and fifth interrogatories I unqualifiedly answer in the affirmative.

To the sixth interrogatory I reply that I believe the protection of the slave trade to be an important consideration, and that the maintenance of that trade is absolutely necessary to the peace of the country and the security of the Government.

T. CAMPBELL.

I want to say here that Thompson Campbell was elected to Congress on that platform, as the Democratic candidate in the Gallina District, against Martin P. Sweet. Judge Douglas’s platform was then the issue, and not only so, but on the 27th of last month, when Judge Douglas and myself spoke at Freeport in joint discussion, there was the same kind of discussion, free from the influence of the Freeport people, and there was heard the voice of Judge Douglas standing on the platform, trying to help poor me to be elected. That is true of one of Judge Douglas’s friends.

So again, in that same race of 1860, there was a Congressional Convention assembled at Joliet, and it nominated R. S. Meekley for Congress, and unanimously adopted the following resolution:

(very few of whom are my political friends), as national men, whether we have reason to expect that the agitation in regard to this will cease while the cause of the institution to which the agitation is directed is not the same as that which produced agitation in 1820, when the Missouri Compromise was formed—then which produced the agitation upon the annexation of Texas, and at other times—is the same as that which produced agitation in one time will not have the same effect at another?

This has been the result so far as my observation of the slavery question and my reading in history extends. What right have we then to hope that the trouble will cease—that the agitation will come to an end—until it shall either be placed back where it originally stood, and where the fathers originally placed it, or, on the other hand, until it shall entirely master all opposition? This is the view I entertain, and this is the reason why I entertained it, as Judge Douglas has read from my Springfield speech.

Now, my friend, there is one other thing that I feel myself under some sort of obligation to mention. Judge Douglas has been today — in a very flattering way, I was about saying—spoke of the platform which he seeks to hold me responsible. He says, “Why can’t you come out and make an open avowal of principles in all places alike?” and he reads from an advertisement that he says was used to notify the people of a speech to be made by Judge Trumbull at Waterloo. In commenting on it he desires to know whether we cannot speak frankly and manfully as he and his friends do! How, I ask, do his friends speak out their own sentiments? A Convention of his party in this State met on the 21st of April, in Springfield, and passed a set of resolutions which they proclaim to the country as their platform. This does constitute their platform, and it is because Judge Douglas claims it is his platform—that these are his principles and purposes—that he has a right to declare he speaks his sentiments — frankly and manfully. On the 9th of June, Col. John Douglas, Gov. Reynolds and others, calling themselves National Democrats, met in Springfield, and adopted a set of resolutions which are as easily understood, as plain and as definitely in stating to the country and to the world what they believed in and would stand upon, as Judge Douglas’s platform. Now, what is the reason, the Judge Douglas is not willing that Col. Dougerty and Gov. Reynolds should stand upon their own written and printed platform as well as he upon his? Why must he look farther than their platform when he claims himself to stand by his platform?

Again, in reference to our platforms: On the 15th of June the Republicans had their Convention and published their platform, which is as clear and distinct as Judge Douglas’s. In it they spoke their principles as plainly and as definitely to the world. What is the reason that Judge Douglas is not willing I should stand upon that platform? Why must he go around hunting for some one who is supporting me, or has supported me at some time in his life, and who has said something at some time contrary to that platform? Does the Judge regard that as a good one? Is it turn out that the rule is a good one for me—that I am responsible for any and every opinion that any man has expressed who is my friend—then it is a good rule for him. I ask, is it not as good a rule for him as it is for me? In my opinion, it is not a good rule for either of us. Do you think differently, Judge?

Mr. Douglas—"I do not."

Mr. Lincoln—Judge Douglas says he does not think differently. I am glad of it. Then can he tell me why he is looking up resolutions of five or six years ago, and insisting that they were my platform, notwithstanding my protest that they are not, and never were my platform, and my pointing out the platform of the State Convention which he allows to say nominated me for the Senate? I cannot see what he means by parading these resolutions, if it is not to hold me responsible for the views in some way. If he says to me here, that he does not hold the rule to be good, one way or the other, I do not comprehend how he could answer me more fully if he answered me at greater length. I will therefore put in my answer to the resolu-
Resolved, That we are uncompromisingly opposed to the extension of slavery; and while we would not make such an extension a ground of interference with the interests of the State when it exists, yet we most firmly insist that it is the duty of Congress to resist such extension into Territory now free, by all means compatible with the obligation of the Constitution, and with good faith to our sister States; that these principles were recognized by the Ordinance of 1812, which received the sanction of Thomas Jefferson, who is acknowledged by all to be the greatest constitutional mind of our nation.

Subsequently the same interrogatories were propounded to Dr. Mology which had been addressed to Campbell, as above, with the exception of the 6th, respecting the inter-State slave-trade, to which Dr. Mology, the Democratic nominee for Congress, replied as follows:

I received the written interrogatories this day, and as you will see by the La Salle Democrat and Ottawa Free Trader, I took at Peot on the 5th and at Ottawa on the 7th, the affirmative side of Interrogatories 1st and 2d, and in reference to the admission of any more slave States from free Territory, my position taken at these meetings, as correctly reported in said papers, was comprehensively and distinctly opposed to it. In relation to the admission of any more slave States from Texas, whether I shall go against it or not will depend upon the opinion that I may hereafter form of the true meaning and nature of the resolutions of annexation. If, by said resolutions, the honor and good faith of the nation is pledged to admit more slave States from Texas when the Cession may apply for the admission of such States, then I should, if in Congress, vote for their admission. If not so, I should, on the contrary, vote for the exclusion of any more slave States from Texas, and such a vote Congress would not receive my vote.

To your fourth interrogatory I answer most satisfactorily in the affirmative, and for reasons set forth in my reported remarks at Ottawa last Monday.

To your fifth interrogatory I also reply in the affirmative most cordially, and that I will use my united efforts to secure the nomination and election of a man who will accomplish the objects of said interrogatories. I most cordially approve of the resolutions adopted at the union meeting held at Princeton on the 27th September last.

Yours etc.,

S. S. MOLONY.

All I have to say in regard to Dr. Mology is, that he was the regularly nominated Democratic candidate for Congress in his district—was elected at that time, at the end of his term was appointed to a land-office at Danville. (I never heard anything of Judge Douglas's instrumentality in this.) He held this office a considerable time, and when we were at Freepoint the other day, there were handbills scattered about notifying the public that after our debate was over, R. S. Mology would make a Democratic speech in favor of Judge Douglas. That is all I know of my own person.

That is added here in this resolution, and truly I believe, that—

"Among those who participated in the Joint Convention, and who supported its nominee, with his platform as laid down in the resolution of the Convention and in his tone and spirit as above given, we call at once the following names, all of which are recognized at this day as leading Democrats?"

"Cook County—E. B. Williams, Charles McDonell, Arno Voss, Thomas Hoyne, James Cook."

I reckon we ought to except Cook.

"F. C. Sherman."

"Will—Joel A. Matteon, S. W. Bowen."

"Kane—H. F. Hall, G. W. Revidick, A. M. Herrington, Elijah Wilson."

"McHenry—W. M. Jackson, Eans Smith, Neil Donnelly."

"La Salle—John Hise, William Redick."

William Redick, another one of Judge Douglas's friends that stood on the stand with him at Judge's when says my knees trembled so that I had to be carried away. The names are all here:

"DuPage—Nathan Allen."

"DeKalb—Z. B. Mayor."

Here is another set of resolutions which I think are proper to the matter in hand.

On the 29th of February of the same year, a Democratic District Convention was held in Naperville, to nominate a candidate for Circuit Judge. Among the delegates were Bowen and Kelly, of Willi; Captain Naper, H. H. Cody, Nathan Allen, of DuPage; W. M. Jackson, J. M. Strode, P. W. Platt and Emes W. Smith of McHenry; J. Hornsby and others, of Winnebago. Col. Strode presided over the Convention. The following resolutions were unanimously adopted—the first on motion of P. W. Platt, the second on motion of William M. Jackson:

Resolved, That this Convention is in favor of the Wilmot Proviso, both as a principle and proviso, and believes it for the best interest of the country why any person should oppose the largest limits in the case of the Slavery in Territory and Free Speech.

Resolved, That in the opinion of this Convention, the time has arrived when all men should be free, whites as well as others.

Judge Douglas—"What is the date of these resolutions?"

Mr. Lincoln—"I understand it was in 1830, but I do not know it. I do not state a thing and say I know it, when I do not. But I have the highest belief that this is so. I know of no way to arrive at the conclusion that there is an error in it. I mean to put a case no stronger than the truth will allow. But what I was going to comment upon is an extract from a newspaper in DeKalb county, and it strikes me as being rather singular, I confess, under the circumstances. There is a Judge Mayo in that county, who is a candidate for the Legislature, for the purpose, if he secure his election, of helping to re-elect Judge Douglas. He is the editor of the newspaper [DeKalb County Sentinel]; and in that paper I find the extract I am going to read. It is part of an editorial article in which he was electioneering as freely as he could for Judge Douglas and against me. It was a curious thing. I think, to be in such a paper. I will agree to that; and the Judge may make the most of it;"

"Our education, that we have ever been nakeds in favor of the equality of the blacks; that is, that they should enjoy all the privileges of the whites without any restraint. We are aware that this is not a very popular doctrine. We have had many a scold with some who are now strong Republicans, who take the broad ground of equality and they the opposite ground."

"We were brought up in a State where blacks were voters, and we do not know of any inconvenience resulting from it, though perhaps it would not work as well where the blacks are more numerous. We have no doubt of the right of the whites to guard against such an evil, if it is one. Our opinion is that it would be best for all concerned that a few colored population in a State by themselves [In this I agree with him]; but if within the jurisdiction of the United States, we say by all means they should have the right to have their Senators and Representatives in Congress, and to vote for President. We have ever made the man, and want it if the fellow. We have seen many a 1uger [this I thought more of than some white men."

That is one of Judge Douglas's friends. Now I do not want to leave myself in an attitude where I can be misrepresented, so I will say I do not think the Judge is responsible for this article; but he is quite as responsible for it as I would be if one of my friends had said it. I think that is fair enough.

I have here also a set of resolutions passed by a Democratic State Convention in Judge Douglas's own good old State of Vermont, that I think ought to be good for him too:

Resolved, That liberty is a right inherent and inalienable in man, and that herein all men are equal.

Resolved, That we claim no authority in the Federal Government to abolish slavery in the several States, but we do claim for it Constitutional power peremptorily to prohibit the introduction of slavery into territory now free, and abolish it wherever, under the jurisdiction of Congress, it exists.

Resolved, That this power ought immediately to be exercised in prohibiting the introduction and existence of slavery in New Mexico and California, in abolishing slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia, on the high seas, and wherever else, under the Constitution, it may be exercised.

Resolved, That no more slave State should be admitted into the Federal Union.

Resolved, That we ought to return to the moral policy, not to exceed, nationalize or encourage, but to limit, localize and discourage slavery.
At present I answered several interrogatories that had been propounded to me by Judge Douglass at the Toronto meeting. The Judge has yet not seen fit to find any fault with the position that I took in regard to those seven interrogatories, which were certainly broad enough, in all conscience, to cover the entire ground. In my answer to one of them he printed, at any rate, and all the other interrogatories of saying, I take the ground that those who elect me must expect that I will do nothing which will not be in accordance with those answers. I have some right to assert that Judge Douglass has no fault to find with them. But he chooses to still try to thrust me upon different ground without paying any attention to my answers, the obtaining of which from me cost him so much trouble and concern. At the same time, I propounded four interrogatories to him, claiming it as a right that he should answer as many interrogatories as I had put to him. I am told that Judge Douglass is put very much out of order by the abolitionists of the North for me as I did for him, and I may say that I regard this as the same thing in substance—that it was more a personal attack on the abolitionists than on the judges themselves.

As I read the Judge’s answers in the newspaper, and as I remember it as pronounced at the time, he does not give any answer which is equivalent to yes or no. He answers at very considerable length, rather quarrelling with me for asking the question, and insisting that Judge Trumbull had done something that I ought to say something about; and finally getting out such statements as induce me to infer that he means to be understood by me, in that supposed case, vote for the admission of Kansas. I only bring this forward now for the purpose of showing that if he chooses to put a different construction upon the answer he may do it. But if he does not, I shall from this time forward assume that he will vote against the admission of Kansas in disregard of the English bill. I have the right to remove any misunderstandings I may have. I only mention it now that I may hereafter assume this to be the true construction of his answer, if he does not now choose to correct me.

The second interrogatory that I propounded to him was this:

"Question 2. Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a Constitution?"

To Judge Douglass answered that they can lawfully exclude slavery from the Territory prior to the formation of a Constitution. He goes on to tell us how it can be done. As I understand him, he holds that it can be done by the Territorial Legislature refusing to make any enactments against or for slavery in the Territory, and especially by adopting unfriendly legislation to it. For the sake of clearness I state it again; that they can exclude slavery from the Territory, 1st, by adopting an act which shall be assumed to be an indispensable necessity to it in the way of legislation; and 2d, by national legislation. If I rightly understand him, I wish to ask your attention to this for his position.

In the first place, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that any Congressional prohibition of slavery in the Territories is unconstitutional—that they have reached this proposition as a conclusion from their former proposition, that the Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes property in slaves, and from that other Constitutional provision, that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Hence they reach the conclusion that the Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes property in slaves, and prohibits any person from being deprived of property without due process of law, to pass an act of Congress prohibiting slavery in a new State, where a slave line would be deprived of him if he took him on the other side. I have heard that Judge Douglass has no fault to find with his answers, the obtaining of which from me cost him so much trouble and concern. At the same time, I propounded four interrogatories to him, claiming it as a right that he should answer as many interrogatories as I had put to him. I only bring this forward now for the purpose of showing that if he chooses to put a different construction upon the answer he may do it. But if he does not, I shall from this time forward assume that he will vote against the admission of Kansas in disregard of the English bill. I have the right to remove any misunderstandings I may have. I only mention it now that I may hereafter assume this to be the true construction of his answer, if he does not now choose to correct me.

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Judge Douglas—"Will you repeat that? I want to answer that question."

Mr. Lincoln—if the slaveholding citizens of a United States Territory should need and demand Congressional legislation for the protection of their slave property in such Territory, would you add a member of Congress, vote for or against such legislation?

I am aware that in some of the speeches Judge Douglas has made, he has spoken as if he did not know or think that the Supreme Court had decided that a Territorial Legislature cannot exclude slavery. Probably what the Judge would say in that subject—whether he would say definitely that he does not understand they have so decided, or whether he would say he does understand that the court have so decided. I do not know; but I know that in his speech at Springfield he spoke of that, as if he had not decided yet; and in his answer to me at Freeport, he spoke of it as again, as I comprehend it, as a thing that had not yet been decided. Now I hold that if the Judge does entertain that view, I think that he is not mistaken in so far as it can be said that the court has not decided any thing save the more general question of jurisdiction. I know the legal arguments that can be made—that after a court has decided it cannot take jurisdiction in a case, it has decided all that is before it, and that is the end of it. A plausible argument can be made in favor of that proposition, but I know that Judge Douglas has said in one of his speeches that the court went forward, like honest men as they were, and decided all the points in the case. If any points are really extraneously decided because not necessarily before them, then this one as to the power of the Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery is one of them, as also the one that the Missouri Compromise was null and void. They are both extraneous, or neither, as is according to the court held that they had no jurisdiction in the case between the parties, because of want of capacity of one party to maintain a suit in that court. I want, if I have sufficient time, to show that the court did pass its opinion, but that is the only thing actually done in the case. If they did decide, they showed what they were ready to decide whenever the matter was before them. That is what I contend? After having said the Congress had power to pass a law excluding slavery from a United States Territory, they then used language in the effect: That simultaneously as Congress itself could not exercise such a power, it followed as a matter of course that it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise it, for the Territorial Legislature can do more than Congress could do. Thus it expressed its opinion emphatically against the possibility of a Territorial Legislature to exclude slavery, leaving us in just as little doubt on that point as upon any other point they really decided.

Now, my fellow-citizens, I will detain you only a little while longer. My time is limited. I have read a report of a speech made by Judge Douglas at Joliet, since we last met in Freeport—published, I believe, in the Missouri Republican—on the 9th of this month, in which Judge Douglas says:

"You know at Ottawa, I read this platform, and asked him if he concurred in each of the principles set forth in it. He would not answer those questions. At last I asked him if he wished to answer them, when he said, where the color of your principles are a little darker than in Egypt, I intend to rest you on the floor of the Senate. The very notice that I was going to take him down to Egypt made him tremble in the knees so that he had to be carried from the platform. He laid up seven days, and in the meantime held a consultation with his political physician; and they have Liverly and Barnswell and all the leaders of the Abolition party, they consulted it all over, and at last Lincoln came to the conclusion that he would not come up to Freeport last Friday."

Now that statement altogether furnishes a subject for philosophical contemplation. I have been thinking it in that way, and I have really come to the conclusion that I can explain it in no other way than by believing the Judge is crazy, and that his opinion is in his right mind. I cannot conceive how he would have risked disregarding the four or five thousand of his own friends who stood there, and knew, as I have been carried from the platform, that there was not a word of truth in it.
Judge Douglass—"Didn't they carry you off?"
Mr. Lincoln—"There; that question illustrates the character of this man Douglass, exactly. He smiles now and says, "Didn't they carry you off?" But he said then, "I had to be carried off!" and he said it to convince the country that he had so completely broken me down by his speech that I had to be carried away. Now he seeks to dodge it, and asks, "Didn't they carry you off?" Yes, they did. But, Judge Douglass, why didn't you tell the truth about it? And then again, "He held up seven days." He puts this in print for the people of the country to read as a serious document. I think he had been in his sober senses when he wrote it. He would not have written it in his sober senses. He would not have written it in his sober senses to make thousands of his own friends, who know that I made speeches within six of the seven days at Harney, Marshall county; Augustas, Hancock county, and Macomb, McDonough county, including all the necessary travel to meet him again at Prospect at the end of the six days. Now, I say, there is no charitable way to look at that conclusion, except to conclude that he is actually crazy. There is another thing in that statement that alarmed me very greatly as he states it, that he was going to "not put me down in Egypt unless he forced me—that I could not be got there; unless, he, giant-like, had hauled me down here. That statement he makes, too, in the teeth of the knowledge that I had made the stipulation to come down here, and that he himself had been very reluctant to enter into the stipulation. More than this, Judge Douglass, when he made that statement must have been crazy, and wholly out of his sober senses; or else he would have known that when he got me down here—that promise—that wheezy promise—of his power to annihilate me, wouldn't amount to anything. Now, how little do I look like being carried away trembling? Let the Judge go on, and after he is done with his half hour, I want you all, if I can go home myself, to let me stay and see; and, if anything happens to the Judge, if I cannot carry him in the case, I put him in the Union. The creed of the Union, I base all my judgments on the Union. As I have adhered to the Union, as set forth in the resolutions of the various Conventions was, that they would under no circumstances vote to admit another slave State. It had been put forth in the Lovejoy resolutions. Would he send me back in a lying legislature? I went through it and passed the Union. I was all the counties who gave Republican or Abolition majorities. Mr. Lincoln cannot and will not deny that the doctrines laid down in those resolutions were in substance put forth in Lovejoy's resolutions, which were voted for by a majority of his party, some of them, if not all, receiving the support of every man of his party. Hence, I laid a foundation for my questions to him before I asked him whether that was or was not the platform of his party. He says that he answered my questions. One of them was whether he would vote to admit any slave States into the Union, and put them into the Union. The creed of the Union, as set forth in the resolutions of the various Conventions was, that they would under no circumstances vote to admit another slave State. It was put forth in the Lovejoy resolutions in a lying legislature. Would he send me back in a lying legislature? I went through it and passed the Union. I was all the counties who gave Republican or Abolition majorities, or elect members to the Legislature of that school of politics. I had a right to know whether he would vote for or against the admission of another slave State in the event the people wanted it. I first answered that he was not pledged on the subject, and then said, "In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission of any more slave States into the Union. I state to you very frankly that I cannot answer to make the impression that when we meet at different places I am literally in my clothes—that I am a poor, helpless, despairing man, and that I can do nothing at all. This is one of the ways he has taken to create that impression. I don't know any other way to meet it, except this. I don't want to quarrel with him—to call him a liar—but when I come square up to him I don't know what else to call him, if I must tell the truth out. I want to be at peace, and reserve all my fighting powers for necessary occasions. My time, now, is very nearly out, and I give up the privilege that is left to the Judge, to let him set my knees trembling again, if he can.

MIL DOUGLASS'S REPLY.
My friends, while I am very grateful to you for the enthusiasm which you show for me, I will say in all candor, that your ‘quizzings will be much more agreeable than your applause, insomuch as you deprive me of some part of my time whenever you cheer. I will commence where Mr. Lincoln left off, and make a remark upon this serious complaint of his about my speech at Joliet. I did say there in a playful manner that when I put these questions to Mr. Lincoln at Ottawa he failed to answer, and that the people would be led to believe that he was carried off the stand, and required three days to get up his reply. That he did not walk off from the stand that he will not deny. That when the crowd went away from the stand with me, a few persons carried him home on their shoulders and laid him down, he will admit. I wish to say to you that I never degrade my friends and myself by allowing them to be carried along the public streets, when I am unable to walk, I am willing to be deemed crazy. I did not say whether I beat him or not he beat me in the argument. He repeatedly put these questions to him, and I put them not as mere idle questions, but showed that I based them upon the creed of the Black Republican party as declared by their Conventions in that portion of the State which he depends upon for his elect, and desired to know whether he favored that creed. He would not answer. When I reminded him that I intended bringing him into Egypt and removing my questions if he refused to answer, he then consulted and did get up his answers one week after—answers which I may refer to in a few minutes and show you how equivocal they are. My object was to make him answer whether or not he stood by the platform of his party; the resolutions I then read, and upon which I based my questions, had been adopted by his party in the Galena Congressional District, and the Chicago and Bloomington Congressional Districts, composing a large majority of the counties in this State that give Republican or Abolition majorities. Mr. Lincoln cannot and will not deny that the doctrines laid down in those resolutions were in substance put forth in Lovejoy's resolutions, which were voted for by a majority of his party, some of them, if not all, receiving the support of every man of his party. Hence, I laid a foundation for my questions to him before I asked him whether that was or was not the platform of his party. He says that he answered my questions. One of them was whether he would vote to admit any slave States into the Union, and put them into the Union. The creed of the Union, I base all my judgments on the Union. As I have adhered to the Union, as set forth in the resolutions of the various Conventions was, that they would under no circumstances vote to admit another slave State. It had been put forth in the Lovejoy resolutions. Would he send me back in a lying legislature? I went through it and passed the Union. I was all the counties who gave Republican or Abolition majorities, or elect members to the Legislature of that school of politics. I had a right to know whether he would vote for or against the admission of another slave State in the event the people wanted it. I first answered that he was not pledged on the subject, and then said, "In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission of any more slave States into the Union. I state to you very frankly that I cannot answer to make the impression that when we meet at different places I am literally in my clothes—that I am a poor, helpless, despairing man, and that I can do nothing at all. This is one of the ways he has taken to create that impression. I don't know any other way to meet it, except this. I don't want to quarrel with him—to call him a liar—but when I come square up to him I don't know what else to call him, if I must tell the truth out. I want to be at peace, and reserve all my fighting powers for necessary occasions. My time, now, is very nearly out, and I give up the privilege that is left to the Judge, to let him set my knees trembling again, if he can.
vote when the people applied for admission into the Union with a slave Constitution? That he does not answer, and that is the condition of every Territory we have now got. No, they have kept out of Kansas by act of Congress, and when I put the question to Mr. Lincoln, whether he will vote for the admission with or without slavery, as her people may desire, he will not answer, and you have not got an answer from him. In Nebraska slavery is not prohibited by act of Congress, but the people under the Nebraska bill, to do as they please on the subject, and when I ask him whether he will vote to admit Nebraska with a slave Constitution if her people desire it, he will not answer. So with New Mexico, Washington Territory, Arkansas, and the four new States to be admitted from Texas. You cannot get an answer from him to these questions. His answer only applies to a given case, to a condition—things which he knows does not exist in any one Territory in the Union. He tries to give you to understand that he would allow the people to do as they please, and yet he dodges the question as to every Territory in the Union. I ask why cannot Mr. Lincoln answer to each of these Territories? He has not done it, and he will not do it. The Abolitionists up North understand that this answer is made with a view of not commiting himself on any one Territory now in existence. It is so understood there, and you cannot expect an answer from him on a case that applies to any one Territory, or applies to the new States which by compact we are pledged to admit out of Texas, when they have the requisite population and desire admission. I submit to you whether he has made a blank answer, so that you can tell how he would vote in any one of these cases. "He would be sorry to be put in the position." Why would he be sorry to be put in this position if his duty required him to give the vote? If the people of a Territory ought to be permitted to come into the Union as a State, with slavery or without it, as they please, why not give the vote admitting them cheerfully? If in his opinion they ought not to come in with slavery, even if they wanted it, why not say that he would exclude them from admission? His intimation is that he would not let them vote. "No," and he would be sorry to do that which his conscience would compel him to do as an honest man.

In the contract or bargain between Trumbull, the Abolitionists and him, which he deems, I wish to say that the charge can be proved by notorious historical facts. Trumbull, Lovejoy, Gildings, Fred Douglass, Hale, and Banks were traveling the State at that time making speeches on the same subject, and in the same cause with him. He contends himself with the simple denial that no such thing occurred. Does he deny that he, and Trumbull, and Breeze, and Gildings, and Chase, and Fred Douglass, and Lovejoy, and all those Abolitionists and deserters from the Democratic party, did make speeches all over this State in the same year? Does he deny that John Matheny was then, and is now, his confidential friend, and does he deny that Matheny made the charge of the bargain and fraud in his own language, as I have read it from his printed speech? Matheny spoke of his own interest in that bargain existing between Lincoln, Trumbull, and the Abolitionists. He still remains Lincoln's confidential friend, and is now a candidate for Congress, by canvassing the Springfield District for Lincoln. I assert that I can prove the charge to be true, in detail, if I can ever get it where I can common and compel the attendance of witnesses. I have the statement of another man to the same effect as that made by Matheny, which I am not permitted to use yet, but which is a good witness on that point, and the history of the paper and the activity upon it. That Lincoln up to that time had been a Whig, and then undertook to Abolitionize the Whigs and bring them into the Abolition camp, is beyond denial; that Trumbull up to that time had been a Democrat, and deserted, and underco to Abolitionize the Democracy, and take them into the Abolition camp, is beyond denial; that they are both now active, leading, distinguished members of this Abolition Republican party, in full communion, is a fact that cannot be questioned or denied.

But Lincoln is not willing to be responsible for the creed of his party. He com-
having owned slaves, he comes to Illinois, turns Abolitionist, and slanders the graves of his father and mother, and broaches curses upon the institutions under which he was born, and his father and mother bred. True, I was not born out west here. I was born away down in Yankee land, I was born in a valley in Vermont, with the high mountains around me. I love the old green mountains and valleys of Vermont, where I was born, and where I played in my childhood. I went up to visit them some seven or eight years ago, for the first time for twenty odd years. When I got there they treated me very kindly. They invited me to the commencement of their commencement, on the scale with their distinguished guests and honored men upon me the degree of LL.D. in Latin (doctor of laws), the same as they did old Hickory, at Cambridge, many years ago, and I give you my word and honor I understood just as well in Latin as he did. When they got through showering the honor, they called upon me for a speech, and I got up with my heart full and swelling with gratitude for their kindness, and I said to them, "My friends, Vermont is the most glorious spot of the face of this globe for a man to be born in, provided he emigrates when he is very young."

I emigrated when I was very young. I came out here when I was a boy, and I found my mind liberalized, and my opinions enlarged when I got on those broad prairies, with only the Heavenly to bound my views, instead of having them circumscribed by the little narrow ridges that surrounded the valley where I was born. But, I damned all things of the land where a man was born. I wish to be judged by my principles, by those great public measures and Constitutional principles upon which the people, the happiness, and the perpetuity of this Republic now rest.

Mr. Lincoln has framed another question, propounded it to me, and desired my answer. As I have said before, I did not put a question to him that I did not first lay a foundation for by showing that it was a part of the platform of the party whose votes he is now seeking, adopted in a majority of the counties where he now hopes to get a majority, and supported by the candidates of his party now running in those counties, who will answer his question. It is as follows: "If the holding citizens of a United States Territory should seek and demand Congressional legislation for the protection of their slave property in such Territory, would you, as a member of Congress, vote for or against such legislation?" I answer him that it is a fundamental principle of the Democratic creed that there should be non-interference and non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States or Territories. Mr. Lincoln could have found an answer to his question in the Cincinnati platform, if he had desired; the Democratic party by that platform declared for non-interference and non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories alike, and I stand on that platform now.

Now I desire to call your attention to the fact that Lincoln did not define his own position in the question. How does he stand on that question? He put the question to me at Freeport whether or not I would vote to admit Kansas into the Union before she had 90,420 inhabitants. I answered him at once that it having been stated that Kansas had now population enough for a slave State, she had population enough for a free State. I answered the question unequivocally, and then I asked him whether he would vote for or against the admission of Kansas before she had 90,420 inhabitants, and he would not answer me. To-day he has called attention to the fact that, in his opinion, my answer on that question was not quite plain enough, and yet he has not answered it himself. He now puts a question in relation to Congressional interference in the Territories to me. I answer him direct, and yet he has not answered the question himself. I ask you whether a man has any right, in common decency, to put questions in these public discussions, to his opponent, which he will not answer himself, when they are pressed upon him. I asked him three times, whether he would vote to admit Kansas whenever the people applied with a Constitution of their own making and their own adoption, under circumstances that were fair, just and unexceptionable, but I cannot get an answer from him. Nor will he answer the question which he put to me, and which I have just answered in relation to Congressional interference in the Territories, by making a slave code there.

It is true that he goes on to answer the question by arguing that under the decision of the Supreme Court it is the duty of a man to vote for a slave code in the Territories. He says that it is his duty, under the decision that the court has made, and if he believes in that decision he would be a perjured man if he did not vote for the code. I know whether he is not bound to a decision which is contrary to his opinions just as much as to one in accordance with his opinions. If the decision of the Supreme Court, the tribunal created by the Constitution to decide the questions, is final and binding, he is not bound by it just as strongly as he was for it instead of against it originally? Is every man in this land allowed to resist decisions he does not like, and only support those that meet his approval? What are important courts under which their decisions are binding on all good citizens? Is it the fundamental principles of the judiciary that its decisions are final? It is created for that purpose, that in order that when you cannot agree among yourselves on a disputed point you appeal to the judicial tribunal which is to decide it and decide for you, and that decision is binding on every good citizen. It is the law of the land just as much on the man who is then binding on every good citizen. It is the law of the land just as much on the man who is then binding on every good citizen.

And yet he says that if that decision is binding to a perjured man if he does not vote for a slave code in the different Territories. If you [turning to Mr. Lincoln] are not going to resist the decision, if you obey it, and do not intend to array much law against the constituted authorities, then, according to your own statement, you will be a perjured man if you do not vote to establish slavery in such Territories. My doctrine is that even taking Mr. Lincoln's view that the decision removes the right of a man to carry his slaves into the Territories of the United States, if he pleases, yet after he gets there he needs affirmative law to make that right of any value. Therefore the court not only applies to slave property, but all other kinds of property. Chief Justice Taney places it upon the ground that slave property is an equal footing with other property.

Suppose one of your merchants should move to Kansas and open a liquor store; he has a right to take groceries and liquors there, but he could not sell or let property. He, therefore, would be prescribed by local legislation, and if that is unconstitutionally it will drive him out just as effectually as if there was a Constitutional provision against the sale of liquor. So the absence of local legislation to encourage and support slave property will not just as effectually as if there was a positive Constitutional provision against it. Hence, I assert that under the Dred Scott decision you cannot establish slavery a day in a Territory where there is no unfair or unconstitutional legislation. If the people are opposed to it, our right is a people and not a lawyerly right. If the people are opposed to it, we cannot force it on them. And this is the practical question, the great principle, upon which our institutions rest. I am willing to take the decision of the Supreme Court as it was pronounced by that august tribunal without stopping to inquire whether I would have decided it that way or not. I have had many decisions made against me on questions of law which I did not like, but I was bound by them just as much as if I had had a hand in making them, and approved them. Did you ever listen to a lawyer or a judge in the courts who had decided a decision of that kind or in that way? They always think a decision unjust when it is given against them. In a Government of laws like ours we must sustain the Constitution as our fathers made it, and maintain the rights of the States as they are guaranteed under the Constitution, and then we will have peace and harmony between the different States and sections of this glorious blessed Union.
FIFTH JOINT DEBATE, AT CHARLESTON,
September 18, 1850.

MR. LINCOLN'S SPEECH.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: It will be very difficult for an audience so large as this to hear distinctly what a speaker says, and consequently it is important that as preserved silence be preserved as possible.

While I was at the hotel today, an elderly gentleman called upon me to know whether I was really in favor of producing a perfect equality between the negroes and white people. While I had not proposed to myself on this occasion to say much on that subject, yet as the question was asked me I thought I would occupy perhaps five minutes in saying something in regard to it. I said then that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races—that I am not nor ever have been in favor of making votes or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And as much as they cannot do, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white races. I say upon this occasion I do not perceive that because the white man is to have the superior position the negro should be denied everything. I do not understand that because I do not want a negro woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife. My understanding is that I can just let her alone. I now in my fifth year, and I certainly never have had a black woman for either a slave or a wife. So it seems to me quite possible for us to get along without making either slaves or wives of negroes. I will add to this that I have never seen, to my knowledge, a man, woman, or child who was in favor of producing a perfect equality, social and political, between negroes and white men. I recollect of but one distinguished instance that I have heard of so frequently as to be satisfactorily disposed of—and that is the case of Judge Douglas's old friend Calhoun, Mr. M. Johnson. I will also add to the remarks I have made (for I am not going to enter at large upon this subject), that I have never heard the least apprehension that I or my friends would marry negroes if there was no law to keep them from it; but as Judge Douglas and his friends seem to be in great apprehension that they might, if there were no law to keep them from it, I give him the most solemn pledge that I will to the very last stand by the law of this State, which forbids the marriage of white people with negroes. I will add one further word, which is this: that I do not understand that there is any place where there is an alteration of the social and political relations of the negro and the white man can be made except in the State Legislature—not in the Congress of the United States—and as I do not really apprehend the absurdity of any such thing myself, and as Judge Douglas seems to be in constant terror that some such danger may be very near approaching, I propose as the best means to prevent it that the Judge be kept at home and placed in the State Legislature to fight the measure. I do not propose dwelling longer at this time on the subject.

When Judge Trumbull, one other Senator in Congress, returned to Illinois in the month of August, he made a speech at Chicago, in which he made what may be called a charge against Judge Douglas, which I understand proved to be very offense-

alive to him. The Judge was at that time upon one of his speaking tours through the country, and when the news of it reached him, as I am informed, he determined Judge Trumbull in rather harsh terms for having said what he did in regard to that matter. I was traveling at that time, and speaking at the same places with Judge Douglas on subsequent days, and when I heard of what Judge Trumbull had said against Judge Douglas, and what Douglas had said back again, I felt that I was in a position where I could not remain entirely silent in regard to the matter. Consequently, upon two or three occasions I alluded to it, and alluded to it in no other way than to say that in regard to the charge brought by Trumbull against Douglas, I personally knew no such thing, and that it was what Judge Douglas—"that I believed him to be a man of veracity—that I believed him to be a man of capacity sufficient to know very well whether an assertion he was making, as a conclusion drawn from a set of facts, was true or false; and as a conclusion of my own from that, I stated it as my belief, if Trumbull should ever be called upon, he would prove every thing he had said. I said this upon two or three occasions. Upon a subsequent occasion, Judge Trumbull spoke again before an audience at Alton, and upon that occasion not only repeated his charge against Douglas, but arrayed the evidence he relied upon to substantiate it. This speech was published at length and subsequently at Jacksonville Judge Douglas alluded to the matter. In the course of his speech, near the close of it, he stated in regard to myself what I will now read: "Judge Douglas proceeded to remark that he should not here occupy his time in refuting such charges made by Trumbull, but that Lincoln having informed the character of Trumbull for veracity, he should hold him (Lincoln) responsible for the slander." I have done simply what I have told you, to subject me to this invitation to notice the charge. I now wish to say that I have not originally been my purpose to discuss that matter at all. But inasmuch as it seems to be the wish of Judge Douglas to hold me responsible for it, then for once in my life I will play General Jackson, and to that extent I take the responsibility.

I wish to say at the beginning that I will hand to the reporters that portion of Judge Trumbull's Allen speech which was devoted to this matter, and also that portion of Judge Douglas's speech made at Jacksonville in answer to it. I shall thereby furnish the readers of this debate with the complete discussion between Trumbull and Douglas. I shall not now read them, for the reason that it would take half of my first hour to do so. I can only make some emendations upon them. Trumbull's charge is in the following words: "Now, the charge is, that there was a plot entered into to have a Constitution formed for Kansas, and put in force, without giving the people an opportunity to vote upon it, and that Mr. Douglas was in the plot." I will state, without quoting further, for all will have an opportunity of reading it hereafter, that Judge Douglas brings forward what he regards as sufficient evidence to substantiate this charge.

It will be perceived Judge Trumbull shows that Senator Pomeroy, upon the floor of the Senate, had declared there had been a conference among the Senators, in which conference it was determined to have an Enabling Act passed for the people of Kansas to form a Constitution under, and in this conference it was agreed among them that it was best not to have a provision for submitting the Constitution to a vote of the people after it should be formed. He then brings forward to show, and showing, as he deems, that Judge Douglas reported the bill back to the Senate with that clause stricken out. He then shows that there was a new clause inserted into the bill, which could in nature present a reference of the Constitution back to a vote of the people. Indeed, upon a mere silence in the law, it could be assumed that they had the right to vote upon it. These are the general statements that he has made.

I propose to examine the points in Judge Douglas's speech, in which he attempts to answer that speech of Judge Trumbull. When you come to examine Judge
Douglas's speech, you will find that the first point he makes is: "Suppose it were true, that there was such a change in the bill, and that I struck it out, would that be a device of a plot to force a Constitution upon them against their will?" His striking out such a provision, if there was such a one in the bill, he argues, does not establish the proof that it was struck out for the purpose of robbing the people of that right. He insists, in the first place, that that would be a most monstrous thing, and that it is true, as Judge Douglas states, that many Territorial bills have passed without having such a provision in them. He believes it is true, though I am not certain that in some instances, Constitutions framed under such bills have been submitted to a vote of the people, with the least alteration upon the subject, but it does not appear that they once had their enabling acts framed with an express provision for submitting the Constitution to be framed to a vote of the people, and then that they were struck out when Congress did not mean to alter the effect of the law. That there have been bills which never had the provision in, I do not question; but when that provision taken out of one that it was? More especially does this evidence tend to prove the proposition that Trumbull advanced, that whether or not that the provision was struck out of the bill almost simultaneously with the time that Higley says there was a conference among certain Senators, and in which it was agreed that a bill should be passed leaving that out. Judge Douglas, in answering Trumbull, points to the testimony of Higley, that there was a meeting in which it was agreed they should strike the provision in the bill to be submitted to a vote of the people. The Judge does not notice this part of it. If you take this as one piece of evidence, and then another that simultaneously Judge Douglas struck out a provision that did require it to be submitted, put the two together, I think it will make a pretty fair show of proof that Judge Douglas did, as Trumbull says, enter into a plot to put in force a Constitution for Kansas without giving the people any opportunity of voting upon it.

But I must hurry on. The next proposition that Judge Douglas puts is this: "But upon examination it turns out that the Toombs bill never did contain a clause requiring that the Constitution to be submitted there be. It was hastily written into the bill, and I can determine by evidence. I only want to ask this question—why did not Judge Douglas say that those words were not struck out of the Toombs bill, or the bill from which it is alleged the provision was struck out—because the name of Toombs, because he originally brought it forward? I ask you, if the Judge wanted to make a direct issue with Trumbull, did he not take the exact proposition Trumbull made in his speech, and say it was not struck out? Trumbull took the exact words that says words which he wanted, and said he would not have it struck out, and that the bill came back, they were struck out. Judge Douglas does not say that the words which Trumbull says were struck out, were not so struck out, but he says there was no provision in the Toombs bill to submit the Constitution to a vote of the people. Now, then, if there be any dispute upon the fact, I have got the documents here to show they were there. If there be any controversy upon the meaning of the words—whether these words which were struck out really constituted a provision for submitting the matter to the vote of the people, as that is the matter of argument, I think I may as well use Trumbull's own argument. He says that the proposition is in these words:

"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered to the said Convention of the people of Kansas when formed, for their free acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the Constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United States and the said State of Kansas."

Now, Trumbull argues that these last words were stricken out of the bill when it came back, and he says this was a provision for submitting the Constitution to a vote of the people, and his argument is this: "Would it have been possible to ratify the kind propositions at the election for the adoption of the Constitution, unless such an election was to be held?" That is Trumbull's argument. Now Judge Douglas does not meet the charge at all; but stands up and says there was no such provision in that bill for submitting the Constitution to be framed to a vote of the people. Trumbull admits that the language is not a direct provision for submitting it, but it is a provision necessarily implied from another provision. He asks you now it is possible to ratify the kind proposition at the election for the adoption of the Constitution, if there was no election to hold for the adoption of the Constitution. And he goes on to show that it is not a less law because the provision is put in that indirect shape than it would be if it was put directly. But I presume I have said enough to draw attention to this point, and I pass it by.

Another one of the points that Judge Douglas makes upon Trumbull, and at very great length, is, that Trumbull, while the bill was pending, said in a speech in the Senate that he supposed the Constitution to be made would have to be submitted to the people. He adds, if Trumbull thought so then, what ground is there for any body thinking otherwise now? Fellow-citizens, this much may be said in reply: That bill had been in the hands of a party to which Trumbull did not belong. It had been in the hands of the committee at the head of which Judge Douglas stood. Trumbull perhaps had a printed copy of the original Toombs bill. I have not the evidence on that point, except a sort of inference I draw from the general course of business there. What alterations, or what provisions in the way of altering were going on in committees, Trumbull had no means of knowing, until the altered bill was reported back. Soon afterward, when it was reported back, there was a discussion over it, and perhaps Trumbull in reading it hastily in the altered form did not perceive all the alterations which had taken place. He was hastily borne into the debate, he did not follow that because there was something in it Trumbull did not perceive, that something did not exist. More than this, is it true that what Trumbull did can have any effect on what Douglas did? Suppose Trumbull had been in the plot with these others, and that for Douglas' sake he did not. Would it exonerate Douglas that Trumbull didn't perceive he was in the plot? He also asks the question: Why didn't Trumbull propose to amend the bill if he thought it needed any amendment? When I say I may venture to say that Judge Douglas did not propose, in his discussion with this question of Kansas and Nebraska, since he had been on the floor of the Senate, had been promptly voted down by Judge Douglas and his friends. He had no promise that an amendment offered by him to any thing on this subject would receive the slightest consideration. Judge Trumbull did bring to the notice of the Senate at that time the fact that there was no provision for submitting the Constitution about to be made for the people of Kansas, to a vote of the people. I believe I may venture to say that Judge Douglas made some reference to Judge Trumbull's, but he never noticed that part of it at all. And so the thing passed by. I think he takes, the fact that Judge Trumbull offered no amendment, does not throw much blame upon him; and if it did, it does not reach the ground at all, so to what Judge Douglas was doing. I repeat, that if Trumbull had himself been in the plot, it would not at all relieve the others who were in it from blame. If I should be indicted for murder, and upon the trial it should be discovered that I had been a principal in that murder, but that the prosecuting witness was guilty too, that would not at all touch the question of my crime. It would be no relief to my neck that they discovered this other man who charged the crime upon me to be guilty too.
ill had the provision in it for submitting the Constitution to a vote of the people. It went into his (Judge Douglas's) hands, that it was in the Senate, reported it to the Senate, and in a public speech he had subsequently said the alteration in the bill was made while it was in committee, and that they were made in consultation between him (Judge Douglas) and Toombs. And Judge Douglas goes on to say that the amendment upon which the bill was struck out, affecting hisoriginal proposition that the bill not only came back with that proposition struck out, but with another clause and another provision in it, saying that "until the complete execution of this act there shall be no election in said Territory," which Trumbull argued was not only taking the provision for submitting to a vote of the people out of the bill, but was adding an affirmative one, in that it prevented the people from exercising the right under a bill that was merely silent on the question. Now in regard to what he says, that Trumbull shifts the issue—that he shifts his ground—and I believe he uses the term, that "it being proven false, he has changed ground"—I call upon all of you, when you come to examine that portion of Trumbull's speech (for it will make a part of mine), to examine whether Trumbull has shifted his ground or not. I say he did not shift his ground, but that he brought forward his original charge and the evidence to sustain it yet more fully, but precisely as he originally made it. Then, in addition thereto, he brought in a new piece of evidence. He shifted no ground. He brought in no new piece of evidence inconsistent with his former testimony, but he brought in a new piece, tendering, as he thought, and as I think, to prove his proposition. To illustrate: A man brings an accusation against another; and on trial the man making the charge introduces A and B to prove the accusation. At a second trial he introduces the same witnesses, who tell the same story as before, and a third witness, who tells the same thing and in addition, gives further testimony correlative of the charge. So with Trumbull. There was no shifting of ground, none inconsistency of testimony between the new piece of evidence and what he originally introduced.

