Sherman, William Tecumseh (1820-1891) to Thomas Ewing

Head Qrs. Camp 2. Near
Mounting Tenn. May 3, 1862
Hon T. Ewing,
Lancaster Ohio

Dear Sir,
Yours of April 25 is received, and has of course been read with great Care. - I do not think I exposed myself at Shiloh more than was necessary from the shape of the ground and the nature of my men. I had under me no men of either practical or theoretical Knowledge of War, and had to give orders that usually devolve on Colonels, Captains and even Corporals. I had even to instruct Gunmen how to cut the fuses of their shells.. Therefore at times I had to be in range of Artillery that otherwise I would have avoided. I knew all the time the vast importance of time and despreate fighting for each inch of ground. The enemy having the Choice of Attack could at first have advantage, and they took it boldly & well, and had our men as boldly met them they would not have broken our Front Line. - That aim [inserted: however] they had to spread, and the [struck: a]equality of force at any point was approximated. - then I was [2] able to hold them in check. All we could do and as much as could be expected.
At first their Lines & Columns advanced steadily inspite of cannister & grape - but towards 2 PM, they approached our Lines with Caution, always sending skirmishrs in advance of their Lines of Battle of course I noticed this change of conduct and divined the Cause - Our shots were producing their natural Effect, fear. Had our men rallied then we could have taken the offensive but officers sent to the rear could not bring them up, and we had to hold on the best we could. However I suppose in your mind you have grouped the picture about as well as possible, and further Explanation is unnecessary.
The Experience of that day convinces me that Officers should wear their uniform - not Epaulettes & Chapeaus. - but the Windsor with Shoulder straps, Cap with Number & letter
In general appearance it does not differ much from the soldiers dress, and the story of picking off officers I discredit. The proportion of officers killed & wounded was not Excessive. I am not conscious that I was a special mark but twice, viz early Sunday when I rode in advance of my left the weakest point, when my orderly was killed [3] That shot was meant for me. as also the volley, but I doubt if they knew who I was except an officer could have judged to be a General officer from my position with a staff following. - Again about 2 PM same day when my horse was killed dead. I was there when grape Cannister & shells were flying thick & fast, with bullets from several regiments converging on a spot where the men were down on the ground & aiming true & well.
The Windsor Uniform should be worn that we may recognize Each other with Rank & Corps without questioning - we are strangers to each other, till the melée brings us in Contact. General Halleck will review from you any suggestion with marked respect, but in this I think he will coincide with me that Experience demonstrates the necessity of an Officers uniform differing in some respects with that of enlisted men. Genl officers also must be mounted of necessity to rapidly move from point to point, and they must be attended by staff officers to convey loyalty & officially their orders. Also a change of uniform is a matter of time. Our wardrobes at best are not heavily stocked & I have been trying without success even to get a pair of shoes from St Louis.
As to Grand Strategy, I am fully satisfied that Halleck is as competent a theorist as [4] we have - Naturally of good strong mind - a head as strongly marked as Websters, and I have known him since 1836, a hard student
In our voyage round Cape Horn many a time when others were struggling to kill time, he was using it in hard study. When the Sea was high, & ship rolling, the sky darkened so that daylight did not reach his State room he stood on a stool, his book & candle on the upper berth. and a [boot] strap round his middle secured to the frame to support him in the wild tossing of the ship. - In such a man the country must have confidence. I am willing to repose in his strategy all Confidence, and I think the other Generals, not Politicians will do the same. This confidence will serve that concert of action which can alone supply the want of discipline enforced in Europe. If Halleck cannot handle 100000 men in a campaign no one can. His [continuations] thus far have been good & successful. and I think they will so continue. He has labored under a serious difficulty. He has been compelled to use fresh lines as though they were real soldiers, and this is the Serious [5] mistake of the War. in not preparing men by drill & organization all last summer fall & winter. It may be the Government could not collect men & arms faster, but I think fear comprehended the vast task before us, and dont realize it now till it stares us in the face.
