“Our democracy’s founding ideals were false when they were written. Black Americans have fought to make them true.”

So goes the title of the New York Times Magazine’s lead essay for the 1619 Project, an audacious, ambitious, and in many respects, very much necessary effort by a group of academics and historians to “reframe the country’s history by placing the consequences of slavery and the contributions of black Americans at the very center of our national narrative.”¹ The project was largely met with praise, especially from secondary school teachers; a full essay from the 1619 Project focuses on the untold stories of slavery left out of history courses, and the New York Times even developed a comprehensive curriculum based on the 1619 Project as a guide for high school teachers when discussing slavery. The project has also not been without criticism from both sides of the political spectrum; some school districts, such as in Buffalo, New York City, and Washington, D.C., have moved to adopt the curriculum, while others have argued that the project inaccurately reflects the U.S.’s history² — with Senator Tom Cotton even introducing a bill to cut off federal funding for schools that use the Times’s curriculum.³ At the core of the debate is the question of how slavery reflects on our country’s founding ideals, and in particular, how these ideals are taught in schools to our nation’s youth.

What unites both supporters and critics of the 1619 Project, though, is the fundamental assumption that the United States was indeed founded upon a legacy based on the principles laid out in the Declaration of Independence: “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by

¹ Nikole Hannah-Jones, “Our democracy’s founding ideals were false when they were written. Black Americans have fought to make them true.” New York Times Magazine, August 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/black-history-american-democracy.html
² Robby Soave, “Public Schools are Teaching The 1619 Project In Class, Despite Concerns From Historians” Reason, January 28, 2020, https://reason.com/2020/01/28/1619-project-new-york-times-public-schools/
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”

Through the American education system, through garish Fourth of July displays of patriotic pageantry, and through countless books written on the American Revolution, the supposedly glorious ideals fought for during the Revolution have been perpetuated throughout the American psyche, in a stunning display of cross-generational cultural osmosis. But, the assumption based on the inherently egalitarian nature of the United States and its government is profoundly incorrect. 1788, not 1776, is where we should look to give American youth an accurate portrait of the American founding narrative. In this year the Federalist Papers — an elaborate advertising campaign for the new Constitution — were published in essay form, with Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay laying out the nuts and bolts of the new government, and in particular, the principles it was to be founded upon.

If the Declaration is thought of as a recruiting poster for the new nation and its ideals, the Constitution is a manual for the actual working of the government. While the Declaration did lay out a set of guiding principles for the new nation to be founded upon, it holds no binding legal power. The Constitution, however, does, and in the Constitution — and the contemporaneous Federalist Papers — the Framers make clear their intent to create a system of government that favors the landed elite over the rabble rousing masses. Whereas the Declaration was a document written to stir populist rancor toward Great Britain that lobbed *ad hominem* arguments against the King of England in order to frame the Revolution as a simplistic struggle between democracy and tyranny, the Constitution acts to curb the tide of the masses against the concrete wall of a republic. So, no, our country’s founding ideals weren’t false when they were written — because the Constitution assured they were never followed to begin with. In reading the Federalist Papers

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4 Thomas Jefferson, “The Declaration of Independence,” (1776), retrieved from [https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib000159/](https://www.loc.gov/item/mtjbib000159/)
— and in particular, James Madison’s Federalist No. 10 — the Framers make clear their intent to create a system of government that is insulated against any popular majority, instead creating a government promoting only incremental change. Black people in bondage were a tragic and callous casualty of this system of incremental change, assumed from the beginning to be three-fifths human and two-fifths property\(^5\) (and regardless of any fractional accounting, all as persons were subject to the Fugitive Slave Clause)\(^6\), and after Emancipation and the decline of Reconstruction, forced to contend with a maddeningly, but purposefully, slow path toward progress, with only elusive equal protection under the law.