But Judge Douglas says that he himself moved to strike out that part provision of the bill, and on his motion it was stricken out and a substitute was introduced, and I presume the truth. I presume it is true that that last provision was stricken out by Judge Douglas. Trumbull has not said it was not. Trumbull has himself said that the provision was stricken out. He says: "I am speaking of the bill as Judge Douglas reported it back. It was amended in the Senate, but I am speaking of it as he brought it back." Now when Judge Douglas parades the fact that the provision was stricken out of the bill when it came back, he asserts nothing about what happened to what Trumbull alleges. Trumbull has only said it should have been stricken out. That is not what Trumbull says. Trumbull said it should have been stricken out. The statement that Trumbull made to the public vote, that it was not in the bill when it went to the committee, is not true. When it came back it was in, and Judge Douglas said the alterations were made by him in consultation with Toombs. Trumbull alleges therefore, as his conclusion, that Judge Douglas put it in. Then if Douglas wants to contradict Trumbull and call him a liar, let him say he did not put it in, and not that he did not take it out again. It is said that a bear is sometimes hard enough to push a cub, and so I presume was in this case. The truth is that Douglas put it in, and afterward took it out. That is to say it is the truth about it. Judge Trumbull says one thing; Douglas says another thing, and the two cannot be true, which is manifest. This provision is one of those that the House always makes to the popular vote. I say that the provision which Trumbull argued was necessary for submitting the Constitution to a vote of the people. What did he take that out for? What did he take out? What did he put this in for? I say that in the run of things, it is not unlikely forever compare to render it vastly expedient for Judge Douglas to take that latter clause out again. The question that Trumbull has made is that Judge Douglas put it in, and he doesn't mean it and he takes it all unless he deems it to be a necessary acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and ratified by the people in the elec-
tion for the adoption of the Constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United States and the said State of Kansas."

"The bill read in his place by the Senator from Georgia, on the 26th of June, and referred to the Committee on Territory, continued the same section word for word. Both these bills were under consideration at the conference referred to; but, sir, when the Senator from Illinois reported the Tomball bill to the Senate with amendments, the next morning it did not contain that portion of the third section which indicated to the Convention that the Constitution should be approved by the people. This wording, 'ratiﬁed by the people at the election, for the adoption of the Constitution,' had been stricken out."

Now, these things Tomball says were stated by Biglow upon the ﬂoor of the Senate, and they are recorded in the Congressional Globe on certain pages. Does Judge Douglas say this is a forgery? Does he say there is no such thing in the Congressional Globe? What does he mean when he says Judge Tomball forged his evidence from beginning to end? So again he says in another place, that Judge Douglas, in his speech December 3, 1857 [Congressional Globe, part 1, page 168], stated:

"That during the last session of Congress, I [Mr. Douglas] reported a bill from the Committee on Territories, to authorize the people of Kansas to assemble and form a Constitution for themselves. Subsequently the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Toombs] brought forward a substitute for my bill, which, after having been modiﬁed by him and myself in consultation, was passed by the Senate."

Now, Tomball says this is a quotation from a speech of Douglas, and is recorded in the Congressional Globe. Is it a forgery? Is it there or not? It may not be there, but I want the Judge to take these pieces of evidence, and distinctly say they are forgeries if he dare do so.

A voice. "He will." Mr. Lincoln—Well, sir, you had better not commit him. He gives other quotations, another from Judge Douglas. He says:

"I will ask the Senator to show me an intimation, from any one member of the Senate, in the whole debate on the Tomball bill, and in the Union, from any quarter, that the Constitution was not to be submitted to the people. I will venture to say that if there was any intimation it was so understood at the time. If the opponents of the bill had understood it was not, they would have made the point on it; and if they had made it, we should certainly have yielded to it, and put in the clause. That is a discovery made since the President found out that it was not safe to take it for granted that that would be done, which ought in fairness to be shown, because it was not.

Judge Tomball says Douglas made that speech, and it is recorded. Does Judge Douglas say it is a forgery, and was not true? Tomball says somewhat, and I propose to go into the chamber it was so understood at the time. That it lacked that provision, and then he goes on, to give another quotation from Judge Douglas, where Judge Tomball uses this language:

"Judge Douglas, however, on the same day and in the same debate, probably recalling or being reminded of the fact that I had objected to the Tomball bill when pending; that it did not provide for a submission of the Constitution to the people, made another statement, which is to be found in the same volume of the Globe, page 22, in which he says:

"That the bill was silent on this subject was true, and my attention was called to the fact when it was passed; and I took the fair construction to be, that powers not delegated were reserved, and that of course the Constitution would be submitted to the people."

Whether this statement is consistent with the statement just made before, and had the power not to be delegated, it would have been yielded to; or if it was a new discovery, you will determine."

So I say, I do not know whether Judge Douglas will dispute this, and yet main-
SENATOR DOUGLASS SPEECH.

JAMES AND GENTLEMEN: I had supposed that we assembled here today for the purpose of a joint discussion between Mr. Lincoln and myself, upon the political questions that now agitate the whole country. The rule of such discussions is, that the opening speech shall touch upon all the points he intends to discuss, in order that his opponent, in reply, shall have the opportunity of answering them. Let me ask you when questions of public policy, relating to the welfare of this State or the Union, has Mr. Lincoln publicly discussed before you? Mr. Lincoln simply contented himself at the outset by saying, that he was not in favor of social and political equality between the white man and the negro, and did not desire the law so changed as to make the latter voters or eligible to office.

I am glad I have at last succeeded in getting an answer out of him upon this question of negro citizenship and eligibility to office, for I have been trying to bring him to the point of view that a canvass cannot be made.

I will now call your attention to the question which Mr. Lincoln has occupied his entire time in discussing. He spent his whole hour in retelling a charge made by Senator Trumbull against me. The circumstances out of which that charge was manufactured, occurred prior to the last Presidential election, over two years ago. If that charge was true, why did not Trumbull make it in 1856, when I was discussing the questions of that day all over this State with Lincoln and him, and when it was pertinent to the then issue? He was then as silent as the grave on the subject. If that charge was true, the time for bringing it forward was the canvass of 1856, the year when the Toombs bill passed the Senate. When the facts were fresh in the public mind, when the Kansas question was the paramount question of the day, and when such a charge would have had a material bearing on the election, why did Lincoln and Lincoln remain silent, knowing that such a charge could be made and proven if true? Were they not afraid to take you and false to the cause in going through that entire campaign, concealing their knowledge of this enormous conspiracy which you knew and would not tell? Mr. Lincoln intimates, in his speech, a good reason why Mr. Trumbull would not tell; for, he says, that it might be true, as I proved that it was at Jacksonsville, that Trumbull was also involved in the plot. He has never said that Trumbull's being in the plot would not in any way relieve him. Why does he not say that the Toombs bill is a plot, and would have raised a storm in Congress, which was 25,000, or make his bill with the Toombs amendment, which is 95,480, the amount of the population of the United States, which is the sole object of the Toombs amendment, by which both his bill and Mr. Toombs's substitute had been referred. I was overruled by a majority of the committee, my proposition was adopted, and Mr. Toombs's proposition to admit Kansas under a population of 25,000, was adopted. Accordingly, a bill to carry out his idea of immediate admission was referred to a subcommittee of nine—the only point of his being, as I have already stated, the question of population, and the adoption of safeguards against frauds at the election. Trumbull knew this—the whole Senate knew it—and he was silent at that time. He waited until I became engaged in this canvass and finding that I was showing up Lincoln's Abolitionism and negro equality doctrines, that I was driving Lincoln to the wall, and white men would not support his rank Abolitionism, he came back from the East and trumped up a system of charges against me, hoping that I would be compelled to occupy my entire time in defense of myself, so that I would not be able to show up the enormity of the principles of the Abolitionists. Now the only reason, and the true reason, why Mr. Lincoln has occupied the whole of his first hour in this issue between Trumbull and myself, is, to conceal from this vast audience the real questions which divide the two great parties.

I am not going to allow them to waste much of my time with these personal matters. I have lived in this State twenty-five years, most of that time have been
public life, and my record is open to you all. If that record is not enough to vindicate me from those petty, malicious assaults, I desire ever to be elected to office by discharging my opponents and traducing other men. Mr. Lincoln asks you to elect him to the United States Senate to-day solely because he and Mr. Trumpshall can slander me. Is he giving any other reason? Has he ever said what he was desirous to do in Congress on any one question? He desires to ride into office, not upon his own merits, not upon the merits andsandiness of his principles, but upon his success in fomenting a stale old slander upon me.

I wish you to bear in mind that up to the time of the introduction of the Toombs bill, and after its introduction, there was neither an act of Congress for the admission of any State, which contained a clause requiring its Constitution to be submitted to the people. This was the general rule under Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, and Polk, under the Whig Presidents and the Democratic Presidents from the beginning of the Government down, and nobody dreamed that an effort ever would be made to abuse the power thus confided to the people of a Territory. For this reason our attention was not called to the fact of whether there was or was not a clause in the Toombs bill compelling submission, but it was taken for granted that the Constitution would be submitted to the people whether the law compelled it or not.

Now, I will read from the report by me as Chairman of the Committee on Territories at the time I reported back the Toombs substitute to the Senate. It contained several things which I had voted against in committee, but had been overruled by a majority of the members, and it was my duty as chairman of the committee to report the bill back as it was agreed upon by them. The main point upon which I had been overruled was the question of population. In my report accompanying the Toombs bill, I said:

In the opinion of your Committee, whenever a Constitution shall be formed in any Territory, preparatory to its admission into the Union as a State, just and the genius of our institutions, the whole theory of our republican system, imperatively demand that the very character of the people shall be fairly expressed, and their wills shall be unburdened in a fundamental law, without fraud, or violence, or intimidation, or any other improperly subversive influence, and subject to no other restrictions than those imposed by the Constitution of the United States.

I am sure that we took it for granted that the Constitution was to be submitted to the people, whether the bill was silent on the subject or not. Suppose I had reported it, following the example of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Adams, Jackson, Van Buren, Harrison, Tyler, and the Senate Constitution, which is evidence of a conspiracy to force a Constitution upon the people of Kansas against their will? If the clause which Mr. Lincoln makes so true against me, it is true against Zachary Taylor, and Millard Fillmore, and all the Democratic Presidents, as well as every Democratic President, and against Henry Clay, who, in the Senate or House, for forty years advocated bills similar to that one I reported, no one of them containing a clause compelling the submission to the people. Are Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Trumpshall prepared to charge upon all those eminent men from the beginning of the Government down to the present day, that the absence of a provision compelling submission, in the various bills passed by them, authorizing the people of Territories for local purposes a corrupt design on their part to force a Constitution upon an unwilling people?

I ask you to reflect on these things, for I tell you there is a conspiracy to carry this election to the Black Republicans by slander, and that Mr. Lincoln, as Mr. Trumpshall says, is this day conclusive evidence of the fact. He has devoted his entire time to an issue between Mr. Trumpshall and myself, and has not uttered a word about the politics of the day. Are you going to elect Mr. Trumpshall's col league upon an issue between Mr. Trumpshall and me? I thought I was running against Abraham Lincoln, that he claimed to be my opponent, had challenged me to a discussion of the public questions of the day with him, and was discussing those questions with me, but it turns out that his only hope is to ride into office on Trumpshall's back, who will carry him by falsehood.

Let me pursue this subject a little further. An examination of the record proves that Trumpshall's charge—that the Toombs bill originally contained a clause requiring the Constitution to be submitted to the people—is false. The printed copy of the bill which Mr. Lincoln held up before you, and which he pretends contains such a clause, merely contains a clause requiring a submission of the land grant. The question is not whether there was a clause in it requiring a submission of the Constitution. Mr. Lincoln cannot find such a clause in it. My report shows that we took it for granted that the Constitution would be submitted to the people, and secure it for themselves. There never was a clause in the Toombs bill requiring the Constitution to be submitted; Trumpshall knew it at the time, and his speech made on the night of its passage discloses the fact that he knew it was silent on the subject. Lincoln pretends, and tells you that Trumpshall has not changed his evidence in support of his charge since he made his speech in Chicago. Let me see. The Chicago Times took up Trumpshall's Chicago speech, compared it with the official records of Congress, and proved that speech to be false in its charge that the original Toombs bill required a submission of the Constitution to the people. Trumpshall then said that he was caught—and his falsehood exposed—and he went to Alto, and, under the very walls of the penitentiary, made a new speech, in which he pretended his assault upon me in the allegation that I had caused to be voted into the Toombs bill a clause which prohibited the Convention from submitting the Constitution to the people, and quoted what he pretended was the clause. Now, has not Mr. Trumpshall entirely changed his evidence on which he bases his charge? The clause which he quoted in his Chicago speech (which he has published and circulated hitherto in the State) as having been put into the Toombs bill by me, is in the following words:

And until the complete execution of this act, no other election shall be held in said Territory.

Trumpshall says that the object of that amendment was to prevent the Convention from submitting the Constitution to a vote of the people.

Now, I will show you that when Trumpshall made that statement at Alto he knew it to be false, for he read from Trumpshall's speech in the Senate on the Toombs bill on the night of its passage. He then said:

There is nothing said in this bill, so far as I have discovered, about submitting the Constitution, which is to be formed, to the people for their adoption or rejection by them. The Convention will have the right to submit it, if it should think proper, but it is certainly not compelled to do so according to the provisions of the bill.

Thus you see that Trumpshall, when the bill was on its passage in the Senate, said that it was silent on the subject of submission, and that there was nothing in the bill to permit the other to put it in. In his Alto speech he says there was a clause in the bill preventing its submission to the people, and that he had voted to insert it. Then I confute him of falsehood and slander by quoting from him on the passage of the Toombs bill in the Senate of the United States, his own speech, made on the night of July 2, 1856, and reported in the Congressional Globe for the first session of the thirty-fourth Congress, vol. 31. What will you think of a man who makes a false charge and falsifies the records to prove it? I will now show you that the clause which Trumpshall says was put in the bill on my motion, was never put in at all by me, but was taken out on my motion and another substituted in its stead in the exact wording of the same volume of the Congressional Globe to which I have already referred, page 795, where you will find the following report of the proceedings of the Senate:

Mr. Douglas—I have an amendment to offer from the Committee on Territories.
On page 148, section 11, strike out the words "until the complete execution of this act, no other election shall be held in said Territory," and insert the amendment which I hold in my hand.

You see from this that I moved to strike out the very words that Mr. Tubb went to the Senate with, and put the clause in, but as soon as I got the bill back into the Senate, I moved to strike out the clause and put another clause in its place. On the same page you will find that my amendment was agreed to unanimously. I then offered another amendment, recognizing the right of the people of Kansas, under the Toombs bill, to order just such elections as they saw proper. You can find it on page 796 of the same volume. I will read it:

"I, Dr. N. J. Graff, have another amendment to offer from the Committee, to follow the amendment which has been adopted. The bill reads now: 'And until the complete execution of this act, no other election shall be held in said Territory.' It has been suggested that it should be modified in this way: 'And to avoid conflict in the complete execution of this act, all other elections in said Territory are hereby postponed until such time as said Convention shall appoint,' so that they can appoint the day in the event that there should be a failure to come into the Union.'

"The amendment was unanimously agreed to—clearly and distinctly recognizing the right of the Convention to order just as many elections as they saw proper to the execution of the act. Mr. Toombs conciliated his Atton speech the fact that the clause he quoted had been struck out in my motion, and the other fact that this other clause was put in the bill on my motion, and made the false charge that I incorporated into the bill a clause preventing submission, in the face of the fact, that on my motion, the bill was so amended before passed as to recognize in express words the right and duty of submission.

"On this record that I have produced before you, I repeat my charge that Mr. Tubb did falsify the public records of the country, in order to make his charge against me, and I tell Mr. Abraham Lincoln that if he will examine these records, he will then know what I state is true. Mr. Lincoln has the day before Mr. Tubb's very act by him for it that that veracity was proved to be violated and forfeited by the public records. It will not do for Mr. Lincoln in parading the witness against me, to put Mr. Tubb up against him and the odium and responsibility which justly attaches to such calumnies. I tell him that I am as ready to prosecute the incendiary as the maker of a forged note. I regret the necessity of occupying my time with these petty personal matters. It is unbecoming the dignity of a canvass for an office of the character for which we are candidates. When I commenced the canvass at Chicago, I spoke of Mr. Lincoln in terms of kindness as an old friend—I said that he was a good citizen, of unblemished character. Mr. Lincoln's friends now have me to say. I repeated these complimentary remarks about him in my successive speeches, until he became the incendiary for those and other slanders against me. If there is anything personally disagreeable, unbecoming, or disrespectful in these personalities, the sole responsibility rests on Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Tubb, and their backers.

I will show you another charge made by Mr. Lincoln against me, as an offset to his determination of willingness to take back any thing that is incorrect, and to correct any false statement he may have made. He has several times made the conversation of the Supreme Court, President Pierce, President Buchanan, and myself, at the time I introduced the Nebraska bill in January, 1854, at Washington, entered into a conversation that covered the whole country, and branded this charge as a falsehood, and then he repeated it, asked me to analyze its truth and answer it. He told him, "Mr. Lincoln, I know what you are after—you want to occupy my time in personal matters, to prevent me from showing up the revolutionary principles which this bill of the people, and whose candidate you are, have proclaimed and advocated."

But he asked me to analyze his proof, and I did so. I called his attention to the fact that at the time the Nebraska bill was introduced, there was no such case as the Dred Scott case pending in the Supreme Court, nor was it brought there for years afterward, and hence that it was impossible there could have been any such conspiracy between the judges of the Supreme Court and the other parties involved. I repeat by the record that the charge was false, and what did they do? And what did you do? and what did you do that the public records prove it to be untrue. Having proved it to be false as far as the Supreme Court and President Buchanan are concerned, I drop it, leaving the public to say whether I, by myself, without their concurrence, could have gone into a conspiracy with them. My friends, you see that the object desired by the incendiaries is the canvass on personal matters, and hunt down with charges that are proven to be false by the public records of the country.

I am willing to throw open my whole public and private life to the inspection of any man, or all men who desire to know it. For twenty-five years, during nearly the whole of which time a public man, exposed to more assaults, perhaps more abuse than any man living of my age, or who ever did live, and having survived it all and still continued in the discharge of my duties, I am willing to trust to your knowledge of me and my public conduct without making any more defense against these assaults.

Fellow-citizens, I came here for the purpose of discussing the leading political topics which now agitate the country. I have no charges to make against Mr. Lincoln, none against Mr. Tubb, and none against any man who is a candidate, except in repelling their assaults upon me. If Mr. Lincoln is a man of bad character, I leave you to find it out; if his votes in this past are not satisfactory, I leave others to determine the fact; if his course on the Mexican war was not in accordance with your notions of patriotism and fidelity to our own country as against a public enemy, I leave you to ascertain the facts. I have no assaults to make upon him, except to trace his course on the questions that now divide the country and express so much of the rage and enmity.

You know that prior to 1854 this country was divided into two great political parties, one the Whig, the other the Democratic. I, as a Democrat for twenty years prior to that time, had been in public discussions in this State and an advocate of Dem-
occlusive principles, and I can appeal with confidence to every one of Clay within the bearing of my voice to bear testimony that during all that period I fought you Whigs like a man on every question that separated the two parties. I had the highest respect for Henry Clay as a gallant party leader, as an eminent statesman, and as other prominent men of this country, but I unconsciously believed that the Democratic party was right on the questions which separated the Democrats from the Whigs. The man does not live who can say that I ever personally assailed Henry Clay or Daniel Webster, or any one of the leaders of that great party, whilst I combatted with all my energy the measures they advocated. Did we differ about in those days? Did Whigs and Democrats differ about this slavery question? On the contrary, did we not, in 1830, unite to a man in favor of that system of Compromise Measures which Mr. Clay introduced? Webster disapproved, I believe, but Clay and Fillmore approved and made the law of the land by his signature. While we agreed on those Compromise Measures, we differed about a bank, the tariff, distribution, the pecuniary, the sub-treasury, and other questions of that description. Now, let me ask you, which one of those questions on which Whigs and Democrats then differed now remains to divide the great parties? Every one of those questions which divided Whigs and Democrats has passed away, the country has outgrown them, they have passed into history. Hence it is immaterial whether you were right or I was right on the bank, the sub-treasury, and other questions, because they no longer continue living issues. What, then, has taken the place of those questions about which we once differed? The slavery question has now become the leading and controlling issue; that question, on which you and I agreed, on which the Whigs and Democrats united, has now become the leading issue between the National Democracy on the one side, and the Republican or Abolition party on the other.

Just recall for a moment the memorable contest of 1850, when the country was agitated from its center to its circumference by the slavery agitation. All eyes in this nation were then turned to the three great lights that survived the days of the Revolution. They hailed as the saviors of the country, as the men who could save it from ruin; they hastened to them, then, and, in its hour of trial, the country chose them, in its hour of trial, their names were written in the annals of history. They have gone, but not without leaving the country in better condition than when they entered it. Their work is not yet done. The country has to thank their memory, and to remember their services, and the work is not yet done.

The slavery question has now become the leading and controlling issue; that question, on which you and I agreed, on which the Whigs and Democrats united, has now become the leading issue between the National Democracy on the one side, and the Republican or Abolition party on the other.

Now, let me ask, how is it that since that time so many of you Whigs have wandered from the true path, marked out by Clay and carried on board the vessel of the great Webster? How is it that so many old line Democrats have abandoned the old faith of their party, and joined with Abolitionists and PRESS AND ABOLITIONISM TO OVERWHEEL THE PLATFORM OF THE OLD DEMOCRATS, AND THE PLATFORM OF THE OLD WHIGS? Can you not deny that since 1854 there has been a great revolution in this one question? How has it been brought about? How have the people of this country been misled? How have the people of this country been deceived? How have the people of this country been misled? How have the people of this country been deceived?

Once more to the point, Clay arrived among us he became the leader of all the Union men, who were opposed to the Abolitionists. For nine months we each assembled, each day, in the council-chamber, Clay in the chair, with CASS upon his right hand and Webster upon his left, and the Democrats and Whigs gathered around, forgetting differences, and only animated by one common, patriotic sentiment to devise means and measures by which we could defeat the mad and revolutionary scheme of Abolitionists, their Northern disunionists. We devised those means. Clay brought them forward, CASS advocated them, the Union Democrats and Union Whigs voted for them, Henry Clay signed them, and they gave peace and quiet to the country. Those Compromise measures of 1850 were founded upon the great fundamental principle that the people of each State and each Territory ought to be left free to form and regulate their own domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Federal Constitution. I will ask every old line Democrat and every old line Whig within the hearing of my voice, if I have not truly stated the issues as they then presented themselves to the country. You recollect that the Abolitionists raised a howl of indignation, and cried for vengeance and the destruction of Democrats and Whigs both, who supported those Compromise measures of 1850. When I returned home to Chicago, I found the citizens inflamed and infuriated against the authors of those great measures. Being the only man in that city who was held responsible for all the failure of the Compromise measures, I came forward and advocated the measures, and we passed the Senate and the House, and we were approved by President Fillmore. Present.

views to that time, the city council had passed resolutions nullifying the act of Congress, and instructing the police to withhold all assistance from its execution; but the people of Illinois listened to my defense, and, like candid, frank, and honest men, who were not only convinced that they had done an injustice to Clay, Webster, and all of us who had supported those measures, they repealed their nullifying resolutions and declared that the laws should be executed and the supremacy of the Constitution maintained. Let it always be recorded in history that the people of Illinois, in 1854, that they returned to their duty when they found that they were wrong, and did justice to those whom they had blamed and abused unjustly. When the Legislature of this State assembled that year, they proceeded to pass reso
the same negro hunting me down, and they now have negro traveling the northern counties of the State, and speaking in behalf of Lincoln. Lincoln knew that when we met at the Peace Convention in Baltimore, there was a distinguished colored friend of his there who was on the stump for him, and who made a speech there the night before we spoke, and another the night after, a short distance from the seat of Lincoln, and in order to show how much interest the colored brethren felt in the success of the Republican Abe. I have with me here, and would read it if it would not occupy too much of my time, a speech made by Fred Douglass in Providence, N. Y. a short time since, to a large Convention, in which he cautions all the friends of negro equality and negro citizenship to rally as one man around Abraham Lincoln, the perfect embodiment of their principles, and by all means to defeat Stephen A. Douglas. Thus you find that this Republican party made the colored gentlemen for their advocates in 1864, in company with Lincoln and Trumbull, as they have now. Where, in October, 1864, I went down to Springfield to attend the State Fair. I found the leaders of this party all assembled together under the title of an anti-Nebraska meeting. It was Black Republicans up north, and anti-Nebraska at Springfield. I found Lovejoy, a high-sounding abolitionist, and Lincoln, one of the leaders who was towing the old line of Whigs into the Abolition camp, and Trumbull, Sidney Breese, and Governor Reynolds, all making speeches against the Democratic party, and myself, at the same place and in the same cause. The same men who are now fighting the Democratic party and the regular Democratic nominees in this State, were fighting then. They did not then know that they had become Abolitionists, and many of them deny it now. Breese and Reynolds were then fighting the Democracy under the title of anti-Nebraska men, and now they are fighting the Democratic party under the title of anti-Nebraska men, saying that they are opposed to the Democrats. I have heard of Illinois delegates who prefer the election of Douglas to that of Lincoln, or the success of the Democratic ticket in preference to the Abolition ticket for members of Congress, State officers, and the Legislature. They are giving the State against us in 1864, as they are doing now, creating different parties in different localities, but having a common object in view, viz.: The defeat of all men holding national principles in opposition to the sectional party. They carried the Legislature in 1864, and when it assembled in Springfield they proceeded to elect a United States Senator, all voting for Lincoln with one or two exceptions, which exceptions prevented them from quite electing him. And why should they not elect him? Lincoln should have Shields' place. Had not the Abolitionists agreed to it? Was it at first a common compact, the condition on which Lincoln agreed to abdicate the old Whigs that he should be Senator? Still, Trumbull having control of a few Abolitionists, would not allow them all to vote for Shields, and kept the party for some time within one or two votes of an election, until he wore out Lincoln's friends, and compelled them to bring him in violation of the bargain. I desire to read you a piece of the letter of the Honorable the Republican or Abolition party for Congress against the gentleman Major Tuske, Lincoln. I will read you the testimony of Matheny about this bargain between Lincoln and Abolition party when they understand to abolish the Whigs and Democrats only four years ago. Matheny being mad at Trumbull for having shot a Yankee tick on Lincoln, exposed the bargain in a public speech two years ago, and I will read the published report of that speech, the corrections of which Mr. Matheny will not deny: 'The Whigs, Abolitionists, Know Nothings, and renounce Democrats. The purpose of carrying this State against the Democracy on this plan: 1st. That they would all combine and elect Mr. Trumbull to Congress, and thereby carry his district for the Legislature, in order to throw all the strength that could be obtained into that body against the Democrats. 2d. That when the State and Senate should meet, the officers of that body, such as Speaker, clerks, door-keepers, etc., would be given to the Abolitionists; and 3d. That the Whigs were to have the United States Senate. Thus, Accordingly, in good faith, Mr. Trumbull was elected to Congress, and his district carried for the Legislature, and when it convened the Abolitionists got all the officers of that body, and thus the 'bond' was fairly executed. The Whigs, on their part, demanded the election of Abraham Lincoln to the United States Senate, that the bond might be fulfilled, the other party having already secured to themselves all that was called for. But, in the most perilous manner, they refused to elect Mr. Lincoln, and the men, bond-breaking, sneaking Trumbull, loving to be near all that was required by any party, in the name of Lincoln, aside and letting himself, an excrecence from the rotten bowels of the Democracy, into the United States Senate; and thus it has ever been, that an honest man makes a bad bargain when he conspires or contracts with rogues.'

Lincoln's confidential friend, Matheny, thought that Lincoln made a bad bargain when he consented with such rogues as Trumbull and the Abolitionists. I would like to know whether Lincoln had as high opinion of Trumbull's veracity when the latter agreed to support him for the Senate, and then cheated him as he does now, when Trumbull comes forward and makes charges against you. You could not then prove Trumbull an honest man either by Lincoln, by Matheny, or by any of Lincoln's Whigs. They charged everywhere that Trumbull had cheated them out of the bargain, and Lincoln found sure enough that it was a bad bargain to contract and conspire with rogues.

And now I will explain to you what has been a mystery all over the State and Union, the reason why Lincoln was nominated for the United States Senate by the Black Republican Convention. You know it has never been usual for any party, or any Convention, to nominate a candidate for United States Senator. Probably this was the first time such a thing was ever done. The Black Republican Convention had not been called for that purpose, but to nominate a State ticket, and every man was surprised and many disgusted when Lincoln was nominated. Archie Williams thought he was entitled to it. Browning knew that he deserved it. Wentworth was certain that he would get it. Parke had hopes. Judd felt sure that he was the man, and Palmer had claims and had made arrangements to secure it; but their utter antagonism, Lincoln was nominated by the Convention, and not only that, but the Convention nominated unanimously, by a resolution declaring that Abraham Lincoln was 'the last, last, and only choice' of the Republican party. How did this occur? Why, because they could not get Lincoln's friends to make another bargain with 'rogues,' unless the whole party would come up as one man and pledge their honor to the fact that they would stand by Lincoln for victory. Why, because they thought Lincoln was 'the last, last, and only choice' of the Republican party. How did this occur? Why, because they could not get Lincoln's friends to make another bargain with 'rogues,' unless the whole party would come up as one man and pledge their honor to the fact that they would stand by Lincoln for victory.

I would like to know whether Lincoln had as high opinion of Trumbull's veracity when the latter agreed to support him for the Senate, and then cheated him as he does now, when Trumbull comes forward and makes charges against you. You could not then prove Trumbull an honest man either by Lincoln, by Matheny, or by any of Lincoln's Whigs. They charged everywhere that Trumbull had cheated them out of the bargain, and Lincoln found sure enough that it was a bad bargain to contract and conspire with rogues.
pledges to the old Democrats, and trying to coax them into the Abolition camp, swerving by his Maker, with the uplifted hand, that he was still a Democrat, always intended to be, and that never would be desert the Democratic party. He got your vote to elect an Abolition Legislator, which passed Abolition resolutions, attempted to pass Abolition laws, and sustained Abolitionists for office, State and Federal. Now, the same game is attempted to be played over again. Then Lincoln and Trumbull make captives of the old Whigs and old Democrats and carried them into the Abolition cause. Then, where Father Gildings, the high-priests of the abolitionists, exulted and threatened them in the dark cause just as fast as they were brought in. Gibbons found the senators so numerous that he had to have assistance, and he sent for John P. Hale, N. P. Banks, Caines, and other Abolitionists, and they came on, and with Lovejoy and Fred Douglass, the negro, helped to break their new converts as Lincoln, Trumbull, Breese, Reynolds, and Doughty could capture them and bring them within the Abolition clubs. Gentlemen, they are now around making the same kind of speeches. Trumbull was down in Monroe county the other day assailing me, and making a speech in favor of Lincoln, and I will show you under what notice his meeting was called. You see these people are Black Republicans or Abolitionists up north, while at Springfield today, they dare not call their Convention "Republican," but are obliged to say "a Convention of all men oppose the Democratic party," and in Monroe county and lower Egypt Trumbull advertises their meetings as follows:

A meeting of the Free Democracy will take place at Waterloo, on Monday, September 12th, next, when Hon. Lyman Trumbull, Hon. John Baker, and others, will address the people upon the different political topics of the day. Members of all parties are cordially invited to be present, and hear and determine for themselves.

September 9, 1858.

Did you ever before hear of this new party called the "Free Democracy"? What object have these Black Republicans in changing their name in every county of Illinois? Do you have one name in the north, and another in the south? When I used to practice law before my distinguished judicial friend, whom I recognize in the crowd before me, if a man was charged with horse-stealing and it was shown that he went by one name in Stephenson county, another in Sangamon, a third in Monroe, and a fourth in Randolph, we thought that the fact of his changing his name so often to avoid detection, was pretty strong evidence of his guilt. I would like to know why it is that this great Illinois Abolition party is not willing to have the same name in all parts of the State? If this party believes that its course is just, why does it not have the same principles in the North, and in the South, in the East and in the West, wherever the American flag waves over American soil?

A voice—"The party does not call itself Black Republican in the North."

Mr. Douglas—Sir if you will get a copy of the paper published at Waukegan, fifty miles from Chicago, which advocates the election of Mr. Lincoln, and has its name written at its mast-head, you will find that it declares that "this paper is devoted to the cause of Black Republicanism."

I had a copy of it and intended to bring it down here into Egypt to let you see what name the party rallied under in the northern part of the State, and to convince you that their principles are as different in the two sections of the State as is their name. I am sorry that I have missed it and have not got it here. Their principles in the north are jet-black, in the center they are barge color, and in lower Egypt they are almost white. Why, I admired many of the white sentiments contained in the white sentiments contained in the white sections of the State and could not help but contrast them with the speeches of the same distinguished orator made in the northern part of the State. Down here he denies that the Black Republican party is opposed to the admission of black men south. Mr. Lincoln tells you, in his speech at Springfield, "that a house divided against itself cannot stand;" that this Government, divided into free and slave States, cannot endure permanently; that they must either be all free or all slave, one thing or all the other." Why cannot this Government...
M. R. LINCOLN'S REJOINDER.

FELLOW-CITIZENS: It follows as a matter of course that a half-hour answer to a speech of an hour and a half can be but a very hurried one. I shall only be able to touch upon a few of the points suggested by Judge Douglas, and give them a brief attention, while I shall have to totally omit others for the want of time.

Judge Douglas has said to you that he has not been able to get from me an answer to the question whether I am in favor of negro citizenship. So far as I know, the Judge never asked me the question before. He shall have no occasion to ever ask it again, for I tell him very frankly that I am not in favor of negro citizenship. This furnishes me an occasion for saying a few words upon the subject. I mentioned in my certain speech of mine which has been printed, that the Supreme Court had decided that a negro could not possibly be made a citizen, and specifically that was my ground of complaint in regard to that, or whether I had any ground of complaint, Judge Douglas has from that thing manufactured nearly every thing that he ever says about my disposition to produce an equality between the negroes and the white people. If any one will read my speech, he will find I mentioned that as one of the points decided in the course of the Supreme Court opinions, but I did not state what objections I had to it. But Judge Douglas tells the people what my objection was when I did not tell them myself. Now my opinion is that the different States have the power to make a negro a citizen under the Constitution of the United States, as they please.

The Dred Scott decision decides that they have not that power. If the State of Illinois had that power I should be opposed to the exercise of it. That is all I have to say about it.

Judge Douglas has told me that he heard my speeches north and my speeches south—that he had heard me at Otaqu and at Freeport in the north, and recently at Jonesboro in the south, and there was a very different kind of sentiment in the speeches made at the different points. I will not charge upon Judge Douglas that he willfully misrepresents me, but I call upon every fair-minded man to take these speeches and read them, and I dare him to point out my differences between my speeches north and south. While I am here perhaps I ought to say a word, if I have the time in regard to the latter portion of the Judge's speech, which was a sort of declamation in reference to my having said I entertained the belief that this Government would not endure, half slave and half free. I have said so, and I did not say it without what seemed to me to be good reasons. It perhaps would require more time than I have now to set forth these reasons in detail, but let me ask you a few questions. Have we ever had any peace on this slavery question? And when are we to have peace upon it if it is kept in the position it now occupies? How are we ever to have peace upon it? That is an important question. To be sure, if we will all stop and allow Judge Douglas and his friends to march on in their present career until they plant the fanatic all over the nation, here and wherever else our flag waves, and we oppose it to it, there will be peace. But let me ask Judge Douglas how is he going to get the people to do that? They have been wrangling over this question for at least forty years. This was the cause of the agitation resulting in the Missouri Compromise, this produced the troubles at the annexation of Texas, in the acquisition of the territory acquired in the Mexican war. Against the acquisition of the territory which was opposed by the fews and slave States, bound together by one common Constitution. We have existed and prospered from that day to this time divided, and have increased with a rapidity never before equalled in wealth, the extension of territory, and all the elements of power and greatness, until we have become the greatest nation on the face of the globe. Why can we not thus continue to prosper? We can if we will live up to our Constitution and Government upon those principles upon which our fathers established it. During the whole period of our existence these Principles have been carried upon us, and showered upon our nation richer and more abundant blessings than have ever been conferred upon any other.
by producing the record. He didn't bring the record, because there was no record for him to bring. When he asks if I am ready to induce Trumbull's veracity, I say yes, and if I have broken a bargain with me, I would not be likely to induce his veracity; but I am ready to induce his veracity because neither in that thing nor in any other, in all the words that I have known Lyman Trumbull, have I known him to tell of his word or tell a falsehood, large or small. It is for that reason that I induce Lyman Trumbull.

Mr. James Brown (Douglas Post Master)—What does Ford's History say about Trumbull?

Mr. Lincoln—Some gentleman asks me what Ford's History says about him. My own recollection is that Ford speaks of Trumbull in very disrespectful terms in several portions of his book, and that he tells of a great deal worse of Judge Douglas. I refer you, sir, to the history for examination.

Judge Douglas complains, at considerable length, about a position on the part of Trumbull and myself to attack him personally. I want to attend to that suggestion a moment. I don't want to be unjustly accused of dealing liberally or unfairly with an adversary, either in court, or in a political canvas, or anywhere else. I would dislike myself if I supposed myself ready to deal less liberally with an adversary than I was willing to be treated myself. Judge Douglas, in a general way, without putting it in a direct shape, revives the old charge against me in reference to the Mexican war. He does not take the responsibility of putting it in a very definite form, but makes a general reference to it. That charge is more than ten years old. He complains of Trumbull and myself because he says we bring charges against him one or two years old. He knows, too, that in regard to the Mexican war story, the more respectable papers of his own party throughout the State have been compelled to take it back and acknowledge that it was a lie.

Here Mr. Lincoln turned to the crowd on the platform, and selecting Hon. Orlando D. Ficklin, led him forward and said:

I do not mean to do any thing with Mr. Ficklin, except to present his face and tell you that he personally knows it to be a fact. He was a member of Congress at the very time I was in Congress, and [Ficklin] knows that whenever there was an attempt to procure a vote of mine which would induce the origin and justice of the war, I was ready to give such inducement, and voted against it; but I never voted against the supplies for the army, and he knows, as well as Judge Douglas, that whenever a dollar was asked by way of compensation or otherwise, for the benefit of the soldiers, I was for it. I am one of the vice-economic party, Douglas and such. Mr. Lincoln and myself are just as good personal friends as Judge Douglas and myself. In reference to this Mexican war, my recollection is that when Ashmun's resolution against the war was offered by Mr. Ashmun, Judge Douglas, in which he declared that the Mexican war was unnecessarily and unconstitutinally commenced by the President—my recollection is that Mr. Lincoln voted for that resolution.

That is the truth. Now you all remember that was a resolution concerning the President for the manner in which the war was begun. You know that there were charged that I voted against the supplies, by which I steered the soldiers who were out fighting the battles of their country. I say that Ficklin knows it to be a fact. When that charge was brought before the Representative Times, the Springfield Register [Douglas] remarked the Times that the charge really applied to John Henry; and I do know that John Henry is now making a fighting for Judge Douglas. If the judge now says that he offers this as a sort of a weapon to what I said to-day in reference to Trumbull's charge, then I remind him that he made this charge before I said a word about Trumbull's. He brought this forward at Ottawa, the first time we met face to face; and in the opening speech that Judge Douglas made, he attacked me in regard to a matter ten years old. Isn't he a pretty man to be whining about people making charges against him only two years old?

In regard to Trumbull's charge that I should have dwelt upon this charge of Trumbull's at all. I gave the apology for doing so in my opening speech. Perhaps it didn't fix your fancy. I said that when Judge Douglas was speaking at places where I spoke, I knew that at the time he used very harsh language about me. Two or three times afterward I said I had confidence in Judge Trumbull's veracity and intelligence; and my own opinion was, from what I knew of the character of Judge Trumbull, that he would vindicate his position, and prove who he had stated to be true. In fact, I repeated two or three times; and then I dropped it, without saying anything more on the subject for weeks—perhaps a month. I passed it by without noticing it at all till I found it at Jacksonville. Judge Douglas, in the multitude of his power, is not willing to answer Trumbull and let me alone; but he comes out there and uses this language:—"He should not hereafter occupy his time in relating such charges made by Trumbull, but that Lincoln, having intimated the character of Trumbull for veracity, he should hold him [Lincoln] responsible for the slander." What was Lincoln to do? Did he do not right, when he had the fair opportunity of meeting Judge Douglas here, to tell him he was ready for the responsibility? I ask a candid audience whether in doing thus Judge Douglas was not the resultant rather than if? Here I meet him face to face and say I am ready to take the responsibility so far as it rests on me.

Having done so, I ask the attention of this audience to the question whether I have succeeded in sustaining the charge, and whether Judge Douglas has at all succeeded in rebutting it? You all heard me call upon him to say which of these pieces of evidence was a forgery? Does he say that what I present here as a copy of the original Toland bill is a forgery? Does he say that what I present as a copy of the bill reported by himself from the House of Representatives is a forgery? Or is what is presented as a transcript from the House of Representatives as true as the quotations from Bigler's speech is a forgery? Does he say the quotations from his own speech are forgeries? Does he say this transcript from Judge Douglas's speeches is a forgery? If he didn't do one of them, I would then say that each piece of a story in true, the whole story turns out false! I take it these people have some sense; they see plainly that Judge Douglas is playing cattle-blef, a small species of fish that has no more use for defending itself when pursued in a black pond, which makes the water so dark that they cannot see it, and thus it escapes. Ain't the Judge playing the cattle-blef?

Now I would ask very special attention to the consideration of Judge Douglas. If Judge Douglas is a genuine friend, you shall hear his speeches to-day, you shall hear him right to-day, you shall hear him right to-day, you shall hear him right to-day. I ask you to watch closely and see which of these pieces of testimony, every one of which he says is a forgery, he has shown to be such. Not one of them has been shown to be a forgery. The difficulty is not in showing the testimony is true, but how it is possible that the whole is a falsehood?