Hallecks first order was to destroy the Memphis & Charleston Road - I attempted it on first arrival at Savannah by landing at Yellow Creek, but the Rains of a second deluge drowned us out & made the country impassible - I attempted it a second time and got as far as Pea Ridge, but found the road so picketed that it was foolish to attempt a surprise the only mode laid out for me, but after the Battle, by means of a joint Expedition of Gun boats and transports I succeeded in destroying it at Bear Creek Bridge 2 ½ miles East of Inca. Mitchell about the same time reached Huntsville & got possession of the Road as far down as [Tusculria]. What he is doing I have no means of knowing. This army is composed of four distinct Corps of Armies - That of the Tennessee Genl Thomas, - composed of 5 Divisions (mine has 6000 men & may be a [6] standard of strength) -Army of the Ohio, Buell about the same - Army of the Mississippi Genl Pope, about the same - and the Reserve compound of McClernand & Wallace's Division. - Halleck is still back at Pittsburg Landing - I as the advance of Thomas' Right wing am in camp north of Lick Cr abreast of mounting. - Buell is at Lick Creek about 2 miles to the left rear, and Pope is on the Hamburg Road to the left rear. - some of our Division are in mounting, The Road was as deep & mud as stiff as you ever saw, but a few days of warm weather has made a marked change, and all the Division have large details improving the Road. - Building bridges & causeways - If other Divisions have worked as well as mine, Lick Creek must now have a dozen bridges, and the Side streams from three to four Each. An army of 100000 men with artillery & train need five or six parallel or converging Roads. - I have 11 Regiments and 5 Batteries of Artillery - Each Regt has 13 wagons. Each Battery two beside there are carriages. I think my Division on a Road single track occupies over two miles; do my best to close Ranks & teams. - we have in our wing 5 such Divisions so that at the [7] very best we can not get the rear started much before the head of column marches Camp. I have therefore in advance prepared two Roads but fear that one will be taken by some of the Rear Division. - Since commencing this I have received orders to march toward Corinth by my new Road at 7 am tomorrow, and ocupy a point 2 ½ miles from [Mosely], a 6 ½ from Corinth about 3 ½ miles from the Enemy's lines of Defense. This Line is composed doubtless of rifle ditches or trenches with bushes & trees cut as Abattis. Somewhat in the form of a Semicircle covering the intersection of the two Railroads. according to accounts they have several lines of such work. - This Road East is broken at Bear Creek about the State Line. The Road north is broken near Purdy. - with Memphis & the south they still have communication - Their force is estimated at from 100. to 130000 - but of course this is speculation. I dont think they had at Shiloh more than 60000 - of these at least 15000 are dead, wounded, prisoners or deserted. - Van Dorn & Price have joined with about 15.000, and their fresh lines may be some 30000 more. They Evidently have a large force. Desirters who were pressed into service at Memphis, natives in our Northern States. who have come into Camp represent their force at 100000, with trains still pouring in. Last night the trains were running all night [8] If New Orleans is taken, Beauregard & Bragg both of Louisiana will be desperate, and will fight like Devils. but I am satisfied the Tennesseeans are shaky. - but thus have mostly gone to Enable them to [demand] other Regiments in their place.
The trees are now in full leaf - oaks of various kind prevailing - with cotton wood, willow, Dogwood, & fern along the water [courses] - a good deal of undergrowth, - field few & scattered - people nearly all gone abandoning Every thing Same for cattle & hogs runing loose. - horses & mules all gone. The destruction of farms & outhouses follows in the wake of each army. To save or protect property appears a waste of patience & labor. - Corinth is in a hollow or rather [level] space, with a gentle Ridge North & South. - not a place of natural strength or importance only as the intersection of two Roads of great length, I prefer them to fight then to Humboldt. a Grand Junction. but you doubtless have as good a geographic idea of the place as I can give without topographical maps [struck: of] these we have to construct as we go, - Buell is our best soldier. Halleck the ablest man - Grant very brave but not brilliant Thomas slow. cool & methodic, I dont think much of Pope or McClernand - Excuse so long a letter but I know you will read it.

Yrs affectionately W.T. Sherman