Federalist No. 10 is typically read as James Madison’s defense of minority rights in the face of “the tyranny of the majority,” but upon closer inspection, it reveals something perhaps more unsavory about American government. Far from functioning as a forum to protect the interests of all, American government is explicitly structured to withstand rapid change and promote only incremental advances. While “the people” no doubt deserve some semblance of a voice in government (“the people” being landowning white men), even they cannot be trusted to run the government themselves. Contrary to seeing human nature as inherently good, Madison, Hamilton, and the other Framers had distinctly cynical views on how people function when ruling themselves; as Madison says in Federalist No. 51, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary.”\(^7\) Proof of this worldview can be observed in how Madison discusses balancing the interests of the masses with the running of an efficient government, and specifically, the role of faction in a republic. To Madison, a faction — a group “who are united

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\(^6\) U.S. Constitution, art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 3.

and accentuated by some common interest of passion” — acts as a poison to republican government, as factious divides act to either inhibit the government due to endless, petty squabbling (“Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention”); or, a faction composed of the majority of citizens acts to trample upon the liberty of the rest (“When a majority is included in a faction…[this] enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.”) 

For Madison, then, the highest goal of government was to ensure that the rights of all (landowning, white, male) citizens would remain intact even when the inevitability of powerful factions emerged, and his solution was two-fold; “refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens,” and to “extend the sphere,” or ensure that through “the greater variety of parties and interests…it [is] less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens.”

Modern and contemporary historians have typically read these lines as proof of the Framers’ beliefs in liberty, justice, and equality, and that American government has always been dedicated to protecting the freedoms of all citizens. However, what Madison lays out is, on principle, anti-democratic, in that it explicitly condemns the majority, and instead aims to distill the voice of “the people” through extended debate and an expanded electorate. As Robert Caro writes in Master of the Senate, “The Framers of the Constitution feared the people’s power because they [the Framers] were...members of what in America constituted an aristocracy,” and that

More specifically, they feared the people’s power because, possessing and esteeming property, they wanted the rights of property protected against those who did not possess it. In the notes he made for a speech in the Constitutional Convention, James Madison wrote of the “real or supposed difference of

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8 James Madison, Federalist No. 10, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter, (New York: New American Library, 1961), pg. 77-84. (See Appendix 1)
9 James Madison, Federalist No. 10, in The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter, (New York: New American Library, 1961), pg. 77-84. (See Appendix 1)
interests” between “the rich and poor” — “those who will labor under all the hardships of life, and secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings” — and of the fact that over the ages to come the latter would outnumber the former.\textsuperscript{10}

The sentiment that the poor majority would come to overpower the rights of a citizenry comprised of the landed minority is also present in Federalist No. 10, when Madison rails against “A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or any other wicked or improper project.”\textsuperscript{11} The Framers feared popular impulses, and the rapid change they could bring about; the Senate further anchored the government against the majority of the poor and propertyless, for as Robert Caro explains, “In creating a Senate for the new nation, its Founding Fathers had tried to create within the government an institution that would speak for the educated, the well-born, the well-to-do, that would protect the rights of property, that would not function as an embodiment of the people’s will but would rather stand — ‘firmly’ — as a great bulwark against that will,” (in reference to power held by wealthy Senators during the Gilded Age).\textsuperscript{12} The point is clear: far from being rooted in principles of full liberty for all, American government is explicitly anchored in a conservative worldview that protects the interests of the landed class above the underprivileged and impoverished.

For those who decry that the 1619 Project conveys a view of the Framers as specifically biased against the enslaved, then, that isn’t the complete picture. When considering enslaved persons directly — a group itself distinct from the poor masses the Framers wished to insulate themselves from — the mythic ideals perpetuated by the Declaration of Independence are nowhere to be found. Madison’s Federalist No. 54 carefully considers how each state’s representation in Congress should function when confronted with the “peculiar” circumstance


\textsuperscript{11} James Madison, \textit{Federalist No. 10}, in \textit{The Federalist Papers}, ed. Clinton Rossiter, (New York: New American Library, 1961), pg. 77-84. (See Appendix 1)

\textsuperscript{12} Robert Caro, \textit{Master of the Senate: The Years of Lyndon Johnson} (New York: Random House, 2003), 33.
that “[the enslaved are] below the level of free inhabitants; which regards the slave as being divested of two fifths of the man.” In other words, because enslaved people can be bought, sold, branded, and whipped like cattle, they lose two fifths of their humanity, and should thus be counted as only three fifths of a person. Furthermore, Madison’s straight tone toward the subject of treating other humans as chattel property tacitly implies his view that slavery would likely always be present in the United States, if only for the sake of keeping the union together. In his own words, “Could it be reasonably expected that the Southern States would concur in a system which considered their slaves in some degree as men when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in the same light when advantages were to be conferred?”