In regard to Trumbull's charge that he [Douglas] inserted a proviso into the bill to prevent the Constitution being submitted to the people, it appears that Mr. Lincoln—my recollection is that Mr. Lincoln voted for the Constitutional Globe to show that on his motion that provision was struck out. Why, Trumbull has not said it. The recollection is that the charge was made that I did not vote against the whole bill, but Trumbull says he [Douglas] put it in, and it is not an answer to the charge to say the bill had afterward been struck out. Both are perhaps true. It was in regard to that thing precisely that I told him I had dropped the cab. Trumbull shows you by his introducing the bill it was his cab. It is no answer to that assertion to call Trumbull a liar merely because he did not specifically say that Douglas struck it out. Suppose that were the case, does it answer Trumbull? I assert that you [pointing to an individual] are here to-day, and you undertake to prove me a liar by showing that you were in Mattoon yesterday. I say that very simply you tear your hat off your head, and you prove me a liar by putting it on your head. That is the whole force of Douglas's argument.
Now, I want to come back to my original question. Mr. Douglas says that Judge Trumbull had a bill with a provision in it for submitting a Constitution to be made a vote of the people of Kansas. Does Judge Douglas deny that fact? Does he deny that the provision which Trumbull read was in that bill? Then through the right to repeat the question — ask Judge Douglas took it out? Bigler has said there was a combination of certain Senators, among whom he did not inclusive Judge Douglas, by which it was said that the Kansas bill should have the Constitution formed under it submitted to a vote of the people. He did not say that Douglas was among them, but we prove by another source that at the same time Douglas comes into the Senate with that provision struck out of the bill. Although Bigler cannot say they were all working in concert, yet it looks very much as if the thing was agreed upon and done with a mutual understanding after the conference; and while we do not know that it was absolutely so, yet it looks so probable that we have a right to call upon the man who knows the true reason why it was done, to tell what the true reason was. When he will not tell what the true reason was, he stands in the attitude of an accused thief who has stolen goods in his possession, and when called to account, refuses to tell where he got them. Not only is there the evidence, but when he denounce, comes in with the bill having the provision struck out, he tells us in his speech, not then, but after, that these alterations and modifications in the bill has been made by him, in consultation with Trumbull, the author of the bill. He tells us the same today. He says there were certain modifications made in the bill in Committee that he did not vote for. I ask you to remember while certain amendments he has himself made to this in particular the alterations and modifications were made by him upon consultation with Trumbull. We have his own word that his the reason Judge Douglas is so shy about coming to the exact question? What is the reason he will not tell you any thing about how it was made, at whom it was made, or that he remembers it being made at all? Why does he say it was playing upon the meaning of words, and quibbling around the edges of the evidence? If he can explain all this, but leaves it unexplained, I have a right to infer that Judge Douglas understood it was the purpose of his party, in engineering that bill through, to make a Constitution, and have Kansas come into the Union without being submitted to a vote of the people. If he will explain his action on this question, by giving a better reason for the facts that happened, than he has done, it will be satisfactory. But until he does that he gives a better or more plausible reason than he has offered against the evidence in the case — I say it will not avail him at all that he swells himself up, takes on dignity, and calls people blurs. Why, sir, there is not a word in Trumbull's speech that depends on Trumbull's veracity at all. He has only arrayed the evidence and told you what follows as a matter of reasoning. There is not a statement in the whole speech that depends on Trumbull's word. If you have ever studied geometry, you remember that by a course of reasoning, Euclid has shown you how to work it, is erroneous, would you prove it to be false by calling Euclid a liar? They tell me that my time is out, and therefore I close.

Extract From Mr. Trumbull's Speech made at Alton, referred to by Mr. Lincoln in his speech of Charleston.

I come now to another extract from a speech of Mr. Douglas, made at Beardstown, and reported in the Missouri Republican. This extract has reference to a statement made by me at Chicago, wherein I charged that an agreement had been entered into by the very persons now claiming credit for opposing a Constitution not submitted to the people, to have a Constitution formed and put in force. I quote the following words at the expense of repeating them, the people of Kansas an opportunity to pass upon it. Without meeting this charge, which I substantiated by a reference to the record, my colleague is reported to have said: —

"For when this change was once made in a much milder form, in the Senate of the United States, I did insist as a lie in the presence of Mr. Trumbull, and Mr. Trumbull sat and heard it thus branded, without daring to say it was true. I tell you he knew it to be false when he uttered it at Chicago; and yet he says he is going to cram the lie down his throat until he should cry enough. The miserable craven-hearted wretch! he would rather have both ears cut off than to use that language in my presence, where I could call him to account. I see the object is to show me into a personal controversy, with the hope thereby of concealing from the public the enormity of the principles to which they are committed. I shall not allow much of my time in this canvass to be occupied by these personal assaults. I have none to make on Mr. Lincoln; I have none to make on Mr. Trumbull; I have none to make on any other political opponent. If I cannot stand on my own public record, on my own private and public character as history will record it, I will not attempt to rise by traducing the character of other men. I will not make a blackguard of myself by imitating the course they have pursued against me. I have no charges to make against them."

This is a singular statement taken altogether. After indulging in language which would disgrace a scoundrel in the lowest portfolio of a fish-market, he232 approaches an argument by saying that he will not make a blackguard of himself, that he has no charges to make against me. So I suppose he considers, that to say of another that he knew a thing to be false when he uttered it, that he was a miserable craven-hearted wretch, does not amount to a personal assault, and does not make a man a blackguard. A disingenuous public will judge of that for themselves; but as he says he has "no charges to make on Mr. Trumbull," I suppose politeness requires that I should believe him. At the risk of again offending this mighty man of war, and doing something more than my part, I shall have the audacity to again read the record upon him and prove it upon him, so that he cannot escape it, the truth of every word I uttered at Chicago. You, fellow citizens, are the judges to determine whether this man is qualified to hold my place here. My colleague says he is willing to stand on his public record. By that he shall be tried, and if he had been able to discriminate between the exposure of a public act by the record and a personal attack upon the individual, he would have discovered that there was nothing personal in my Chicago remarks, unless the condemnation of himself by his own public record is personal, and then you must judge whether the blame for the torture his public record inflicts upon him, he is for making, or if the reading it after it was made. As an individual I care very little about Judge Douglas one way or the other. It is his public acts with which I have to do, and if they condemn, disgrace and consign him to oblivion, he has only himself, not me, to blame. Now, the charge is that it was a plot entered into to have a Constitution formed for Kansas and put in force, without giving the people an opportunity to pass upon it, and that Mr. Douglas was in the plot. This is an example of proof by the record as to the fact that the State of Minnesota was admitted into the Union at the last session of Congress. On the 26th of June, 1856, a bill was pending in the United States Senate to au
authorize the people of Kansas to form a Constitution and come into the Union. On that day Mr. Toombs offered an amendment which he intended to propose to the bill which was then understood to be printed, and, with the original bill and the popular vote, recommended to the Committee on Territories, of which Mr. Douglas was Chairman. This amendment of Mr. Toombs, printed by order of the Senate, and a copy of which I have here present, for the appointment of commissioners who were to take a census of Kansas, divide the Territory into election districts, and superintend the election of delegates to form a Constitution, and contain a clause in the 18th section which I will read to you, requiring the Constitution which should be formed to be submitted to the people for adoption. It reads as follows:

"That the following propositions be and the same are hereby offered to the said Convention of the people of Kansas, when formed, for their free acceptance or rejection, which, if accepted by the Convention, and ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the Constitution, shall be obligatory on the United States, and upon the said State of Kansas," etc.

It has been contended by some of the newspaper press that this section did not require the Constitution which should be formed to be submitted to the people for approval and that it was only the land propositions which were to be submitted. You will observe the language is that the propositions are to be "ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the Constitution." Would it have been possible to ratify the land propositions "at the election for the adoption of the Constitution," unless such an election was to be held?

When one thing is required by a contract or law to be done, the doing of which is made dependent upon and cannot be performed without the doing of some other thing, is not that other thing just as much required by the contract or law as the first? It matters not in what part of the act, nor in what phraseology the intention of the Legislature is expressed, you can clearly ascertain what it is; and whenever that intention is ascertained from an examination of the language used, such intention is part of and a requirement of the law. Can any candid, fair-minded man, read the section I have quoted, and say that the intention to have the Constitution which should be formed submitted to the people for their adoption, is not clearly expressed? In my judgment there can be no controversy among honest men upon a proposition so plain as this. Mr. Douglas has never pretended to deny, so far as I am aware, that the Convention is to be the amendment, as originally intended, to be submitted to the people. This amendment of Mr. Toombs was referred to the committee of which Mr. Douglas was Chairman, and reported back by him on the 30th of June, with the words, "And ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the Constitution." But Mr. Douglas substituted the word "submitted" for "ratified." Various other alterations were also made in the bill to which I shall presently have occasion to call attention. There was no other clause in the original Toombs bill requiring a submission of the Constitution to the people than the one I have read, and there was no clause whatever, after that was struck out, in the bill, as reported back by Judge Douglas, requiring a submission. I will now introduce a witness whose testimony cannot be impeaded, he acknowledging himself to have been one of the conspirators and privy to the fact about which he testifies.

Senator Bigler alluding to the Toombs bill, as it was called, and which, after sundry other changes in the Senate, and to the property of submitting the Constitution which should be formed to a vote of the people, made the following statement in his place in the Senate, December 9th, 1857. I read from part 1, Congressional Globe, House session, paragraph 21:

"I was present when that subject was discussed by Senators, before the bill was introduced, and the question was raised and discussed whether the Constitution, when formed, should be submitted to a vote of the people. It was held by the most intelligent Senators that Toombs, the difficulties attending the danger of any experiment at that time of a popular vote, it would be better that there should be no such provision in the Toombs bill; and it is my understanding, in all the intercourse I had, that that Convention would make a Constitution and send it to the people to vote on it."

In speaking of this meeting again on the 21st December, 1857 (Congressional Globe, same vol., page 113), Senator Bigler said:

"Nothing was further from my mind than to allude to any social or sectional interest, but the meeting was not of that character. Indeed, it was semi-official, and called to promote the public good. My recollection is clear that I left the conference under the impression that it had been deemed best to adopt measures to admit Kansas as a State through the agency of one popular election, and that for delegates to the Convention. This impression was the stronger, because I thought the spirit of the bill infringed upon the doctrine of non-intervention, to which I had given assent, but with the hope of accomplishing good great, and no movement had been made in that direction in the Territory, I wanted this objective, and concluded to support the measure. I have a few items of testimony as to the correctness of these impressions, and with their submission I believe. I have before me the bill reported by the Senator from Illinois, on the 7th of March, 1856, providing for the admission of Kansas as a State, the third section of which reads as follows:

"That the following propositions be and the said are hereby offered to the said Convention of the people of Kansas, when formed, for their free acceptance or rejection; which, if accepted by the Convention and ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the Constitution, shall be obligatory upon the United States, and upon the said State of Kansas."

"The bill read in place by the Senator from Georgia, on the 25th of June, and referred to the Committee on Territories, contained the same section, word for word. Both these bills were under consideration at the conference referred to, but, sir, when the Senator from Illinois reported the Toombs bill to the Senate, with amendments, he went so far as to indicate to the Convention that the Constitution should be approved by the people. The words 'and ratified by the people at the election for the adoption of the Constitution' were inserted."

I am not now seeking to prove that Douglas was in the plot to force a Constitution upon Kansas without allowing the people to vote directly upon it. I shall attend to that branch of the subject by and by. My object now is to prove the existence of the plot, what the design was, and ask if I have not already done so. Here are the facts:

The introduction of a bill on the 7th of March, 1856, providing for the ending of a temporary government, in order to form a Constitution and providing that the Constitution should be submitted to the people for adoption; an amendment to this bill, proposed by Mr. Toombs, containing the same requirement; a reference of various bills to the Committee on Territories; a reversion of Senators to determine whether it was advisable to have the Constitution submitted for ratification; the determination that it was not advisable; and a report of the bill back to the Senate next morning, with the clause providing for the submission stricken out. Could evidence be more complete to establish the fact of the plot of the(plot) I have made of a plot having been entered into by somebody, to have a Constitution adopted without submitting it to the people?

For those charges of the charge, that Judge Douglas was in this plot, whether knowingly or ignorantly, is not material to my purpose. The charge is that he was an instrument co-operating in the project to have a Constitution formed and put into operation, without affording the people an opportunity to pass upon it. The first evidence of such a charge is the fact that he reported back the Toombs amendment with the clause providing for the submission stricken out. This, in connection with his speech in the Senate on the 9th of December, 1857 (Congressional Globe, part 1, page 114), wherein he stated:

"That, after the last Congress, I [Mr. Douglas] reported a bill from the Con-
mittee on Territories, to authorize the people of Kansas to assemble and form a Constitution for themselves. Subsequently the Senator from Georgia (Mr. Toombs,) brought forward a substitute for my bill, which, after having been modified by him and by the Senate, was finally passed, was signed by the Senate.

This was itself ought to be sufficient to show that my colleague was an instrument in the plot to have a Constitution put in force without submitting it to the people, and to finally close his mouth from attempting to dep. No man can reconcile his words with his present denial, and the only charitable conclusion would be that he was being used by others without knowing it. Whether he is ex- cited to the benefit of even this excuse, you must judge on a candid hearing of the facts. I shall present it in its present form, with the facts.

When the charge was first made in the United States Senate, by Mr. Bigler, that my colleague had voted for an Amending Act which put a Govern- ment in operation without submitting the Constitution to the people, my colleague Draftsman of the said Amendment, in his speech, on the 12th of November, 1855, page 72, urging this very objection. Do you ask why I did not expose him at the time? I will tell you—Mr. Douglas was engaged in the military service against the Lecompton insurrection. He was engaged in a hand-to-hand fight, and in order to get him out of the Senate, I finally engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the National Democracy, to prevent the bringing of Kansas into the Union as a slave State against the wishes of its inhabitants, and of course I was unwilling to turn my guns from the common enemy to strike down an ally. Judge Douglas, however, on the same day, and in the same de- bate, probably recollecting, or being reminded of the fact, that I had objected to the Toombs bill, when pending, that it did not provide for the submission of the Constitution, then made another statement which is to be found in the same volume of the Congressional Globe, page 22, in which he says:

"That the bill was silent on the subject is true, and my attention was called to the fact about the time it was passed, and I took the fair construction to be that provision not delegated were reserved, and that of course the Constitution would be submitted to the people. Whether this statement is consistent with the statement just before made, that had the point been made it would have been yielded to, or that it was a mere discovery, you will determine; but if the public records do not convict and condemn him, he may go uncondemned, so far as I am concerned. I make no use here of the testimony of Senator Bigler to show that Judge Douglas must have been privy to the Toombs bill held at his house, when it was determined to make the Constitution subject to the people, because Judge Douglas denies it, and I wish to use my own acts and declarations, which are abundantly sufficient for my purposes. I come to a point of testimony which disproves of all these various pretences which have been set up for striking out of the original Toombs proposition, the clause requiring a submission of the Constitution to the people, and shows that it was not done either by accident, by inadvertence, or because it was believed that the bill, being so worded, would be submitted to the people, but that the Constitution would necessarily be submitted for approval. What will you think, after listening to the facts already presented, to show that there was a design with those who composed the Toombs bill as amended, not to submit to the Constitution to the people, if I now bring before you the amended bill as Judge Douglas reported it back, and show the clause of the original bill requir-
In order to give more pertinency to that question, I will read an extract from Mr. Trumbull’s speech in the Senate, on the Toombs bill, made on the 24th of July, 1856. He said:

"We are asked to amend this bill, and make it perfect, and a liberal spirit seems to be manifested on the part of some Senators to have a fair bill. It is difficult, I admit, to frame a bill that will give satisfaction to all, but to approach it, or come near to that".

The first thing, he goes on to say, was the application of the Wilmot Proviso to the Territories, and the second the repeal of all the laws passed by the Territorial Legislature. He did not then say that it was necessary to put the barrier on the Constitution as a whole but that it was necessary to put it in a clause requiring the submission of the Constitution to the Senate. Why, if he thought such a provision necessary, did he not introduce it? He said in his speech that he was invited to offer amendments; Why did he not do so? He cannot pretend that he had no chance to do this, for he did offer some amendments, but none requiring submission.

I now proceed to show that Mr. Trumbull knew at the time that the bill was silent as to the subject of submission, and also that he, and every body else, took it for granted that the Constitution would be submitted. Now for the evidence. In his second speech be says: "The bill in many of its features meets my approbation...”

So he did not think it so very bad.

Further on he says:

"In regard to the measure introduced by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Toombs], and recommended by the Committee, I regard it, in many respects, as a most excellent bill; but we must look at it in the light of surrounding circumstances. In the condition of things now existing in the country, I do not consider it as a safe measure, not one which will give peace, and I will give my reasons. First, it affords no immediate relief. It provides for taking a census of the voters in the Territory, for an election in November, and the assembling of a Convention in December, to frame, if it thinks proper, a Constitution for Kansas, preparatory to its admission into the Union as a State. It is not until December that the Convention is to meet. It would take some time to form a Constitution. I suppose that Convention would have a charter granted by the President before it becomes valid."

He there expressly declared that he supposed, under the bill, the Constitution would have to be submitted to the people before it became valid. He went on to say:

"No provision is made in this bill for such a ratification. This is objectionable to my mind. I do not think the people should be bound by a Constitution, without passing upon it directly themselves."

Why was he not offered an amendment providing for such a submission, if he thought it necessary? Notwithstanding the absence of such a clause, he took it for granted that the Constitution would have to be ratified by the people, under the bill.

In another part of the same speech, he says:

"There is nothing said in this bill, so far as I have discovered, about submitting the Constitution which is to be framed, to the people, for their sanction or rejection. Perhaps the Convention would have the right to submit it, if it should think proper; but it is certainly not compelled to do so, according to the provisions of the bill. If it is to be submitted to the people, it will take time, and it will not be until some time next year that this new Constitution, adopted and ratified by the people, would be submitted here to Congress for its acceptance, and what is to be the condition of that people in the meantime?"

You see that his argument was that the Toombs bill would not get Kansas into the Union in thirty-five years, and was objectionable on that account. He had no fears about this submission, or why did he not introduce an amendment to meet the case?

A voice—"Why didn’t you? You were Chairman of the Committee."

Mr. Douglas—I will answer that question for you.
it rest upon the declaration that I had introduced a clause into the bill prohibiting the people from voting upon the Constitution. I am told that he made the same charge when made at Alto, that I had actually inserted and incorporated into the bill, a clause which prohibited the people from voting upon their Constitution. I hold his Alto speech in my hand, and will read the amendment, which he alleges that I offered. It is in these words:

"And until the complete execution of this act no other election shall be held in said Territory."

Trumbull says the object of that amendment was to prevent the Convention from submitting the Constitution to a vote of the people. I will read what he said at Alto on that subject:

"This clause put it out of the power of the Convention, had it been so disposed, to submit the Constitution to the people for adoption; for it absolutely prohibited the holding of any other election, than that for the election of delegates, till that act was completely executed, which would not have been till Kansas was admitted as a State, or, at all events, till her Constitution was fully prepared and ready for submission to Congress for admission."

Now, do you suppose that Mr. Trumbull supposed that that clause prohibited the Convention from submitting the Constitution to the people, when, in his speech in the Senate, he declared that the Convention had a right to submit it? In his Alto speech, as will be seen by the extract which I have read, he declared that the clause put it out of the power of the Convention to submit the Constitution, and in his speech in the Senate he said:

"There is nothing said in this bill, so far as I have discovered, about submitting the Constitution which is to be formed, to the people, for their sanction or rejection. Perhaps the Convention could have the right to submit it, if it should think proper, but it is certainly not compelled to do so according to the provisions of the bill."

Then, in Congress, he declared the bill to be silent on the subject; and a few days since, at Alto, he made a speech, and said that there was a provision in the bill prohibiting submission. I have two answers to make to that. In the first place, the amendment which he quotes as depriving the people of an opportunity to vote upon the Constitution, was stricken out on my motion—absolutely stricken out and not voted on at all! In the second place, in lieu of it, a provision was voted in authorizing the Convention to order an election whenever it pleased. I will read. After Trumbull had made his speech in the Senate, declaring that the Constitution would probably be submitted to the people, although the bill was silent upon that subject, I made a few remarks, and offered two amendments, which you may find in the Appendix to the Government Code, volume thirty-three, first session of the thirty-fourth Congress, page 795.

I quote:

"Mr. Douglas—I have an amendment to offer from the Committee on Territories. On page 8, section 11, strike out the words 'until the complete execution of this act no other election shall be held in said Territory,' and insert the amendment which I hold in my hand!"

The amendment was as follows:

"That all persons who shall possess the other qualifications prescribed for voters under this act, and who shall have been bona fide inhabitants of said Territory since its organization, and who shall have resided the necessary time in consequence of the disturbances therein, and who shall have been of the voting age during the period aforesaid, and have been frequent attenders at public meetings shall be entitled to vote at said election and shall have their names placed on said roll of voters for that purpose."

That amendment was adopted unanimously. After its adoption, the record shows the following:

"The first Amendment was then agreed to.
"Mr. Douglas—I have another amendment to offer from the Committee, to follow the amendment which has been adopted. The bill reads now, that until the complete execution of this act, no other election shall be held in said Territory. It has been suggested that it should be modified in this way, and to avoid all conflict in the execution of this act, all other elections in said Territory are hereby postponed until such time as said Convention shall appoint, so that they can appoint the day in the event that there should be a failure to come into the Union."

This amendment was also agreed to without dissent.

Mr. Trumbull, at Alton, as evidence against me, instead of putting up the bill by me, was stricken out on my motion, and never became a part thereof at all. You also see that the substitute clause expressly authorized the Convention to appoint such day of election as it should deem proper.

Mr. Trumbull when he made that speech knew these facts. He forged his evidence from beginning to end, and by falsifying the record he endeavors to bolster up his false charge. I ask you what you think of Trumbull thus going around the country, falsifying and garbling the public records. I ask you whether you will sustain a man who will descend to the infamy of such conduct.

Mr. Douglas proceeded to remark that he would not hereafter occupy his time in refuting such charges made by Trumbull, but that Lincoln having introduced the character of Trumbull for veracity, he should hold him [Lincoln] responsible for the slander.

FIFTH JOINT DEBATE, AT GALESBURGH,

October 7, 1856.

MR. DOUGLASS'S SPEECH.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Four years ago, I appeared before the people of Knox county for the purpose of defending my political action upon the Compromise measures of 1850 and the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill. Those of you before me, who were present then, will remember that I vindicated myself for supporting those two measures by the fact that they rested upon the great fundamental principle that the people of each State and each Territory of the Union have the right, and ought to be permitted to exercise the right, of regulating their own domestic concerns in their own way, subject to no other limitation or restriction than that which the Constitution of the United States imposes upon them. I then called upon the people of Illinois to decide whether that principle of self-government was right or wrong. If it was and is right, then the Compromise measures of 1850 were right, and, consequently, the Kansas and Nebraska bill, based upon the same principle, must necessarily have been right.

The Kansas and Nebraska bill declared, in so many words, that it was the true intent and meaning of the act not to legislate slavery into any State or Territory, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States. For the last four years I have devoted all my energies, in private and public, to command that principle to the American people. Whatever else may be said in condemnation or support of my political course, I apprehend that no honest man will doubt the fidelity with which, under all circumstances, I have stood by it.

During the last year a question arose in the Congress of the United States whether or not that principle would be violated by the admission of Kansas into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution. In my opinion, the attempt to force Kansas in under that Constitution, was at least a violation of the principle embraced in the Compromise measures of 1850, and Kansas and Nebraska bill of 1854, and therefore I stood in the fight against the Lecompton Constitution, and conducted it until the effort to carry it through the Constitution Congress was abandoned. And it is only on the admission of Kansas and Nebraska, and Southern men and Northern men that during the whole of that fight I carried the banner of Popular Sovereignty aloft, and never allowed it to trail in the dust, or lowered my flag until victory perch'd upon my arm.

When the Lecompton Constitution was defeated, the question arose in the minds of those who had advocated it what they should next resort to in order to carry out their views. They devised a measure known as the English bill, and granted a general amnesty and political pardon to all men who had fought against the Lecompton Constitution, provided they would support that bill. I for one did not choose to accept the pardon, or to avoid myself of the amnesty granted on that condition. The fact that the supporters of Lecompton were willing to forgive all differences of opinion at that time in the event those who opposed it favored the English bill, was an admission they did not think that opposition to Lecompton impaired a man's standing in the Democratic party. Now the question arose, what was that English bill which certain men are now attempting to make a test of political orthodoxy in this country. It provided, in substance, that the Lecompton Constitution should be sent back to the people of Kansas for their adoption or rejection, at an election which was held in August last, and in case they refused admission under it, that Kansas should be kept out of the Union until she had 90,000 inhabitants.

I am in favor of sending the Constitution back in order to enable the people to say whether or not it was their act and deed, and embodied their will; but the other proposition, that if they refused to come into the Union under it, they should be kept out until they had double or treble the population they then had, I never would sanction by my vote. The reason why I could not sanction it is to be found in the fact that by the English bill, if the people of Kansas had only agreed to become a shalldolding State under the Lecompton Constitution, they could have done so with 35,000 people, if they insisted on being a free State as they had a right to do, then they were to be punished by being kept out of the Union until they had nearly three times that population. I then said in my place in the Senate, as I now say to you, that whenever Kansas has population enough for a slave State she has population enough for a free State. I have never yet given a vote, and I never intend to record one, making an odious and unjust distinction between the different States of this Union. I hold it to be a fundamental principle in our republican form of government that the States of this Union, old and new, free and slave, stand on a level equality. Equality among the different States is a cardinal principle on which all our institutions rest. Wherever, therefore, you make a discrimination, saying to a slave State that it shall be admitted with 35,000 inhabitants, and to a free State that it shall not be admitted until it has 90,000 or 100,000 inhabitants, you are throwing the whole weight of the Federal Government into the scale in favor of one class of States against the other. Nor would I on the other hand any sooner sanction the doctrine that a free State could be admitted into the Union with 35,000 people, while a slave State was kept out until it had 90,000. I have always declared in the Senate my willingness, and I am willing now to adopt the rule, that no Territory shall ever become a State, until it has the requisite population for a number of Congressmen, according to the present existing ratio. But while I have always been, and am now willing to adopt that general rule, I was not willing and would not consent to make an exception of Kansas, as a punishment for her obstinacy, in demanding the right to do as she pleased in the formation of her Constitution. It is proper that I
should remark here, that my opposition to the Lecompton Constitution did not rest upon the peculiar position taken by Kansas on the subject of slavery, but that I did, defeat it by doing right, to break the power of another man in the United States in my place. The men who make an alliance with Federal officers, who, as a rule, is their right to have it, and no man should ever press against their admission because they ask it under the Constitution, under the other. I hold to that great principle of self-government which asserts the right of every people to decide for themselves the laws and character of the domestic institutions and fundamental law under which they live.

This effort has been and is being made in this State by certain postmasters and other Federal officers to make a test of faith on the support of the English bill. These are now making speeches all over the State against me and in favor of Lincoln, either directly or indirectly, because I would not sanction a discrimination between slave and free States by voting for the English bill. While that bill is made a test in Illinois for the purpose of breaking up the Democratic organization in this State, how is it in the other States? Go to Indiana, and there you find English himself, the author of the English bill, who is a candidate for re-election to Congress, has been forced by public opinion to abandon his own darng project, and to give a promise that he will vote for the admission of Kansas at once, whenever she forms a Constitution in pursuance of law, and ratifies it by a majority vote of her people. Not only is this the case with English himself, but I am informed that every Democrat candidate for Congress in Indiana takes the same ground. Pass to Ohio, and there you find that Groseclose, Pendleton, and Cox, and all the other anti-Lecompton men who stood shoulder to shoulder with me against the Lecompton Constitution, but voted for the English bill, now repudiate it and take the ground that I do on that question. So it is with the Iowans and Michiganders, and so it is with every other Lecompton Democrat as well as in the free States. They now abandon even the English bill, and come back to the true platform which I proclaimed at the time in the Senate, and upon which the Democracy of Illinois now stand. And yet another anti-Lecompton and anti-Lecompton Democrat in the free States has abandoned the English bill, you are told that it is to be a test upon me, while the power and patronage of the Government are all exerted to elect men to Congress in the other States who occupy the same position with reference to it that I do. It seems to me that the Southern offense consists in the fact that I first did not vote for the English bill, and then their pledge myself to keep Kansas out of the Union until she has a population of 40,000, and then return home, but to the North the most fiercely, the bill, and take the opposite ground. If I had done this, perhaps the Administration would not be revoking my re-election, as it is that of the others who have pursued this course. I did not choose to give that pledge, for the reason that I did not intend to carry out that principle. I never will consent, for the sake of coordinating the issues, to pledge myself to do that which I do not intend to perform. I now submit the question to you as my constituency, whether I was not right, first, in resisting the adoption of the Lecompton Constitution at all, and, secondly, in resisting the English bill. I repeat, that I opposed the Lecompton Constitution because it was not the act and deed of the people of Kansas, and did not embody their will. I denied the right of any power on earth, under our system of Government, to force a Constitution on an unwilling people. There was a time when some men could pretend to believe that the Lecompton Constitution embodied the will of the people of Kansas, but that time has passed. The question was referred to the people of Kansas under the English bill last August, and then, at an election, they rejected the Lecompton Constitution by a vote of from eight to ten against it to one in its favor. Since it has been voted down by so overwhelming a majority, no man can pretend that it was not the act and deed of that people. I submit the question to you whether or not, if it had not been for me, that Constitution would have been carried through the throats of the people of Kansas against their consent. While at least ninety-nine out of every hundred people here present, agree that I was right in defeating that project, yet my enemies make the State of Ohio a base of operations from which to attack the North and another man in the United States in my place. The men who acknowledge that I was right in defeating Lecompton, now form an alliance with Federal officers, to make an attack on the Federal officers who, are using their influence and the patronage of the Government against me for having defeated the Lecompton Constitution. But you know how life and the terror of proscription is threatened every Democrat by the present Administration, unless he supports the Republican ticket in preference to any other political candidates and myself. I could find an instance in the parturient of the city of Galena, and in every other postmaster in this vicinity, all of whom have been stricken down simply because they discharged the duties of their office honestly, and supported the regular Democratic ticket in this State in the right. The Republican party is availing itself of every unworthy means in the present contest to carry the election, because its leaders know that if they let this chance slip they will never have another, and their hopes of making this Republican State will be blasted forever.

Now, let me ask you whether the country has any interest in sustaining this organization, known as the Republican party. That party is unlike all other political organizations in this country. All other parties have been national in their character—have avowed their principles alike in the slave and free States as well as in the North and in the South. But in this case we have a Republican candidate and the American flag waved over American soil.

But now you have a sectional organization; a party which appeals to the Northern section of the United States against the Southern party which appeals to the Southern section of the United States against the Northern section, the Southern States and Southern institutions. The leaders of that party hope that they will be able to unite the Northern States in one great sectional party, and that will be the same as the old Whig party, and the Whigs and Democrats could proclaim their principles boldly and fearlessly in the North and in the South, and in the East and in the West, wherever the Constitution was upheld and the American flag waved over American soil.

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were created equal, and endowed by the Divine law with that equality, and down
speak he tells the old Whigs, the Kentuckians, Virginians, and Tennesseans, that
there is a physical difference in the races, making one superior and the other in-
ferior, and that he is in favor of maintaining the superiority of the one of the two
positions of Mr. Lincoln? He is to be voted for in the south as a pro-slavery man, and he is to be voted for in the
north as an Abolitionist. Up here he thinks it is all nonsense to talk about a
difference between the races, and says that we must "discuss all questions as
between the races and the other race being inferior, and therefore they must be placed
in an inferior position." Down south he makes this "a gamble" about this race and that
race and the other race being inferior as the creed of his party, and declares that the
 negro must be elevated to the position of the white man. You find that his politi-
cal meetings are called by different names in different counties in the State. Here they
are called Republican meetings, but in old Tazewell, where Lincoln made a speech
last Tuesday, he did not address a Republican meeting, but "a grand rally of the
Lincoln men.

There are very few Republicans there, because Tazewell county is
filled with old Virginians and Kentuckians, all of whom are Whigs or Democrats, and
if Mr. Lincoln had called an Abolition or Republican meeting there, he would not get
many votes. Go down into Egypt and you find that he and his party are operat-
ing under an alias there, wherein his friend Trumbull has given them, in order that
they may cheat the people. When I was down in Monroe county a few weeks ago
addressing the people, I saw handbills posted announcing that Mr. Trumbull was go-
ing in behalf of Lincoln, and what do you think the name of his party was there?
Why the "Free Democracy." Mr. Trumbull and Mr. John Baker were announced to address the Free Democracy of Monroe county, and the bill was signed
"Free Democracy." The reason that Lincoln and his party adopted the name of "Free Democracy" down there was because Monroe county has al-
ways been an old-fashioned Democratic county, and hence it was necessary to make
the people believe that the Free Democrats were the Democrats, and so they called
their party Free Democrats. Come up to Springfield, where Lincoln now lives
and always has lived, and you find that the Convention of his party which assembled
to nominate candidates for Legislature, who are expected to vote for him, are defen-
ding the name of Republican, but assembled under the title of "all-opposed
to the Democracy." Thus you find that Mr. Lincoln's creed cannot travel
through even one half of the counties of this State, but that it changes its lines and
becomes lighter and yet votes in it travels from the extreme north until it is near
by white, when it reaches the extreme south end of the State. I ask you my friends,
why cannot Republicans avow their principles alike everywhere? I would despise
myself if I thought that I was presenting your votes by unsuccessful measures, or
that I am not doing the best for the white man. I will say in addition, that there is a
physical difference between the white and black races, which, I suppose, will forever
the two races living together upon terms of social and political equality, and inasmuch as they cannot so live,
that while they do remain together, there must be the position of superior and
inferior, that I as much as any other man am in favor of the superior position being
assigned to the white man.

"Good for Lincoln." Fellow-citizens, here you find men housing for Lincoln and saying that he did right,
when in one part of the State he stood up for negro equality, and in another
political effect, displeased the doctrine and declared that there al-
ways must be the inferior and inferior races are expected
and required to vote for Lincoln because he goes for the equality of the races, holding that by the Declaration of Independences the white man and the negro
holding constancy. Recollect, also, that no one of them emancipated his slaves, much less put them on an equality with himself, after he signed the Declaration. On the contrary, they all continued to hold their negroes as slaves, in the same relation to them as before. Now, do you believe—are you willing to have it said—that every man who signed the Declaration of Independence declared the negro his equal, and then was hypocritical enough to continue to hold him as a slave, in violation of what he believed to be the Divine law? And yet when you say that the Declaration of Independence included the negro, you charge the signers of it with hypocrisy.

I say to you, candidly, that, in my opinion, this Government was made by our fathers on the white basis. It was made by white men for the benefit of white men; and, having made it on that basis, they postured forever, and was intended to be administered by white men in all time to come. But while I hold that under our Constitution and political system the negro is not a citizen, cannot be a citizen, and ought not to be a citizen, it does not follow by any means that he should be a slave. On the contrary, it follows that the negro, as an inferior man, ought to possess every right, every privilege, every immunity which he can safely exercise consistent with the safety of the society in which he lives. Humanity requires, and Christianity commands, that you shall extend to every inferior being, and every dependent being, all the privileges, immunities, and advantages which can be granted to them consistent with the safety of society. If you ask me the nature and extent of these privileges, I answer that that is a question which the people of each State must decide for themselves. Illinois has decided that question for herself. We have said that in this State the negro shall not be a slave, nor shall he be a citizen. Kentucky holds a different doctrine. New York holds one different from either, and Maine one different from all. Virginia, in her policy on this question, differs in many respects from the others, and so on, until there is hardly two States in this Union that are exactly alike in regard to the relation of the white man and the negro. Nor can you reconcile them. Each State has the right to do as it pleases on all these questions, and no other State, or power on earth, has the right to interfere with us, or complain of us merely because our system differs from theirs. In the Compromise Measures of 1850, Mr. Clay declared that this great principle ought to exist in the Territories as well as in the States, and I reasserted his doctrine in the Kansas and Nebraska bill in 1854.

Your position cannot be made to understand, and those who are determined to vote for it, no matter whether he is a proslavery man in the north and a negro equality advocate in the south, and a negro equality advocate in the north, cannot be made to understand that in the Territories the people can do as they please on the slavery question under the Dred Scott decision. Let us see whether I cannot explain it to the satisfaction of all impartial men. Chief Justice Taney has said in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, that a negro slave being property, stands on an equal footing with other real property, and the owner may carry them into United States territory the same as he does other property. Suppose any two of you, neighbors, should conclude to go to Kansas, one carrying $100,000 worth of negro slaves and the other carrying $100,000 worth of mixed merchandise, including quantities of liquors. You both agree that under that decision you may carry your property to Kansas, but when you get there, the merchant who is possessed of the liquors is met by the Maine liquor law, which prohibits the sale or use of his property, and the owner of the slaves is met by equally unfriendly legislation, which makes his property worthless after he gets it there. What is the right to carry your property into the Territory worth to either, when unfriendly legislation in the Territory renders it worthless after you get it there? The slaveholder when he goes his slaves there is no law how to protect him in holding them, to slave code, no police regulation maintaining and supporting him in his rights, and he discovers at once that the absence of such friendly legislation excludes his property from the Territory, just as inevitably as if there was a positive Constitutional prohibition excluding it. Thus you find it is with any kind of property in a Territory, it depends for its protection on the local and municipal law. If the slaveholder wants slavery, they make friendly legislation to introduce it; but if they do not want it, they withhold all protection from it, and then it cannot exist there. Such was the view taken on the subject by different Southern men when the Nebraska bill passed. See the speech of Mr. Orr, of South Carolina, the present Speaker of the House of Representatives of Congress, made at that time, and there you will find this whole doctrine argued out at full length. Read the speeches of other Southern Congressmen, Senators and Representatives, made in 1854, and you will find that they took the same view of the subject as Mr. Orr—that slavery could never be forced on a people who did not want it. I hold that in this country there is no power on the face of the globe that can force any institution on an unwilling people. The great fundamental principle of our Government is that the people of each State and each Territory shall be left perfectly free to decide for themselves what shall be the nature and character of their institutions. When this Government was made, it was based on that principle. At the time of its formation there were twelve slaveholding States and one free State in this Union. Suppose this doctrine of Mr. Lincoln and the Republicans, of uniformity of law of all the States on the subject of slavery, had prevailed; suppose Mr. Lincoln himself had been a member of the Convention which framed the Constitution, and that he had been in that august body, and addressing the father of his country, had said as he did at Springfield:

"A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other."

What do you think would have been the result? Suppose he had made that Convention believe that this doctrine and they had acted upon it, what do you think would have been the result? Do you believe that the one free State would have ousted the twelve slaveholding States, and thus abolish slavery? On the contrary, would not the twelve slaveholding States have ousted the one free State, and under his doctrine have fastened slavery by an irrevocable Constitutional provision upon every inch of the American Republic? Thus you see that the doctrine he now advances, if proclaimed at the beginning of the Government, would have established slavery everywhere throughout the American continent, and are you willing, now that we have the majority, to exercise a power which we never would have submitted to were we in the minority? If the Southern States had attempted to control our institutions, and make the States all slave when they had the power, I ask you whether I would have submitted to it? If you would not, are you willing now, that we have become the strongest under that great principle of self-government that allows each State to do as it pleases, to attempt to control the Southern institutions? Then, my friends, I say to you that there is but one path of peace in this Republic, and that to administer this Government as our fathers made it, divided into free and slave States, allowing each State to decide for itself whether it wants slavery or not. If Illinois will settle the slavery question for herself, and mind her own business and let her neighbors alone, we will be at peace with Kentucky, and every other Southern State. If every other State in the Union will do the same there will be peace between the North and the South, and in the whole Union.
MR. LINCOLN'S REPLY.

My fellow-citizens: A very large portion of the speech which Judge Douglas has addressed to you has previously been delivered and put in print. I do not mean that for a bit upon the judge at all. If I had not been interrupted, I was going to answer a question that has been asked me very intimately, and that has already been more than once made and published. There has been an opportunity afforded to the public to see our respective views upon the topics discussed in a large portion of the speech which he has just delivered. I make these remarks for the purpose of excusing myself for not passing over the entire ground that the Judge has traversed. I however desire to take up some of the points that he has advanced to, and ask your attention to them, and I shall follow him backwards upon some notes which I have taken, reversing the order by beginning where he concluded.

The Judge has alluded to the Declaration of Independence, and insisted that negroes are not included in that Declaration; and that it is a slander upon the framers of that instrument, to suppose that negroes were meant therein; and he asks you: Is it possible to believe that Mr. Jefferson, who penned the immortal paper, could have supposed himself applying the language of that instrument to the negro race, and yet hold a portion of that race in slavery? Would he not at once have freed them? I only have to remark upon this part of the Judge's speech (and that, too, very briefly, for I shall not detain myself, or you, upon that point for any great length of time), that I believe the entire record of the world, from the date of the Declaration of Independence up to within three years ago, may be searched in vain for one single affirmation, from one single man, that the negro was not included in the Declaration of Independence; I think I may defy Judge Douglas to show that he ever said so, that Washington ever said so, that any President ever said so, that any member of Congress ever said so, or that any living man upon the whole earth ever said so, until the necessities of the present policy of the Democratic party, in regard to slavery, had to invent that affirmation. And I will remind Judge Douglas and this audience, that while Mr. Jefferson was the owner of slaves, as undoubtedly he was, in speaking upon this very subject, he used the strong language that he was 'trembled for his country when he remembered that God was just,' and I will offer the highest premium in my power to Judge Douglas if he will show that he, in all his life, ever uttered a sentiment at all akin to that of Jefferson.

The next thing to which I will ask your attention is the Judge's comments upon the fact, as he assumes it to be, that we cannot call our public meetings as Republican meetings; and he instances Taxwell county as one of the places where the friends of Lincoln have called a public meeting and have not dared to name it a Republican meeting. He instances Monroe county as another where Judge Trumbull and John Baker addressed the persons whom the Judge assumes to be the friends of Lincoln, calling them the "Free Democracy." I have the honor to inform Judge Douglas that he spoke in that very meeting of Taxwell last Saturday, and I was there on Tuesday last, and when he spoke there he spoke under a call not venturing to use the word "Democrats." [Turning to Judge Douglas.] What think you of this?

So again, there is another thing to which I would ask the Judge's attention upon this subject. In the contest of 1856 his party delighted to call themselves together as the "National Democracy," but now, if there should be a notice put up anywhere for a meeting of the "National Democracy," Judge Douglas and his friends would not come. They would not suppose themselves invited. They would understand that it was a call for those hateful postmasters whom he talks about.

Now a few words in regard to these extracts from speeches of mine, which Judge Douglas has read to you, and which he supposes are in very great contrast to each other. These speeches have been before the public for a considerable time, and if they have any incoherency in them, if there is any conflict in them, the public has had an opportunity to detect it. When the Judge says, in speaking on this subject, that I make speeches of one sort for the people of the northern end of the State, and of a different sort for the southern people, he assumes that I do not understand that my speeches will be put in print and read north and south. I knew all the while that my words would be before the public, and the one I mean to use, and the one at Charleston, would all be put in print and all the reading and intelligent men in the community would see them and know all about my opinions. And I have not supposed, nor do not now suppose, that there is any conflict whatever between them. But the Judge will have it that if we do not confess that there is a sort of inequality between the white and black races, which justifies us in making them slaves, we must, then insist, that there is a degree of equality that requires us to make them our slaves. Now, I have all the while taken a broad distinction in regard to that matter: and that is all there is in these different speeches which he arrays here, and the entire reading of either of the speeches will show that that distinction was made. Perhaps by taking two parts of the same speech, he could get up as much of a conflict as the one he has found. I have all the while maintained, that in so far as it should be insisted that there was an equality between the white and black races that should produce a perfect social and political equality, it was an impossibility. This you have seen in my printed speeches, and with it I have said, that in their right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," as proclaimed in that old Declaration, the inferior races are our equals. And these declarations I have constantly made in reference to the absolute moral question, to contemplate and consider when we are legislating about any new country which is not already cursed with the actual presence of the evil—slavery. I have never manifested any impatience with the necessities that spring from the actual presence of black people amongst us, and the actual existence of slavery amongst us, as a necessity of life; but I have insisted that, in legislating for new countries, where it does not exist, there is no just rule other than that of moral and abstract right. With reference to these considerations, and that which concerns us the right to the pursuit of happiness, were the just rules to be constantly referred to. There is no misunderstanding this, except by men interested to misunderstand it. I take it that I have to address an intelligent and reading community, who will perceive what I say, weigh it, and then judge whether I advance bigoted or unsound views, or whether I advance hypocritical, and deceptive, and contrary views in different parts of the country. I believe myself to be guilty of no such thing as the latter, though, of course, I cannot claim that I am entirely free from all error in the opinion I advance.

