Wool, John E. (1784-1869) to Preston King, Erastus Corning, and Abram B. Olin

Head Qrs, Dept of Virginia,
Fort Monroe, 2d April 1862.
To the
Hon: Preston King.
Hon: Erastus Corning,
Hon: A. B. Olin
Gentlemen and Friends,
I give you many thanks for your friendly letter of the 29th ultimo just received, to which I send the following reply:
I was requested by the President not to permit technicalities nor geographical lines to interfere with the organization of an army in the Department I commanded by major general Mc.Clellan, but to what end or for what purpose was not communicated to me; at the same time I was requested to assist in its organization. To all which I readily assented, with the assurance that I would do all in my power to aid and assist major Gene Mc.Clellan in perfecting the organization of his Army. In accordance with that [2] assurance my whole staff have been, since the arrival of the troops called the army of the Potomac, engaged in getting them established in their various camps, and supplying them with whatever they required. We have now I believe some 15.000 men of the Army of the Potomac in and near the Hampton. I regret to say that all the troops are not as well supplied as they should have been. Their wants I have ordered to be supplied as far as we have the means. A large number of shoes have been called for as well as under clothing besides other articles. It has never entered my mind to know any obstacles in the way of organizing Major General Mc.Clellan's Army, or to withhold anything that would add to or perfect its efficiency. On the contrary I would do all in my power to make it in all things an efficient army and to push it forward before the enemy is prepared to stay its progress or its advance. It ought at this time to be in possession of Yorktown, if Richmond is its destination. Neglecting to take Yorktown will no doubt delay the advanced of the Army of the Potomac.
What more would you require of [3] me than what I have profferred, and what I have done and am doing? Do you imagine that I could or would do more if major general Mc.Clellan should be placed over me who is fifteen years my junior in rank. It would be imposing on me a degradation which I could not have anticipated and which no circumstance can justify. Can you believe for a moment that I could self degraded do as much as I would if it was left to my discretion. To place me under the command of Gen'l McClellan would show a want of confidence with which I am in no respect changeable. I am too loyal, too patriotic, and too anxious to put down this nefarious rebellion, to interfere with any measure or movement that would tend to accomplish that end. I have not asked nor intimated that I desired the command of the Army of the Potomac.
What have I done that I should be degraded, or that there should be any want of confidence, or apprehension that I would interfere with or defeat any plans confided to General Mc.Clellan, or any other officer, having for its [4] object the suppression of the rebellion. I do not belong to the Knights of the Golden Circle, nor do I sympathize with that band of traitors.
I was the first to sound the Tocsin of alarm and to arouse the free States to the dangers meditated by the rebels of the South to the dangers meditated by the rebels of the south. In my letter dated 6th December 1860, to the Hon: Lewis Cass, I urged him to induce the President to prevent a civil war, which, as I said, if it should take place would not fail to call forth all the baser passions of the human heart, followed by pestilence, famine and desolation. - Every word I wrote int hat letter has already been literally fulfilled. That letter was followed by several others to members of Congress, which when made public roused the people of the free states. I received hundreds of responses filled with the strongest sentiments of patriotism, with declarations that they were prepared to furnish any number of men, and any amount of money to save the Union.
Since that time I have not faltered in [5] my course a single moment to put down the rebellion which is subjecting the northern people to an expense of nearly two millions a day. If my advise had been followed I think we would not have had two hundred and thirty six thousand men encamped for months within rifle range of the rebels near Washington without doing anything worthy to be recorded in history. Again if the activity and energy displayed in New York in the last week of April 1861, when ten thousand men armed and quipped and with ammunition and provisions were sent to Washington - which as Leiut. Gen'l scott declared before the Union Defence Committee of New York, not only saved the Capital but the Union - had been followed up at Washington Richmond might have been taken, which would have saved us the disgraceful affair of Bull Run, and would have prevented the Capital from being an encamping ground for over two hundred and thirty thousand men eating out the substance of the northern people. In forwarding the men and saving the [6] Capital - and as General Scott said the Union - the Union Defence Committee did not hesitate to bestow upon me the most exalted praise. In the services thus performed I was ordered to my head Quarters at Troy to take care of my health which Gen'l Scott proclaimed he knew to be feeble, when at the same time I was never in better health.
It cannot be said I was the cause of losing Norfolk or Harper's Ferry. Nor was it in consequence of anything I did that we came nigh losing the Capital. It was the reliance of Lieut. Gen'l Scott on the honor of Virginia that lost us the two first named places and came near losing us the Capital, which I have the credit of saving.
Since I assumed the command of the Department of Virginia I have labored day and night to perfect my command for both defensive and offensive operations. If the command is not such as it should be for either offensive or defensive operations, it is no facet of mine. My efforts have been unceasing to place this most important command - second to no [7] other in the possession of the Federal Government in a defensive position and especially Fort Monroe. The latter is far from being supplied with the necessary means for its defence. Similar remarks are applicable to the troops outside of the Fort, and Newport's news, for the want of light batteries and horses. I have now two batteries but deficient in Artillerists and horses. I have a third battery but without horses, harness or ammunition. In November last I was anxious to take Norfolk before the "Merrimac" was iron clad and prepared to leave the dry-dock. It might easily have been done at that time. I only asked for twenty five thousand men who at that time could have taken either Richmond or Norfolk, but no response was made to my applications, and on several occasions an officer of my staff was sent to explain my plan of operations for taking both of those cities, but still I received no response.
In conclusion allow me to ask with the facts above presented and with an unfaltering determination to suppress [8] this nefarious rebellion am I to be distrusted lest I may do something to interfere with the Army or with the plans of Major General Mc.Clellan. - my junior in rank by fifteen years, and this too after I have again and again assured the Secretary of war that I would voluntarily do all in my power to aid and assist him to perfect his army? What have I done that the President should have less confidence in me than Major General Mc.Clellan? has he done more, or manifested more zeal in putting down this rebellion than myself. It is said by those who were acquainted with my efforts in the last days if April 1861, that I saved the capital, and as General Scott said the Union, although he excluded me from any credit of the achievement. Has Major General Mc.Clellan done now?
If I am to be continued in the command of fort Monroe I ought at least to have the privilege of saying what [9] troops I require to defend my position, especially as there are at and near Norfolk at least twenty thousand rebels and the number will probably be increased. In saying this much I do not intend to be understood that I would deprive General Mc.Clellan of any part of his command for the defence or protection of this Department. On the contrary my object is simply to be allowed the priviledge of saying and determining how much of my present force ought to be retained for its protection and defence.
I have the honor to be
Very truly yours,
John E Wool
Major General