One could make the argument that even with his dehumanizing statements regarding enslaved people, Madison was truly opposed to slavery on principle, and merely saw it as necessary evil to ensure the establishment of the Union. Madison did express views condemning slavery later in his life, writing to the Marquis de Lafayette of “the dreadful fruitfulness of the original sin of the African trade,” and ultimately, the Constitution he helped write contained the power to amend the document, the tool used to eventually outlaw slavery with the Thirteenth Amendment. However, based on the principles laid out in Federalist No. 10, Madison was not simply biased against enslaved people on the basis of race. The Father of the Constitution held distinctly prejudicial views about class as well, and in this respect, both poor, uneducated whites and enslaved blacks were put at a disadvantage by the incrementalist system created by the Constitution, a system which acted to protect the interests of a landed aristocracy that Madison

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and the Framers viewed themselves as members of. Enslaved people were held in a uniquely disadvantaged position, held hostage both by their (nonexistent) socioeconomic status and the color of their skin; and because the U.S. government was established with the idea that any rapid action — such as granting the enslaved immediate equal protection under the law — was inherently risky, the path to progress for the emancipated would prove to be long indeed.

As far from the Declaration’s ideals that the Constitution and Federalist No. 10 may seem, including its flawed elevation of a wealthy minority, the Constitution was still far more dedicated to protecting individual liberties than any system of government which preceded it. The republican system of government it described was indeed revolutionary, and ultimately, the Framers gave later generations the tools to amend the Constitution and create the laws that would work to stamp out the “original sin” of slavery, regardless of whether this was their intent. Nonetheless, the mythos surrounding the Framers should be viewed critically — regardless of whether the 1619 Project or the Tom Cottons of the world promote life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as the country’s founding ideals. It is no accident that the vast majority of the American historical canon has focused on white men, since has also been written by white men; they have been at the top of our education system’s hierarchy, and their perspective has dominated our textbooks and curriculums for centuries by skewing and oversimplifying the nation’s founding, especially in terms of the harm done to enslaved people and their descendents.

Recognizing the myth of the “objectivity” of history is key; we all have a story to tell, and assumptions behind that story on how the world works and who deserves to be at the center of it. When we take the view that our stories are the unvarnished truth, though, the stories passed down from generation to generation are no longer stories: they become the lens through which we understand the world, however divorced they are from reality. In the United States, this has
taken the form of perpetrating the story of the nation’s founding as guided by principles of equality and justice, when in actuality, the country was founded on assumptions that discriminated against the underprivileged, and made it more difficult to enact change to better their situation — but the Framers made no secret of this. The Federalist Papers do not attempt to hide the prejudices of their writers; they merely provide elaborate justifications for them. The key to the debate surrounding the 1619 Project, then, lies in casting off the myths funneled through the biases of the men who’ve cherry-picked the facts comprising our history. Instead, if we look at the key sources from the time of the Founding, we realize the intent was always clear: to protect the landed from the destitute, and the few from the many. Once we eschew this fable, the manner in which the enslaved were treated as chattel property who maintained only three-fifths of their humanity becomes apparent; the Constitution’s framework defied bringing about a swift reversal to the institution’s place in the law, let alone wiping its perverse legacy away from the United State’s economic and social hierarchies. We have simply been fed a centuries-old narrative that blanketed over this thorny reality in favor of a comfortable fiction portraying the Framers as guardians of the populist ideals laid out in the Declaration’s lofty tracts on freedom and equality. Uncomfortable as this reality may be for some to accept, though, its truth points to the roots of our nation’s past — and allows us to better evaluate our ever-evolving future.
AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labor have been
erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn,
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the Union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations:

In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it
will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or
dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose
concurrence is necessary.

Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling
the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,—is enjoyed by the Union over the States
composing it. Does the advantage consist in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views
and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and schemes of injustice? It will not be
denied that the representation of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments.
Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one
party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the increased variety of
parties comprised within the Union, increase this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles
opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority?
Here, again, the extent of the Union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to
spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political
faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure
the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of
debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to
pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a
malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases
most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in
being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.
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U.S. Constitution, art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 3.