The Judge has also detailed us awhile in regard to the distinction between his party and our party. His he assumes to be a national party—ours a sectional one. He does this in asking the question whether this country has any interest in the maintenance of the Republican party? He assumes that our party is altogether sectional—that the party to which he adheres is national; and the argument is, that no party can be a rightful party—can be based upon rightful principles—unless it can announce its principles everywhere. I presume that Judge Douglas could not go into Russia and announce the doctrine of our national Democracy; he could not denounce the doctrine of kings and emperors and monarchies in Russia; and it may be true of this country, that in some places we may not be able to proclaim a doctrine as clearly true as the truth of Democracy, because there is a section so directly opposed to it that they will not tolerate us in doing so. Is it the true test of the soundness of a doctrine, that in some places people won't let you proclaim it? Is that the way to test the truth of any doctrine? Why, I understand that at one time the people of Chicago would not let Judge Douglas preach a certain favorite doctrine of his. I commend to his consideration the question, whether he takes that as a test of the soundness of what he wanted to preach.
There is another thing to which I wish to ask attention for a little while on this occasion. What has always been the evidence brought forward to prove that the Republicans could ever have been a sectional party? The纽论 was that the Union of the Union the people did not let the Republicans proclaim their doctrines amongst them. That has been the main evidence brought forward—that they had no supporters, or substantially none, in the slave States. The South have not taken hold of our principles as we announce them; nor does Judge Douglas new grasp them with these principles. We have a Republican State Platform, laid down in Spring- field in June last, stating our position all the way through the questions before the country, and now advanced in this canvass. Judge Douglas and I have made perhaps forty speeches apiece, and we have now for the fifth time met face to face in debate, and up to this day I have not found either Judge Douglas or any friend of his taking hold of the Republican platform or laying his finger upon anything in that it is wrong. I ask you all to recollect that. Judge Douglas turns away from the platform of principles to the fact that he can find people somewhere who will not allow us to announce those principles. If he had great confidence that our principles were wrong, he would take hold of them and demonstrate them to be wrong. But he does not do so. The only evidence he has of their being wrong is in the fact that there are people who won't allow us to present them. I ask again is that the way to test the soundness of a doctrine?

I ask his attention also to the fact that by the rule of nationality he is himself first becoming sectional. I ask his attention to the fact that his speeches would not go as current now south of the Ohio river as they have formerly gone there. I ask his attention to the fact that he felicitates himself to-day that all the Democrats of the free States are agreeing with him, while he omits to tell us that the Democrats of any slave State agree with him. If he has not thought of this, I commend to his consideration the evidence in his own declaration, on this day, in the beginning of this canvass. I see it rapidly approaching. Whatever may be the result of this ephemeral contest between Judge Douglas and myself, I see the day rapidly approaching when his pill of sectionalism, which he has been thrusting down the throats of Republicans for years past, will be crumbled down his own throat.

Now in regard to what Judge Douglas said (in the beginning of his speech) about the Compromise of 1850, containing the principle of the Nebraska bill, although I have many views upon that subject, yet as I have canvassed, I will, if you please, detain you a little with them. I have always maintained, so far as I was able, that there was nothing of the principle of the Nebraska bill in the Compromise of 1850 at all—nothing whatever. Where can you find the principle of the Nebraska bill in that Compromise? If any evidence of the Compromise organizing the Territories of New Mexico and Utah, it was expressly provided in these two acts, that when they came to be admitted into the Union they should be admitted with or without slavery, as they should choose, by their own Constitutions. Nothing was said in either of those acts as to what was to be done in relation to slavery during the territorial existence of those Territories, while Henry Clay constantly made the declaration (Judge Douglas recognizing him as a leader) that, in his opinion, the old Mexican laws would control that question during the territorial existence, and that those old Mexican laws excluded slavery. How can that be used as a principle for declaring that during that territorial existence as well as at the time of framing the Constitution, the people, if you please, might have slaves if they wanted them? I am not discussing the question whether it is right or wrong; but how are the New Mexican and Utah laws pattern for the Nebraska bill? I maintain that the organization of Utah and New Mexico did not establish a general principle at all. It had no feature of establishing a general principle. The acts to which I have referred were a part of a general system of Compromises. They did not lay down what was proposed as a regular policy for the Territories. This fact is a great agreement to this particular case, that way, or other things were done that were to be a compensation for it. They were allowed to come in in that shape, because in another way it was paid for—considering that as a part of that system of measures called the Compromise of 1850, which finally included half a dozen acts. It included the admission of California as a free State, which was kept out of the Union for half a year because it had formed a free Constitution. It included the settlement of the boundary of Texas, which had been a slave Territory, and which was in itself a slavery question; for, if you pushed the line farther west, you made Texas larger, and made more slave Territory; and, while you drew the line toward the east, you narrowed the boundary and diminished the domain of slavery and by so much increased free Territory. It included the abolition of the slave-trade in the District of Columbia. It included the passage of a new Fugitive Slave law. All these things were put together, and though passed in separate acts, were severally in their influence (as the speeches at the time will show), made more oppressive to one another, and for this each other. Each gave its weight, with the understanding that the other measures were to pass, and by this system of Compromises, in that series of measures, these two bills—the New Mexico and Utah bills—were passed; and I say for that reason they could not be taken as models, framed upon their own intrinsic principle, for all future Territories. And I have the evidence of this in the fact that Judge Douglas, a year afterward, or more than a year afterward, perhaps, when he first introduced bills for the purpose of framing new Territories, did not attempt to follow these bills of New Mexico and Utah; and even when he introduced this Nebraska bill, I think you will discover that he did not exactly follow them. But I do not wish to dwell at great length upon this branch of the discussion. My own opinion is that a thorough investigation will show more plainly that the New Mexico and Utah bills were part of a system of Compromise, and not designed as patterns for future territorial legislation; and that this Nebraska bill did not follow them as a pattern at all. The purpose is in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any odious distinctions between free and slave States. I am altogether unaware that the Republicans are in favor of making any odious distinctions between the free and slave States. But there still is a difference, I think, between Judge Douglas and his friends. In this, I suppose the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends, and the Republicans on the contrary, is, that the Judge is not in favor of making any difference between slavery and liberty—that he is in favor of eradicating, of prizing out all the distinctions of preference in this country for free or slave institutions; and consequently every sentiment he utters discards the idea that there is any wrong in slavery. Every thing that emanates from him or his coadjutors in their course of policy, carefully excludes the thought that there is any thing wrong in this; and consequently all of these things will be seen to exclude the thought that there is any thing whatever wrong in slavery. If you will take the Judge's speeches, and select the short and pointed sentences expressed by him—as his declaration that he disapproves of slavery is voted up or down—you will see at once that this is perfectly logical, if you do not admit that slavery is wrong. If you do admit that it is wrong, Judge Douglas cannot logically say he doesn't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. Judge Douglas declares that if any censure of slavery they have a right to have it. He can say that logically, if he says that there is no wrong in slavery; but if you admit that there is a wrong in it, he cannot logically say that any body has a right to do wrong. He must insist, that upon the score of equality, the owners of slaves and owners of property—of horses and every other sort of property—should be alike and hold them alike in a new Territory. That is perfectly logical, if the two species of property are alike and are equally founded in right. But if you admit that one of them is wrong, you cannot institute an inequality between right and wrong. And from this difference of sentiment—the belief on the part of one that the institution is wrong, and a policy springing from that belief which looks to the arrest of the enlargement of that wrong and this enactment of wrong and a policy springing from that sentiment which will tolerate no idea of preventing that wrong from growing larger, and looks to the never being an end of it through all the existence of things—arises the real difference be-
between Judge Douglas and his friends on the one hand, and the Republicans on the other. I find myself in the class of the country who contemplate slavery as a moral, social and political evil, having due regard for its existence amongst us and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and to all the Constitutional objections which have been brought about it; but nevertheless, I hold that policy looks to the prevention of it as a wrong, and looks hopefully to the time when a wrong as it may come to an end.

Judge Douglas has again, for I believe, the fifth time, if not the seventh, in my presence, reiterated his charge of a conspiracy or combination between the National Democrats and Republicans. What evidence Judge Douglas has upon this subject I know not, inasmuch as he never favors us with any. I have said upon a former occasion, and I do not choose to suppress it now, that I have no objection to the division in the Judge's party. He got up himself. It was all his and their work. He had, I think, a great deal more to do with the steps that led to the Lexington Constitution than Mr. Buchanan had; though at last, when they reached it, they quarreled over it, and their friends divided upon it. I am very free to confess to Judge Douglas that I have no objection to the division; but I defy the Judge to show any evidences that I have in any way promoted that division, unless he insists on being a witness himself in merely saying so. I can give all fair friends of Judge Douglas here to understand exactly the view that Republicans take in regard to that division. Don't you remember how two years ago the opponents of the Democratic party were divided between Fremont and Fillmore? I guess you do. Any Democrat who remembers that division, will remember also that he was at the time very glad of it, and then he will be able to see all there is between the National Democrats and the Republicans. What we now think of the two divisions of Democrats, you then thought of the Fremont and Fillmore divisions. That is all there is of it.

But, if the Judge continues to put forward the declaration that there is an unavowed and unnatural alliance between the Republican and the National Democrats, I now want to ask, why do you ever treat him as an entire competent witness upon that subject? I want to call to the Judge's attention an attack which made upon me in the first one of these debates, at Ottawa, on the 21st of August. In order to fix extreme Abolitionism upon me, Judge Douglas read a set of resolutions which he had declared had been passed by a Republican State Convention on or about the 10th of October, at Springfield, Illinois, and he declared that he had taken part in that Convention. It turned out that although a few men calling themselves an anti-Illinois State Convention at Springfield about that time, neither did I take any part in it, nor did it pass the resolutions or any such resolutions as Judge Douglas read. So apparent had it become that the resolutions which he had read had not been passed at Springfield at all, nor by a State Convention in which I had taken part, that seven days afterwards at Freeport, Judge Douglas declared that his mistake was due to Charles H. Laupher, editor of the State Register, and Thomas L. Harris, member of Congress in that District, and he promised in that speech that when he went to Springfield he would go there to investigate the matter. Since then Judge Douglas has been to Springfield, and I presume he has made the investigation; but a month has passed since he has been there, and so far as I know, he has made no report of the result of his investigation. I have waited as I think sufficient time for the report of the investigation, and I have some curiosity to see and hear it. A fraud— an absolute forgery was committed, and the perpetuation of it was traced to the three—Laupher, Harris and Douglas. Whether it can be narrowed in any way so as to exonerate any one of them, is what Judge Douglas' report would probably tell us. It is true that the set of resolutions read by Judge Douglas were published in the Illinois State Register on the 16th of October, 1854, as being the resolutions of an anti-Illinois Convention, which had sat in that same month of October, at Springfield, and the question is still behind, which of the three, if not all of them, committed that forgery. The idea that it was done by mistake is absurd. The article in the Illinois Register, makes me as a party to the resolutions of that Springfield Convention, showing that the writer of the article had the real proceedings before him, and purposely threw out the genuine resolutions passed by the Convention, and fraudulently substituted the others. Laupher then, as now, was the official of the Register, so that there is no policy that looks to the prevention of it as a wrong, and looks hopefully to the time when a wrong as it may come to an end.

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While we were at Freeport, in one of these joint discussions, I answered certain interrogatories which Judge Douglas had propounded to me, and pronounced some to him, which he in a sort of way answered. The third one of those interrogatories I have with me and wish now to make some comments upon it. It was in the nature of this: "If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that the States cannot exclude slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adhering to and following such decision, as a rule of political action?"

The interrogatory Judge Douglas made no answer in any just sense of the word. He contented himself with the answer that in case the Supreme Court should make such a decision, he would have to address himself to the people, or the legislature, or courts of the American states, to effectuate the purpose. It was possible for the Supreme Court to make such a decision. He admitted at no price propounding the interrogatory. I had not propounded it without some reflection, and I wish now to address it to this audience some remarks in regard to the Supreme Court decision and the political action of the United States.

The essence of the Dred Scott case is compressed into the sentence which I will now read: "Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution," I repeat it, "the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution?" What is it to be "affirmed in" the Constitution? Made firm in the Constitution—made so that it cannot be separated from the Constitution without destroying the Constitution, durable as the Constitution, and part of the Constitution. Now, remembering the plainness of the Constitution which I have read, affirming that that instrument is the supreme law of the land, that the Judges of every State shall be bound by it, any law or constitution of any State to the contrary notwithstanding, that the right of property in a slave is affirmed in that Constitution, is made, formed, into, and cannot be separated from it without destroying it; durable as the instrument; part of the instrument—what follows as a short and even a splendid argument from it? I think it follows, and I submit to the consideration of men capable of arguing whether as I state it, in a logical form, the argument has any faith in it?

Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.

The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.

To the extent that nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy the right of property in a slave.

I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument; assuming the truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have capacity at all to understand it, follows inevitably. Here is a fault in it as I think, but the fault is not in the reasoning; but the falsehood in fact is a fault of the premises. I believe that the right of property in a slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, and therefore I think it is. I believe that the Supreme Court and the advocates of that decision may search in vain for the place in the Constitution where the right of a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed. I say, therefore, that one of the premises is not true in fact. But it is true with Judge Douglas. It is true with the Supreme Court who pronounced it. They are stopped from denying it, and being stopped from denying it, the conclusion follows that the Constitution of the United States being the supreme law, no constitution or law can interfere with it.

I believe in the decision that the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. I say to Judge Douglas and to all others, that I think it will take a better answer than a mere to show that those who have said that the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution are not prepared to show that no constitution or law can interfere with that right. I say I believe it will take a far better argument than a mere to show the minds of intelligent men that whatever has said, is not prepared, whenever public sentiment is so far advanced as to justify it, to say the other. This is but another argument, and the opinion of one very humble man, but it is my opinion that the Dred Scott decision, as it is, never would have been made in its present form if the party that made it had not been sustained previously by the elections. My own opinion is, that the new Dred Scott decision, if it is to be made, can be made by the right of the people of the States to exclude slavery, will never be made, if that party is not sustained by the people. I believe, further, that it is just as sure to be made as tomorrow is to come; and if that party shall be sustained, I have said upon a former occasion, and I repeat it now, that the course of argument that Judge Douglas makes use of upon this subject (I charge not his motives in this), is preparing the public mind for that new Dred Scott decision. I have asked him again to point out to me the reasons for his first adherence to the Dred Scott decision as it is. I have turned his attention to the fact that General Jackson differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. I have asked his attention to the fact that Jefferson differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. Jefferson said, that "Judges are as honest as other men, and not more so." And he said, substantially, that "whenever a free people should give up an absolute submission to any department of government, retaining for themselves no appeal from it, their liberties were gone." I have asked his attention to the fact that he himself was one of the most active instruments at one time in breaking down the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, because it had made a decision distasteful to him—a struggle ending in the remarkable circumstance of his sitting down at one end of the table, who were to overs凌ingly that decision—getting his title of Judge in that very way.

So far in this controversy I can get no answer at all from Judge Douglas upon these subjects. Not one can I get from him, except that he will stand by the decision and says, "All of us who stand by the decision of the Supreme Court are the friends of the Constitution: all you fellows that dare question it in any way, are the enemies of the Constitution."

Now, in this very devoted adherence to this decision, in opposition to John C. Calhoun the greatest political leader whom he has recognized as a leader—in opposition to his former self and history, there is something very marked. And the manner in which he adheres to it—not as being right upon the merits, as he conceives (because he did not discuss that at all), but as being absolutely obligatory upon every one, simply because of the source from whence it comes—as that which no man can gainsay, whatever it may be—this is another marked feature of his adherence to that decision. It marks it in this respect, that it commits him to the next decision, whatever that decision may be, as being absolutely obligatory as this one, since he does not investigate it, and won't inquire whether this opinion is right or wrong. So he takes the next one without inquiring whether it is right or wrong. He teaches men this doctrine, and in so doing prepares the public mind to take the next decision when it comes, without any inquiry. In this I think I argue fairly (without questioning motives at all), that Judge Douglas is most ingeniously and powerfully preparing the public mind to take that decision when it comes; and not only so, but he is doing it in various other ways. In these general maxims about liberty—in his assertions that he "don't care whether slavery is voted up or voted down," that "whatsoever slavery has a right to have it," that "upon principles of equality it should be allowed to go everywhere," that "there is no inconsistency between slavery and liberty," and in the way of popular meetings, and in the also preparing (whether purposely or not) the way for making the institution of slavery national. I repeat, for I wish no misunderstanding.
ing, that I do not charge that he means it so; but I call upon your minds to inquire, if you were going to get the best instrument you could find, and the most ingenious way, to prepare the public mind for this movement, operating in the free States, where there is now an abhorrence of the institution of slavery, could you find an argument so capable of doing it as Judge Douglas? or one employed in so apt a way to do it?

I have said once before, and I will repeat it now, that Mr. Clay, when he was once answering an objection to the Colonization Society, that it had a tendency to the ultimate emancipation of the slaves, said that "those who would express all tendencies to liberty and ultimate emancipation must do more than put down the beneficial efforts of the Colonization Society—they must go back to the era of our liberty and independence, and muzzle the cannon that thunders its annual joyous return—they must blot out the moral lights around us—they must penetrate the human soul, and eradicate the light of reason and the love of liberty!" And I do think—

I repeat, though I said it on a former occasion—that Judge Douglas, and whoever like him teaches that the negro has no share, humble though it may be, in the Declaration of Independence, is going back to the era of our liberty and independence, and, so far as I see him lie, muzzling the cannon that thunders its annual joyous return; that he is blowing out the moral lights around us, when he contends that whoever wants slaves has a right to hold them; that he is penetrating, so far as lies in his power, the human soul, and crucifying the light of reason and the love of liberty, when he is in every possible way preparing the public mind, by his vast influence, for making the institution of slavery perpetual and national.

There is, my friends, only one other point to which I will call your attention for the remaining time that I have left me, and perhaps I shall not occupy the entire time. I say that one point may not escape me through it.

Among the interlocutors that Judge Douglas proffered to me at Freeport, there was one in about this language: "Are you opposed to the acquisition of any further territory to the United States, unless slavery shall first be prohibited therein?" I answered as I thought, in this way, that I am not opposed to the acquisition of additional territory, and that I would support a proposition for the acquisition of additional territory, according as my supporting it was or was not calculated to abate this slavery question amongst us. I then proposed to Judge Douglas another interrogatory, which was correlative to that: "Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory in disregard of how it may affect us upon the slavery question?" Judge Douglas answered, that, in his own way he answered it. I believe that, although he took a good many words to answer me, it was not an answer to any other than my own. The substance of his answer was, that this country would continue to expand—that it would need additional territory—that it was as absurd to suppose that the public interest would continue upon our present territory, enlarging in population as we are, as it would be to keep a boy twelve years of age and expect him to grow to man's size without bursting the hoops. I believe it was something like that. Consequently he was in favor of the acquisition of further territory, as fast as we might need it, in disregard of how it might affect us upon the slavery question. May be it is; let us consider that for a while. This will probably, in the run of things, become one of the concrete manifestations of this slavery question. If Judge Douglas' policy upon this question succeeds and gets fairly settled down, until all opposition is crushed out, the next thing will be a grab for the territory of poor Mexico, an invasion of the rich lands of South America, then the adjoining islands will follow, each one of which promises additional slave fields. And this question is to be left to the people of those countries for settlement. When we shall get Mexico, I don't know whether the Judge will be in favor of the Mexican people for themselves and all others; because we know the Judge has a great horror for men and I understand that the people of Mexico are most decidedly a race of mongrels. I understand that there is not more than one person in ten of them who is not a mongrel, and if I suppose from the Judge's previous declaration that when we get Mexico or any considerable portion of it, that he will be in favor of these mongrels settling the question, which would bring him somewhat into collision with his horror of an inferior race.

It is to be remembered, though, that this power of acquiring additional territory is a power confined to the President and Senate of the United States. It is a power not under the control of the representatives of the people any further than they, the President and the Senate, can be considered the representatives of the people. Let me illustrate that by a case we have in our history. When we acquired the territory from Mexico in the Mexican war, the House of Representatives, composed of the immediate representatives of the people, all the time insisted that the territory thus to be acquired should be brought into union upon condition that slavery should be forever prohibited therein, upon the terms and in the language that slavery had been prohibited from coming into this country. That was linked upon constantly, and never failed to call forth an assurance that any territory thus acquired should have that prohibition in it; so far as the House of Representatives was concerned. But at last the President and Senate acquired the territory without asking the House of Representatives anything at all, and took it without that prohibition. They have the power of acquiring territory without the immediate representatives of the people being called upon to say anything about it, and thus furnishing a very apt and powerful means of bringing new territory into the Union, and when it is once brought into the country, involving us in slavery agitation. It is, therefore, as I think, a very important question for the consideration of the American people, whether the policy of bringing in additional territory, without considering at all how it may affect us upon the safety of the Union in reference to this one great disturbing element in our national policies, shall be adopted as the policy of the country. You will bear in mind that it is to be acquired, according to the Judge's view, as fast as it is needed, and the indefinite part of this indefinite policy is that Judge Douglas and his class of men to decide how fast it is needed. We have no clear and certain way of determining or demonstrating how fast territory is needed by the necessities of the country. Whoever wants to go out filling the gaps, then, thinks that he is justified in filling the gaps. Whoever wants wider slave fields, feels sure that some additional territory is needed as slave territory. Then it is as easy to show the necessity of additional slave territory as it is to assert any thing that is incapable of absolute demonstration. Absolutely nothing a man can say about property or territory, it is very easy to assert, but much less easy to disprove, that it is necessary for the wants of the country.

And now it only remains for me to say that I think it is a very grave question for the American people to consider, whether in view of the facts that this slavery question has been the only one that has ever endangered our Republican institutions—the only one that has ever threatened or menaced a dissolution of the Union—that has ever disturbed us in such a way as to make it appear a danger to our unity in view of these facts, I think it is an exceedingly interesting and important question for this people to consider, whether we shall engage in the policy of acquiring additional territory, discarding altogether from our consideration, while discarding this territory, the question how it may affect us in regard to this the only endangering element to our liberties and national greatness. The Judge's view has been expressed. I, in my answer to his question, have expressed mine. I think it will become an important and practical question. Our views are before the public, but I am willing and anxious that they should consider them fully—that they should turn it about and consider the importance of the question, and arrive at a just conclusion as to whether it is or is not wise in the people of the Union, in the acquisition of new territory, to consider whether it will add to the people we bring in danger that now exists among us—whether it will add to the one only danger that has ever
MR. DOUGLAS'S REPLY.

GENTLEMEN: The highest compliment you can pay me during the brief half hour that I have to conclude is by observing a strict silence. I desire to be heard rather than to be applauded.

The first criticism that Mr. Lincoln makes on my speech was that it was in substance what I have said everywhere else in the State where I have addressed the people. I wish I could say the same of his speech. Why, the reason I complain of him is because he makes one speech north and another south. Because he has one set of sentiments for the abolition counties and another set for the counties opposed to Abolitionism. My point of complaint against him is that I cannot induce him to hold up the same standard, to carry the same flag in all parts of the State. He does not pretend, and no other man will, that I have one set of principles for Galesburg and another for Charleston. He does not pretend that I hold to one doctrine in Chicago and an opposite one in Jonesboro. I have proved that he has a different set of principles for each of these localities. All I asked of him was that he should deliver the speech that he has made here today not as it was begun in the right spot, but as it was finished in the right spot. It would have settled the question between us as in that doubtful county. Here I understand him to reaffirm the doctrine of negro equality, and to insist that the Declaration of Independence the negro is declared equal to the white man. He tells you to-day that the negro was included in the Declaration of Independence when it was asserted that all men were created equal. ["We believe it."]

Very well. Mr. Lincoln asserts today as he did at Chicago that the negro was included in that clause of the Declaration of Independence which says that all men were created equal and endowed by the Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. If the negro was made equal to the white man, then his rights as a negro were established by Divine law, and were the inalienable right, how came he to say at Charleston to the Kentuckians residing in that section of our State, that the negro was physically inferior to the white man, belonged to an inferior race, and he was for keeping him as an inferior race, and he was for keeping him in that inferior condition. There he gave the people to understand that there was no moral question involved, because the inferiority being established, it was only a question of degree and not a question of right; here, to-day, instead of making it a question of degree, he makes it a moral question, says that it is a great crime to hold the negro in that inferior condition. ["He's right."] Is he right now or was he right in Charleston? ["Don't know."]

He is right there, sir, in his estimation, not because he is consistent, but because he can trim his principles any way in any section so as to secure votes. All I desire of him is that he will declare the same principles in the section that he does in the north.

But did you notice how he answered my position that a man should hold the same principles throughout the length and breadth of this Republic? He said, "Would Judge Douglas go to Russia and proclaim the same principles he does here?" I would, and if I go to Russia my principles toward the American Constitution are the same. If my principles are the same as in Russia, it is not under the American Constitution, if Russia was a part of the American Republic, under our Federal Constitution, and I was sworn to support the Constitution, I would maintain the same doctrine in Russia that I do in Illinois. The slaveholding States are governed by the same Federal Constitution as we are, and hence a man's principles, in order to be in harmony with the Constitution, must be the same in the south as they are in the north, the same in the free States as they are in the slave States. Whenever a man advocates one set of principles in one section, and another set in another section, his claim to be in violation of the spirit of the Constitution which he has sworn to support. When Mr. Lincoln went to Congress in 1847, and laying his hand upon the Holy Evangelists, made a solemn vow in the presence of high Heaven that he would be faithful to the Constitution—what did he mean? The Constitution as he expounds it in Galesburg, or the Constitution as he expounds it in Charleston.

Mr. Lincoln has devoted considerable time to the circumstance that at Ottawa I read a series of resolutions as having been adopted at Springfield, in this State, on the 4th or 6th of October, 1854, which happened not to have been adopted there. He has used hard names; has dared to talk about fraud, about forgery, and has insinuated that there was a conspiracy between Mr. Lamphier, Mr. Harris, and myself to perpetrate a forgery. Now, bear in mind that he does not deny that these resolutions were adopted in a majority of all the Republican counties of this State in that year; he does not deny that they were declared to be the platform of this Republican party in the first Congressional District, in the second, in the third, and in many counties of the fourth, and that they thus became the platform of his party in a majority of the counties upon which he now relies for support; he does not deny the truthfulness of the resolutions, but takes exception to the spot on which they were adopted. He takes to himself great merit because he thinks they were not adopted on the right spot for me to use them against him, just as he was very severe in Congress upon the Government of his country when he thought that he had discovered in it a wrong in the right spot, and was therefore unjust. He is very hard to make out that there is something very extraordinary in the place where the thing was done, and not in the thing itself. I never believed before that Abraham Lincoln would be guilty of what he has done this day in regard to these resolutions. In the first place, the moment it was intimated to me that they had been adopted at Aurora and Rockford instead of Springfield, I did not wait for him to call my attention to the fact, but led off and explained in my first speech after that, and in all the other speeches that the mistake was, and how it had been made. I supposed that for an honest man, conscious of his own recidivism, that explanation would be sufficient. I did not wait for him, after the mistake was made, to call my attention to it, but frankly explained it at once as an honest man would. I made the authorship of these resolutions known to the Springfield Republican Convention. That is the way I have handled this matter. I have sent copies of this newspaper containing them. I read them from the newspaper just as Mr. Lincoln reads the proceedings of meetings held years ago from the newspapers. After giving that explanation, I did not think there was an honest man in the State of Illinois who doubted that it had been led into the error, if it was such, innocently, in the way I detailed; and I will now say that I do not now believe that there is an honest man on the face of the globe who will not respect with abhorrence and disgust Mr. Lincoln's indifference of his country's interests in that forgery, if it was a forgery. Does Mr. Lincoln wish to point out those things to the point of personal difficulties here? I commenced this contest by treating him courteously and kindly; I always spoke of him in words of respect, and in return he has sought, and is now seeking to divert public attention from it by raising a new question of his revolutionary principles by imposing men's sincerity, integrity, and inviting personal quarrels.
I declared to conduct this contest with him like a gentleman, but I spurn the insinuation of complacency and fraud made upon the simple circumstance of an editor of a newspaper who, in his capacity as such, has made a mistake as to the acts of Mr. Lincoln, by a public act of the majority of the Republican delegates to the convention of that year. They were adopted in a majority of the Republican counties in the State, and when I asked him at Ottawa whether they formed the platform upon which he stood, he did not, and to this he did not oppose any one of them. He then thought, as I thought, that those resolutions were adopted at the Springfield Convention, but excused himself by saying that he was not there when the resolutions were adopted, and had gone to a place where he might be present, in order to avoid being present at the Convention. He saw them published as having been adopted at Springfield, and so did I, and he knew that if there was a mistake in regard to them, that I had nothing under heaven to do with it. Besides, you find that in all those northern counties where the Republican candidates are running pledged to him, that the Convention which nominated them adopted that identical platform. One cardinal point in that platform which it shrinks from is this—that there shall be no more slave States admitted into the Union, even if the people want them. Loyalty stands pledged against the admission of any more slave States. ["Right, so do we."] So do you, so say. Farmersworth stands pledged against the admission of any more slave States. Washburn stands pledged the same way. The candidate for the Legislature who is running on Lincoln's ticket in Henderson and Warren counties, committed by his vote in the Legislature to the same thing, and I am informed you do not know of the fact, that your candidate here is also so pledged. ["Hurra for him, good."] No, you Republicans all hurra for him, and for the doctrine of "no more slave States," and yet Lincoln tells you that his conscience will not permit him to sanction that doctrine. And complains because the resolutions I read at Ottawa may injure him, as a member of the party, responsible for sanctioning the doctrine of no more slave States. You are one way, you confess, and he is the other, and yet you are both governed by principle in supporting one another. If it be true, as I have shown it, that the whole Republican party in the northern part of the State stands committed to the abolition of slave States, and that this same doctrine is repudiated by the Republicans in the other part of the State, I wonder whether Mr. Lincoln and his party do not present the case which he cited from the Senators of a house divided against itself which cannot stand! I desire to know what are Mr. Lincoln's principles and the principles of his party. Are the States to be divided, and the party with which I am identified hold, that the people of each State old and new, have the right to decide the slavery question for themselves, and when I used the expression that they did not care whether slavery was voted up or down, I used it in the connection that I was for allowing Kansas to do just as she pleased in the slavery question. I said that I did not care whether they voted slavery up or down, because they can do as they please on the question, and therefore my action would not be controlled by any such consideration, but yet as it is a question of unrighteousness and injustice, and the party with which he acts, speak out their principles so that they may be understood? Why do they claim to be one thing in one part of the State and another in the other party? Whenever I allude to the A. L. convention doctrine, which he considers a slander to be charged with being in favor of, you all infer, and hurra for them, not knowing that your candidate is pledged to acknowledge them. I have a few words to say upon the Dred Scott decision, which has troubled the brain of Mr. Lincoln so much. He insists that that decision would carry slavery into the free States, notwithstanding that the decision says directly the opposite to it, and goes into a long argument to make you believe that I am in favor of, and would sanction the doctrine that would allow slaves to go into the free States and hold as slaves contrary to our Constitution and laws. Mr. Lincoln knew better when he wrote that speech, and he knew that one newspaper, and so far as within my knowledge but one, ever asserted that doctrine, and that was the first man in either House of Congress that read that article in debate, and denounced it on the floor of the Senate as revolutionary. When the Washington Union, on the 17th of last November, published an article to that effect, I branded it at once, and denounced it, and hence the Union has been pursuing me ever since. The Union was got out of the hands of the slave States south of the Potomac river that held any such doctrine. Mr. Lincoln knows that there is not a member of the Supreme Court who holds that doctrine; he knows that every one of them, as shown by their opinions, holds the doctrine, and so voted, that the Supreme Court into disgrace among the people? It looks as if during an effort made to destroy public confidence in the highest judicial tribunal on earth. Suppose he succeeds in destroying public confidence, and goes to the court so that the strong arm of violence will be substituted for the decisions of the court of justice. He complains because I did not go into an argument reviewing Chief Justice Taney's opinion, and the other opinions of the different judges, to determine whether their reasoning is right or wrong on the questions of law. What are you to think of it? He wants to take an appeal from the Supreme Court, in all the cases, to determine whether the questions of law were decided properly. He is going to appeal from the Supreme Court of the United States to every town meeting in the hope that he can excite a prejudice against that court, and on the score of that prejudice into the Senate of the United States, when he could not get there on his own principles, or his own merits. Suppose he should succeed in getting into the Senate of the United States, what then will he have to do with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case? Can he reverse that decision when he gets there? Can he act upon it? Has the Senate any right to reverse it or revise it? He will not pretend that it has. Then why drag the matter into this contest, unless for the purpose of making a false issue, by which he can direct public opinion from the people to the Congress? He says that the Supreme Court decided that if a bank of the United States was a necessary fiscal agent of the Government, it was Constitutional, and if not, that it was unconstitutional, and also, that whether or not it was necessary for that purpose, was a political question, for the Congress and the judicial one. Then, how do the Court determine? Hence the Court would not determine the bank unconstitutional. Jackson respected the decision, obeyed the law, executed it, and carried it into effect during its existence; but after the charter of the bank expired and a proportion of it, all the power of the courts and judges, like the rest of the Constitution, he would have been established and supreme, and, therefore, I am against it on Constitutional grounds as well as those of expediency." Is Congress bound to pass every act that is Constitutional? Why, there are a thousand things that are Constitutional, but yet inexpedient and unnecessary, and you surely would not vote for them merely because you had the right to it? And because General Jackson would not do a thing which he had a right to do, but did not deem expedient or proper, Mr. Lincoln is going to justify himself in doing just the opposite, and which he has no right to do, if he ask him, whether he is not bound to respect and obey the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as me? The Constitution has created that court to decide all Constitutional questions in the last resort, and when such decisions have been made, they become the law of the land, and you, and he, and myself, and every other good citizen are bound by them. Yet, he argues that I am bound by their decisions and he is not. He says that their decisions are binding on Democrats, but not on Republicans. Are not Republicans bound by the laws of the land as well as Democrats? And what the Constitution has fixed the construction of the Constitution on the validity of a given law, is not their decision binding upon Republicans as well as upon Democrats? In is it possible that you Republicans have the right to make your laws and oppose the laws of the land and the constitutional authorities, and yet hold us Demo-
MR. LINCOLN'S SPEECH.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I have had no opportunity to confer with Judge Douglas, but I will venture to say that he and I will perfectly agree that your absence, both when I speak and when he speaks, will be most agreeable to us.

In the month of May, 1856, the elements in the State of Illinois, which have since been consolidated into the Republican party, assembled in a State Convention at Bloomington. They adopted at that time what, in political language, is called a platform. In June of the same year, the elements of the Republican party in the nation assembled together in a National Convention at Philadelphia. They adopted what is called the National Platform. In June, 1856—the present year—the Republicans of Illinois reassembled at Springfield, in State Convention, and adopted again their platform, as I suppose, not differing in any essential particular from either of the former ones, but perhaps adding something in relation to the new developments of political progress in the country.

The Convention that assembled in June last did me the honor, if it be one, and I esteem it such, to nominate me as their candidate for the United States Senate. I have supposed that, in entering upon this canvass, I stood generally upon these platforms, that they now met together at Springfield, and I am unaware that in this canvass, from the beginning until today, any one of our adversaries has taken hold of our platforms, or held his finger upon any thing that he calls wrong in them.

In the very first one of these joint discussions between Senator Douglas and myself, Senator Douglas, without alluding at all to these platforms, or any one of them, of which I have spoken, attempted to hold me responsible for a set of resolutions passed long before the meeting of either one of these Conventions of which I have spoken. And as a ground for holding me responsible for these resolutions, he assumed that they had been passed at a State Convention of the Republican party, and that I took part in that Convention. It was discovered afterward that this was erroneous, that the resolutions which he endeavored to hold me responsible for, had not been passed by any State Convention any where—had not been passed at Springfield, where he supposed they had, or supposed that they had, and that they had been passed in no Convention in which I had taken part. This Judge, nevertheless, was not willing to give up the point that he was endeavoring to make upon me, and he therefore thought to still hold me to the point that he was endeavoring to make, by showing that the resolutions that he read, had been passed at a local Convention in the northern part of the State, although it was not a local Convention that embraced my residence at all, nor one that reached, as I suppose, nearer than one hundred and fifty or two hundred miles of where I was when it met, nor one in which I took any part at all. He also introduced other resolutions, passed at other meetings, and by combining the whole, although they were all antecedent to the two State Conventions, and the one National Convention I have mentioned, still he is led and now insists, as I understand, that I am in some way responsible for them.

At这件ones, on our third meeting, I insisted to the Judge that I was no way rightfully held responsible for the proceedings of this local meeting or Convention in which I had and in which I was in no way embraced; but I insisted to him that if he thought I was responsible for every man or every set of men by whom I happen to be my friends, the rule ought to work both ways, and he ought to be responsible for the acts and resolutions of all men or set of men who were or are now his supporters and friends, and gave him a pretty long string of resolutions passed by men who are now his friends, and announcing doctrines for which he does not desire to be held responsible.

This still does not satisfy Judge Douglas. He still adheres to his proposition, that I am responsible for what some of my friends in different parts of the State have done; but that he is not responsible for what his have done. At least, so I understood him. But in addition to that, the Judge, in our meeting in Galesburg, last week, undertakes to establish that I am guilty of a species of double-dealing with the public—that I make speeches of a certain sort in the north, among the Abolitionists, which I would not make in the south, and that I make speeches of a certain sort in the south which I would not make in the north.

In the course I have marked out for myself, that I shall not have to dwell at very great length upon this subject. As soon as the Judge's opening speech at Galesburg, I had an opportunity, as I had the middle speech then, of saying something in answer to it. He brought forward a quotation or two from a speech of mine, delivered at Chicago, and then to contrast it, he brought forward an extract from a speech of mine at Galesburg. At Chicago I was so long as to have insisted that I was greatly inconsistent, and indeed that his conclusion followed that I was playing a double part, and speaking in one region one way, and in another region another way. I have not time now to dwell on this as long as I would, and with only now to repeat that portion of my speech at Charleston, which the Judge quoted, and then make some comments upon it. This he quotes from me as being delivered at Charleston, and I believe correctly:—"I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about an actual social and political equality between the white and black races in this country. I am not nor ever have been in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of giving them the right to hold office, or to intermingle with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together, there must be the position of superior and inferior. I am as much as any other man in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race." This, I believe, is the entire quotation from the Charleston speech, as Judge Douglas made it. His comments are as follows:

"Yes, here you find men who hrn for Lincoln, and say he is right when he disagrees all distinction between races, or when he declares that he discards the doctrine that there is such a thing as a superior and inferior race; and Abolitionists are required and expected to vote for Mr. Lincoln because he goes for the equality of the races. Mr. Lincoln himself in the Declaration of Independence: the white man and Negro were declared equal, and endowed by divine law with equality. And down south with the old-line Whigs, with the Kentuckians, the Virginians, and the Tennesseans, he tells you that there is a physical difference between the races, making the
one superior, the other inferior, and he is in favor of maintaining the superiority of the white race over the negro."

These are the Judge's comments. Now I wish to show you, that a month or, on an occasion of seven or eight days of a month before I made the speech at Charleston, which the Judge quotes from, he had himself heard me say substantially the same thing. It was in our first meeting at Ottawa—and I will say a word about where it was, and the atmosphere it was in at that meeting. It was in, after midnight—on that topic, I pass over it. I read an extract from an old speech of mine, made nearly four years ago, not merely to show my sentiments, but to show that my sentiments were long entertained and openly expressed; in which extract I expressly declared that I admitted the social and political equality between the white and black races, and that even if my own feelings would admit of it, I still knew that the public sentiment of the country would not, and that such a thing was an utter impossibility, or substantially that. That extract from my old speech, the reporters, by some sort of accident, passed over, and it was not reported. I lay no blame upon any body. I suppose they thought that I would hand it over to them, and dropped reporting while I was reading it, but afterward went away without getting it from me. At the end of that quotation from my old speech, which I read at Ottawa, I made the comments which were reported at that time, and which I will now read, and ask you to notice how very nearly they are the same as Judge Douglass says were delivered by me, down in Egypt. After reading I added these words: "Now, gentlemen, I don't want to read at any great length, but this is the true complex of all I have ever said in regard to the institution of slavery or the black race, and this is the whole of it; any thing that argues me into his idea of perfect social and political equality with the negro, is but a specious and fantastical arrangement of words by which a man can prove a horse-chestnut to be a chestnut horse. I will say here, while upon this subject, that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery as it now exists. I believe it is a mistake to do any of them in their opinions here. I have no purpose to do so. I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and black races. There is a physical difference between the two, which, in my judgment, will probably forever forbid their living side by side with the white man."

I especially introduced this subject again for the purpose of saying that I have the Dred Scott decision here, and I will thank Judge Douglass to lay his finger upon the place in the entire opinions of the court where any one of them says the contrary. It is very hard to affirm a negative with entire confidence. I say, however, that I have examined that decision with a good deal of care, as a lawyer examines a decision, and so far as I have been able to do so, the court has no where in its opinions said that the States have no power to exclude slavery, nor have they used other language substantially that. I also say, so far as I can find, not one of the concurring Judges has said that the States can exclude slavery, nor said anything that was substantially the nearest agreement that any one of them has made to it, so far as I can find. I quote the opinion of Mr. Chase, the opinion of Mr. Taney, and the opinion of Mr. Strong. The concurring Judges, McLean or Curtis, has not asked to get an express declaration that the States could absolutely exclude slavery from their limits, what reason have we to believe that it would not have been voted down by the majority of the Judges, just as Chase's amendment was voted down by Judge Douglass and his co-signers when it was offered to the Nebraska Bill.

Also at Galesburg, I said something in regard to those Springfield resolutions that Judge Douglass had attempted to use upon me at Ottawa, and commented at some length upon the fact that they were, as presented, not genuine. Judge Douglass in his reply to me seemed to be somewhat exercised. He said he would never have believed that Abraham Lincoln, as he kindly called me, would have attempted such a thing; that he was present at the debate at Charleston, the like of which Judge Douglass thinks I would not make where there was any Abolition element. I only refer to this matter to say that I am altogether unconscious of having attempted any double-dealing anywhere—that upon one occasion I may say one thing and have other things usually, and vice versa; but that I have said anything on one occasion that is inconsistent with what I have said elsewhere, I deny—at least I deny it so far as the intention is concerned. I find that I have devoted to this topic a larger portion of my time than I had intended. I wished to show, but I will pass it upon this occasion, that in the sentiments advanced on the Declaration of Independence, South Carolina had tiredly borne out by the sentiments advanced by our old Whig leader, Henry Clay, and I have the book here to show it from; but because I have already occupied more time than I intended to do on that topic, I pass over it.

At Galesburg, I tried to show that by the Dred Scott decision, pushed to its legitimate consequences, slavery would be established in all the States as well as in the Territories. I did this because, upon a former occasion, I had asked Judge Douglass whether the Supreme Court should make a decision declaring that a man, even if he had the power to exclude slavery from their limits, would adopt and follow that decision as a rule of political action; and because he had not directly answered that question, but had merely contented himself with sneering at it; I again introduced it, and tried to show that the conclusion that I stated followed inevitably and logically from the proposition already decided by the court. Judge Douglass had the privilege of replying to me at Galesburg, and again he gave me no direct answer as to whether he would or would not sustain such a decision if made. I give him this third chance to say yes or no. He is not obliged to do either—probably he will not do either—but I give him the third chance. I tried to show then that this conclusion inevitably followed from the point already decided by the court. The Judge, in his reply, again sneers at the thought of the court making any such decision, and in the course of his remarks upon this subject, uses the language which I will now read.

Speaking of me the Judge says:

"He goes on and insists that the Dred Scott decision would carry slavery into the free States, notwithstanding the decision itself says the contrary." And he adds: "Mr. Lincoln knows that there is no member of the Supreme Court that holds that doctrine anywhere, and in which court exists. I believe it is a mistake to do so. I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and black races. There is a physical difference between the two, which, in my judgment, will probably forever forbid their living side by side with the white man."

I have chiefly introduced this for the purpose of meeting the Judge's charge that the quotation he took from my Charleston speech was what I would say down south among the Kentuckians, the Virginians, etc., but would not say in the regions to which was supposed to be more of the Abolition element. I now make this comment: That speech from which I have now read the quotation, and which is there given correctly, perhaps too much so for good taste, was made away in the Abolition District of this State per excellence—in the Lovejoy District—in the personal presence of Lovejoy, for he was on the stand with us when I made it. It had been made and put in print in that region only three days less than a month before the Charleston speech. I was at Charleston, the like of which Judge Douglass thinks I would not make where there was any Abolition element. I only refer to this matter to say that I am altogether unconscious of having attempted any double-dealing anywhere—that upon one occasion I may say one thing and have other things usually, and vice versa; but that I have said anything on one occasion that is inconsistent with what I have said elsewhere, I deny—at least I deny it so far as the intention is concerned. I find that I have devoted to this topic a larger portion of my time than I had intended. I wished to show, but I will pass it upon this occasion, that in the sentiments advanced on the Declaration of Independence, South Carolina had tiredly borne out by the sentiments advanced by our old Whig leader, Henry Clay, and I have the book here to show it from; but because I have already occupied more time than I intended to do on that topic, I pass over it.
said by Judge Trumbull, and at the close of what he said upon that subject, he declared to say that Trumbull had forged his evidence. He said, too, that he should not concern himself with Trumbull any more, but that he should hold Lincoln responsible for what he was then saying upon him. When I met him at a railroad station, I think that I should not have noticed the subject if he had not said that he would hold him responsible for what he then said. I spread out before him the statements of the evidence that Judge Trumbull had used, and I asked Judge Douglas, piece by piece, to put his finger upon one piece of all the evidence that he would say was a forgery. When I went through with each and every piece, Judge Douglas did not dare then to say that any piece of it was a forgery. So it seems that there are some things that Judge Douglas has no chance to do, and some that he dares not to do.

A voice—"It's the same thing with you."

Mr. Lincoln—Yes, sir, it's the same thing with me. I do dare to say forgery when I mean it, and don't dare to say forgery when it's false. Now, I will say that to this audience and to Judge Douglas, I have never dared to say that he committed a forgery, and I never will until I know it; but I did dare to say—just to suggest to the Judge—that a forgery had been committed, which by his own showing had been traced to him and two of his friends. I dared to suggest to him that he had expressly promised in one of his public speeches to investigate that matter, and I dared to suggest to him that there was an implied promise that when he investigated it he would make known the result. I dared to suggest to the Judge that he could not expect to be quite clear of suspicion of that fraud, for since the time that promise was made he had been with those friends, and had not kept his promise in regard to the investigation and the report upon it. I am not a very daring man, but I dared to suggest that, and I am not much scared about it yet. When the Judge says he would not have believed of Abraham Lincoln that he would have made such an attempt as that, he reminds me of the fact that he entered upon this canvass with the purpose to treat me in the most contemptuous manner that touched me personally. I remember, when it was first agreed that Judge Douglas and I were to have those joint discussions, that they were the successive acts of a drama—perhaps I should say, to be enacted not merely in the faces of audiences like this, but in the face of the nation, and to some extent by my relation to him, and not from any thing in myself, in the face of the world; and I am anxious that they should be conducted with dignity and in the good temper which would be befitting the vast audience before which it was conducted. I think it is in the light of that when Judge Douglas and I parted good night at the railroad station, that speech in Chicago, the evening afterward I made some sort of a reply to it. His second speech was made at Bloomington, in which he commented upon my speech at Chicago, and said that I had used language indifferently contrived to conceal my intentions and to meet the needs of his purpose. Now, I understand that the great importance of your good name on my veracity and my candor. I do not know what the Judge understood by it, but in our first discussion at Ottawa, he led off by charging a bargain, somewhat corneal, somewhat blunted; I am led to say that I might have done it in a more unassailing manner, one of the terms of which was that Trumbull was to abolish the old Democratic party, and I (Lincoln) was to abolish the old Whig party. I pretended to be as good as the fine Whig as ever. Judge Douglas may not understand that he implicated my truthfulness and my honor, when he said I was doing one thing and pret-
ing on the voter to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favors no measure that they shall deeming to concur with the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation for merely of entering and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil into the States themselves. We propose no resist it as it is to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject. I will add this, that if there be any man who does not believe that slavery is wrong in the three respects to which I have men, that man is mislaid, and ought to leave us. While, on the other hand, if there be any man in the Republican party who is impatient over the necessity springing from its actual policy, it is impatient of the Constitutional guarantee made over it, and would act in disregard of these, he too is mislaid, standing with us. He will find his place somewhere else; for we have a due regard, so far as we are capable of understanding them, for all these things. This, gentlemen, as well as I can give it, is a plain statement of all our principles in all their essence.

I will say now that there is a sentiment in the country contrary to me—a sentiment which holds that slavery is not wrong, and therefore it goes for the policy that does not propose dealing with it as a wrong. That policy is the Democratic policy, and that sentiment is the Democratic sentiment. If there be a doubt in the mind of any one of this vast audience that this is really the central idea of the Democratic policy, in relation to this subject, I ask him to bear with me while I state a few points leading as I think, to prove that proposition. In the first place, the leading man—I think I may say my friend Judge Douglas the honor of calling him such—advocating the present Democratic policy, never himself says it is wrong. He has the high distinction, so far as I know, of never having said it was either right or wrong. Almost everybody else says one or the other, but the Judge never does. If there be a man in the Democratic party who thinks it is wrong, and yet advocates that policy, I suggest to him in the first place that his leader don’t talk as he does, for he never says that it is wrong. In the second place, I suggest to him that if he will examine the policy proposed to be carried forward, he will find that he carefully excludes the idea that there is any thing wrong in it. If you will carefully examine the statements that are made on it, you will see that he carefully excludes the idea that there is anything wrong in slavery. Perhaps that Democrat who says he is as much opposed to slavery as I am, will tell me that I am wrong in the three respects to which I have men. I wish to examine his own course in regard to this matter a moment, and then see if his opinion will not be changed a little. You say it is wrong; but don’t you constantly object to any body else saying so? Do you not constantly argue that this is not the right place to oppose it? You say it must be opposed in the slave States; but how do you account for the fact that it is not opposed in the slave States, because it is there; it must not be opposed in politics, because that will make a fuss; it must not be opposed in the pulpit, because it is not right. Thus, there is no place to oppose it. There is no place in the country to oppose this evil over there in the continent, which you say yourself is coming. Frank Blair and Gratz Brown tried to get up a system of gradual emancipation in Missouri, had an election in August and get beat, and you, Mr. Douglas, throw up your hat, and hallowed—burn it for a Democracy. So I say again, that in regard to the arguments that are made, when Judge Douglas says he “doesn’t care whether slavery is voted up or voted down,” that is, he means that he can be an individual expression of sentiment, or only as a sort of statement of his views on national policy, it is alike true to say that he can thus argue logically if he don’t see anything wrong in it; but he cannot say so logically if he admits that slavery is wrong. He cannot say that he was opposed to it. When I see a man who that however, whatever or whatever community wants slaves, they have a right to have those, he is perfectly logical if there is nothing wrong in the institution; but if you admit that it is wrong, he cannot logically say that any body has a right to do wrong. When he says he doesn’t care whether slavery is voted up or voted down, what does he mean? He means they are the votes up or voted down, that is, he means that he is willing to be an individual expression of sentiment, or only as a sort of statement of his views on national policy. I know in truth that it is not, and in this matter ourselves, in all the arguments sustaining the Democratic policy, and in that policy itself there is a careful, studied exclusion of the idea that there is anything wrong in slavery. Let us understand this. I am not, just here, trying to prove that we are right and they are wrong. I have been sitting here, and I want to act with us in treating it as a wrong—then, and not till then, I think we will in some way come to an end of this slavery agitation.

MR. DOUGLASS’S REPPLY.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: Permit me to say that unless silence is observed it will be impossible for me to be heard by this immense crowd, and my friends can confer no higher favor upon me than by exercising all expressions of applause or approbation. I desire to be heard rather than to be applauded. I wish to address myself to your reason, your judgment, your sense of justice, and not to your passions.

I regard that Mr. Lincoln should have deemed it proper for him to again indulge in great personalities and base insinuations in regard to the Springfield resolutions. It has imposed upon me the necessity of using some portion of my time for the purpose of calling your attention to the facts of the case, and it will then be easy to believe all that you think of a man who can predicate such a charge upon the circumstances as he has in this. I had seen the platform adopted by a Republican Congressional Convention held in Aurora, the Second Congressional District, in September, 1859, published as purporting to be the platform of the Republican party. That platform declared that the Republican party was pledged never to admit another slave State into the Union, and also that it pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States, not only all that we then had, but all that we should hereafter acquire, and to repeal unconditionally the Fugitive Slave law, abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and prohibit the slave-trade between the different States. Those and other articles against slavery were contained in the five States, became platform, and unanimously adopted by the Republican Congressional Convention in that District. I had also seen that the Republican Congressional Conventions at Rockford in the First District, and at Bloomington, in the Third, had adopted the same platform that year, nearly word for word, and had declared it to be the platform of the Republican party. I had noticed that Major Thomas L. Harris, a member of Congress from the Springfield District, had referred to that platform in a speech in Congress as having been adopted by the first Republican State Convention which assembled in Illinois. When I had occasion to use the fact in this canvass, I wrote to Major Harris to know on what day that Convention was held, and to ask him to send me its proceedings. He being sick, Charles H. Laughler answered my letter by sending me the published proceedings of the Convention held at Springfield on the 5th of October, 1859, as they appeared in the report of the State Register. I read those resolutions from that newspaper the same as any of you would refer back and quote any facts from the film. I could not see a word voted up or voted down. When I had so quoted those resolutions he discovered that they had never been adopted at Springfield. He does not deny their adoption by the Republican party at Aurora,
at Bloomington, and at Richmond, and by nearly all the Republican County Conventions in Northern Illinois where his party is in a majority, but nobody seemed to have been adopted on the "spot" on which I said they were, he chooses to quibble about the place rather than meet and discuss the merits of the resolutions themselves. I stated when I quoted them that I did so from "memoranda," from Mr. Lincoln's and my authorities. Lincoln believed at the time, as he has since admitted, that they had been adopted at Springfield, as published. Does he believe now, that I did not tell the truth when I quoted those resolutions? He knows, in his heart, that I quoted them in good faith, believing, at the time, that there was a warrant for them. I would consider myself an infamous wretch, if, under such circumstances, I could charge any man with being a party to a trick or a fraud. And I will tell him, too, that it will not pay to charge a forgery on your friends, at least as they would read the resolutions, and put the questions to him, and he then related to answer them. Subsequently, one week afterward, he did answer a part of them, but the other has not answered up to this day.

Now, let me call your attention to the moment to the answers which Mr. Lincoln made at Freepost to the questions which I propounded him at Ottawa, based upon the platform adopted by a majority of the Abolition counties of the State, which now as then supported him. To answer to my question whether he embodied the Black Republican principles of "no more slave States," he answered that he was not pleading against the admission of any more slave States, but that he would be very sorry if he should ever be placed in a position where he would have to vote on the question; that he would not vote to know that no more slave States would be admitted into the Union, and, in his answer, he added: "if slavery be kept out of the Territories, and the Territories, and any given Territory, and then the people shall, having a free and an equal right to the field when they come to adopt the Constitution, do such an extraordinarly great thing as to adopt a slave Constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them within the Constitution of the United States, and make the same as their other States, as far as, with slavery or without, as they shall determine."

His answer at Freepost does not apply to any territory in America. I ask you, turning to that which he said at Ottawa, if you vote to admit Kansas into the Union, with just such a Constitution as her people want, with slavery or without, as they shall determine? He will not answer. I have put that question to him time and time again, and have not heard a denial of him. I ask you again, Lincoln, if you vote to admit New Mexico when she has the requisite population with such a Constitution as her people adopt, and either recognizing slavery or not, as they shall determine? Will you not answer? I put the same question to him in references to Oregon and the nation. As he said at Freepost, if you vote to expel out of Texas, in pursuance of the contract between Texas and the United States, and he will not answer. He will not answer these questions in reference to any territory now in existence; but says, that if Congress should prohibit slavery in a Territory, and when its people asked for admission, if Congress should adopt slavery as one of their institutions, that he supposes he would have to let it come in. I submit to you whether that answer of his to my question does not justify me in saying that he has a fertile genius in devising language to conceal his thoughts. I ask you whether there is an intelligent man in America who does not believe, that that answer was made for the purpose of concealing what he intended to do. I wished to make the old line Whigs believe, that he would stand by the Constitution and the Union with slavery, or without, as they pleased, while Lincoln and his Abolition allies up North, explained to the Abolitionists, that in making this ground he preached good abolition doctrine, because his proviso would not apply to any territory in America. I suggest therefore. There was no chance of his being governor, and the Whigs have been quite easy for him to have said, that he would let the people of the State do just as they pleased, if he desired to convey such an idea. Why did he not do it? He
would not answer my question directly, because up north, the Abolition creed declares that there shall be no more slave States, while down south, in Adams county, in Coles, and in Sangamon, he and his friends are afraid to advance that doctrine. Therefore, in the course of the speech delivered by him at Chicago, and then another from his speech at Charleston, and compared them, thus showing the people that he had one set of principles in one part of the State and another in the other part. And how does he answer this question? Why, he quotes from his Charleston speech as I quoted from him, and then quotes another extract from a speech which he made at another place, which he says is the same as the extract from his speech at Charleston; but he does not quote the extract from his Chicago speech, upon which I convicted him of double-dealing. I quoted from his Chicago speech to prove that he held one set of principles up north among the Abolitionists, and from his Charleston speech to prove that he held another set down at Charleston and in southern Illinois. In his answer to this charge, he ignores entirely his Chicago speech, and merely argues that he said the same thing which he said at Charleston at another place. If he did, it follows that he has twice, instead of once, held one creed in one part of the State and a different creed in another part. Up at Chicago, in the opening of the campaign, he reviewed my reception speech, and undertook to answer my argument attacking his favorite doctrine of negro equality. I had shown that it was a falsification of the Declaration of Independence to pretend that that instrument applied to and included negroes in the clause declaring that all men were created equal. What was Lincoln's reply? I will read from his Chicago speech and the one which he did not quote, and dare not quote, in this part of the State. He said:

"I should like to know, if, taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares all men are created equal upon principles, and making except of negroes, what will it stop? If one man says it does not mean a negro, why may not another man, it does not mean another man? If that declaration is not the truth, let us get this state of things in which we find it and tear it out."

There you find that Mr. Lincoln told the Abolitionists in Chicago that if the Declaration of Independence did not declare that the negro was created by the Almighty the equal of the white man, that you ought to tear out that instrument and tear out the clause which says that all men were created equal. But in another part of the same speech, he read, he declared that the negro belongs to an inferior race, who is inferior to the white man, and should always be kept in an inferior position. He will now read what he said at Chicago on that point. In concluding his speech at that place, he remarked:

"My friends, I have detailed you about as long as I desire to do, and I have only to say that I accept all this qualification of our national existence, and which one of the people of this country race and that race, and the other race being inferior, and therefore they must be placed in an inferior position, disregarding our standard that we have left us. Let us discard all these things, and unite as one people throughout this land until we shall once more stand up declaring that all men are created equal."

Thus you see, that when addressing the Chicago Abolitionists he declared that all declarations must be discarded and blotted out, because the negro stood on an equal footing with the white man; that if one man said the Declaration of Independence did not mean a negro when it declared all men created equal, that another man said that it did not mean another man; and hence we ought to discard all declarations as between the negro race and all other races, and declare them all created equal. Did old Giddings, when he came down among you four years ago, make as much radical Abolitionism as this? Did Lovejoy, or Lloyd Garrison, or Wendell Phillips, or Fred Douglass, ever take higher Abolition grounds than that? Lincoln told you that I had charged him with getting up these personal attacks to conceal the character of his principles, and then commenced talking about something else, omitting to quote this part of his Chicago speech which contained the enormity of his principles to which I alluded. He knew that I alluded to his negro-equality doctrines when I quoted part of the northern, which, although I did not understand the enormity of his principles, yet he is not apparently an answer at all with reference to any territory now in existence.

Mr. Lincoln complains that, in my speech the other day at Galesburg, I read an extract from a speech delivered by him at Chicago, and then another from his speech at Charleston, and compared them, thus showing the people that he had one set of principles in one part of the State and another in the other part. And how does he answer this charge? Why, he quotes from his Charleston speech as I quoted from him, and then quotes another extract from a speech which he made at another place, which he says is the same as the extract from his speech at Charleston; but he does not quote the extract from his Chicago speech, upon which I convicted him of double-dealing. I quoted from his Chicago speech to prove that he held one set of principles up north among the Abolitionists, and from his Charleston speech to prove that he held another set down at Charleston and in southern Illinois. In his answer to this charge, he ignores entirely his Chicago speech, and merely argues that he said the same thing which he said at Charleston at another place. If he did, it follows that he has twice, instead of once, held one creed in one part of the State and a different creed in another part. Up at Chicago, in the opening of the campaign, he reviewed my reception speech, and undertook to answer my argument attacking his favorite doctrine of negro equality. I had shown that it was a falsification of the Declaration of Independence to pretend that that instrument applied to and included negroes in the clause declaring that all men were created equal. What was Lincoln's reply? I will read from his Chicago speech and the one which he did not quote, and dare not quote, in this part of the State. He said:

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In his speech at Springfield before the Abolition or Republican Convention, he denied that his hostility to any more slave States in this language: "Under the operation of that policy the slaveholding States may be not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the issue to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the oppressor is to vanquish the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward until it shall become alike unlawful in all the States—or as well new, norh, as well as south.

Mr. Lincoln there told his Abolition friends that this Government could not endure permanently, divided into free and slave States as our fathers made it, and that it must become all free or all slave, otherwise, that the Government could not exist.

How then does Lincoln propose to save the Union, unless by compelling all the States to become free, so that the house shall not be divided against itself? He intends making them all free; he will preserve the Union in that way, and yet, he is not going to interfere with slavery anywhere where it now exists. How is he going to bring it about? Way, he will again, he will invade the South to secure until the South shall be worried out, and forced to abolish slavery. Let us examine the policy by which this is to be done. He first tells you that he would prohibit slavery everywhere where in the Territories. He would thus confine slavery within its present limits. When he thus gets it confined, and surrounded, so that it cannot spread, the natural laws of increase will go on until the negroes will be so plenty that they cannot live on the soil. He will bring them in until starvation sets them, and by starving them to death, he will put slavery in the course of ultimate extinction. If he is not going to interfere with slavery in the States, that intend to interfere and prohibit it in the Territories, and thus another slavery out, it naturally follows, that he can extinguish it only by extinguishing the negro race, for his policy would drive them to starvation. This is the humane and Christian remedy that he proposes for the great crime of slavery.

He tells you that I will not argue the question whether slavery is right or wrong. I tell you why I will not do it. I hold that under the Constitution of the State, each State of this Union has a right to do as it pleases on the subject of slavery. In Illinois we have exercised that sovereign right by prohibiting slavery within our own limits. I approve of that line of policy. Illinois does what is right. Missouri or not. Missouri is a sovereign State of this Union, and has the same right to do the same thing that I do.

He tells you that the courts would not have the power to do these things, and that the Constitution of our common country. It is none of our business whether slavery exists in Michigan or not. Missouri is a sovereign State of this Union, and has the same right to make laws of its own, whether it is right or not.

What one question has he discussed that comes within the power of the courts or calls for the action or interference of an American statesman, or, for the decision of a public question, or, for the determination of that instrument, and when such decisions are pronounced, they are the law of the land, binding on every good citizen? Mr. Lincoln has a very convenient mode of arguing on the subject. He holds that because he is a Republican, that he is not bound by the decisions of the court. He says that he does not like the Dred Scott decision. Suppose he does not, how is he going to help himself? He says that he does not like it, but what will he do? Will he reverse it? I know of but one mode of reversing judicial decisions, and that is by appealing from the inferior to the superior courts. But I have never yet learned how or where an appeal could be taken from the Supreme Court of the United States. The Dred Scott decision was pronounced by the Court of the United States. From that decision there is no appeal this side of Heaven. Yet, Mr. Lincoln, he says he is going to reverse that decision. By what tribunal will he reverse it? Will he appeal to a mob? Does he intend to set up a system of self-government and rebellion in the land and overturn the court by violence? Will he annoy and incite and seduce and persuade the people to rioted and rebellion? Does he not know that he will have the mob? He shall have the touchstone for the war, and he shall have the mark of the public. He shall have the recognition of that decision before this political meeting. I say to you, with all due respect, that I choose to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court as they are pronounced. It is not for me to inquire after a decision is made whether I like it or not. The Supreme Court is the highest Court in the land, and I shall regard and respect its decisions.

But Mr. Lincoln says that I will not answer his question as to what I would do in the event of the court making so ridiculous a decision as he imagines they would by deciding that the free State of Illinois could not prohibit slavery within her own limits. I told him at Fort Scott why I would not answer such a question. Why, because a man possessing any brains in America knows or not, who ever dreamed that such a thing could be done, I told him then, as I do now, that by all the principles set forth in the Dred Scott decision, it is impossible. I told him then, as I do now, that it is an insult to any man's understanding, and I charge you to the court, to pronounce in advance that it was going to degrade itself so low as to make a decision known to be in direct violation of the Constitution.

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I know of but one mode of reversing judicial decisions, and that is by appealing from the inferior to the superior courts. But I have never yet learned how or where an appeal could be taken from the Supreme Court of the United States. The Dred Scott decision was pronounced by the Court of the United States. From that decision there is no appeal this side of Heaven. Yet, Mr. Lincoln, he says he is going to reverse that decision. By what tribunal will he reverse it? Will he appeal to a mob? Does he intend to set up a system of self-government and rebellion in the land and overturn the court by violence? Will he annoy and incite and seduce and persuade the people to rioted and rebellion? Does he not know that he will have the mob? He shall have the touchstone for the war, and he shall have the mark of the public. He shall have the recognition of that decision before this political meeting. I say to you, with all due respect, that I choose to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court as they are pronounced. It is not for me to inquire after a decision is made whether I like it or not. The Supreme Court is the highest Court in the land, and I shall regard and respect its decisions.
party—who will repudiate such a monstrous doctrine. The decision in the Dred Scott case is binding on every American citizen alike; and yet Mr. Lincoln argues that the Declaration of Independence was not bound by it, because they are opposed to it, whilst Democrats are bound by it, because we will not resist it. A Democrat cannot resist the constitutional authorities of this country. A Democrat is a law-abiding man, the law stands by the Constitution and the laws, and relies upon legality as protected by law, and upon nothing else in political or civil society. I have never yet been able to make Mr. Lincoln understand, or can I make any man who is determined to support him, right or wrong, understand how it is that under the Dred Scott decision the power of a Territory can be slavery or not, just as they please. I believe that I can explain to him the propriety of all Constitution-loving, law-abiding men in a way that they cannot fail to understand it. Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, said that slaves being property, the owner of them has a right to take them into a Territory the same as he would any other property; in other words, that slave property, so far as the right to own a Territory is concerned, stands on the same footing with other property. Suppose we grant that proposition. Then any man has a right to go to Kansas and take his property with him, but when he gets there he must rely upon the local law to protect his property, whatever it may be. In order to illustrate this, imagine that three of your conclude to go to Kansas. One takes $10,000 worth of slaves, another $10,000 worth of liquor, and the third $16,000 worth of dry goods. When the man who owns the dry goods arrives out there and commences selling them, he finds that he is stopped and prohibited from selling until he gets a license, which will destroy all the profits he can make on his goods to pay for. When the man with the liquors gets there and tries to sell his he finds a Maine liquor law in force which prevents him. Now, of what use is his right to go there with his property unless he is protected in the enjoyment of that right after he gets there? The man who goes there with his slaves finds that there is no law to protect him when he arrives there. He has no remedy if his slaves run away to another country: there is no slave code or police regulations, and the absence of them excludes his slaves from the Territory just as effectively and as positively as a Constitutional prohibition could.

Such was the understanding when the Kansas and Nebraska bill was pending in Congress. Read the speech of Speaker Orr in South Carolina, in the House of Representatives, in 1856, on the Kansas question, and you will find that he takes the ground that while the owner of a slave has a right to go into a Territory, and carry his slaves with him, that he cannot hold them one day or hour unless there is a slave code to protect him. He tells you that slavery was intended to legislate slavery into any Territory or State of Carolina, or any other State, unless there was a friendly people and friendly legislation. Read the speeches of that giant in intellect, Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, and you will find them to the same effect. Read the speech of Mr. Smith, of Tennessee, and of all Southern men, and you will find that they all understood this doctrine as we understand it now. Mr. Lincoln cannot be made to understand it, however; even in his latest speech in Nebraska, he went on to argue that if it be the law that a man has a right to take his slaves into territory of the United States under the Constitution, then that a member of Congress was perjured if he did not vote for a slave code. I ask him whether he knows that the decision of the Supreme Court is not binding upon him as well as upon me? If so, and he holds that he would be perjured if he did not vote for a slave code under it, I ask him whether, if elected to Congress, he will be so? I have a right to his answer, and I will tell you why. He put that question to me when I was in the Democratic creed, as put forth in the Nebraska bill and the Cincinnati platform, was sedition against the Constitution and the laws of the United States; but in the event of a slaveholding State of one of the Territories should demand and demand a slave code to protect his slaves, will you vote for it? I answered him that a fundamental article in the Democratic creed, as put forth in the Nebraska bill and the Cincinnati platform, was sedition against the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and hence, I would not vote in Congress for any code of laws, either for or against slavery in any Territory. I will leave the people perfectly free to decide that question for themselves.

Mr. Lincoln says I was not bound by it, because they are opposed to it, whilst Democrats are bound by it, because we will not resist it. A Democrat cannot resist the constitutional authorities of this country. A Democrat is a law-abiding man, the law stands by the Constitution and the laws, and relies upon legality as protected by law, and upon nothing else in political or civil society. I have never yet been able to make Mr. Lincoln understand, or can I make any man who is determined to support him, right or wrong, understand how it is that under the Dred Scott decision the power of a Territory can be slavery or not, just as they please. I believe that I can explain to him the propriety of all Constitution-loving, law-abiding men in a way that they cannot fail to understand it. Chief Justice Taney, in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, said that slaves being property, the owner of them has a right to take them into a Territory the same as he would any other property; in other words, that slave property, so far as the right to own a Territory is concerned, stands on the same footing with other property. Suppose we grant that proposition. Then any man has a right to go to Kansas and take his property with him, but when he gets there he must rely upon the local law to protect his property, whatever it may be. In order to illustrate this, imagine that three of your conclude to go to Kansas. One takes $10,000 worth of slaves, another $10,000 worth of liquor, and the third $16,000 worth of dry goods. When the man who owns the dry goods arrives out there and commences selling them, he finds that he is stopped and prohibited from selling until he gets a license, which will destroy all the profits he can make on his goods to pay for. When the man with the liquors gets there and tries to sell his he finds a Maine liquor law in force which prevents him. Now, of what use is his right to go there with his property unless he is protected in the enjoyment of that right after he gets there? The man who goes there with his slaves finds that there is no law to protect him when he arrives there. He has no remedy if his slaves run away to another country: there is no slave code or police regulations, and the absence of them excludes his slaves from the Territory just as effectively and as positively as a Constitutional prohibition could.

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those bills and put a wafer between them and reported them back to the Senate as one bill, which was entitled the Kansas and Nebraska bill. One of those amendments was, that the Territories should not legislate upon the subject of African slavery. I objected to this provision, upon the ground that it curtailed the right of the Territories, whereas it says I advocated. The first is the right of the people of the Territory, the same as a State, to decide for themselves whether slavery should exist within their limits, in the language of Mr. Buchanan; and the second is, that a Constitution shall be submitted to the people of a Territory for its adoption or rejection before their admission as a State under the Constitution. Thereafter, Mr. Buchanan expressed himself as follows: that he was pledged to both these heresies, for supporting which the Washington Union has read me out of the Democratic church. In his annual message he said, that the example of the Minnesota case would be followed in future cases, requiring a submission of the Constitution; and in his letter of acceptance, he said that the people of the Territory, the same as a State, had the right to decide for themselves whether slavery should exist within their limits. Thus you find that this little corrupt gang who control the Union, and wish to elect Lincoln in preference to me—because, as they say, of these two heresies which I support—denounce President Buchanan when they denounce me, if he stands now by the principles upon which he was elected. Will they pretend that he does not now stand by the principles on which he was elected? Do they hold that he has abandoned the Kansas-Nebaska bill, the Cincinnati platform, and his own letter accepting his nomination, all of which declare the right of the people of a Territory, the same as a State, to decide the slavery question for themselves? I will not believe that he has betrayed or intends to betray the platform which elected him; but if he does, he will not follow him. I will stand by that great principle, no matter who may desert it. I intend to stand by it for the purpose of preserving peace between the North and the South, the free and the slave States. If each State will only agree to mind its own business, and let its neighbors alone, there will be peace forever between us. We are in Illinois, slavery when a Territory, and found it was not good for us in this climate, and with our surroundings, and beyond all, we abhorred it. I hold that a free State Constitution, as we had a right to do. In this State we have demanded that a negro shall not be a citizen, and we have also declared that he shall not be a slave. We had a right to adopt this system of preserving peace between the North and the South, the free and the slave States. If each State will only agree to mind its own business, and let its neighbors alone, there will be peace forever between us. I assert that they have as much right to the Constitution to adopt the system of policy which we have as we have to adopt ours. So it is with every other State in this Union. Let each State stand firmly by that great Constitution which will let each State mind its own business and let its neighbors alone, and there will be no trouble on this question. If we will stand by that Constitution, then Mr. Lincoln will find that this Republic can exist forever divided into free and slave States, as our fathers made it, and the people of each State have decided. Stand by that great principle, and we can go on as we have done, increasing in population, in power, and in all the elements of greatness, until we shall be the admiral and terror of the world. We can go on and enlarge as our population increases, require more room, until we make this continent the seat of the world. Under that principle the United States can perform that great mission, that destiny, which Providence has marked out for us. Under that principle we can receive the two great streams of intelligence which is constantly flowing from the Old World to the New, filling up our cities, changing our roads, our buildings, our cities, roadways, and other internal improvements, and thus make this the asylum of the oppressed of the whole earth. We have this great mission to perform, and it can only be performed by adhering faithfully to that principle of self-
government on which our institutions were all established. I repeat that the principle is the right of each State, each Territory, to decide this slavery question for itself, to have slavery or not, as it chooses, and it does not become Mr. Lincoln, or anybody else, to tell the people of Kentucky that they must not have slavery, or that they are living in a state of sin, and that they are violating the law of God. Better for him to adopt the doctrine of the South, that God will judge the world, and let him perform his office to the best of his ability for the future, and he will have a better fate in the future. I think there are objects of charity enough in the free States to excite the sympathies and open the pockets of all the benevolent, and we have amongst us, without going abroad, in search of negroes of whose condition we know nothing. We have enough objects of charity at home, and it is our duty to take care of our own poor, and our own suffering, before we go abroad to interfere with other people's business.

My friends, I am told that my time is within two minutes of expiring. I have omitted many topics that I would like to have discussed before you at length. There were many points touched by Mr. Lincoln that I have not been able to take up for the want of time. I have hurried over each subject that I have discussed as rapidly as possible, so as to omit but few, but our hour and a half is not time sufficient for a man to discuss at length one half of the great questions which are now dividing the public mind.

In conclusion, I desire to return to you my grateful acknowledgments for the kindness and the courtesy with which you have listened to me. It is something remarkable that in an audience as vast as this, composed of men of opposite politics and views, with their passions highly excited, there should be so much courtesy, kindness and respect exhibited not only toward one another, but toward the speakers, and I feel that it is due to you that I should thus express my gratitude for the kindness with which you have treated me.

Mr. Lincoln's Rejoinder.

My Friends: Since Judge Douglas has said to you in his conclusion that he had more than an hour and a half to answer all I had said in my speech and that course of that I will not be able to answer in half an hour at all that he said in an hour and a half.

I wish to return to Judge Douglas my profound thanks for his public utterance here. He has been so near the true issue of this controversy, and I am profoundly grateful for this one sentence. Judge Douglas says to me, "You cannot the institution of slavery, or rather, you cannot the nation, part slave and part free, continue as our fathers made it forever?"

In the first place, I insist that our fathers did not make this nation half slave and half free, or part slave and part free. I insist that they found the nation of slavery existing here. They did not make it so, but they left it so because they knew of no way to get rid of it at that time. When Judge Douglas understands to say that, as a matter of choice, the fathers of the Government made this nation part slave and part free, he commits what is historically a falsehood. More than that: when the fathers of the Government cut off the source of slavery by the abolition of the slave-trade, and adopted a system of restricting it from the new Territories where it does not exist, I maintain that they understood all sensible men understood, it was in the course of ultimate extinction; and when Judge Douglas asks me why it cannot continue as our fathers made it, I ask him why he and his friends could not let it remain as our fathers made it.

It is precisely all I ask of him in relation to the institution of slavery, that it shall be placed upon the basis that our fathers placed it upon. Mr. Brooks, of South Carolina, once said, and truly said, that when this Government was established, no one expected the institution of slavery to last until this day; and that the men who formed this Government were wiser and better than the men of these days; but the day has come when we must face the facts which the fathers had not made. That experience has taught them the invention of the cotton gin, and this has made the perpetuation of the institution of slavery a necessity in this country. Judge Douglas could not let it stand upon the basis which our fathers placed it in, but removed it, and put it upon the cotton gin basis. It is a question, therefore, for him and his friends to answer—why they could not let it remain where the fathers of the Government originally placed it.

I have understood him as trying to sustain the doctrine that we have a right to quarrel with Kentucky, or Virginia, or any of the slave States, about the institution of slavery—thus giving the Judge an opportunity to make himself eloquent and valiant against us in fighting for their rights. I expressly declared in my opening speech, that I had neither the inclination to exercise, nor the belief in the existence of the right to interfere with the States of Kentucky or Virginia in doing as they pleased with slavery or any other existing institution. Then what becomes of all his eloquence in behalf of the rights of States, which are assailed by no living man?

But I have to hurry on, for I have but a half hour. The Judge has informed me, or informed this audience, that the Washington Union is laboring for my election to the United States Senate. This is new to me—not very ungrateful news either. [Turning to Mr. W. H. Carlin, who was on the stand]—I hope that Carlin will be elected to the Senate and I will vote for him. [Mr. Carlin shook his head.] Carlin don't starve, I perceive, and I suppose he will not do much for me, but I am glad of all the support I can get anywhere, if I can get it without practicing any deception to obtain it. In respect to this large portion of Judge Douglas's speech, in which he has to show that in the controversy between himself and the Democratic party, he is in the right, I do not feel myself at all competent or inclined to answer him. I say to him, "Give it to them—give it to them just all you can"—and, on the other hand, I say to Carlin, and Judge Davis, and to this man Woolsey up here in Hancock, "Give it to Douglas—just pour it into him."

Now, in regard to this matter of the Dred Scott decision, I wish to say a word or two. After all, the Judge will not say whether, if a decision is made, holding that the Senate of the United States cannot exclude slavery, he will support it or not. He absolutely refuses to say what he will do in that case. The Judges of the Supreme Court have obstinately refused to say what they would do or on this subject. Before this I repeated him that at Galena, he said that the Judges had expressly declared the contrary, and you remember that in my opening speech I told him I had the book containing that decision here, and I would think him to lay his finger on the place where any such thing was said. He has occupied his hour and a half, and he has not ventured to try to sustain his assertion. He never will. But he is discoursing of knowing how we are going to reverse the Dred Scott decision. Judge Douglas ought to know how. Did he not and his political friends find a way to reverse the Brown v. the board of regents, in favor the Constitutionality of the National Bank? Did they find a way to do it so astutely that they have revised it as completely as any decision ever was reversed, so far as its practical operation is concerned? And let me ask you, didn't Judge Douglas find a way to reverse the decision of our Supreme Court, when he declared that Carlin's father—old Governor Carlin—had not the Constitutional power to remove a Secretary of State? Did he not appeal to the "senses," as he calls them? Did he not make speeches in the lobby to show how villainous that decision was, and how it ought to be overthrown? Did he not succeed, too, in getting an act passed by the Legislature to have it overthrown? And didn't he himself sit down on that bench as one of the five added judges, who were to overhang the four old ones—getting his name of "Judge" in that way and no other? If there is a villainy in using disrespect or making opposition to Supreme
Court decisions, I commend it to Judge Douglas's earnest consideration. I know of no man in the State of Illinois who ought to know so well about how much villainy it takes to oppose a decision of the Supreme Court as our honorable friend, Stephen A. Douglas.

Judge Douglas also makes the declaration that I say the Democrats are bound by the Dred Scott decision, while the Republicans are not. In the sense in which he argues, I never said it; but I will tell you what I have said and what I do not hesitate to repeat to-day. I have said that, as the Democrats believe that decision to be correct, and that the extension of slavery is affirmed in the National Constitution, they are bound to support it as such; and I will tell you here that General Jackson once said in that manner was bound to support the Constitution as he understood it.

Now, Judge Douglas understands the Constitution according to the Dred Scott decision, and he is bound to support it as he understands it. I understand it another way, and therefore I am bound to support it in the way in which I understand it. And as Judge Douglas believes that decision to be correct, I will remark that argument if I have time to do so. Let me talk to some gentleman down there among you who looks me in the face. We will say you are a member of the Territorial Legislature, and like Judge Douglas, you believe that the right to take and hold slaves there is a Constitutional right. The first thing you do is, to swear you will support the Constitution and all rights guaranteed therein; that you will, whenever your neighbor needs your legislation to support his Constitutional rights, not withhold that legislation. If you withhold that necessary legislation for the support of the Constitution and Constitutional rights, do you not commit perjury? I ask every sensible man, if that is not so! That is undoubtedly just as, say what you please. Now, that is precisely what Judge Douglas says, and this is a Constitutional right. Does the Judge mean to say that the Territorial Legislature in legislating may, by withholding necessary laws, or by passing unfriendly laws, and thereby destroy said Constitutional right? Does he mean double-dealing? I deny that, and I will ignore the proposition so long and well established in law, that what you cannot do directly, you cannot do indirectly. Does he mean that? The truth about the matter is this: Judge Douglas has shown great ability in the Dred Scott case, and he has managed to get a decision of the Supreme Court, co-operating with him, that propagated his Symanter Sovereignty out. But he will keep up this species of humbuggery about Squatter Sovereignty. He has at last invented this sort of doing-nothing Sovereignty—that the whole country was made a slave colony by a sort of Squatter Sovereignty postulated in the Illinois State Register could not have been the result of anything, as the proceedings of that meeting bore unmistakable evidence of being done by a man who knew it was a forgery; that it was a publication partly taken from the real proceedings of the Convention, and partly from the proceedings of a Convention at another place, which showed that he had the real proceedings before him, and taking one part of the resolutions, he threw out another part and substituted false and fraudulent ones in their stead. I pointed that out to him, and also that his friend Lamphier, who was editor of the Register at that time and now is, must have known how it was done. Now whether he did it or got some friend to do it for him, I could not tell, but he certainly knew all about it. I pointed out to Judge Douglas that in his Freepo speech he had promised to investigate that matter. Does he now say he did not make that promise? I have a right to ask why he did not keep it? I call upon him to tell here to-day why he did not keep that promise? That truth has been traced up so that it lies between him, Hurl but, and me. There is little room for escape for Lamphier. Lamphier is doing the Judge good service, and Douglas desires his word to be taken for the truth. He desires Lamphier to be taken as authority in what he states in his newspaper. He desires Hurl but to be considered as a man of vast creditibility, and when this thing lies between them, they will not press it to show where the guilt really belongs. Now, as he has said that he would investigate it, and implied that he would tell us the result of his investigation, I demand of him to tell why he did not investigate it, if he did not; and if he did, why he would not tell the result? I call upon him to that.
This is the third time that Judge Douglas has assumed that he learned about these resolutions by Harris's attempting to use them against Norton on the floor of Congress. I tell Judge Douglas the public records of the country show that he himself attempted it upon Trumbull a month before Harris tried them on Norton—that Harris had the opportunity of learning it from him, rather than he from Harris. I now ask his attention to that part of the record on the case. My friends, I am not disposed to detain you longer in regard to that matter.

I am told that I still have five minutes left. There is another matter I wish to call attention to. He says, when he discovered there was a mistake in that case, he came forward magnanimously, without any calling his attention to it, and explained it. I will tell you how he became so magnanimous. When the newspapers of his side had discovered and published it, and put it beyond his power to deny it, then he came forward and made a virtue of necessity by acknowledging it. Now he argues that all the point there was in those resolutions, although never passed at Springfield, is retained by their being passed at other localities. Is that true? He said I had a hand in passing them, in his opening speech—that was in the Convention and helped to pass them. Do the resolutions touch me at all? It strikes me there is some difference between holding a man responsible for an act which he has not done, and holding him responsible for an act that he has done. You will judge whether there is any difference in the "pass." And he has taken credit for the great magnanimity in coming forward and acknowledging what is proved on him beyond even the capacity of Judge Douglas to deny, and he has more capacity in that way than any other living man.

Then he wants to know why I won't withdraw the charge in regard to a conspiracy to make slavery national, as he has withdrawn the one he made. May it please his worship, I will withdraw it if it is proven false on me that was proven false on him. I will add a little more than that. I will withdraw it whenever a reasonable man shall be brought to believe that the charge is not true. I have asked Judge Douglas's attention to certain matters of fact tending to prove the charge of a conspiracy to nullify slavery, and he says he concedes me that this is all untrue because Mr. Buchanan was not in the country at that time, and because the Dred Scott case had not then got into the Supreme Court; and he says that I say the Democratic owners of Dred Scott got up the case. I never did say that. I defy Judge Douglas to show that I ever uttered it. [One of Mr. Douglas's reporters gestilatated affirmatively at Mr. Lincoln.] I don't care if your birthing does say I did. I tell you myself that I never said the "Democratic" owners of Dred Scott got up the case. I have never pretended to know whether Dred Scott's owners were Democrats or Abolitionists, or Freesiders or Border Ruffians. I have said that there is evidence about the case tending to show that it was made up for that purpose of getting that decision. I have said that that evidence was very strong in the case that Dred Scott was declared to be a slave, the owner of him made him free, showing that he had had the case tried and the question settled for such use as could be made of that decision; he cared nothing about the property thus declared to be his by that decision. But my time is out and I can say no more.

THE LAST JOINT DEBATE, AT ALTON,
October 15, 1858.

SENATOR DOUGLAS'S SPEECH.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: It is now nearly four months since the canvass between Mr. Lincoln and myself commenced. On the 16th of June the Republican Convention assembled at Springfield and nominated Mr. Lincoln as their candidate for the United States Senate, and he, on that occasion, delivered a speech in which he laid down what he understood to be the Republican creed and the platform on which he proposed to stand during the contest. The principal points in that speech of Mr. Lincoln's were: First, that the Government could not endure permanently divided into free and slave States, as our fathers made it; that they must all become free or all become slaves; all become one thing or all become the other, otherwise this Union could not continue to exist. I give you his opinions almost in the identical language he used. His second proposition was a crusade against the Supreme Court of the United States because of the Dred Scott decision; urging as an especial reason for his opposition to that decision that it deprived the negroes of their rights and benefits of that clause in the Constitution of the United States which guarantees to the citizens of each State all the rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizens of the several States. On the 10th of July I returned home, and delivered a speech to the people of Chicago, in which I announced it to be my purpose to appeal to the people of Illinois to sustain the course I had pursued in Congress. In that speech I joined issue with Mr. Lincoln on the points which he had presented. Thus there was an issue clear and distinct made up between us on these two propositions laid down in the speech of Mr. Lincoln at Springfield, and controverted by me in my reply to him at Alton. On the next day, the 11th of July, Mr. Lincoln replied to me at Chicago, explaining at some length, and reaffirming the positions which he had taken in his Springfield speech. In that Chicago speech he went further than he had ever gone, and uttered sentiments in regard to the negro being an equal with the white man. He adopted in support of this position the argument which Lovejoy and Colding, and other Abolition lecturers had made familiar in the northern and central portions of the States, to wit: that the Declaration of Independence included the negro in the class, asserting that all men were created equal, and went so far as to say that if one man was allowed to take the position, that it did not include the negro, others might take the position that it did not include other men. He said that all these distinctions between this man and that man, this race and the other race, must be discarded, and we must all stand by the Declaration of Independence, declaring that all men were created equal.

The issue thus being made up between Mr. Lincoln and myself on three points, we met for a joint debate of the people of the State. During the following seven weeks, between the Chicago speeches and our first meeting at Ottawa, he and I addressed large assemblies of the people in many of the central counties. In my speeches I confined myself closely to those three positions which he had taken, controverting his proposition that this Union could not exist as our fathers made it, divided into free and slave States, controverting his proposition of a crusade against the Supreme Court because of the Dred Scott decision, and controverting his proposition that the Declaration of Independence included and meant the negroes as well as the white men, when it declared all men to be created equal. I supposed at that time that
these propositions constituted a distinct issue between us, and that the opposite positions were involved. He has been bound to go to war with all parts of the State, I never intended to wave one hair's breadth from that issue, either to the north or the south, or wherever I should address the people of Illinois. I hold that the doctrine arrives that I cannot proclaim my political creed in the same terms as the Northern States, and whatever the American flag waves over American soil, that there must be something wrong in that creed. So long as we live under a Constitution, in which one out of twelve States we have grown to be the majority of States of the whole Union, with the power to control the House of Representatives and Senate, and the power, consequently, to elect a President by Northern votes without regard to the bid of a Southern State. Having this power under the operation of that great principle, are you now prepared to abandon the principle and declare that merely because we have the power you will wage a war against the Southern States and their institutions until you force them to abolish slavery everywhere.

After having pressed these arguments home on Mr. Lincoln for seven weeks, publishing a number of my speeches, we met at Ottawa in joint discussion, and then began to work a little, and let himself down. I press that I cannot answer questions to them. Among others, I asked him whether he would vote for the admission of any more slave States in the event the people wanted them. He would not answer. I then told him that if he did not answer the question there I would renew it at Freeport, and would then try him down into Egypt and again put it to him. Well, at Freeport, knowing that the next joint discussion took place in Egypt, and being in dread of it, he did answer my question in regard to more slave States in a mode which he hoped would be satisfactory to me, and in which the object he had in view. I will show you what his answer was. After saying that he was not needed to the Republican doctrine of "no more slave States," he declared:

"I state to you freely, frankly, that I should be exceedingly glad if the legislature would not pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there never would be another slave State admitted into this Union."

Here permit me to remark, that I do not think the people will ever force him into a part of his views. He went on to say:

"But I must add in regard to this, that if slavery shall be kept out of the Territory during the territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people should, having a fair chance and a clear field when they come to vote, they would be expected to have to adopt a slave Constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but we must admit it into the Union."

Thus the Union Liberator turned the roundabout way said that if slavery should be kept out of a Territory during the whole of its territorial existence, and then the people, when they adopted a State Constitution, asked admission as a slave State, he supposed the people would have to admit the State come into the Union. The case I put to him was an entirely different one. I desired to know whether he would vote to admit a State if Congress had not prohibited slavery in it during its territorial existence, as Congress never promised to do, under the Compromise measures of 1850. He would not answer, and I have not yet been able to get an answer from him. I have asked him whether he would vote to admit Nebraska if her people asked to come in as a State with a Constitution recognizing slavery, and he refused to answer. I have put the question to him with references to the treaty they entered into, and he has not answered a word in answer. I have examined the Territories, one after another, putting the same question to him with reference to each, and he has not said, and will not say, whether he would elect to Congress, have resisted with our hearts' blood had it been attempted on us when we were in a nation. It is now the question, upon which we would be willing to go to war in every part of the State, I never intended to wave one hair's breadth from that issue, either to the north or the south, or wherever I should address the people of Illinois. I hold that the doctrine arrives that I cannot proclaim my political creed in the same terms as the Northern States, and whatever the American flag waves over American soil, that there must be something wrong in that creed. So long as we live under a Constitution, in which one out of twelve States we have grown to be the majority of States of the whole Union, with the power to control the House of Representatives and Senate, and the power, consequently, to elect a President by Northern votes without regard to the bid of a Southern State. Having this power under the operation of that great principle, are you now prepared to abandon the principle and declare that merely because we have the power you will wage a war against the Southern States and their institutions until you force them to abolish slavery everywhere.
he will vote to admit any Territory now in existence with such a Constitution as her people may adopt. He invents a case which does not exist, and asks for any other question of the Constitution, and answers it but he will not answer the question I put to him in connection with any of the Territories now in existence. The contract we entered into with Texas when we entered the Union obliges us to allow four States to be formed out of the Old State, and admitted with or without slavery as the respective inhabitants of each may desire. I have asked Mr. Lincoln three times in our joint discussion whether he would vote to redeem that pledge, and he has never yet complied with his promise. He is silent as the grave on this Constitution back to the people, with the option to add them to a State of the case which will never arise than count himself by telling what he would do in a case which would come up for his action soon after his election to Congress where he has no say whether he is willing to allow the people of each State to have slavery or not as they please, and come into the Union when they have the requisite population as a slave or a free State as they decide? I have no trouble in answering the question. I have said everywhere, and now repeat it to you, that if the people of Kansas want a slave State they have a right, under the Constitution of the United States, to form such a State, and I will let them come into the Union with slavery or without, as they determine. If the people of any other Territory desire slavery, let them have it. If they do not want it, let them prohibit it. It is their business, no mine. It is none of our business in Illinois whether Kansas is a free State or a slave State. It is none of your business in Missouri whether Kansas shall adopt slavery or reject it. It is the business of her people and none of yours. The people of Kansas have as much right to decide that question for themselves as you have in Missouri to decide it for yourselves, or we in Illinois to decide it for ourselves.

And here I may repeat what I have said in every speech. I have made in Illinois, that I taught the Lecompton Constitution to its death, not because of the slavery clause in it, but because it was not the act and deed of the people of Kansas. I said then in Congress, and I say now, that if the people of Kansas want a slave State, they have a right to have it. If they wanted the Lecompton Constitution, they have a right to have it. I was opposed to that Constitution because I did not believe that it was the act and deed of the people, but on the contrary, the act of a small, pitiful minority who gave the name of the majority. When at last I was compelled to send that Constitution back to the people, and accordingly, in August last, the question of admission under it was submitted to a popular vote, the citizens rejected it by nearly ten to one, thus showing conclusively, that I was right when I said that the Lecompton Constitution was not the act and deed of the people of Kansas, and did not embody their will.

I hold that there is no power on earth, under our system of Government, which has been delegated to the Constitution upon an unwilling people. Suppose there had been a majority of ten to one in favor of slavery in Kansas, and suppose there had been an Abolition President, and an Abolition Administration, and by some means the Abolitionists succeeded in signing an Abolition Constitution on these slaveholding people, would the people of the South have submitted to that act or constitution? Well, if you of the South would not have submitted to it a day, how can you, as fair, honorable and honest men, insist on putting a slave Constitution on a people who desire a free State? Your safety and ours depend upon each other and the Constitution of the United States.

Most of the men who denounced my course on the Lecompton question, objected to it not because I was not right, but because they thought it expedient at that time, for the sake of keeping the party together, to do wrong. I never knew the Democratic party to object to any one of its principles out of policy or expediency, principles out of policy or expediency, principles out of policy or expediency. I never knew the Democratic party at any time to have paid the debt with sorrow. There is no safety or success for our party unless we always do right, and trust the consequences to God and the people. I chose not to depart from principle for the sake of expediency in the Lecompton question, and I remain true to my word.

But I am told that I would have been all right if I had only voted for the English bill after Lecompton was killed. You know a general pardon was granted to all political offenders on the Lecompton question, provided the bill for the English bill did not accept the benefits of that pardon, for the reason that I had been right in the course I had pursued, and hence did not require any forgiveness. Let us see how the ranch has been worked out. English brought in his bill reelecting the Lecompton Constitution back to the people, with the option to accept it, with the option to add them to a State of the case which will never arise than count himself by telling what he would do in a case which would come up for his action soon after his election to Congress where he has no say whether he is willing to allow the people of each State to have slavery or not as they please, and come into the Union when they have the requisite population as a slave or a free State as they decide? I have no trouble in answering the question. I have said everywhere, and now repeat it to you, that if the people of Kansas want a slave State they have a right, under the Constitution of the United States, to form such a State, and I will let them come into the Union with slavery or without, as they determine. If the people of any other Territory desire slavery, let them have it. If they do not want it, let them prohibit it. It is their business, no mine. It is none of our business in Illinois whether Kansas is a free State or a slave State. It is none of your business in Missouri whether Kansas shall adopt slavery or reject it. It is the business of her people and none of yours. The people of Kansas have as much right to decide that question for themselves as you have in Missouri to decide it for yourselves, or we in Illinois to decide it for ourselves.

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against the Democratic party. All I have to say in reference to the matter is, that if that Administration have not regarded enough for principle, if they are not sufficiently attached to the creed of the Democratic party, as they were in 1850, 1854, and 1856. The War Department have personal interests in order to succeed in carrying out our glorious principles, I have no personal difficulty with Mr. Buchanan or his cabinet. He chose to make certain recommendations to Congress, as he had a right to do, on the Lecompton question. I could not vote in favor of them. I had as much right to vote in favor of them as any member of his cabinet. It is unseemly to discuss the question. I should vote as he had he should recommend. I undertake to say to you, if you do not vote as I tell you, I will take off the hands of your friends. I replied to him, "You did not elect me. I represent Illinois, and I am responsible to Illinois, as my constituency, and to God, but not to the President or to any other power on earth.

And now this warfare is made on me because I would not surrender my convictions of duty. I would not abandon my constituency, and receive the orders of the executive authorities how I should vote in the Senate of the United States. I hold that an attempt to control the Senate on the part of the Executive is subversive of the principles of our Constitution. The Executive department is independent of the Senate, and the Senate is independent of the President. In matters of legislation the President has a veto on the action of the Senate, and in appointments and treaties the Senate has a veto on the President. He has no more right to tell me how I shall vote on his appointments than I have to tell him whether he shall veto or approve a bill that the Senate has passed. Whenever you recognize the right of the Executive to say to a President, "Do this, or I will take off the hands of your friends," you convert this Republic from a republic into a despotism. Whenever you recognize the right of a President to say to a member of Congress, "Vote so as I tell you, or I will bring a power to bear against you at home which will crush you," you destroy the independence of the executive department, and convert him into a tool of Executive power. I resisted this invasion of the constitutional rights of a Senator, and I intend to resist it as long as I have a voice to speak, or a vote to give. Yet, Mr. Buchanan cannot coerce me to abandon one iota of Democratic principles out of revenge or hostility to his own party, and by its organization, and support its nominees. If there are any who choose to believe the fact only shows that they are not as good Democrats as I am.

My friends, there never was a time when it was so difficult to be a Democrat. But whether we are less than before Democrats, or not, every half-minded man will see that James Buchanan has answered the question, and has asserted that the people of a Territory, like those of a State, shall decide for themselves whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits. This question will not be decided by putting Abolitionists to power to interfere in the internal affairs of a Territory. The people of a Territory shall decide whether slavery shall or shall not exist within their limits. I answer specific questions. If you want a further answer, and say that while under the decision of the Supreme Court, as recorded in the opinion of Chief Justice Taney, slavocratic property like all other property, and can be carried into any Territory of the United States. If they do or do not, as any other description of property, you will find them there they are subject to the local law of the Territory just like all other property.

You will find in a recent speech delivered by that able and eloquent statesman, Hon. Jefferson Davis, at Bangor, Maine, that he took the same view of the subject that I took in my Freeport speech. Here he said:

"If the inhabitants of any Territory should refuse to enact such laws and police regulations as would give security to their property or to his, it would be rendered meaningless. Having in proportion to the difficulties of holding it without such protection. In the case of property in the hands of men, or what is usually called slave property, the insecurity would be so great that the owner could not ordinarily retain it. Therefore, though the right of the property holder, the remedy being withheld, it would follow that the owner would be practically disfranchised, by the circumstances of the case, from taking slave property into a Territory where the sense of the inhabitants was opposed to its introduction. So much for the oft-repeated failure of forcing slavery upon any community."

You will also find that the distinguished Speaker of the present House of Rep-
representatives, Hon. Jno. L. Orr, construed the Kansas and Nebraska bill in this same way. In 1846, and said that the great intellect of the South, Alex. H. Stephens, put the same construction upon it in Congress that I did. But I hold to the doctrine that the whole South is imeeting to the support of the doctrine that if the people of a Territory want slavery they have a right to have it, and if they do not want it that no power on earth can put it upon them. I hold to the doctrine that if there is no principle on earth more sacred to all the friends of freedom than that which says that a man has no constitutional right to have slavery unless he has a constitutional right to have it, that the negro is not a citizen, and that a man who is a citizen does not have the right to have slavery unless it is voluntarily given to him. The negro is not a citizen, and that a man who is a citizen does not have the right to have slavery unless it is voluntarily given to him. The negro is not a citizen, and that a man who is a citizen does not have the right to have slavery unless it is voluntarily given to him. The negro is not a citizen, and that a man who is a citizen does not have the right to have slavery unless it is voluntarily given to him. The negro is not a citizen, and that a man who is a citizen does not have the right to have slavery unless it is voluntarily given to him.

In the Declaration of Independence, the negro is equal to the white man, and that negro equality is an unchangeable right conferred by the Almighty, and hence that all human beings are equal. With such men it is no use for me to argue. I hold that the signers of the Declaration of Independence had no reference to negroes at all when they declared all men to be created equal. They meant that all men, not the savage Indians, nor the Pequot Indians, nor any other barbarous race. They were speaking of white men. They alluded to men of European birth and European descent—to white men. I have some objections to negroes, when they declared that doctrine. I hold that this Government was established on the basis of color. It was established by the Government of the whole country, and the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and should be administered by white men and none others. But it does not follow, by any means, that merely because a negro is in a mixed company, that the principles of that company should be a slave. On the contrary, it does follow that we ought to extend the negro race, and to all other dependent races in the rights, the privileges, and all the other advantages which we can exercise consistently and agreeably with any society. Humanity requires that we should give them all these privileges; Christianity requires that we should extend those privileges to them. The question then arises what are those privileges and what is the manner and extent of them. My answer is that is a question which each State must answer for itself. We have already decided it for ourselves. We tried slavery, kept it up for twelve years, and finding that it was not profitable, we abolished it for that reason, and became a free State. We adopted in its stead the policy that a negro in this country should not be a slave and shall not be a citizen. We have a right to adopt that policy. For my part I think it is a wise and sound policy for us. You in Missouri must judge for yourselves whether it is wise and sound for you. If you choose to follow our example, very good; if you reject it, still well, it is your business, not ours. So with Kentucky. Let Kentucky adopt a policy to suit herself. If we do not like it we will keep away from it, and if it should not like us, let her stay at home, mind her own business and let us alone. If the people of the whole State get not on that ground to mind its own business, attend to its own affairs, take care of its own negroes and not meddle with its neighbors, then there will be peace between the North and the South, the Black and the White. Why can we not have that peace? Why should we thus allow a sectional party to agitate this country, to array the North against the South, and convert us into enemies instead of friends, merely that a few ambitious men may ride into power on a sectional hobby? How long is it since these ambitious Northern men wished for a sectional organization? Did my one dream of a sectional party so long as the North was the weaker section and the South the stronger? Then all were opposed to sectional parties, but the moment the North obtained the majority in the House and Senate by the admission of California, and could elect a President without the aid of Southern votes, that moment ambitious Northern men formed a scheme to excite the North against the South, and make the people governed in their votes by geographical lines, thinking that the North, being the stronger section, would outvote the South, and consequently the leaders would rush into office on a sectional hobby. I am told that my hour is out. It was very short.

**MR. LINCOLN'S REPLY.**

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:—I have been somewhat, in my own mind, complimented by a large portion of Judge Douglas's speech—I mean that portion which he devotes to the controversy between himself and the present Administration. This is the seventh time Judge Douglas and myself have met in these joint discussions, and he has been gradually improving in regard to his war with the Administration. At Quincy, day before yesterday, he was a little more severe upon the Administration than I had hinted upon any occasion, and I took pains to compliment him for it. I then told him to "Give it to them with all the power he had," and as some of them were present, I told him I would be very much obliged if they would give it to him in about the same way. I take it he has now vastly improved upon the attack he made then upon the Administration. I flatter myself that he himself did not think his present attacks upon the Administration were very effective. All I can say now is it is re-commanded to him and to them what I then commented—to prosecute the war against another one in the most vigorous manner. I say to them again—Go it, husband!—Go it, bear!

There is one other thing I will mention before I leave this branch of the discussion.—Although I do not consider it much of my business, any way, I refer to that part of the Judge's remarks where he endeavors to involve Mr. Buchanan in an inconsistency. He reads something from Mr. Buchanan, from which he endeavors to involve him in an inconsistency; and he gets something of a cheer for having done so. I would only remind the Judge that while he is very valiantly fighting for the Nebraska bill and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, we are trying to get them there. I want to know if Buchanan has not as much right to be inconsistent as Douglas has? Has Douglas the exclusive right in this country, of being on all sides of all questions? Is anybody allowed that high privilege but himself? Is he to have an entire monopoly on that subject?

So far as Judge Douglas addressed his speech to me, or so far as it was about me, it is my business to pay some attention to it. In that speech which I made at Springfield, Illinois, I had in a very special manner complained that the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case had decided that a negro could never be a citizen of the United States; and this was met by some accident hereofore to analyze this statement, and it is required of me to notice it now. In point of fact it is untrue. I never have complained especially of the Dred Scott decision because it held that a negro could not be a citizen, and the Judge is always wrong when he says I have done so. I have done so to such an extent that I have done so, to have strongly impressed me with the belief of a predetermination on his part to misrepresent me.
He could not get his foundation for insisting that I was in favor of this negro equality anywhere else as well as he could by assuming that untruth proposition. Let me tell this audience what is true in regard to that matter; and the means by which they may correct me if I do not tell them truly it is by a recantation to the speech itself. I spoke of the Dred Scott decision in my Springfield speech, and I was then endeavoring to prove that the Dred Scott decision was a portion of a system or scheme to make slavery general in this country. I pointed out what things had been decided by the court. I mentioned as a fact that they had decided that a negro could not be a citizen—that they had done so, as I supposed, to deprive the negro, under all circumstances, of the remotest possibility of ever becoming a citizen and claiming the rights of a citizen of the United States under a certain clause of the Constitution.

I stated that, without making any complaint of it at all. I then went on and stated the other points decided in the case, namely: that the bringing of a negro into the State of Illinois and holding him in slavery for two years there was a matter in regard to which they would not decide whether it would make him free or not; that they decided the further point that taking him into a United States Territory where slavery was prohibited by act of Congress, did not make him free, because that act of Congress, as they held, was unconstitutional. I mentioned these three things as making up the points decided in that case. I mentioned them in a lump taken in connection with the introduction of the Nebraska bill, and the amendment of Chase, offered at the time, declaratory of the right of the people of the Territories to exclude slavery, which was voted down by the friends of the bill. I mentioned all these things together, as evidence tending to prove a combination and conspiracy to make the institution of slavery national. In that connection and in that way, I mentioned the decision on the point that a negro could not be a citizen, and in no other connection.

Out of this, Judge Douglas builds up his beautiful fabrication—of my purpose to introduce a perfect, social, and political equality between the races. His assertion that I made an "especially objection" (that is, his exact language) to this decision on this account, is untrue in point of fact. Now, while I am upon this subject, and as Henry Clay has been alluded to, I desire to place myself, in connection with Mr. Clay, as nearly right before this people as may be. I am quite aware what the Judge's object is here by all these allusions. He knows that we are two, and an audience, having strong sympathies, southward of relationship, place of birth, and so on. He desires to set up a standard abolition attitude. He read upon a former occasion, and alludes without reading today to a portion of a speech which I delivered in Chicago. In his quotations from that speech, as he has made them upon other occasions, the excerpts were taken, as a way, as I suppose, brings me within the definition of what is called garbling—taking portions of a speech which, when taken by themselves, do not present the entire sense of the speaker as expressed at the time. I propose, therefore, out of that same speech, to show how one portion of it which, he skilfully over (taking an extract before and an extract after) will give a different idea, and the true idea I intended to convey. It will take me some little time to read it, but I believe I will occupy the time that way.

You have heard him frequently allude to my controversy with him in regard to the Declaration of Independence. I confess that I have a struggle with Judge Douglas on that matter, and I will try briefly to place myself right in regard to it on this occasion. I said—and it is between the extracts Judge Douglas has taken from this speech, and put in his published speeches:

"Judge Douglas has been heard to say that there are certain conditions that make necessaries and impose them upon us, and to the extent that a necessity is imposed upon a man he must submit to it. I think that was the condition in which we found ourselves when we established this Government. We had slaves among us, we could not get our Constitution unless we permitted them to remain in slavery; we could not secure the good we desired if we grasped for more; and having by necessity submitted to that which it does not destroy the principle that is the charter of our liberties. Let the charter remain as our standard."

Now I have upon all occasions declared as strongly as Judge Douglas against the disposition to interfere with the existing institution of slavery. I do not pretend to draw from the same speech from which he takes garbled extracts for the purpose of proving upon me a disposition to interfere with the institution of slavery, and establish a perfect social and political equality between negroes and white people.

Allow me while upon this subject briefly to present one other extract from a speech of mine, more than a year ago, at Springfield, in discussing this very same question, soon after Judge Douglas took his ground that negroes were not included in the Declaration of Independence:

"I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did not mean to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all men were equal in color, size, intelligence, moral development or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness in what they did explain all men created equal—equal in certain inalienable rights, among which are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This they said, and this they meant. They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, or yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit.

"They meant to set up a standard maxim for free society which should be familiar to all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even, though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people, of all colors, everywhere."

There are again the sentiments I have expressed in regard to the Declaration of Independence. It is a former occasion—sentiments which have been put to print and read wherever any body cared to know what so humble an individual as myself chose to say in regard to it.

A day or two after the other day, I said in answer to Judge Douglas, that three years ago there never had been a man, so far as I know or believed, in the whole world, who had said that the Declaration of Independence did not include negroes in the term "all men." I remitted it to-day. I assert that Judge Douglas and all his friends have been a whole record of the country, and it is beyond my power to an astonishment to me if they shall be able to find that one human being three years ago had ever uttered the astounding sentiment that the term "all men" in the Declaration did not include the negroes. Do not let me be misunderstood. I know that more than three years ago there were men who, finding this assertion constantly in the way of their schemes to bring about the ascendancy and perpetuation of slavery, devoured the sentiments I have expressed to the time.

I know that Mr. Calhoun and all the politicians of his school denied the truth of the Declaration. I know that it ran along in the mouth of some Southern men for a period of years, ending at last in that shameful though rather forcible declaration of Pettit of Indiana, upon the floor of the United States Senate. That the Declaration of Independence was in that respect "a self-evident truth" than a self-evident truth. But I say, with a perfect knowledge of all this hawking at the Declaration without directly attacking it, that three years ago there never had been a man who ever said that we would so to speak it in the sneaking way of pretending to believe it and then asserting it did not include the negro. I believe the first man who ever said it was Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott case, and the next to him was our friend, Stephen A. Douglas. And now it has become the catch-word of the entire party. I would like to call upon his friends everywhere to consider how they have come in so short a time to view this matter in a way so entirely different from their former belief? to ask whether they are not being born along by an irrepressible current—whether, they know not?

In answer to my proposition at Galena last week, I see that some man in
Chicago has got up a letter addressed to the Chicago Times, to show, as he professes, that slavery had never been included in the term "all men" in the Declaration of Independence. What is the evidence he produces? I will bring forward his evidence and let you see what he offers by way of showing that slavery was never included in the Declaration.

And what is the foundation of this appeal to me in Indiana, to liberate the slaves under my care in Kentucky? It is a general declaration, in the act annexing to the world the independence of the thirteen American colonies, that all men are created equal. Now, as an abstract principle, there is no doubt of the truth of that declaration; and it is, therefore, in the original construction of society, and in organized societies, to keep it in view as a great fundamental principle. But, then, I apprehend that in no society that ever did exist, or ever shall be formed, was or can the equality asserted among the members of the human race, be practically enforced and carried out. Yet there are portions, very large portions, of any opinion in regard to the institution of slavery, that will always probably remain subject to the government of another portion of the community.

The declaration, whatever may be the extent of its import, was made by the delegations of the thirteen States. In most of them slavery existed, and had long existed, and was established by law. It was introduced and forced upon the colonies by the paramount law of England. Do you believe, that in making that declaration, the States that enacted it, or that were parties to the union, intended to take an abolition of slavery among them? Did any of the thirteen colonies entertain such a design or expectation? To impose such a secret and unavowed purpose, would be to charge a political fraud upon the noblest band of patriots that ever assembled in counsel—a fraud upon the Confederaation of the United States. A fraud upon the union of those States whose Constitution not only recognized the lawfulness of slavery, but permitted the importation of slaves from Africa until the year 1808. That is the entire quotation brought forward to prove that slavery was never included in the term "all men" in the Declaration. How does it do so? In what way has it a tendency to prove that? Mr. Clay says it is true as an abstract principle; that all men are created equal. But that is a great abstraction; that is an abstract principle carried out in all cases. He illustrates this by bringing forward the cases of females, minors, and insane persons, with whom it cannot be enforced; but he says it is true as an abstract principle in the organization of society, and it should be kept in view as a fundamental principle. Let me read a few words more before I add some comments of my own. Mr. Clay says a little further on:

"I desire no concealment of my opinions in regard to the institution of slavery. I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we have derived it from the parental Government, and from our ancestors. But here they are, and the question is, how can they be best dealt with? If a state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundations of society, no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be, to incorporating the institution of slavery among its elements."

But there is a point that I wish, before leaving this part of the discussion, to ask attention to. I have read and I repeat the words of Henry Clay:

"There are portions, large portions, of any opinion in regard to the institution of slavery, I look upon it as a great evil, and deeply lament that we have derived it from the parental Government, and from our ancestors. I wish every slave in the United States was in the country of his ancestors. But here they are; the question is how they shall be dealt with? If a state of nature existed, and we were about to lay the foundations of society, no man would be more strongly opposed than I should be, to incorporating the institution of slavery among its elements."

Judge Davis has again referred to a Springfield speech in which I said a "house divided against itself cannot stand." The Judge has so often made the entire quotation from that speech that I can make it from memory. I used this language:

"We are now far into the fifth year, since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to the slavery agitation. Under the operation of this policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. A 'house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the
house to fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States—old as well as new, North as well as South.

That extract and the sentiments expressed in it, have been extremely offensive to Judge Douglas. He has warred upon them as Satan warred upon the Bible. His persecutions upon it are endless. Here now are my views upon it in brief:

1. It is evident that a policy was in effect with the avowed object and certain promise of putting an end to the slavery agitation. Is it not so? When that Nebraska bill was brought forward four years ago last January, was it not for the "avowed object" of "putting an end to the slavery agitation? We were to have no more agitation in Congress it was all to be banished to the Territories. By the way, I will remark here that, as Judge Douglas is very fond of complimenting Mr. Crittenden in these days, Mr. Crittenden has said there was a falsehood in that whole business, for there was no slavery agitation at that time to agitate. We were for a while rather quiet on the troublesome subject, and that very abating of Judge Douglas's stirred it up again. But was it not understood or intimated with the "candid promise" of putting an end to the slavery agitation? Surely it was. In every speech you heard Judge Douglas make, until he got into this "imbroglio," as they call it, with the Administration about the Lecompton Constitution, every speech on that Nebraska bill was full of his declarations that we were just at the end of the slavery agitation. The last tip of the last point of the old serpent's tail was just drawing out of view. But has it proved so? I have asserted that under that policy that agitation "has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented." When was there ever a greater and more intelligent agitation in Congress than last winter? When was it as great in the country as to-day?

2. There was a collateral object in the introduction of that Nebraska policy which was a separation of the people of the Territories were that the fathers of the Government (beyond) suffering upon the people a higher degree of "self-government," is a question of fact to be determined by you in answer to a single question. Have you ever heard or known of a people anywhere on this globe that have had in the first instance as a part of its use, the people of Kansas had with this same right of "self-government? In its main policy and in its collateral object, it has been nothing but a lie trying to get by the people from the time of its introduction.

I have intimated that I thought the agitation would not cease until a crisis should have been reached and passed. I have stated in what way I thought it would be reached and passed. I have said that it might go one way or the other. We might, by investing the further spread of it, and placing it where the fathers originally placed it, put it where the public mind should rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. Thus the agitation may cease. It may be pushed forward. It shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South. I have said, and I repeat, my wish is that the further spread of it may be arrested, and that it may be placed where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. Thus the agitation may cease. It may be pushed forward. I have said that the fathers of the Government placed that institution where the public mind did rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. Let me ask why they made provision that the source of slavery—the African slave-trade—should be cut off as at the end of twenty years? Why did they make provision that in all the new territory, we owned at that time, slavery should be forever prohibited? Why stop its spread in that direction and cut off its course in another, if they did not look to its being placed in the course of ultimate extinction?

Again, the institution of slavery is only mentioned in the Constitution of the United States two or three times; and in neither of these cases does the word "slavery" or "negro race" occur; but covert language is used each time, and for a purpose. The word "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed—three-fifths of all other persons.

It says "persons," not slaves, not negroes; but this "three-fifths" can be applied to no other class among us than the negroes.

Lastly, in the provision for the reclamation of fugitive slaves, it is said: "No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." There again there is no mention of the word "negro" or of slavery. In all three of these places, being the only allusions to slavery in the instrument, covert language is used. Language is used not suggesting that slavery existed or that the black race were among us. And I understand the contemporaneous history of these times to be that covert language was used with a purpose, and that purpose was that in our Constitution, which it was hoped and is still hoped will endure forever—when it should be read by intelligent and patriotic men, after the institution of slavery had passed from among us—there should be nothing on the face of the great charter of liberty suggesting that such a thing as negro slavery had ever existed among us. This I take to be an argument that the fathers of the Government expected and intended the institution of slavery to cease at an end. They expected and intended that it should be in the course of ultimate extinction. And when I say that I desire to see the further spread of it arrested, I only say I desire to prevent the institution of slavery from being extended. When I say I desire to see it placed where the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, I only say I desire to see it placed where they placed it. It is not a new one; it is not the Judge Douglas one, made this Government make that proposition and part free. Understand the sense in which he puts it. He assumes that slavery is a rightful thing within itself—was introduced by the framers of the Constitution. This exact truth is, that they found the institution existing among us, and they left it in the Constitution. But in making the Government they left this institution with many clear marks of disapprobation upon it. They found slavery among them, and they left it among them because of the difficulty—the absolute impossibility of its immediate abolition. It was upon this that the fathers of the Constitution grounded their opposition to the spread of it. I have entertained the opinion upon evidence sufficient to my mind, that the fathers of this Government placed that institution where the public mind did rest in the belief that it was in the course of ultimate extinction. Let me ask why they made provision that the source of slavery—the African slave-trade—should be cut off as at the end of twenty years? Why did they make provision that in all the new territory, we owned at that time, slavery should be forever prohibited? Why stop its spread in that direction and cut off its course in another, if they did not look to its being placed in the course of ultimate extinction?
fathers left it. I ask you, when he infers that I am in favor of setting the free and slave States at war, when the institution was placed in that attitude by those who made no exception, what deep mine may war? If we had no war, we then placed, wherein is the ground of belief that we shall have war out of it, if we return to that policy? Have we any peace upon this matter springing from any other basis? I maintain that we have not. I have proposed nothing more than a return to the policy of the fathers.

I confess, when I propose a certain measure of policy, it is not enough for me that I do not intend any evil in the result, but it is incumbent on me to show that it is not a tendency to evil to that result. I have not Judge Douglass in that point of view. I have not only made the declaration that I do not mean to produce a conflict between the States, but I have tried to show by fair reasoning, and I think I have shown to the minds of fair men, that I propose nothing but what has a most peaceful tendency. The question that I happened to make in that Springfield speech, that "a house divided against itself cannot stand," and which has proved so offensive to the Judge, was part and parcel of the same thing. He tries to show that variety in the domestic institutions of the different States is necessary and indispensable. I do not dispute it. I have no controversy with Judge Douglass about that. I shall readily agree with him that it would be foolish for us to insist upon having a cranberry law here, in Illinois, where we have no cranberries, because they have a cranberry law in Indiana, where they have cranberries. I should insist that it would be exceedingly wrong in us to deny to Virginia the right to enact oyster laws, where they have oysters, because we want no such laws here. I understand, I hope, quite as well as Judge Douglass or any body else, that the variety in the soil and climate and face of the country, and consequent variety in the industrial pursuits and productions of a country, require systems of law conforming to this variety in the natural features of the country. I understand quite as well as Judge Douglass, that if we here raise barrel of flour more than we want, and the Louisianians raise a barrel of sugar more than they want, it is of mutual advantage to exchange. That produces commerce, brings us together, and makes us better friends. We like another the more for it. And I can prove to the Judge, as well as Judge Douglass, that the undertakings to build up a system of policy best calculated to make the public peace and the public accommodations are the cements which bind together the different parts of this Union—that instead of being a thing to "divide the house"—figuratively expressing the thing they tend to entail it; they are the props of the house tending always to hold it up.

But when I have admitted all this, I ask if there is any parallel between those things and this institution of slavery? I do not see that there is any parallel at all between those two things. Let us consider it. Our controversy with him is in regard to the institution of slavery. Let me put the Judge and myself about the cranberry laws of Indiana, or the oyster laws of Virginia, or the pine timber laws of Maine, or the fact that Louisiana produces sugar, and Illinois flour. Have we not any quarrel over those things? Have we had perfect peace in regard to this thing which I say is an element of discord in this Union? We have sometimes had peace, but when was it? It was when the institution of slavery was remembered where it was. We have had difficulty and turmoil whenever it has made a struggle to spread itself where it was not. I ask, if whenever does not speak in thunder-tones, telling us that the policy which has given peace to the country heretofore, being returned to, gives the greatest promise of peace again. You may say, and Judge Douglass has insisted that I say, that all this difficulty in regard to the institution of slavery is the mere agitation of office-seekers and ambitious northern politicians. He thinks we want to get his plan. I agree; I agree that there are office-seekers amongst us. The Bible says somewhere that we are desperately selfish. I think we would have discovered that fact without the Bible. I do not claim that I am any less so than the average of men, but I do claim that I am not more selfish than Judge Douglass.

But it is true that all the difficulty and agitation we have in regard to this institution of slavery springs from office-seeking—from the mere ambition of politicians? Is that the truth? How many times have we heard danger from this question? Go back to the day of the Missouri Compromise. Go back to the Nullification question, at the bottom of which lay this same slavery question. Go back to the time of the Annexation of Texas. Go back to the troubles that led to the Compromise of 1850. You will find that every time, with the single exception of the Nullification question, they sprung from an endeavor to spread this institution. There never was a question in the history of the country, and there probably never will be, that will have strength to disturb the general peace of the country. Parties themselves may be divided and quarreled on minor questions, yet it extends not beyond the parties themselves. But does this question make a disturbance outside of political circles? Does it not enter into the churches and rend them asunder? What divided the great Methodist Church into two parts, North and South? What has raised this constant disturbance in every Presbyterian General Assembly that meets? What disturbed the Unitarian Church in this very city two years ago? What has jolted and shaken the great American Tract Society recently, not yet splitting it, but sure to divide it in the end? Is it not this same mighty, deep-seated power that somehow operates on the minds of men, exciting and stirring them up in every avenue of society—in politics, in religion, in literature, in morals, in all the manifold relations of life? Is that the work of politicians? Is that irresistible power which for fifty years has shaken the Government and agitated the people to be called and supported by pretending that it is an exceedingly simple thing, and we ought not to talk about it? If you will get every body else to stop talking about it, I assure you I will quit before they have half done so. But when is the philosophy or statesmanship which assumes that you can quiet that disturbing element in our society which has disturbed us for more than half a century, which has been the only serious danger that has threatened our institutions—I say, is the philosophy or the statesmanship based on the assumption that we are to quiet it? and if quiet it, and that the public mind is all at once so ease being agitated by it? Yet this is the policy here in the north that Douglass is advocating—that we are to cure nothing about it. I ask you if it is not a false philosophy? Is it not a far more dangerous thing than the Judge supposed? Is it not the very thing the Judge would be most careful nothing about the very thing that everybody does cure the most about?—a thing which all experiences has shown we care a very great deal about? The Judge makes very often in the course of his remarks the exclusive right which the States have to decide the whole thing for themselves. I agree with him very readily that the different States have that right. He is but fighting a man of straw when he assumes that I am contending against the right of the States to do as they please. Our controversy with him is in regard to the institution of slavery.
who have left slave States and come into the free State of Illinois to get rid of the institution of slavery? [Another voice—"A thousand and one."] I reckon there are a thousand and one. I hope, if the policy you are now pursuing had prevailed when this country was in a Territorial condition, where would you have gone to get rid of it? Where would you have found your free State or Territory to go to? And when you had found it, for any cause, the people in this place shall desire to find new homes, if they wish to be rid of the institution, where will they find the place to go to?

Now irrespective of the moral aspect of this question as to whether there is a right or wrong in excluding a negro, and in favor of one new Territories being in such a condition that white men may find a home—may find some spot where they can better their condition—where they can settle upon new soil and better their condition in life. I am in favor of this not merely (I must say it here as I have elsewhere) for our own people who are born amongst us, but as an outlet for free white people everywhere, the world over—in which Huns and Baptists and Patrick, and all other men from all the world, may find new homes and better their conditions in life.

I have stated upon former occasions, and I may as well state again, what I understand to be the real issue in this controversy between Judge Douglas and myself. On the point of my wanting to make war between the free and the slave States, there has been no issue between us. So, too, when he assumes that I am in favor of introducing a perfect social and political equality between the white and black races. These are false issues, upon which Judge Douglas has tried to force the controversy. There is no issue in truth for the charge that I am either for these propositions. The real issue in this controversy—the one passing upon every mind—is the sentiment on the part of one class that looks upon the institution of slavery as a wrong, and of another class that does not look upon it as a wrong. The sentiment that constitutes the institution of slavery in this country as a wrong is the sentiment of the Republican party. It is the sentiment around which all their political arguments circled—around which they build their propositions and theories. They look upon it as being a moral, social, and political wrong; and while they contemplate it as such, they nevertheless have due regard for its actual existence among us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way and to all the constitutional obligations thrown about it. You have a due regard for these, they desire a policy in regard to it that looks to its not creating any more danger. They insist that it should as far as may be, be treated as a wrong, and one of the methods of treating it is the same as the peculiar practice that Judge Douglas has described.

They also desire a policy that looks to a peaceful end of slavery at some time, as being a wrong. These are the views they entertain in regard to it; I understand them; and all their sentiments and their arguments and propositions are brought within this range. I have said and I repeat it here, that if there be a man amongst us who does not think that the institution of slavery is wrong in any one of the aspects of which I have spoken, he is misplaced and ought not to be with us. And if there be a man amongst us who looks upon it as a wrong, it is in the difficulty of getting rid of it suddenly in a satisfactory way, and to disregard constitutional obligations thrown about it, that man is misplaced if he is on our platform; he must claim sympathy with him in practical action. He is not placed properly with us.

On this subject of treating it as a wrong, and limiting its spread, let me say a word. Has any thing ever threatened the existence of this Union save and except this very institution of slavery? What is it that we hold most dear amongst us? Our own liberty and prosperity. What has ever threatened our liberty and prosperity save and except this institution of slavery? If this is true, how do you propose to improve the condition of things by enhancing slavery—by spreading it out and making it bigger? You may have a war or cancer upon your person and not be able to cut it out lest you should die; but surely it is no way to cure it, to engraft it and spread it over your whole body. That is no proper way of treating what you regard a wrong. You see this peaceful way of dealing with it as a wrong—limiting the spread of it, and not allowing it to go into new countries where it has not already existed. That is the peaceful way, the old-fashioned way, the way in which the fathers themselves set the example.

On the other hand, I have said there is a sentiment which treats it as not being wrong. That is the Democratic sentiment of this day. I do not mean to say that every man who stands within that range positively asserts that it is right. That class will include all who absolutely positively assert that it is right, and all who say that slavery is right, that it is either right or wrong. These two classes of men fall within the general class of those who do not look upon it as a wrong. And if there be among you any body who supposes that he, as a Democrat, can consider himself "as much opposed to slavery as anybody," I would like to reason with him. You never treat it as a wrong. What other thing that you consider as a wrong, do you deal with as you deal with that? Perhaps you say it is wrong, but your leader never does, and you quarrel with any body who says it is wrong. Although you pretend to say so yourself you cannot find no place to deal with it as a wrong. You must not say any thing about it in the pulpit, because that is religion and has nothing to do with it. You must not say any thing about it in politics, because that will disturb the security of any place.

There is no place to talk about it as a wrong, although you say yourself it is a wrong. But finally you will assert yourself up to the hilt that if the people of the slave States should adopt a system of gradual emancipation on the slavery question, you would be in favor of it. You would be in favor of it. You say that is getting it in the right place, and you would be glad to see it succeed. But you fail to remember that you yourself all know that Frank Blair and Grant Brown, down there in St. Louis, undertook to introduce that system in Missouri. They fought as valiantly as they could for the system of gradual emancipation, and which you pretend you would be glad to see adopted. They would bring you to the test. After a hard fight they were beaten, and when the news came over here you threw up your bats and learned for Democracy. More than that, they took all the arguments made in favor of the system you have given over to the people in the United States was in the country of his ancestors, I am denounced by those preceding to respect Henry Clay for uttering a wish that it might sometime be possible to arrive at a system that would in some degree bring you to the test. The Democratic policy in regard to it is quite clear and full of the fact that there is any thing wrong in the institution of slavery. The arguments to sustain that policy carefully excluded it. Even here today you heard Judge Douglas quarrel with me because I uttered a wish that it might sometime be possible to arrive at a system that would through Henry Clay could say he would do for the people of the United States in the country of his ancestors; I am denounced by those preceding to respect Henry Clay for uttering a wish that it might sometime be possible, in some peaceful way, come to an end. The Democratic policy in regard to it is quite clear and full of the fact that there is any thing wrong in the institution of slavery.
There is no use to institute a comparison between right and wrong. You may turn over centuries of history in the Democratic policy from beginning to end, and you will never discover in the shape it takes on the statute book, in the shape it takes in the Dred Scott decision, in the shape it takes in conversation, or the shape it takes in short maxims-like arguments—it every where carefully excludes the idea that there is anything wrong in it.

That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this country when those poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right and wrong—throughout the world. They are the two principles that have stood firm to face the beginning of time; and will ever continue to struggle. The one is the common right of humanity and the other the divine right of kings. It is the same principle in whatever shape it develops itself. It is the same spirit that says, "You work and toil and earn bread, and I'll eat it." No matter in what shape it comes, whether from the mouth of a king or from the mouth of a ragged poor man, who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live by the fruit of their labor, or from one man of men as an apology for enslaving another race, it is the same tyrannical principle. I was glad to express my gratitude at Quincy, and I re-express it here to Judge Douglas—that he looks to no end of the institution of slavery. That will help the people to see where the struggle resides. It will here and ever after place with us all men who really do wish the wrong may have an end. And whenever we can get rid of the fog which obliterates the real question—when we can get Judge Douglas and his friends to avoid a policy looking to its perpetuation—we can get rid of among that class of men and bring them to the side of those who treat it as a wrong. Then there will soon be an end of it, and that end will be its ultimate extinction. However the issue can be distinctly made, and all extraneous matter thrown out, so that men can shilly see the real difference between the parties, this controversy will soon be settled, and it will be done peaceably too. There will be no war, no violence. It will be placed again where the wisest and best men of the world placed it. Brooks of South Carolina once declared that when this Constitution was framed, its framers did not look to the institution of slavery. It can be shown that it is today.

When he said this, I think he stated a fact that is fully borne out by the history of the times. But he also said they were better and wiser men than the men of those days; yet the men of those days had experience which they had not, and by the invention of the cotton gin it became a necessity in this country that slavery should be perpetual. I now say that, willingly or unwillingly, purposely or without policy, Judge Douglas has been the most prominent instrument in changing the position of the institution of slavery, which the fathers of the Government expected to come to an end ere this—and putting it upon Brooks's cotton gin basis—placing it where he openly confesses he has no desire there shall ever be an end of it.

I understand it takes ten or twenty minutes at least to say anything about this argument Judge Douglas uses, while he sustains the Dred Scott decision, that the people of the Territories can still somehow exclude slavery. The first thing I ask attention to is the fact that Judge Douglas constantly said, before the decision, that whether they could or not, was a question for the Supreme Court. But after the court has made the decision he virtually says it is not a question for the Supreme Court, but for the people. And how is it he tells us they can exclude it? He says it needs "police regulations," and that admits of "unfriendly legislation." Although it is a right established by the Constitution of the United States to take a slave into a Territory of the United States and hold him as property, yet unless the Territorial Legislature, by friendly legislation, and, more especially, by unfriendly legislation, they can practically exclude him. Now, without meeting this proposition as a matter of fact, I pass to consider the real Constitutional obligation. Let me take the gentleman who looks me in the face before me, and let us suppose that is the case. The first thing I wish to have the reader to know is that he will support the Constitution of the United States. His neighbor by his side in the Territory has slaves and needs Territorial legislation to enable him to enjoy that Constitutional right. Can he withhold the legislation which his neighbor needs for the enjoyment of a right which is fixed in his favor in the Constitution of the United States which he has sworn to support? Can he withhold it without violating his oath? And more especially, can he pass unfriendly legislation to violate his oath? Why, this is a monstrous sort of talk about the Constitution of the United States. There has never been an outburst of hostility to a doctrine from the mouth of any respectable man on earth. I do not believe it is a Constitutional right to hold slaves in a Territory of the United States. I believe the decision was improperly made and I go for reversing it. Judge Douglas is furious against it, and now is preparing a bill to support it. But he is for legislating it out of, or making the law itself stand. I repeat that there has never been so monstrous a doctrine uttered from the mouth of a respectable man.

I suppose most of us (I know it of myself) believe that the people of the Southern States are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave Law—that is a right fixed in the Constitution. But it cannot be made available to them without Congressional legislation. In the Judge's language, it is a "barren right," which needs legislation before it can become efficient and valuable to the persons to whom it is guaranteed. And as the right is Constitutional I agree that the legislation shall be granted to it—and that not that we like the institution of slavery. We professed to have no taste for running and catching nigros, at least I profess no taste for that job at all. Why then do I yield support to a Fugitive Slave law? I do not understand that the Constitution, which guarantees that right, can be supported without it. And if I believed that the right to hold a slave in a Territory was equally fixed in the Constitution with the right to reclaim fugitives, I should be bound to give it the legislation necessary to support it. I say that no man can deny his obligation to give the necessary legislation to support slavery in a Territory, who believes it is a Constitutional right to have it there. No man can, who does not give the Abolitionists an argument to deny the obligation enjoined by the Constitution to enact a Fugitive Slave law. Try it now. It is the strongest Abolition argument ever made. I say if that Dred Scott decision is correct, then the right to hold slaves in a Territory of Constitutional right with the right of a shareholder to have his runaway removed. The one is expressed, so that we cannot deny it. The other is construed to be in the Constitution, so that he who believes the decision to be correct believes in the right. And the man who argues that by unfriendly legislation, in spite of that Constitutional right, slavery may be driven from the Territories, cannot avoid furnishing an argument by which Abolitionists may show the obligation to return fugitives, and pass laws unfriendly to the right of the shareholder to reclaim his fugitive. I do not know how such an argument may strike a popular assembly like this, but I defy any body to go before a body of men whose minds are educated to estimating evidence and reasoning, and show that there is an issue of difference between the Constitutional right to reclaim a fugitive, and the Constitutional right to hold a slave, in a Territory, provided this Dred Scott decision is correct. I defy any man to make an argument that a right that is juridically unfriendly legislation to deprive a shareholder of a right to reclaim a slave in a Territory, that will not equally, in all its length, breadth and thickness, furnish an argument for nullifying the Fugitive Slave law. Why, there is not such an Abolitionists in the nation as Douglas, after all.

MR. DOUGLAS'S REPLY

Mr. Lincoln has concluded his remarks by saying that there is not such an Abolitionist as I am in all America. If he could make the Abolitionists of Illinois believe that he could not have much show for the Senate. Let him make the Abolitionists believe the truth of that statement and his political back is broken.
First, his criticism upon me is the assumption of his hope that the war of the administration will be prosecuted against me and the Democratic party, with vigour. He wants that war prosecuted with vigour; I have no doubt of it. His hopes of success, and the hopes of his party depend solely upon it. They have no chance of success in the Democracy of this State, or in the Democracy of the Union; the leaders in the Democratic party are driven by the fear of federal tyranny. He has all the federal office-holders here as his allies, rushing out to give the Democrats a business ticket against the Democracy to divide the party, although the leaders all intend to vote for me, to save the collar ticket, and only leave the greenrooms to vote this separate ticket which refuses to go into the Abolition camp. There is something of that feeling in the theory that Mr. Lincoln is in favor of prosecuting one war vigorously. If he is the first war he ever knew how to be in favor of prosecuting. It is the first war that he ever knew he intended to fight for, because he knew the Mexican war was being waged, and the American army was surrounded by the enemy in Mexico, he thought that war was unconstitutional, unnecessary, and unjust. He thought it was not commenced on the right spot.

When I made an incidental allusion of that kind in the joint discussion over at Charleston some weeks ago, Lincoln, in reply, said that I, Douglas, had charged him with voting against supplies for the Mexican war, and then he raved up, full length, and swore that he never voted against the supplies— that it was a slanderous-and-courageous and caught hold of Fieldkin, who sat on the stand, and said, "Here, Fieldkin, tell the people that it is a lie." Well, Fieldkin, he who served in Congress with him, stood up and told them all that he recollected about it. It was that when George Ashman, of Massachusetts, brought forward a resolution declaring the war unconstitutional, unnecessary, and unjust, that Lincoln had voted for it. "Yes," said Lincoln, "I did!" Thus he confessed that he voted that the war was wrong, that our country was in the wrong, and consequently that the Mexicans were in the right; but charged that I had slandered him by saying that he voted against the supplies. He never charged me with voting against the supplies in my life, because I know that he was not there when they were voted. The war was concluded on the 6th day of May, 1846, and on that day we appropriated in Congress ten millions of dollars, and fifty thousand men to prosecute it. During the same session we voted more men and money, and at the first session of this State Congress we voted more men and money here, so that by the time Mr. Lincoln entered Congress we had enough men and enough money to carry on the war, and had no occasion to vote for any more. When he got into the House, being opposed to the war, and not being able to stop the supplies, because they had already gone forward, he voted for the land of Corwin, and proved that the war was not begun on the right spot, and that it was unconstitutional, unnecessary, and wrong. Remember, too, that this he did after the war had begun. It is one thing to oppose the declaration of a war, another and very different thing to take sides with the enemy against your own country. After the war was commenced. Our army was in Mexico at the time, many battles had been fought, our citizens who were defending the honor of their country's flag, were surrounded by the fugitives, and the prison of the enemy. It was then that Corwin made his speech in which he declared that the American soldiers ought to be welcomed by the Mexicans with bloody hands and hospitable graves; then it was that Ashman's resolution was defeated, Corwin's speech, and Lincoln's vote, were sent to Mexico and read at the head of the Mexican army, to prove to them that there was a Mexican party in the Congress of the United States who were doing all in their power to aid them. That a man who takes sides with the enemy against his own country in time of war should rejoice in a war being made on me now, is very natural. And in my opinion, no other kind of a man would rejoice.

Mr. Lincoln has told you a great deal to-day about his being an old line Clay Whig. Bear in mind that there are a great many old Clay Whigs down in this region. It is more agreeable, therefore, for him to talk about the old Clay Whig party than it is for him to talk about Abolitionism. We did not hear much about the old line Whig party up in the Abolition districts. How much of an old line Henry Clay Whig was he? Have you read General Singleton's speech at Jacksonville? You know that Gen. Singleton was, for twenty-five years, the constitutional head of the Democracy of the United States; and he testified in 1847, when the Constitutional Convention of this State was in session, the Whig members were invited to a Whig caucus at the house of Mr. Lincoln's brother-in-law, where Mr. Lincoln proposed to throw away Clay overboard and take up Gen. Singleton's revived formula, that if the Whigs did not take up Gen. Taylor the Democrats would. Singleton testifies that Lincoln, in that speech, urged, as another reason for throwing Clay overboard, that the Whigs had fought long enough for the principle and ought to begin the fight for the success. Singleton also testifies that Lincoln's speech did have the effect of cutting Clay's throat, and that he (Singleton) and others withdrew from the caucus in indignation. He further states that when they got to Philadelphia to attend the National Convention of the Whig party, that Lincoln went there; the bitter and deadly enemy of Clay, and that he tried to keep him (Singleton) out of the Convention because he insisted on voting for Clay, and Lincoln was determined to have Taylor. Singleton says that Lincoln replied to very great joy when he found the mangled remains of the murdered Whig statement lying cold before him. Now, Mr. Lincoln tells you that he is an old line Clay Whig! Gen. Singleton testifies to the facts I have narrated, in a public speech which has been printed and circulated throughout the State for weeks, yet not a sip have we heard from Mr. Lincoln on the subject, except that he is an old line Clay Whig.

What part of Henry Clay's policy did Lincoln ever advocate? He was in Congress in 1848-49, when the Whig power was disturbed the peace and harmony of the country, till it shook the foundation of the Republic from its center to its circumference. It was that agitation that brought Clay forth from his retirement at Ashland again to occupy his seat in the Senate of the United States. He called the war of 1846 a desperate and determined war; the war of 1848 a war of resistance to its own wisdom and experience, and the renown of his name, to do something to restore peace and quiet to a disturbed country. Who got up that sectional strife that Clay had to be called upon to quell? I have heard Henry Clay boast that he voted for clay many times for the Whig provost, and his brave words; it was more than once more if he could. Lincoln is the man, in connection with Seward, Chase, Giddings, and other Abolitionists, who got up that strife that helped Clay to come down. Henry Clay came back to the Senate in 1849, and when he could do no more, he retired to the country.

The Union Whigs and the Democratic Whigs welcomed him the moment he arrived, as the man for the occasion. We believed that he, as a man of earth, had been preserved by Divine Providence to us out of our difficulties, and we Democrats rallied under the banner of old Jack, forgetting party when the country was in danger, in order that we might have a country first, and parties afterward.

This reminds me that Mr. Lincoln tells you that the slavery question was the only thing that ever disturbed the peace and harmony of the Union. Did not nullification once raise his head and disturb the peace of the Union in 1837? Did not the Med. or Mexican War? Did not Sumter raise his head during the last war with Great Britain? Was that the slavery question, Mr. Lincoln? The peace of this country has been disturbed three times, once during the war with Great Britain, once over the tariff question, and once on the slavery question, or rather, preparation, therefore, that slavery is the only question that has ever created discord in the Union falls to this ground. It is true that agitators are enabled now to use this slavery question for the purpose of sectional strife. He admits that in regard to all these laws, the principle that I advocate, making each State and Territory free to decide for itself, ought to prevail. He instances the cranberry law, and the oyster laws, and he might have gone through the whole list with the same effect.
be left to each State and each Territory to manage for itself. If agitators would accede to that principle, there never would be any danger to the peace and harmony of the Union.

Mr. Lincoln tries to avoid the main issue by attacking the truth of my proposition, that our fathers made this Government to protect the Negro from slavery in the future. He says that they did not make it, and adds another contradiction in the principle of the right of each State to decide all local questions for itself. Did they not make it? It is true that they did not establish slavery in any of the States, or abolish it in any of them; but feeling thirteen States, twelve of which were slave and one free, they agreed to form a government uniting them together, and divided into free and slave States, and to guaranty forever to each State the right to do as it pleased on the slavery question. Having thus made the government, and agreed to make it, and ever to make it as they made it, divided into free and slave States, if any one State chooses to retain slavery, he says that he looks forward to a time when slavery shall be abolished everywhere. I look forward to a time when each State shall be allowed to do as it pleases. If it chooses to keep slavery forever, it is not my business, but its own; if it chooses to abolish slavery, it is its own business—no mine. I care more for the great principle of self-government, the right of the people to rule, than I do for all the negroes in Christendom. I would not blot out the great inalienable rights of the white men for all the negroes that ever existed. Hence, I say, let us maintain this Government on the principles that our fathers made it, recognizing the right of each State to keep slavery as long as its people determine, or to abolish it when they please. But Mr. Lincoln says that when our fathers made this Government they did not look forward to the state of things now existing, and therefore thinks the doctrine was wrong; and he quotes Brooks, of South Carolina, to prove that our fathers were not that probably slavery would be abolished by each State acting for itself before this time. Suppose their idea; suppose they did not foresee what has occurred, does that change the power of the Government? They did not propose to forever sell; they did not intend to forever enslave; they did not intend to forever destroy their fellow citizens. They thought they were uniting the railroads that now form the bonds of union between the different States; or the thousand mechanical inventions that the world was destined to make. But do those things that the authors of the principles of the Government? Our fathers, I say, made this Government on the local law and the local right of each State to do as it pleases in its own domestic affairs, subject to the Constitution, and the people of each to apply to every new change of circumstances for what they think will improve their condition. This right they have for all time to come.

Mr. Lincoln went on to tell you that he does not at all desire to interfere with slavery in the Territories where it exists, and does not desire his Government to say that down here. Let me ask him then how he expects to put slavery in the course of ultimate extinction everywhere, if he does not intend to interfere with it in the States where it exists? He says that he will prohibit it in all Territories, and the inference is, then, that unless they make free States out of them he will keep them out of the Union. For, mark you, he did not say whether or not he would vote to admit Kansas with slavery or not, as her people might apply (he forgot that it was us, etc.) he did not say he would vote it, or he would not vote it. He says he speaks in the interest into the Union on the principle of Clay's Compromise measures on the slavery question. I told you that he would be prohibited in all the Territories where it exists, and does not desire his Government to say that down here.

His idea is that he will prohibit slavery in all the Territories where it exists, and does not desire his Government to say that down here. He will extinguish slavery in the Southern States as the French general exterminated the Algerines when he smoked them out. He is going to extinguish slavery by surrounding the slave States, hemming in the slaves and starving them out of existence, as you smoke a fox out of his hole. He intends to do that in the name of humanity and Christianity, in order that we may get rid of the terrible crime and sin entailed upon our fathers of holding slaves. Mr. Lincoln makes out that line of policy, and appeals to the moral sense of justice and to the Christian feeling of the community to sustain him. He says that many men hold it is absurd to decide on the contrary doctrine in the principle of the right of each to decide all local questions for itself. Did they not make it? It is true that they did not establish slavery in any of the States, or abolish it in any of them; but feeling thirteen States, twelve of which were slave and one free, they agreed to form a government uniting them together, and divided into free and slave States, and to guaranty forever to each State the right to do as it pleased on the slavery question. Having thus made the government, and agreed to make it, and ever to make it as they made it, divided into free and slave States, if any one State chooses to retain slavery, he says that he looks forward to a time when slavery shall be abolished everywhere. I look forward to a time when each State shall be allowed to do as it pleases. If it chooses to keep slavery forever, it is not my business, but its own; if it chooses to abolish slavery, it is its own business—no mine. I care more for the great principle of self-government, the right of the people to rule, than I do for all the negroes in Christendom. I would not blot out the great inalienable rights of the white men for all the negroes that ever existed. Hence, I say, let us maintain this Government on the principles that our fathers made it, recognizing the right of each State to keep slavery as long as its people determine, or to abolish it when they please. But Mr. Lincoln says that when our fathers made this Government they did not look forward to the state of things now existing, and therefore thinks the doctrine was wrong; and he quotes Brooks, of South Carolina, to prove that our fathers were not that probably slavery would be abolished by each State acting for itself before this time. Suppose their idea; suppose they did not foresee what has occurred, does that change the power of the Government? They did not propose to forever sell; they did not intend to forever enslave; they did not intend to forever destroy their fellow citizens. They thought they were uniting the railroads that now form the bonds of union between the different States; or the thousand mechanical inventions that the world was destined to make. But do those things that the authors of the principles of the Government? Our fathers, I say, made this Government on the local law and the local right of each State to do as it pleases in its own domestic affairs, subject to the Constitution, and the people of each to apply to every new change of circumstances for what they think will improve their condition. This right they have for all time to come.

My friends, if I have said before, we will only live up to this great fundamental principle, there will be peace between the North and the South. Mr. Lincoln admits that under the Constitution on all domestic questions, except slavery, the people in the Territories may vote to make or keep slaves. What right have we to interfere with slavery any more than we have to interfere with any other question? He says that this slavery question is now the bone of contention. Why? Simply because agitators have combined in all the free States to make war upon it. Suppose the agitators in the States should combine in one-half of the Union to make war upon the railroad system of the other half? They would thus be driven to the same sectional strife. Suppose one section makes war upon the other, and even the other to encourage the opposite section, and the same strife is produced. The only remedy and safety is that we shall stand by the Constitution as our fathers made it, obey the laws as they are passed, while they stand the proper test and sustain the decisions of the Supreme Court and the constituted authorities.
FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF OHIO: I cannot fail to remember that I appear for the first time before an audience in this great State—an audience that is accustomed to hear such speakers as Corwin, Chase, and Wade, and many other renowned men; and, remembering this, I feel that it will be well for you, as for me, that you should not raise your expectations to the standard to which you would have been justified in raising them had one of these distinguished men appeared before you. You would perhaps be only preparing a disappointment for yourselves, and, as a consequence of your disappointment, mortification to me. I hope, therefore, that you will commence with very moderate expectations; and perhaps, if you will give me your attention, I shall be able to interest you to a moderate degree.

Appearing here for the first time in my life, I have been somewhat embarrassed for a topic by way of introduction to my speech; but I have been relieved from that embarrassment by an introduction which the Ohio State Journal newspaper gave me this morning. I have read an article, in which, among other statements, I find the following:

"In debating with Senator Douglas during the memorable contest of last fall, Mr. Lincoln declared in favor of negro suffrage, and attempted to defend that vital conception against the Little Giant."

I mention this now, at the opening of my remarks, for the purpose of making three comments upon it. The first is, I have already announced—it furnishes me an introductory topic; the second is to show that the gentleman is mistaken; thirdly, to give him an opportunity to correct it.

In the first place, in regard to this matter being a mistake, I have found that it is not entirely safe, when one is misrepresented under his very nose, to allow the misrepresentation to go uncorrected. I therefore propose, here at the outset, not only to say that this is a misrepresentation, but to show conclusively that it is so; and you will bear with me while I read a couple of extracts from that very memorable debate with Judge Douglas last year, to which this newspaper alludes. In the fifth and sixth parts which Senator Douglas and myself had, at the town of Ottawa, I used the language which I will now read. Having been previously reading an extract, I continued as follows:

"Now, gentlemen, I don't want to read at any greater length, but this is the true complexion of all we have ever said in regard to the institution of slavery and the black race. This is the whole of it, and any thing that is not a part of this is entirely wrong. It is a political and social equality with the negro, and it is a species of fanaticism, I suppose, that by which a man can prove a horse-cloud to be a chestnut horse. I will say this, while upon this subject, that I have no purpose directly or indirectly to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. I have no purpose to introduce political and social equality between the white and the black races. There is a physical difference between the two which, in my judgment, will probably forever living together upon the footing of perfect equality, and inasmuch as it is because it is necessary that there must be a difference, I, as well as Judge Douglas, am in favor of the race to which I belong having the superior position. I have never said any thing to the contrary, but I hold that, notwithstanding all this, there is no reason in the world why the negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. I hold that he is as much entitled to these as the white man. I agree with Judge Douglas, he is not my equal in many respects—perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowments. But in the right to eat the bread without leave of any body else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal, and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man."
they found African slavery, or any other sort of slavery, prohibited by State Constitutions. They also found a law existing, supposed to be valid, by which slavery was excluded from almost all the territory the United States then owned. This was the condition of the country, with reference to the institution of slavery, on the first of January, 1854. A few days after that, a bill was introduced in the Senate and House of Representatives for the purpose of excluding slavery from the Territories of the United States. In connection with the law itself, and, in fact, in the terms of the law, the then existing prohibition was not only repealed, but there was a declaration of a purpose on the part of Congress, by a majority of a two-thirds vote, to exercise any power that they might have, real or supposed, to prohibit the extension or spread of slavery. This was a very great change; for the law thus repealed was of more than thirty years standing. Following rapidly upon the heels of this action of Congress, a decision of the Supreme Court was made, by which it is declared that Congress, if it desires to prevent the spread of slavery into the Territories, has no constitutional power to do so. Not only so, but that decision lays down principles, which, if it is held to be legal conclusion—my opinion is that the Constitution of free States, forbidding slavery, are themselves unconstitutional. Mark me, I do not say the Judge said this, and let no man say I affirm the Judge used those words; but I only say it is my opinion that what they did say, if presented to its logical conclusion, will inevitably result from it.

Looking at these things, the Republican party, as I understand its principles and policy, believe that there is great danger of the institution of slavery being spread out and extended, until it is ultimately made alike lawful in all the States of this Union; so believing, to prevent that incidental and ultimate consummation, is the origin of this party, and the chief purpose of the Republican organization. Any "chief purpose" of any political organization; for it is certainly true that if the National House shall fall into the hands of the Republicans, they will have to an extent such influence over the的命运 of the House, and there to maintain it, looking for no further change in reference to it, than that which the original framers of the Government themselves expected and looked forward to.

"The chief danger to this purpose of the Republican party is not just now the revival of the African slave-trade, or the passage of a Congressional slave code, or the decree of any other kind, but making slavery lawful in all the States. These are not pressing just now. They are not quite ready yet. The authors of these measures know that we are too strong for them; but they will be upon us in a few years, and we will be grappling with them hand to hand, if they are not now headed off. They are not now the chief danger to the purpose of the Republican organization; but the most imminent danger that now threatens is that insidious Douglass Popular Sovereignty. This is the miner and suwer. While it does not do all those things which pertain to it, and all the local Governments shall do precisely as they please in respect to those matters which exclusively concern them. I believe there is a genuine popular sovereignty. I think a definition of genuine popular sovereignty, in the abstract, would be about this: That such a thing shall be precisely as he pleases with himself, and with all those things which exclusively concern him. Applied to Government, this principle would be, that a General Government shall do all those things which pertain to it, and all the local Governments shall do precisely as they please in respect to those matters which exclusively concern them. I understand that this Government of the United States, under which we live, is based upon this principle, and it is misunderstood if it is supposed that we have any war to make upon that principle.

Now, what is Judge Douglass's Popular Sovereignty? It is, as a principle, no other than that, if one man chooses to make a slave of another man, neither that man nor any body else has a right to object. Applied in Government, as he seeks to apply it, it is this: If, in a new Territory into which a few people are beginning to enter for the purpose of making their homes, they choose to either exclude slavery from their limits, or to establish it there, however one or the other of these persons be enslaved, or the indefinitely greater number of persons who are afterward to inhabit that Territory, or the other members of the families of communities, of which they are but an insignificant member, or the general head of the community of States as parent of all—however their action may affect one or the other of these, there is no power or right to interfere. That is Douglass's popular sovereignty applied.

He has a good deal of trouble with popular sovereignty. His explanations of explanations explained are interminable. The most long-winded, and, as I suppose, the most maturely considered of the long series of explanations, is his great essay in Harper's Magazine. I will not attempt to enter on any thorough investigation of his argument, as there made and presented. I will nevertheless occupy a good portion of your time here in drawing your attention to certain points in it. Such of you as may have read this document will have perceived that the Judge, early in the document, quotes from two persons as belonging to the Republican party, without naming them, but who can readily be recognized as being Gov. Seward of New York and myself. It is true, that exactly fifteen months ago this day, I believe, I for the first time expressed a sentiment upon this subject; and in such a manner that it should get into print, that the public might see it beyond the circle of my hearers; and my expression of it at that time is the quotation that Judge Douglass makes. He has not made the quotation so that it is sufficiently accurate not to change its sense.

The sense of that quotation condensed is this—that that slavery element is a durable element of discord among us, and that we shall probably not have perfect peace in this country with it until either masters the free principle in our Government, or is so far mastered by the free principle as for the public mind to rest in the belief that it is going to end. This sentiment, which I now express in this way, was, at no great distance in time, perhaps, in different language, and in its more essential parts, expressed by Gov. Seward. Judge Douglass has been so much annoyed by the expression of that sentiment that he has constantly, I believe, in almost all his speeches since it was uttered, been referring to it. I find he alludes to it in his last book, as well as in the copy-right essay. I do not now enter upon this for the purpose of making an elaborate argument to show that we were right in the expression of that sentiment. In other words, I shall not stop to say all that might properly be said upon that point; but I only ask your attention to it for the purpose of making one or two points upon it.

If you will read the copy-right essay, you will discover that Judge Douglass himself says a controversy between the American Colonists and the Government of Great Britain began on the slavery question in 1839, and continued from that time until the Revolution, and, while he did not say so, we all know that it has continued with more or less violence ever since the Revolution.

Then we need not appeal to history, to the declarations of the framers of the Government, but we know from Judge Douglass himself that slavery began to be an element of discord among the white people of this country as far back as 1839, or one hundred and sixty years ago, or five generations of men—counting each generation ten years.
There is another point I desire to make in regard to this matter, before I leave it. From the adoption of the Constitution down to 1820 is the precise period of our history when we had comparative peace upon this question—the precise period of time when we came nearer to having peace about it than any other time of that entire one hundred and sixty years, in which he says it began, and during the eighty years of our own Constitution. Then it would be worth our while to stop and consider into the probable reason of our coming nearer to having peace then than at any other time. This is the precise period of time during which our fathers adopted, and during which they followed, a policy restricting the spread of slavery, and the whole Union was acquisiting in it. The whole country looked forward to the ultimate extinction of the institution. It was when a policy had been adopted and was prevailing which led all just-minded men to suppose that slavery was gradually coming to an end, and that they might be quiet about it, watching it as it expired. I think Judge Douglass might have perceived that too, and whether he did or not, it is worth the attention of fair-minded men, here and elsewhere, to consider whether that is not the truth of the case. If he had looked at these two facts, that this has been an element of discord for one hundred and sixty years among this people, and that the only comparative peace we have had about it was when that policy prevailed in this Government, which he now waxes upon, he might then, perhaps, have brought a more just appreciation of what I said fifteen months ago—that "a horse divided against itself cannot stand. I believe that this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to dissolve; but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind will rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward, until it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, north as well as south. That was my sentiment at that time. In connection with it, I said, "we are now far into the fifth year, since a policy was inaugurated with so avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of the policy, starvation is not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. I now say to you here that we are advanced still further into the sixth since that policy of Judge Douglas—that Popular Sovereignty has for quelling the slavery question—was made the national policy. Fifteen months more are not enough, since I uttered that sentiment, and I call upon you, and all other right-minded men, to say whether that fifteen months have belied or corroborated my arguments. While I am here upon this subject, I cannot but express gratitude that this true vision ... the element of discord among us— as I believe it is attracting more people and more attention. I do not believe that Gov. Seward uttered that sentiment because I had done so before, but because he reflected upon this subject and saw the truth of it. I believe, because Gov. Seward or I uttered it, that Mr. Hickman of Pennsylvania, in different languages, since that day, this disease is developing itself in the utter antagonism which exists between the principles of liberty and slavery. You are multiplying. Now, while am speaking of Hickman, let me say, I know but little about him. I have never seen him, and know scarcely anything about the man; but I will say this much of him: Of all the anti-Lecompton Democrats that have been brought to my notice, he alone has the true, genuine ring of the metal. And now, without endorsing anything else he has said, I will ask this audience to give three cheers for Hickman. [The audience responded with three ringing cheers for Hickman.]

Another point in the copyright essay to which I would ask your attention, is really that which could be extracted from the whole thing, than from any express declaration of it at any point. It is a general feature of the document, and indeed, of all of Judge Douglas's discussions of this question, that the Ter- ritorialism of the United States and the States of this Union are exactly alike—

that there is no difference between them at all—that the Constitution applies to the Territories precisely as it does to the States—and that the United States Governor is the Governor of the Constitution, may not do in a State what it may do in a Territory, and what it must do in a State, it must do in a Territory. Gentlemen, is that a true view of the case? It is necessary for this squatter sovereignty; but is it true? Let us consider. What does it depend upon? It depends altogether upon the States, not, in the States must, without the intervention of the General Government, do all those things that pertain exclusively to themselves—that are local in their nature, that have no connection with the General Government. After Judge Douglas has established this proposition, which nobody disputes, that it may not do in a Territory, he is to proceed to assume, without proving it, that slavery is one of these little, unimportant, trivial matters which are of just about as much consequence as the question would be to me, whether my neighbor should raise horned cattle or plant tobacco; that there is no moral question about it, but that it is altogether a matter of dollars and cents; that when a new Territory is opened for settlement, the first man who goes into it may plant there a thing which, like the canal tilia or some other of those pests of the soil, cannot be dug out by the millions of men who will come thereafter; that it is one of those little things that is so trivial in its nature that it has no effect upon any body save the few men who first plant upon the soil; that it is not a thing which in any way affects the family of communities composing these States, nor any way endangers the General Government. Judge Douglass ignores altogether the very well known fact, that we have never had a serious menace to our political existence, except it spring from this thing, which he chooses to regard as only upon a par with onions and potatoes. Turn it, and contemplate it in another view. He says, that according to his Popular Sovereignty, the General Government may give to the Territories governors, judges, marshals, secretaries, and all the other official men to govern there, but they must not touch upon this other question. Why? The question of who shall be Governor of a Territory for a year or two, and pass away, without his track being left upon the soil, or an act which he did for good or evil being left there for posterity. It is so much opposed in its nature to locality, that the nation itself must decide it; while this other matter of planting slavery upon a soil—a thing which once cannot be eradicated by the succeeding generation who have succeeded him, which is the first cause, or if eradicated, without infinite difficulty and a long struggle—he considers the power to prohibit it, as one of these little, local, trivial things that the nation ought not to say a word about; that it affects nobody save the few men who are there.

Take these two things and consider them together, present the question of planting a State with the institution of slavery by the side of a question of who shall be Governor of Kansas for a year or two, and is there a man here— is there a man on earth, who would not say that the Governor question is the little one, and the slavery question is the great one? I ask any honest Democrat if the small, the local, and the trivial and temporary question is not who shall be Governor? While the durable, the imperishable, the most abhorred one is, shall this soil be planted with slavery or not? This is an idea, I suppose, which has arisen in Judge Douglass's mind from his peculiar structure. I suppose the institution of slavery looks small to him. He is so put up by nature that a look upon his back would hurt him, but that a big body does not hurt him. That is in the build of the man, and consequently he looks upon the matter of slavery in this unimportant light.

Judge Douglass ought to remember when he is endeavoring to free this policy upon the American people that while he is putting it up in this way a good many are not. He ought to remember that there was once in this country a man by the name of Thomas Jefferson, supposed to be a Democrat—a man whose principles and policy are not very different amongst Democrats to-day; it is true; but he said that man did not take exactly this view of the insignificance of the element of slavery which our friend Judge Douglass does. In contemplation of this thing, we all know he was led to ex-
claim, "I tremble for my country when I remember that God is just!" We know how much he looked upon it when he thus expressed himself. There was danger to this country—danger of the avenging justice of God. It was little unusual for Popular Sovereignty of Judge Douglas. He supposed there was a question of God's eternal justice wrapped up in the enduring of any race of men, or any man, and that those who did so brave the arm of Jehovah—that when a nation did thus it behove Almighty, every friend of that nation had cause to dread its wrath. Choose ye between Jefferson and Douglas as to what is the true view of this element among men, as to who has the little difficulty about this matter of treating the Territories and States alike in all things, to which I ask your attention, and I shall leave this branch of the case. If there is no difference between them, why not make the Territories States at once? What is the reason that Kansas was not fit to come into the Union when it was organized into a Territory, in Judge Douglass's view? Can any of you tell any reason why it should not have come into the Union at once? They are fit, as he thinks, to decide upon the slavery question—the largest and most important with which they could possibly deal—what could they do by coming into the Union that they are not fit to do, according to his view, by staying out of it? Oh, they are not fit to sit in Congress and decide upon the rates of postage, or questions of ad valorem or specific duties on foreign goods, or live oak timber contracts; they are not fit to decide these vasty important matters, which are national in their import, but they are fit, "from the jump," to decide this little negro question. But gentlemen, the case is too plain; I occupy too much time on this head, and I pass on.

Near the close of the copy-right essay, the Judge, I think, comes very near kicking his own fist into the fire. I did not think, when I commenced these remarks, that I would read from that article, but I now believe I will:

"This exposition of the history of these measures, shows conclusively that the authors of the Compromise Measures of 1850 and of the Kansas-Nebraska act of 1854, as well as the members of the Continental Congress of 1774, and the founders of our system of Government subsequent to the Revolution, regarded the people of the United States and Colonies as political, communal associations of individuals, and exclusive power of legislation in their provisional legislatures, where their representation could alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal politics.

"There is very little difficulty in seeing what putting in the word "slavery" would have done to the history of his own history, he put in what he knew pass as synonymous with its "internal policy." Whenever we find that in one of his speeches, the substitute is used in this manner, and I can tell you the reason. It would be too bad a contradiction to say slavery, but "internal policy" is a general term for all individuals, and which he hopes will pass with the reading community for the same thing.

"This right pertains to the people collectively, as a law-abiding and peaceful community, and not to the isolated individual who may be the subject of the public community in violation of the law. It can only be exercised where there are inhabitants sufficient to constitute a Government, and capable of performing its various functions and duties; a fact to be ascertained and determined by—who do you think? Judge Douglas says "by Congress!"

"Whether the number shall be fixed at ten, fifteen or twenty thousand inhabitants, does not affect the principle."
The page contains text discussing the history of the United States, focusing on the Ordinance of 1787 and its significance in the context of the Revolutionary War. The text references the expansion of slavery and the struggle for freedom, noting the historical context and the actions of individuals and groups. The text also discusses the political history of the country, including the role of the Constitution and the legal framework that governed territorial expansion.

The text is extracted from a larger body of work, likely a historical or political document, and includes references to specific events and figures. The language is formal and educational, aimed at conveying scholarly or informative content about the period described.
will stand by Judge Douglas in that to the bitter end. And now, Judge Douglas, come and stand by me, and truly show how they acted, understanding it better than we do. All I ask of you, Judge Douglas, is to stick to the proposition that: the men of the Revolution understood this subject better than we do now, and with that better understanding they acted better than you are trying to act now.

What you say is nothing new in regard to the Dred Scott decision, as dealt with by Judge Douglas. In that "memorable debate" between Judge Douglas and myself, last year, the Judge thought fit to commence a process of catching me, and at Frederic I answered his questions, and propounded some to him. Among others propounded to him was one that I have here now. The substance, as I remember it, is, "Can the people of a United States Territory, under the Dred Scott decision, in any lawful way, against the will of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits, prior to the formation of a State Constitution?". He answered that they could lawfully exclude slavery from the United States Territories, notwithstanding the Dred Scott decision. There was something about that answer that has probably been a trouble to the Judge ever since.

The Dred Scott decision expressly gives every citizen of the United States a right to carry his slaves into the United States Territories. And now there was some inconclusiveness in saying that the decision was right, and saying, too, that the people of the Territory could lawfully drive slavery out again. When all the trash, the words, the collateral matter, was cleared away from it—all the chaff was fanned out of it, it was a bare absurdity—no less than a thing may be lawfully driven away from where it has a lawful right to be. Cooke, in the whole, and that is the naked truth of his proposition—that a thing may be lawfully driven from the place where it has a lawful right to stay. Well, it was because the Judge couldn't help seeing this, that he has so much trouble with it; and what I want to ask your special attention to, just now, is to remind you, if you have not noticed the fact, that the Judge does not any longer say that the people can exclude slavery. He does not say so in the copy-right essay; he did not say so in the speech that he made before the San Francisco Convention; as far as I know, since his decision of the Supreme Court, or destroying it. When he said, as he did at Frederic, that the people of the Territories can exclude slavery. He desires that you, who wish the Territories to remain free, should believe that he stands by that position, but he does not say it himself. He escapes to some extent from the question that the Supreme Court have stated by changing his language entirely. What he says now is something different in language, and we will consider whether it is not different in sense too. It is now that the Dred Scott decision, or rather the Constitution was carried. It is now that the people of the Territories to control it as other property. He does not say the people can drive it out, but they can control it as other property. The language is changed. He does not say, as he did before, Driving a horse out of this lot is too plain a proposition to be mistaken about; it is putting him on the other side of the fence. Or it might be a sort of exclusion of him from the lot if you were to kill him. If you were to kill him and let him leave his pasture; but rather than that is the thing that is to take the place of driving him as other property. That would be far more than just such as to give you gentlemen who want his popular sovereignty the power to exclude the institution or drive it out at all. I know the Judge sometimes alludes to the argument that in controlling it as other property by unfriendly legislation they may control it to death, as you might in the case of a horse, perhaps, feed him so lightly and ride him so much that he would die. But when you come to legislative control, there is something more to be attended to. I have no doubt, myself, that if the Territories should undertake to control slave property as other property—that is, to drive a man with his slave out of the Territory—the Supreme Court of the United States will say, "God speed you and Amen." But I undertake to tell the present generation of the law that he is free because of being taken in there, or to tax him to such an extent that he cannot keep his slaves, the Supreme Court will undoubtedly decide all such situations as long as that Supreme Court is constructed as the Dred Scott Supreme Court is. The first two things they have already decided, except that there is a little quibble among lawyers between the words safe and decision. They have already decided a negro cannot be made free by territorial legislation.

What is that Dred Scott decision? Judge Douglas labors to show that it is the one thing, while I think it is altogether different. It is a long opinion, but it is all embodied in this short statement: "The Constitution of the United States forbids Congress to deprive a man of his property, without due process of law; the right of property in slaves is distinctly and expressly affirmed in that Constitution; therefore if Congress shall undertake to say that a man's slave is no property, or when he crosses a certain line into a Territory, that is depriving him of his property without due process of law, and is unconstitutional."

There is the whole Dred Scott decision. They add that if Congress cannot do so itself, Congress cannot confer any power to do so, and hence any effect by the Territorial Legislature to do either of these things is absolutely decided against. It is a foregone conclusion by that court.

Now, as to this indirect mode by "unfriendly legislation," all lawyers here will readily understand that such a proposition cannot be tolerated for a moment, because a legislature cannot indirectly do that which it cannot accomplish directly. Then I say any legislation to control this property, as property, for its benefit or property, would be ruled by this Dred Scott Supreme Court, and fully sustained; but any legislation to control this property directly is beyond the power of Congress, or the Territories, or the States, or the slave, or the Negro, or the Dred Scott Supreme Court, and is the supreme law of the land. Now, gentlemen, if it were not for my excessive modesty I would say that I told you in 1854 that Judge Douglas was quite a young man. This argument is based on the consideration whether if it were not for my overbearing, or my modesty, or my legislation, I might call your attention to it. If you read it, you will find that I not only made that argument, but made it better than he has made it since.

There is, however, this difference. I say now, and said then, there is no sort of question about the constitutionality of the act, or any of the acts. That would be quite distinct from the Dred Scott case, so that it is the right of the slaveholder to take his slave and hold him in the Territory; and saying this, Judge Douglas himself admits the conclusion. He says if that is so, this consequence will follow; and hence we can do this, and this, and this, and this. But if you consider what the consequences of slavery would be, or what the consequences of making him a slave, or what the consequences of making him free, you would instantly see that there is nothing in the Constitution. It seems to be his purpose to make the whole of that decision to result in a more negative declaration of a want of power in Congress to do any thing in relation to this
matter in the Territories. I know the opinion of the Judges states that there is a total absence of power; but that is, unfortunately, not all it states; for the Judges add that the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. I do not stop at saying that the right of property in a slave is recognized in the Constitution, it is declared to exist somewhere in the Constitution, but says it is affirmed in the Constitution. Its language is equivalent to saying that it is embodied and so woven into that instrument that it cannot be detached without breaking the Constitution itself. In a word, it is part of the Constitution.

Douglas is singularly unfortunate in his effort to make out that decision to be altogether negative, when the express language of the vital part is that this is distinctly affirmed in the Constitution. I think myself, and I repeat it here, that this decision does not merely carry slavery into the Territories, but by its logical conclusion it carries it into the States in which we live. One provision of that Constitution is that it shall be the supreme law of the land—I do not quote the language—any Constitution or law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. The Dred Scott decision says that the right of property in a slave is affirmed in that Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land, any State Constitution or law notwithstanding. Then I say that to destroy a thing which is distinctly affirmed and supported by the supreme law of the land, even by a State Constitution or law, is a violation of that supreme law, and there is no escape from it. In my judgment there is no avoiding that result, save that the Americans shall see that Constitutions are better construed than our Constitution is construed in that decision. They must take care that it is more faithfully and truly carried out than it is there expounded.

I must hasten to a conclusion. Near the beginning of my remarks, I said that this audacious Douglas Popular Sovereignty is the measure that now threatens the purpose of the Republican party, to prevent slavery from being nationalized in the United States. If you will ask your attention for a little moment, to the propositions in affirmation of that statement. Take it just as it stands, and apply it as a principle; extend and apply that principle elsewhere and consider where it will lead you. I now propose this proposition that Judge Douglas's Popular Sovereignty applied will reopen the African slave-trade; and I will demonstrate it by any variety of ways in which you can turn the subject or look at it.

The Judge says that the people of the Territories have the right, by his principle, to have slaves, if they want them. Then I say that the people in Georgia have the right to keep slaves in Africa, if they want them, and I defy any man on earth to show any distinction between the two things—to show that the one is either more wicked or more unlawful to show, on original principles, that one is better or worse than the other; or to show by the Constitution, that one differs a whit from the other. He will tell me, doubtless, that there is no Constitutional provision against people taking slaves into the new Territories, and I tell him that there is equally no Constitutional provision against buying slaves in Africa. He will tell you that a people, in the exercise of their popular sovereignty, ought to do as they choose; that thing, and have slaves if they want them; and I tell you that the people of Georgia are as much entitled to popular sovereignty and to buy slaves in Africa, if they want them, as the people of the Territories to have slaves if they want them. I ask any man, dealing honestly with himself, to point out a distinction between these two.

I have recently seen a letter of Judge Douglas' in which, without stating that to be the object, he doubtless endeavors to make a distinction between the two. He says it is, in substance, opposed to the repeal of the laws against the African slave-trade. And why? He then seeks to give a reason that would make it as popular in the Territories. What is that reason? “The abolition of the African slave-trade is a compact of the Constitution.” I deny it. There is not truth in the charge. Then he says that the abolition of the African slave-trade is a compact of the Constitution. No man can put his finger on anything in the Constitution that is out of harmony with this. It is a mere barren assertion, made simply for the purpose of getting up a distinction between the repeal of the African slave-trade and his “great principle.”

At the time the Constitution of the United States was adopted it was expected that the slave-trade would be abolished. I should assert, and insist upon that, if Judge Douglas denied it. But I know that it was equally expected that the slave-trade would be abolished. I can show by history, that in regard to these two things, public opinion was exactly alike, while in regard to positive action, there was more to be done in the Ordinance of '87 to reach the spread of slavery than was ever done to abolish the foreign slave-trade. Let me be misunderstood, I say again that at the time of the formation of the Constitution, public expectation was that the slave-trade would be abolished, but no more so than the spread of slavery in the Territories should be restrained. They stated alike, except that in the Ordinance of '87 there was a mark left by public opinion, showing that it was more committed against the spread of slavery in the Territories than against the foreign slave-trade.

Compromise! What word of compromise was there about it? Why, the public sensa was then in favor of the abolition of the slave-trade; but there was at the time a very great commercial interest involved in it and extensive capital in that branch of trade. There were doubts of the incipient stages of improvement in the South in the way of farming, dependent on the slave-trade, and they made a proposition to Congress to abolish the trade after allowing it twenty years, a sufficient time for the capital and commerce engaged in it to be transferred to other channels. They made no provision that it should be abolished in twenty years; I do not doubt that they expected it would be; but they made no bargain about it. The public sentiment left no doubt in the minds of any that it would be done away. I repeat, there is nothing in the history of those times in favor of that matter being a compromise of the Constitution. It was the public expectation at the time, manifested in a thousand ways, that the spread of slavery should be also restricted.

Then I say if this principle is established, that there is no wrong in slavery, and whatever wants it has a right to have it; it is a matter of dollars and cents, a sort of question, as to how they shall deal with brutes, that between us and the negro here there is not sort of question, but that at the South the question is between the negro and the crocodile. That is all. It is a mere matter of policy; there is a perfect right according to interest to do just as you please—what he is done, where this doctrine prevails, the masters and owners will have formed public opinion for the slave-trade. They will be ready for Jeff Davis and Others of that party, to sound the bugle for the revival of the slave-trade, for the second Dred Scott decision, for the flood of slavery to be poured over the free States, while we shall be here tied down and helpless and run over like sheep.

It's to be a pest and parcel of this same idea, to say to men who want to adhere to the Democratic party, who have always belonged to that party, and are only looking for some excuse to stick to it, but nevertheless hate slavery, that Douglas's popular sovereignty is as good a way as any to oppose slavery. They allow themselves to be persuaded easily in accordance with their previous dispositions, into this belief that it is as good as a way of opposing slavery as any, and we can do that without sacrificing our old party ties or breaking up old political associations, we can do so without being called negro worshipers. We can do that without being subject to the slams and sneers that are so readily thrown out in place of argument with us. Let us stick to this popular sovereignty—this insidious popular sovereignty. Now let me call upon your attention to one thing that has really happened, which shows this gradual and steady debuching of public opinion, the cause of preparation for the revival of the slave-trade, for the territorial slave code! So far as the Dred Scott decision is to carry slavery into the free States. Did you ever, five years before, hear of any body in the world saying that the negro had no share in the Declaration of National Independence; that it did not
mean negroes at all; and when "all men" were spoken of negroes were not included.

I am satisfied that five years ago that proposition was not put upon paper by any
living being anywhere. I have been unable at any time to find a man in any audience
who would declare that he had ever known of any body saying so five years
ago. But last year there was a Douglas popular sovereign in Illinois who did not
say it. Is there one in Ohio but declares his firm belief that the Declaration of
Independence did not mean negroes at all? I do not know how this is; I have not
been here long enough; but I presume you are very much alike everywhere. Then I
suppose that all who express the belief that the Declaration of Independence
never did mean negroes. I call upon one of them to say that he said it five
years ago.

If you think that now, and did not think it then, the next thing that strikes me is to
remark that there has been a change wrought in you, and a very significant change
it is; being no less than changing the negro in your estimation, from the rank of a
man to that of a brute. They are taking him down, and placing him, when spoken
of, among reptiles and crocodiles, as Judge Douglas himself expresses it.

Is not this change wrought in your minds a very important change? Public
opinion in this country is every thing. In a nation like ours this popular
sovereignty and popular sovereignty have already wrought a change in the public
mind to the extent I have stated. There is no man in this crowd who can contro
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Now, if you are opposed to slavery honestly, as much as any body, I ask you to
note that fact, and the like of which is to follow, to be plastered on, layered upon layer,
until very soon you are prepared to deal with the negro everywhere as you do the brute.
If public sentiment has not been debased already to this point, a new turn of the
screw in that direction is all that is wanting; and this is economically done by
the teachers of this insidious popular sovereignty. You need but one or two
weeks further until your minds, now reeling under those teachings, will be ready for all
these things, and you will receive and support, or submit to, the slave-trade, revived
with all its horrors, a slave code enforced in our Territories, and a new Dred Scott
decision to bring slavery up into the very heart of the free North. This, I must
say, is but carrying out those words prophetically spoken by Mr. Clay many, many years
ago. I believe more than thirty years, when he told an audience that if they
would repress all tendencies to liberty and ultimate emancipation, they must go back to
the era of our independence and muzzle the cannon which thundered its annual joys
return on the Fourth of July; they must blow out the moral lights around us; they
must penetrate the human soul and eradicate the love of liberty; but until they did
those things, and others eloquently enumerated by him, they could not repress all
tendencies to ultimate emancipation.

I ask attention to the fact that in a pre-eminent degree those popular sovereigns
are at this work; blowing out the moral lights around us; teaching that the
negro is no longer a man but a brute; that the Declaration has nothing to do
with him; that he ranks with the crocodile and the reptile; that man, with body
and soul, is a matter of dollars and cents. I suggest to this present period of the
Republican, or Democrat, if there be any present, the serious consideration of this
fact, that there is now going on among you a steady process of debauching public
opinion on this subject. With this, my friends, I bid you adieu.

SPEECH OF HON. ABRAHAM LINCOLN,
At Cincinnati, Ohio, September, 1859.

MY FELLOW-CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF OHIO: This is the first time in my
life that I have appeared before an audience in so great a city as this. I therefore
—though I am no longer a young man—make this appearance under some degree
of embarrassment. But, I have found that when one is embarrassed, usually the
shortest way to get through with it is to quit talking or thinking about it, and go at
something else.

I understand that you have had recently with you my very distinguished friend,
Judge Douglas, of Illinois, and I understand, without having had an opportunity
(not greatly sought to be sure) of seeing a report of the speech that he made here,
that he did me the honor to mention my humble name. I suppose that he did so for
the purpose of making some objection to some sentiment at some time expressed by
me. I should expect, it is true, that Judge Douglas had reminded you, or informed
you, if you had never before heard of it, that I had once in my life declared it as my
opinion that this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free;
that a house divided against itself cannot stand; and, as I had expressed it, I did not
expect the house to fall; that I did not expect the Union to be dissolved; but
that I did expect that it would cease to be divided; that it would become all one
thing or all the other; that either the opposition of slavery would arrest the further
spread of it, and place it where the public mind would rest in the belief that it was
in the course of ultimate extinction; or the friend of slavery would push it forward
until it becomes alike lawful in all the States, old or new, free or slave. I did, fifteen months ago, express that opinion, and upon many occasions Judge Douglas
has denounced it, and has greatly, intentionally or unintentionally, misrepresented
my purpose in the expression of that opinion.

I presume, without having seen a report of his speech, that he did so here. I
presume that he alluded also to that opinion in different languages, having been expressed in a subsequent time by Governor Seward of New York, and that he took
the two in a lump and denounced them; that he tried to point out that there was
something concealed in this opinion which led to the making of an entire uniformity
of the local institutions of the various States of the Union, in utter disregard of the
different States, which in their nature would seem to require a variety of institutions.
and a variety of laws, according to the differences in the nature of the different States.
Not only so: I presume he insisted that this was a declaration of war between the
free and slave States—that it was the sounding to the onset of continual war between the
different States, the slave and free States.

This charge in his frame, was made by Judge Douglas, on, I believe, the 9th of
July, 1858, in Chicago, in my hearing. On the next evening, I made some reply to it.
I informed him that many of the inferences he drew from that expression of
mine were altogether foreign to any purpose entertained by me, and in so far as he
should ascribe these inferences to me, as my purpose, he was entirely mistaken, and
so far as he might argue that whatever might be my purpose, actions, conforming
to my views, would lead to these results, he might argue and establish it if he could;
but to say my purposes were misconstrued, he was totally mistaken as to me.

When I made that reply to him—when I told him, on the question of declaring
war between the different States of the Union, that I had not said that I did not
expect any peace upon that question until slavery was exterminated; that I had only
said I expected peace when that institution was put where the public mind should
rest in the belief that it was in course of ultimate extinction; that I believed from the organization of our Government, until a very recent period of time, the institution had been placed and continued upon such a basis; that we had had comparative peace—peace through a portion of that period—peace in the sense that a public mind rested in that belief in regard to it, and that when we returned to that position in relation to that matter, I supposed we should again have peace as we previously had. I assured him, as I now assure you, that I neither then had, nor have, or ever had, any purpose in any way of interfering with the institution of slavery, where it exists. I have no power, under the Constitution of the United States, or under the form of Government under which we live, to interfere with the institution of slavery, or any other institution of the institutions of the States, free or slave States. I declared them, and I now redeclare, that I have as little inclination to interfere with the institution of slavery where it now exists, through the instrumentality of the General Government, or any other instrumentality, as I believe we have no power to do so. I accidentally used this expression. I had no purpose of entering into the slave States to disturb the institution of slavery! So, upon the first occasion that Judge Douglas got an opportunity to reply to me, he passed by the whole body of what I had said upon that subject, and seized upon the particular expressions of mine, that I had no purpose of entering into the slave States to disturb the institution of slavery. "Oh, no," said he; "he (Lincoln) won't enter into the slave States to disturb the institution of slavery; he is too prudent a man to do such a thing as that; he only means that he will go on to the line between the free and slave States, and shoot over at them. This is all he means to do. He means to do them all the harm he can, to disturb them all he can, in such a way as to keep his own hold in perfect safety." Why do not all think, at that time, that that was either a very dignified or very logical argument; but so it was. I had to go along with it as well as I could. It has occurred to me here to-night, that if I ever do shoot over the line at the people on the other side of the line into a slave State, and purpose to do so, keeping my promise, I have now about the best chance I shall ever have, not to know that there are some Kentuckians about this audience; we are close to Kentucky; and whether he be so or not, we are on elevated ground, and by speaking distinctly, I should not wonder if some of the Kentuckians would hear me on the other side of the river. For that reason I propose to address a portion of what I have to say to the Kentuckians.

I say, then, in the first place, to the Kentuckians, that I am what they call, as I understand it, a "Black Republican." I think slavery is wrong, morally and politically. I desire that it should be no further spread in these United States, and I would not object if it should gradually terminate in the whole Union. While I say this for myself, I say to you Kentuckians, that I understand you differ radically with me upon this proposition that you believe slavery is a good thing; that slavery is right; that it ought to be extended and perpetuated in this Union. Now, there being this broad difference between us, I do not pretend in addressing myself to you Kentuckians, to attempt reconciling your views with mine. I do not enter into this controversy to try to show you that you are wrong, and I propose, for the next Presidency, at Charleston, my distinguished friend, Judge Douglas. In all that there is a difference between you and him, I understand he is sincerely for you, and more wisely for you, than you are for yourselves. I will try to demonstrate that proposition. Understand now, I say that I believe he is as sincerely for you, and more wisely for you, than you are for yourselves.

What do you want more than any thing else to make successful your views of slavery? I take it to be the overthrow of it, and to secure and perpetuate the maintenance of it? What do you want more than any thing else? What is indispensable to you? Why, if I may be allowed to answer the question, it is to retain a hold upon the North—it is to retain support and strength from the free States. If you can get this support and strength from the two States you can succeed. If you do not get this support and this strength from the free States, you are in the minority, and you are beaten at once.

If that proposition can be admitted—and it is undeniable—then the next thing I say to you is, that Douglas of all the men in this nation is the only man that affords you any hold upon the free States; that no other man can give you any strength in the free States. This being so, if you doubt the other branch of the proposition, whether he is for you—whether he is really for you, as I have expressed it, I propose asking your attention for a while to a few facts.

The time between you and me, understand, is, that I think slavery is wrong, and ought not to be extended; and you think it is right and ought to be extended and perpetuated. [A voice, "Oh, Look."] That is my Kentucky I am talking to now. I now proceed to try to show you that Douglas is as sincerely for you and more wisely for you than you are for yourselves.

In the first place, we know that in a Government like this, in a Government of the people, where the voice of all the men of that country, substantially, enters into the execution—or administration rather—of the Government—in such a Government, what lies at the bottom of all of it, is public opinion. I lay down the proposition, that Judge Douglas is not only the man that promises you in advance a hold upon the North, and support in the North, but that he constantly makes public opinion to your ends; and that in every possible way he can, he constantly makes the public opinion of the North to your ends; and if there are a few things in which he seems to be against you—a few things which he says that appear to be against you, and a few that he forbears to say which he would like to have you say—you ought to remember that the saying of the one, or the forbearing to say the other, would lose his hold upon the North, and, by consequences, would lose his capacity to serve you.

Upon this subject of making public opinion, I call your attention to the fact—that a well-established fact it is—that the Judge never says your institution of slavery is wrong. He never says it. He never says it. He is not a public man in the United States, I believe, with the exception of Senator Douglas, who has not, at some time in his life, declared his opinion whether the thing is right or wrong; but Senator Douglas never declares it is wrong. He leaves himself at perfect liberty to do all in your favor which he would be hindered from doing if he were to declare the thing to be wrong. On the contrary, he takes all the chances that he has for inveighing the sentiment of the North, opposed to slavery, into your support, by never saying it is right. This you ought to set down to his credit. You ought to give him all credit for this much little though it be, in comparison to the whole which he does for you.

Some other things I will ask your attention to. He said upon the floor of the United States Senate, and he has repeated it as I understand a great many times, that he does not care whether slavery is "voted up or voted down." This again shows you, or ought to show you, if you would reason upon it, that he does not believe it to be wrong, for a man may say, when he sees nothing wrong in a thing, that he does not care whether it is voted up or voted down; but to my own knowledge, I know that he cares not whether a thing goes up or goes down, which to him appears to be wrong. You therefore have a demonstration in this, that to Judge Douglas's mind your favorite institution which you would have spread out, and made perpetual, is no wrong.

Another thing he tells you, in a speech made at Memphis, in Tennessee, shortly after the canvass in Illinois, last year. He there distinctly told the people, that there was a "line drawn by the Almighty across this continent, on the one side of which there has always been cultivated by slaves," that he did not pretend to know exactly where that line was, but that there was such a line. I want to ask your attention to that proposition again; that there is one portion of this continent where the Almighty has declared the soil shall always be cultivated by slaves, and that it is being cultivated by slaves at that place is right; that it has the direct sympathy and author-
In Kentucky perhaps, in many of the slave States certainly, you are trying to establish the right of your negroes to the slave by reference to the Bible. You show that slavery existed in the Bible times by divine ordinance. Now, Douglas is when you do the same thing, for your own benefit, upon that subject. Douglas knows that whenever you establish that slavery was right by the Bible, it will occur that that slavery is the踊跃 of the soul and stamp of the Almighty. Whenever, in any means it escapes over here, it is wrong to say that the Constitution has and law, it is right for you about it.

So Douglas is moulding the public opinion of the North, first to say that the thing is right in your State over the Ohio River, and, hence to say that that which is right there is not wrong here, and that all laws and Constitutions here, recognizing it as being wrong, are themselves wrong, and ought to be repelled and abrogated. He will tell you, men of Ohio, that if you choose here to have laws against slavery, it is in conformity to the idea that your climate is not suited to it, that your climate is not suited to it, and therefore you have Constitutions and laws against it.

Let us attend to that argument for a little while and see if it be sound. You do not raise sugar-cane (except the new-fashioned sugar-one, and you won't raise that log), but they do raise it in Louisiana. You don't raise it in Ohio because you can't raise it profitably, because the climate doesn't suit it. They do raise it in Louisiana because there it is profitable. Now, Douglas will tell you that this is the slavery question. That they do have slaves there because they are profitable, and you don't have them here because they are not profitable. If that is so, then it leads to dealing with the one precisely as with the other. Is there any thing in the Constitution or laws of Ohio against raising sugar-cane? Have you found it necessary to put any such provision in your law? Surely not! No man desires to raise sugar-cane in Ohio; but, if any man did desire to do so, you would say it was a tyrannical law that forbids his doing so, and whenever you shall agree with Douglas, whenever your minds are brought to adopt his argument, as surely you will have reached the conclusion, that although slavery is not profitable in Ohio, if any man wants it, it is wrong to let him have it.

In this matter Judge Douglas is preparing the public mind for you of Kentucky, to make perpetual that good thing in your estimation, about which you and I differ. In this connection let me ask your attention to another thing. I believe it is safe to assert that five years ago, no living man had expressed the opinion that the negro had no share in the Declaration of Independence. Let me state that again: five years ago no living man had expressed the opinion that the negro had no share in the Declaration of Independence. If there is in this large audience any man who ever heard an opinion being put upon paper as much as five years ago, I will be obliged to him now or at a subsequent time to show it.

It if be true I wish you then to note the next fact; that within the space of five years Senator Douglas, in the argument of this question, has got his entire party, so far as I know, without exception, to join in saying that the negro has no share in the Declaration of Independence. If there be now in all these United States one Douglas man that does not say this, I have been unable upon any occasion to scare him up. That is the same as if you said this five years ago, and all five years ago, and all five years ago, and a man that you Kentuckians ought to note. That is a vast change in the Northern public sentiment upon that question.

Of what tendency is that change? The tendency of that change is to bring the public mind to the conclusion that when men are spoken of, the negro will mean; that when negroes are spoken of, brutes alone are contemplated. That change in public sentiment has already degraded the black man in the estimation of Douglas and his followers from the condition of a man of some sort, and assigned him to the status of a brute. Now, you Kentucky ought to give Douglas credit for this. That is the largest possible stride that can be made in regard to the perpetuation of your thing of slavery.

A vote — Speak to Ohio men, not to Kentuckians? —

Mr. Lincoln: I beg permission to speak as I please.
you question this, listen awhile, consider awhile, what I shall advance in support of that proposition.

He says that it is the sacred right of the man who goes into the Territories, to have slavery if he wants it. Grant that for argument's sake. Is it not the sacred right of the man who does not have there equally to buy slaves in Africa, if he wants them? Can you point out the difference? No man can point it out. Is that a greater title to the Constitution than the other? The same title is said in the Constitution in regard to the spread of slavery into the Territory. I grant that, but there was something very important said about it by the same generation of men in the adoption of the old Ordinance of '54, through the interest of which you live in Ohio. In neighbors in Indiana, in west Illinois, our neighbors in Michigan and Wisconsin are happy, prosperous, teeming millions of free men. That generation of men, though not to the full extent members of that Constitution that this generation were to some extent members of that Constitution, were at the same time in one body and the other, so that if there was any compromise on either of these subjects, the strong evidence is that that compromise was in favor of the restriction of slavery from the new Territories.

But Douglas says that he is unabashedly opposed to the repeal of those laws; because, in his view, it is a compromise of the Constitution. You Kentuckians, no doubt, are somewhat offended with that! You ought not to be! You ought to be patient! You ought to know that if he said less than that, he would lose the power of "rigging" the Northern States to your support. Really, what you would push him to do would take from him his entire power to serve you. And you ought to remember how long, by precedent, Judge Douglas holds himself obliged to stick by compromises. You ought to remember that by the time you yourselves think you are ready to inaugurate measures for the revival of the African slave-trade, that sufficient time will have arrived, for precedent, for Judge Douglas to break through that compromise. He says now nothing more strong than he said in 1849 when he declared, for the reason of the Missouri Compromise—that precisely for the quarter after he declared that compromise to be a sacred thing, which "no ruthless hand would ever dare to touch," he, himself, brought forward the measure, ruthlessly to destroy it. By a mere calculation of time it will only be four years more until he is ready to take back his profession about the sacredness of the Compromise abolishing the slave-trade. Precisely as soon as you are ready to have his services in that direction, by fair calculation, you may be sure of having them.

But you remember and set down to Judge Douglas's debt, or discreditt, that he, last year, said the people of Territories can, in spite of the Dred Scott decision, exclude your slaves from those Territories; that he declared by "unfriendly legislation," the extension of your property into the new Territories may be cut off in the teeth of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.

He assumed that position at Freeport on the 7th of August, 1856. He said that the people of the Territories can exclude slavery, in so many words. You ought, however, to bear in mind that he has never said it since. You may hunt in every section book he has ever made, and he has never used that expression once. He has never seemed to notice that he is stating his views differently from what he did then; but, by some sort of accident, he has always really stated it differently. He has always since then declared that, "The Constitution does not enable the Territories beyond the power of the people legally to control it, as other property." Now, there is a difference in the language used upon that former occasion and in this latter day. There may or may not be a difference in the meaning, but it is worth while considering whether there is not also a difference in meaning.

What is it to exclude? Why, it is to drive it out. It is in some way to put it out of the Territory. It is to force it across the line, or change its character, so that a new character is the result of existence. But what is the controlling interest there? Is it driving it away? Should I think not. I should think the controlling interest in other property would be just about what you in Kentucky should want. I understand the control-
being of property means the controlling of it for the benefit of the owner of it. While I have no doubt the Supreme Court of the United States would say "God speed" to any of the Territorial Legislatures that should thus control slave property, they would sing quite a different tune, if by the pretense of controlling it they were to create the same class laws which virtually excluded it, and that upon a very well known principle to all lawyers, that what a Legislature cannot directly do, it cannot do by indirection; that as the Legislature has not the power to drive slaves out, they have no power by indirection, by tax, or by imposing burdens in any way on that property, so ought it not to be allowed, and that any attempt to do so would be held by the Due Court unconstitutional.

Douglas is not willing to stand by his first proposition that they can exclude it, because he is more fearful that that proposition, or any which is based on the naked absurdity, that you may lawfully drive out that which has a lawful right to remain. He admitted at first that the slave might be lawfully taken into the Territory under the Constitution of the United States, and yet asserted that he might be lawfully driven out. That being the proposition, it is the absurdity he has stated. He is not willing to stand in the face of that direct, naked and impudent absurdity; he has, therefore, modified his language into that of being "construed as other property."

The Kentuckians don't like this in Douglas! I will tell you where it will go. He now swears by the court. He was once a leading man in Illinois to break down a court, because it had made a decision he did not like. But he now not only swears by the court, but swears to getting out for you, but he denounces all men who do not swear by the courts, as unpatriotic, as bad citizens. When one of these acts of unfeeling legislation shall impose such heavy burdens as to, in effect, destroy property in slaves in a Territory and show plainly enough that there can be no mistake, that the government of the Legislature, in other words, the Supreme Court will decide that law to be unconstitutional, and he will be ready to say for your benefit, "I swear by the court; I give it up." and while that is going on he has been getting all his men to swear by the courts, and to give it up with him.

In this again he serves you faithfully, and as I say, more wisely than you serve yourselves.

Again: I have alluded in the beginning of these remarks to the fact, that Judge Douglas has made great complaint of my having expressed the opinion that this Government "cannot endure permanently half slave and half free." He has complained of Seward for using different language, and declaring that there is an "irrepressible conflict" between the principles of free and slave labor. [A voice.—"He says it is not original with Seward. That is original with Lincoln." I will attend to that immediately, sir. Since that time, Hickman of Pennsylvania expressed the same sentiment. He has never denounced Mr. Hickman: why? There is a little chance, notwithstanding that opinion in the mouth of Hickman, that he may yet be a Douglas man, but the concept of the difference! It is not unpatriotic to hold that opinion, if a man is a Douglas man.

But neither I nor Seward, nor Hickman, is entitled to the enviable or unequivocal distinction of having first expressed that idea. That same idea was expressed by Judge Commer of Virginia, in 1864; quite two years before it was expressed by the first of us. And while Douglas was blaming himself, that in his conflict with his humble self, last year, he had "squashed" that idea here, as he delighted to call it, and had suggested that if he only had a chance he would to New York, and make Seward, or some other to hold that opinion, then he, as before, has never occurred to him to breather a word against Pryor. I don't think that you can discover that Douglas ever talked of going to Virginia to "squash" that idea there. No. More than that. He never did. He never talked of any such "squash." He was editor of the New York Times paper, after making use of that expression, which, in us, is so unpatriotic and heretical. From all this, my Kentucky friends may see that this opinion is heretical in his view only when it is expressed by men suspected of a desire that the country shall all become free, and not when expressed by those fairly known to entertain the desire that the whole country shall become slave. When expressed by that class of men, it is in course offensive to him. In this again, my friends of Kentucky, you have Judge Douglas with you.

There is another reason why you Southern people ought to nominate Douglas at your Convention at Charleston. That reason is the wonderful capacity of the man; the power he has of doing what would seem to be impossible. Let me call your attention to one of these apparently impossible things. Douglas is a twelve or thirteen very distinguished men of the most extreme anti-slavery views of any men in the Republican party, expressing their desire for his re-election to the Senate last year. That would, of itself, have seemed to be a little wonderful, but that wonder is heightened when we see that Wise of Virginia, a man exactly opposed to them; a man who believes in the Divine right of slavery, was also expressing his desire that Douglas should be re-elected; that another man that may be said to be kindred to Wise, Mr. Breckenridge, the Vice President, and of your own State, was also agreeing with the anti-slavery men in the North, that Douglas ought to be re-elected. Still, to heighten the wonder, a Senator from Kentucky, who I have always loved with an affection as tender and enduring as I have ever loved any man; who was opposed to the anti-slavery men for reasons which seemed sufficient to him, and equally opposed to Wise and Breckenridge, was writing letters into Illinois to secure the re-election of Douglas. Now that all these conflicting elements should be brought, while at大叔's points, with one another, to support him, is a fact that is worthy of you to note and consider. It is quite probable that each of these classes of men thought that the re-election of Douglas, their peculiar views would gain something; it is probable that the anti-slavery men thought their views would gain something; that Wise and Breckenridge thought so too, as regards their opinions that slavery would gain something, although it was opposed to both these other men. It is probable that each and all of them thought that they were using Douglas, and it is yet an unsolved problem whether he was not using them all. If he was, then it is for you to consider whether that power to perform wonders is one for you lightly to throw away.

There is one other thing that I will say to you in this relation. It is but my opinion, I give it to you without a fee. It is my opinion that he is for you to take him or to defeat him; and that if you do take him you may be beaten. You will surely be beaten if you do not take him. We, the Republicans and others forming the opposition of the country, intend to "stand by our guns," to be patient and firm, and in the long run to beat you whether you take him or not. We know that before we fairly beat you, we have to be beaten you too. We know that you are a "call of a feather," and that you have to beat you altogether, and we expect to do it. We don't intend to be very impatient about it. We mean to be as deliberate and calm about it as it is possible to be, but as firm and resolved as it is possible for men to be. When we do as we say, beat you, you perhaps want to know what we will do with you.

I will tell you, so far as I am authorized to speak for the opposition, what we mean to do with you. We mean to treat you, as I said last year, as we do those who are in the South at Washington, Jefferson and Madison treated you. We mean to leave you alone, and in no way to interfere with your institution; to abide by and carry out the compromise of the Constitution, and, in a word, coming back to the original proposition, to treat you as we do the rest of the people. If we have been mistaken (if we have been deceived) may be excused, and the examples of these noble fathers—Washington, Jefferson and Madison. We mean to remember that you are as good as we; that there is no difference between us other than the difference of circumstances. We mean to treat you as the fathers of Virginia, of Kentucky, of North Carolina, of Tennessee, of South Carolina, of Georgia, of Alabama, of Mississippi, of Louisiana, of Arkansas, and of Texas, were treated by them.
have a chance—the white ones I mean, and I have the honor to inform you that I once did have a chance in that way. I have told you what we mean to do. I want to know, now, when that thing takes place, what do you mean to do. I often hear it indicated that you mean to divide the Union whenever a Republican or any thing like it is elected President of the United States. [A voice—"That is so."] "That is so," one of them says; I wonder if he is a Kentuckian? [A voice—"He is a Douglas man."] Well, then, I want to know what you are going to do with your half of it? Are you going to keep it through, and push your half off a piece? Or are you going to keep it right alongside of us outrageous fellows? Or are you going to build a wall some way between your country and ours, which that movable property of yours can't come over here any more, to the danger of your being hit? Do you think you can bet-theres on that subject, by leaving us here under no obligation whatever to return those speciments of your movable property that come hither? You have divided the Union because we would not do right with you, as you think, upon that subject; when we came to be under obligation to do anything for you, how much better off do you think you will be? Will you make war upon us and kill us all? Why, gentlemen, I think you are as gallant and brave men as live; that you can fight as bravely in a good cause, man for man, as any other people living; that you have shown yourselves capable of this upon various occasions; but man for man, you are not better than we are; and there are not so many of you as there are of us. You will never make much of a hand at whipping us. If we were fewer in numbers than you, I think that you could whip us; if we were equal it would likely be a drawn battle; but being inferior in numbers, you will make nothing by attempting to master us.

But perhaps I have addressed myself as long or longer, to the Kentuckians than I have to the Illinoisans; as I have said that whatever course you take we intend in the end to meet you. I propose to address a few remarks to our friends, by way of discussion with them the best means of keeping that promise, that I have in good faith made.

In 1845, I believe, it was you who made your first Convention, with the clause prohibiting slavery, and you did it I suppose very nearly unanimously; but you should bear in mind that you—speaking of you as one people—that you did so unimpressively by the act presence of the institution amongst you: that you made it in a Free State; not by such a provision as had been made upon you before—under which if they had been here, and you had sought to make a Free State, you would not know what to do with. If they had been among you, embarrassing difficulties, most probably, would have induced you to tolerate a slave Constitution instead of a free one; and in that model, these very difficulties have constrained every people on this continent who have adopted slavery.

Pray what was it that made you free? What kept you free? Did you not find yourselves in a situation when you came to decide that Ohio should be a Free State? It is important to inquire by what reason you found it so? Let us take the question between the States of Ohio and Kentucky. Kentucky is separated by this River Ohio, not a mile wide. A portion of Kentucky, by reason of the course of the Ohio, is further north than this portion of Ohio, in which we now stand. Kentucky is entirely covered with slavery—Ohio is entirely free from it. What made that difference? Was it climate? No! A portion of Kentucky was further north than this portion of Ohio. Was it soil? No! There is nothing in the soil of the one more favorable to slave life than the other. It was not climate or soil that decided the line to be entirely covered with slavery and the other side free of it. What was it? Study over it. Tell us, if you can, in all the range of conjecture, if there be any thing you can conceive of that mode that difference, other than that there was less hindrance, or keeping it out of Kentucky, while the Ordinance of 1803 kept it out of Ohio. If there is any other reason than this, I confess that it is wholly beyond my power to conceive of it. This, then, I offer to combat the idea that that ordinance has made any State free.

I don't stop at this illustration. I come to the State of Indiana; and what I have said as between Kentucky and Ohio, I repeat as between Indiana and Kentucky; it is equally applicable. One additional argument is applicable also to Indiana. In her Terititorial condition the more over petitioned Congress to abrogate the ordinance entirely, or at least so far as to suspend its operation for a time, in order that they should exercise the "Popular Sovereignty" of having slaves if they wanted them. The men then controlling Congress, the members of the Revolution, refused Indiana the privilege. And so we have the evidence that Indiana supposed she could have slaves, if it were not for that ordinance; that she sought Congress to put that barrier out of the way; that Congress refused to do so, and it all ended at last in Indiana being a Free State. Tell me not then that this Ordinance of '57 had nothing to do with making Indiana a free State, when we find some men chasing against and only restrained by that barrier.

Come down again to our State of Illinois. The great North-west Territory, included the territory of Illinois as it was, Michigan and Wisconsin, was acquired from the French by the British Government, in part at least, from the French. Before the establishment of our independence, it became a part of Virginia; enabling Virginia afterward to transfer it to the General Government. There were in that territory, at the admission to the Union, French settlements in what is now Illinois; and at the same time there were French settlements in what is now Missouri—in the tract of country that was not purchased till about 1803. In these French settlements negro slavery had existed for many years—perhaps more than a hundred, if not as much as two hundred years—at Kaskaskia, in Illinois, and at St. Charles, or Cape Girardeau, perhaps, in Missouri. The number of slaves was not very great, but there was about the same number in each place. They were there when we acquired the Territory. There was no effort made to break up the relation of master and slave; and even the Ordinance of 1787 was not so enforced as to destroy that slavery in Illinois; nor did the ordinance apply to Missouri at all.

What I want to ask your attention to, at this point, is that Illinois and Missouri came into the Union about the same time, Illinois in the latter part of 1818, and Missouri, after a struggle, in which I believe you who were here sometime in 1820. They had been filling up with the same American people about the same period of time; their progress enabling them to come into the Union about the same. At the end of that ten years, in which they had been so preparing for (it was about that period of time), the number of negroes in Illinois had increased five-fold; you had of negroes in Illinois; but you had of negroes in Missouri, beginning with very few, at the end of that ten years, there were about ten thousand. This being so, and it being remembered that Missouri and Illinois are, to a certain extent, in the same parallel of latitude—that the northern one third of Missouri and the southern one third of Illinois are, in the parallel of latitude—that climate would have the same effect upon one as upon the other, and that in the soil there is no material difference so far as bears upon the question of slavery being settled upon one or the other—there being more or less of the same kind of land, there must be a difference of climate to produce a difference in filling them, and yet you being brought to that with the same degree of latitude in their filling up, we are led again to inquire what was the cause of that difference.

It is most natural to say that in Missouri there was no law to keep that country from filling up with slaves, while in Illinois there was the Ordinance of '57. The
ordinance being there, slavery decreased during that ten years—the ordinance not being in the other, it increased from a few to ten thousand. Can any body doubts the result of the difference?

I think all these facts most abundantly prove that my friend, Judge Douglas's proposition, that the Ordinance of '87, or the national restriction of slavery, never had a tendency to make a Free State, is a fallacy—a proposition without the shadow or substance of any proof.

Douglas sometimes says that all the States (and it is part of this same proposition I have been discussing) that have become free, have become so upon his "great principle" that the State of Illinois itself has entered the Union as a slave State, and that the people of the "great principle" have since made it a Free State. Allow me but a little while to state to you what facts there are to justify him in saying that Illinois came into the Union as a Slave State.

I have mentioned to you that there were few old French slaves there. They numbered, I think, one or two hundred. Besides that, there had been a Territorial law for indenturing black persons. Under that law, in violation of the Ordinance of '87, but without any enforcement of the ordinance to overawe the system, there had been a small number of slaves introduced as indentured persons. Owing to this the clause for the prohibition of slavery was slightly modified. Instead of running like yours, that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except for crime, of which the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in the State, they said that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude should thereafter be introduced, and that the children of indentured servants should be free; and nothing was said about the few old French slaves. Out of this fact, the clause for prohibiting slavery was modified because of the actual presence of it, Douglas asserts again and again that the other States were no more free than Illinois was; and it is a conclusion that he draws, it is for intelligent and impartial men to decide. I leave it with you with these remarks, worthy of being remembered, that that little thing, those few old French slaves being there, was of itself sufficient to modify a Constitution made by a people distinctly desiring to have a free Constitution; showing the power of the actual presence of the institution of slavery to prevent any people, however anxious to make a Free State, from making it perfectly so.

I am in some doubt whether I introduced another topic upon which I could talk awhile. [Cries of "Go on!" and "Give us it."] It is this then: Douglas's Popular Sovereignty, as a principle, is simply this: If one man chooses to make a slave of another man, neither that man any body else has a right to object to it. Apply it to Government, as he seeks to apply it, and it is this: if in a new Territory, into which a few people are beginning to enter for the purpose of making their homes, they choose to either exclude slavery from their limits, or to establish it there, however one or the other may affect the persons to be admitted, or the infinitely greater number of persons who are afterward to inhabit that Territory, or the other members of the family of communities, of which they are but an incident member, or the general head of the family of States as parent of all—however their action may affect one or the other of these, there is no power or right to interfere with it. That is the true and popular Sovereignty applied. Now I think that there is a real Popular Sovereignty in the world. I think a definition of Popular Sovereignty, in the abstract, would be about this—that all the people should do precisely as they please with himself, and with all those things which exclusively concern him. Applied to government, this principle becomes, that a general government shall do all those things which concern it, and all the local governments shall do precisely as they please in respect to those matters which exclusively concern them.

Douglas looks upon slavery as so insignificant that the people must decide that question for themselves, and yet they are not fit to decide who shall be their Governor, Judge or Secretary, or who shall be any of their officers. These are vast national matters, in his estimation, but the little matter in his estimation is that of plantation slavery there. That is purely of local interest, which nobody should be allowed to say a word about.

Labor is the great source from which nearly all, if not all, human comforts and necessities are drawn. There is a difference of opinion about the elements of labor in society. Some men assume that there is a necessary connection between capital and labor, and that capital draws within it the whole of the labor of the community. They assume that nobody works unless capital excites them to work. They begin next to consider what is the best way. They say there are but two ways: one is to hire men and to allure them to labor by their consent; the other is to buy the men and drive them to it, and that is slavery. Having assumed that, they proceed to discuss the question of whether the laborers themselves think it better to be driven into the condition of slaves or of hired laborers, and they usually decide that they are better off in the condition of slaves.

In the first place, I say that the whole thing is a mistake. That there is a certain relation between capital and labor, I admit. That it does exist, and rightfully exists, I think is true. That men who are industrious, and sober, and honest in the pursuit of their own interests should after a while accumulate capital, and after that should be allowed to enjoy it in peace, and also if they should choose, when they have accumulated it, to use it to buy themselves from actual labor and hire other people to labor for them, is right. In doing so they do not wrong the man they employ, for they find men who have not of their own land to work upon, or scope to work in, and who are benefited by working for others, hired laborers, receiving their capital for it. Thus a few men that own capital, hire a few others, and these establish the relation of capital and labor rightfully. A relation of which I make no complaint. But I insist that that relation after all does not embrace more than one-eighth of the labor of the country.

The speaker proceeded to argue that the hired laborer, with his ability to become an employer, must have more pecuniary power over him who labors under the inducement of force. He concluded.

Incidentally putting himself in the name of some of you to say, that we expect upon these principles to ultimately get them. In order to do so, I think we want and must have a national policy in regard to the institution of slavery, that acknowledges and deals with that institution as being wrong. Whoever desires the prevention of the spread of slavery and the nationalization of that institution, yields all, when he yields to any policy that either recognizes slavery as being right, or as being an indifferent thing. Nothing will make you successful but setting up a policy which shall treat the thing as being wrong. When I say this, I do not mean to say that this General Government is charged with the duty of restricting or preventing all the wrongs in the world; but I do think that it is charged with preventing and redressing all wrongs which are wrong to itself. This Government is expressly charged with the duty of providing for the general welfare. We believe that the spreading out and perpetuity of the institution of slavery impairs the general welfare. We believe—we say, we know, that that is the only thing that has ever threatened the perpetuity of the Union itself. The only thing which has ever menaced the existence of the Union is the existence of slavery. In this very thing, we think, is providing for the general welfare. Our friends in Kentucky differ from us. We need not make our argument for them, but we who think it is wrong in all its relations, or in some of them at least, must decide as to our own actions, and our course of action is, in our own judgment.

I say that we must not interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists, because the Constitution forbids it, and the general welfare does not require us to do so. We must not withhold an efficient Fugitive Slave Law from them.

This situation requires us to understand it, not to withhold such a law. But we must prevent the spreading of the institution, because neither the Constitution nor general welfare requires us to extend it. We must prevent the revival of the African slave-trade, and the enticing by Congress of a Territorial slave code. We must pre-
vent each of these things being done by either congress or courts. The people of these
United States are the rightful masters of both congress and courts, not to over-
throw the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert the Constitution.
To do these things we must employ Instrumentalities. We must hold conventions;
we must adopt platforms, if we conform to ordinary custom; we must nominate can-
didates, and we must carry elections. In all these things, I think that we ought to
keep in view our real purpose, and in none do anything that stands adverse to our
purpose. If we shall adopt a platform that fails to recognize or express our purpose,
or elect a man that declares himself intent to our purpose, we not only take wounding
by our success, but we fail to admit that we act upon no other principle than a de-
sire to have "the laurels and dishes," by which, in the end, our apparent success is really
an injury to us.
I know that this is very desirable to me, as with every body else, that all the
elements of the Opposition shall unite in the next Presidential election and in all fu-
ture time. I am anxious that that should be, but there are serious things seriously to be
considered in relation to that matter. If the terms can be arranged, I am in favor
of the Union. But suppose we shall take up some man and put him upon one side
or the other of the ticket, who declares himself against us in regard to the prevention
of the spread of slavery—who turns up his nose and says he is tired of hearing any
thing more about it, who is more against us than against the enemy, what will be
the issue? Why, he will get no slave States after all—he has tried that already un-
til being beat is the rule for him. If we nominate him upon that ground, he will
not carry a slave State, and not only so but that portion of our men who are high-
strung upon the principle we really fight for, will not go for him, and he will not get
a single electoral vote anywhere, except, perhaps, in the State of Maryland. There
is no use in saying to us that we are stubborn and obstinate, because we won't do
some such thing as this. We cannot do it. We cannot get our men to vote it. I
speak by the card, that we cannot give the State of Illinois in such a case by fifty thou-
sand. We would be wiser down than the "Negro Democracy" themselves have
the heart to wish to see us.
After saying this much, let me say a little on the other side. There are plenty of
men in the slave States that are altogether good enough for me to be either President
or Vice-President, provided they will profess their sympathy with our purpose, and
will place themselves on the ground that our men, upon principle, can vote for them.
There are scores of them, good men in their character for intelligence and talent and
integrity. If such a one will place himself upon the right ground, I am for his oc-
cupying one place upon the next Republican or Opposition ticket. I will heartily
go for him. But, unless he does so place himself, I think it a matter of perfect non-
sense to attempt to bring about a union upon any other basis; that if a union be
made, the elements will scatter so that there can be no such success for such ticket, not
any thing like success. The good old maxims of the Bible are applicable, and truly
applicable to human affairs, and, in this, as in other things, we may say here that he
who is not for us is against us; he who gathers not with us shall scatter. I should
be glad to have some of the many good, and able, and noble men of the South to
place themselves where we can confer upon them the high honor of an election upon
one or the other of our tickets. It would do our soul good to do that thing. It
would enable us to teach them that, inasmuch as we select one of their own number
to carry out our principles, we are free from the charge that we mean more than we
say.
But, my friends, I have detained you much longer than I expected to do. I believe
I may do myself the compliment to say that you have stayed and heard me with
great patience, for which I return you my most sincere thanks.